Last night I heard a conversation on a train a few ahead of mine. A control point that was for a crossover was showing a track light (occupancy) after a previous train had traversed it. The dispatcher told this conductor to walk up through the CP and look to see if he could see a broken rail and that the switch points were locked. If everything looked good in the field, the dispatcher would talk them by the stop signal.
I told my conductor that was bad communication. You can't tell by just looking at a remote controlled power switch if the points are locked. The locking mechanism is internal, not a switch padlock on a switch stand. To be sure such a switch points were locked you would have to take it off power and manually line it. This was not instructed.
Then the dispatcher clarified that the switch was showing locked for their route, just to look for something out of the ordinary. The condr saw nothing and the train was flagged past the signal and through the crossover. The next train, needing to go straight, not crossover, was instructed to take the crossover in hand operation and line themselves through. After operating one of the switches, the track light went away. The dispatcher had that train's condr return everything to power to see if it would now work. Whatever had caused the track light was gone and everything was working normally. They still had a signal maintainer come out to try to find out what caused the proplem.
The initial conversation, before clarification, was ambivalent. The condr in the field could've interpretted the instructions to take the switch in hand operation. Had he done that, he would've been in trouble because that was not the intent of the instructions given.
Jeff
The article stated there were protocol violations by both the Bridge Operator and the Train Crew.
I only worked one drawbridge in my career - a rolling Bascule affair known as Bridge 460 in Cleveland. Since the 'normal' position of the bridge was raised for river traffic, when necessary to lower it for rail traffic, you operated one switch that lowered the bridge to about 5 feet from 'touchdown' where the machienry stopped the bridge. Then you operated another switch which completed lowering the bridge and applied the rail locks to the tracks on each end of the bridge, when these actions were successfully accomplished a indicator light turned on and then you opeated another switch to close the split rail derails and finally line a signal for the movement over the bridge.
I have no knowledge of the operation of the bridge in this particular incident. I am going to GUESS - a minimally trained Bridge Operator lined the bridge for the movement, without operating the derails and was then unable to line a signal for the train across the bridge. I suspect, the Bridge Operator then gave the train Verbal Permission to pass the Stop Signal that protects the bridge. The Train Crew moved on the basis of the Verbal Permission, however, they DID NOT note the position of the derail before they operate over it and derailed their train.
The Bridge Operator gave invalid verbal permission to pass the stop signal. The train crew did not observe and protect the train against the derail that was in the derailing position.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Another incident of loco hitting a bridge derail in Washington state again. This mirrors the Amtrak incident earlier.
Washington train knocked off tracks by safety device, 3K gallons of diesel fuel spilled | Fox News
Since derails are mostly remotely operated why are they not part of the bridge signaling interlocking? At least some kind of mechaniical warning device.
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