I just saw a story from the New York Post that an MTA engineer was charged in the death of a teenager. This happened at a grade crossing in Baltimore.
"Charging documents obtained by the station alleged that Smith caused Patterson’s death by operating the locomotive “in a grossly negligent manner.”
What could the engineer have done that would lead to these charges?
https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/other/maryland-train-engineer-charged-in-death-of-star-high-school-football-player/ar-AA16Myiq?cvid=c6e484c75fab4264b395f6969cd46392
rlukeI just saw a story from the New York Post that an MTA engineer was charged in the death of a teenager. This happened at a grade crossing in Baltimore. "Charging documents obtained by the station alleged that Smith caused Patterson’s death by operating the locomotive “in a grossly negligent manner.” What could the engineer have done that would lead to these charges? https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/other/maryland-train-engineer-charged-in-death-of-star-high-school-football-player/ar-AA16Myiq?cvid=c6e484c75fab4264b395f6969cd46392
This incident happened on Baltimore's Light Rail system that is operated by MDOT between BWI Airport South of downtown, through downtown and North to Hunt Valley. In the location of the incident Light Rail operates on the roadway that was operated by the Baltimore & Annapolis Railroad that ceased commuter operations in 1952.
The article states that the crossing protection was not observed to have been working.
I have no idea of MDOT's policies and procedures are for operation when crossing protection IS KNOWN to be inoperative. The unanswered question from the article is - did the Engineer know that the crossing protection was not operating, and if he did then did he take the appropriate operational actions under the circumstance.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Yeah, like most news articles nowadays it leaves more questions UN-answered than it answers.
EuclidDo those crossings have enough activation time to permit an engineer to observe upon approach, that the crossing protection is not working, and then react by stopping the train before it reaches the crossing?
Your basic crossing signal not only shows out the "front" of the signal, but also to the side. Older signals simply have a small window through which the bulb in the signal head shines. Newer LED signals have LEDs mounted on the sides for the same purpose.
Unless the signals themselves are obscured from the view of an oncoming train, the engineer should be able to see whether or not the lights are flashing on the signal.
Likewise, it's hard to miss the movement of the crossing arms - which have lights on them.
I rode the line years ago from Linthicum to the baseball field, but wasn't paying that kind of attention to details.
I'm guessing he wasn't paying attention...
Edit - Looking at Google Street View, it appears that trains approaching the crossing from either direction would have a clear view of the crossing equipment. In addition, there are searchlight signals on both tracks, facing away from the road. They may or may not be tied to the crossing circuit. Or they may just be part of a normal signal system.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 Euclid Do those crossings have enough activation time to permit an engineer to observe upon approach, that the crossing protection is not working, and then react by stopping the train before it reaches the crossing? Your basic crossing signal not only shows out the "front" of the signal, but also to the side. Older signals simply have a small window through which the bulb in the signal head shines. Newer LED signals have LEDs mounted on the sides for the same purpose. Unless the signals themselves are obscured from the view of an oncoming train, the engineer should be able to see whether or not the lights are flashing on the signal. Likewise, it's hard to miss the movement of the crossing arms - which have lights on them. I rode the line years ago from Linthicum to the baseball field, but wasn't paying that kind of attention to details. I'm guessing he wasn't paying attention...
Euclid Do those crossings have enough activation time to permit an engineer to observe upon approach, that the crossing protection is not working, and then react by stopping the train before it reaches the crossing?
Someone needs to find and post a link to the relevant section of MTA's actual operating rules.
On many railroads, there are rules about how to approach and negotiate an unguarded crossing. Most of these presume a 'second man', either to flag the crossing or to drive up and block it with lights flashing (we have video of the New York MTA doing this for moves on the South Brooklyn).
Most rules treat damaged or defective automatic crossing signals as 'unguarded'. At the very least this would involve a stop short of the crossing and then proceedwith 'safe lookout' or whatever. The little 'side windows' on the crossing equipment are an indication to watch if the gates and lights are not clearly visible at reasonable stopping distance.
In order for charges like this to be actually brought, there must be some other evidence, perhaps from onboard cameras. Until we see that, we should reserve further judgment.
test This a Light Rail incident.
More akin to a street car oprerating in a suburban area. I have no idea what is required for a person to go from Bus Driver to Light Rail Operator. I do know that Light Rail has had several incidents where movements have run over the end of track blocks at the BWI station in the past.
OvermodOn many railroads, there are rules about how to approach and negotiate an unguarded crossing. Most of these presume a 'second man', either to flag the crossing or to drive up and block it with lights flashing (we have video of the New York MTA doing this for moves on the South Brooklyn). Most rules treat damaged or defective automatic crossing signals as 'unguarded'. At the very least this would involve a stop short of the crossing and then proceedwith 'safe lookout' or whatever. The little 'side windows' on the crossing equipment are an indication to watch if the gates and lights are not clearly visible at reasonable stopping distance.
I have also seen white lamps on the wayside box as well.
Much easier to see at night!
Methinks you're reading way too much into this.
On older signals, the window allows light from the incandescent lamp inside the housing to be seen by approaching trains. That's exactly why it's there. On LED fixtures, there are LEDs serving the same purpose.
When you're coming up on a crossing equipped with lights and gates, you look for them. If you can see the gates, you watch for them. If they do not activate properly, there are rules on how to deal with it, including reporting the failure.
The crossing protection should be activating 15-20 seconds before the train enters the crossing.
Until the problem is declared resolved by the signal folks, you approach the crossing prepared to stop.
That's how it is on "real" railroads. There are rules that lay that all out. Balt asks about the rules for light rail, which is a good question. I tend to believe they are similar.
Light rail is probably not going to run at any sort of speed that would overrun the crossing protection.
I stand by my conclusion that the operator was not paying attention. If he was, he would have seen that the crossing protection was not functioning properly and reacted accordingly.
Larry, For the most part, I agree with you but having when I have been in a cab, I have seen the small flasher porthole lamps showing that the flashers are activated and then the arm lamps are visable and showing the arms are descending. Fortunately, I was never in an event where they did not function as required. But at track speed, do the rules require that the operator (engineer or operator) require them to put their train in emergency braking if they do not see them functioning properly. Its been a long time since I study the rules but I don't recall that.
On some transit systems, I note that they have signal (lunar) lamps or other signals that light or change aspect to indicate the crossing is protected and the operator can proceed.
Electroliner 1935Larry, For the most part, I agree with you but having when I have been in a cab, I have seen the small flasher porthole lamps showing that the flashers are activated and then the arm lamps are visable and showing the arms are descending. Fortunately, I was never in an event where they did not function as required. But at track speed, do the rules require that the operator (engineer or operator) require them to put their train in emergency braking if they do not see them functioning properly. Its been a long time since I study the rules but I don't recall that. On some transit systems, I note that they have signal (lunar) lamps or other signals that light or change aspect to indicate the crossing is protected and the operator can proceed.
If the pictures shown in the published article are accurate - it was a sunny day. If the driver was headed to school as was reported, then the incident happened in the early morning in February - when the Sun is low on the horizon during the sunrize period (as well as the entire day in early February).
I wonder what effect glare and reflections from the Sun and reflective surfaces (other cars, buildings, signs etc.) had on the actions of both parties. Sun glare and reflections can functionally blind a person to things happening right in front of them.
tree68 Methinks you're reading way too much into this. On older signals, the window allows light from the incandescent lamp inside the housing to be seen by approaching trains. That's exactly why it's there. On LED fixtures, there are LEDs serving the same purpose. When you're coming up on a crossing equipped with lights and gates, you look for them. If you can see the gates, you watch for them. If they do not activate properly, there are rules on how to deal with it, including reporting the failure. The crossing protection should be activating 15-20 seconds before the train enters the crossing. Until the problem is declared resolved by the signal folks, you approach the crossing prepared to stop. That's how it is on "real" railroads. There are rules that lay that all out. Balt asks about the rules for light rail, which is a good question. I tend to believe they are similar. Light rail is probably not going to run at any sort of speed that would overrun the crossing protection. I stand by my conclusion that the operator was not paying attention. If he was, he would have seen that the crossing protection was not functioning properly and reacted accordingly.
Our older crossing signals have the "portholes" on the big flashers, one coworker called them the "wig-wag" lights, and some have a separate LED light that flashes with the flashing light. Those with the LED indicators often have LED wig-wag lights. Sometimes the indicators flash red.
On the older "portholes" the visibility of them can vary depending on how the signal light is positioned. That positioning depends on the degree of the road/rail intersection. It should go without saying that they are a lot more visible at night then during the daylight.
There is no rule for a train operating at track speed to stop short of an unforseen malfunction. The only things that comes close is when stopped or increasing speed 5 mph within 3000 ft of a crossing or the train has less then 13 axles. The crossing is not to be fouled until the signal protection has activated and gates, if equipped, are down and providing protection. At track speed, any malfunction is to be reported to the dispatcher. If the dispatcher hasn't responded to being buzzed up, warn any other known trains appproaching that crossing.
Usually malfunctions are of one, or more lights being out. Sometimes it's a gate that won't come down, or maybe comes down to far. During some very windy days last summer, some gates were being blown off center enough that when they rose back up they became entangled into the lights or signs mounted on the pole and wouldn't drop when activated. One gate was down, but blown onto the tracks far enough that a train broke it off.
Total activation failures are rare from just normal "wear and tear" on the system. Usually some condition that might lead to a complete failure will be known and trains warned. One condition comes to mind is during extreme weather when power is out for much more extended times and back up batteries may deplete that it could affect signal operations.
Jeff
PS. Last night I had a single light engine move. (An adventure in and of itself.) That part about 12 or less axles came into play. Fortunately it was at night, when activations are a lot easier to see, and it was all on main line track. It's the less used track that might develope a little rust that impedes occupancy detection.
EuclidThe signals failed to activate until the train had actually reached the crossing. So there was no warning to the driver until it was too late to be of use.
Based on the published information, that would probably be a reasonable conclusion.
The engineer's culpability would probably be related to his ability to react in time to prevent a collision. As Balt notes, he may not have been able to detect the failure of the crossing protection due to the angle of the sun. This also can involve what kind of lighting the engineer can see. Having lunar lights indicating the lights are flashing is one way. A local short line has a standard amber turn signal mounted on the equipment shelter which flashes with the crossing signals.
That would certainly be a mitigating circumstance, and not hard to replicate if verified immediately (ie, the next day, assuming it's sunny again).
As I noted before, this incident may have occurred because he simply wasn't paying attention. You're not going to see something if you're not looking for it.
Not only do drivers assume the crossing protection is working correctly, so do the crews. Otherwise they'd approach every crossing prepare for a failure.
Faced with discovering that the upcoming crossing protection was not operating correctly, I'd be using lots of horn, getting off the power, and probably making a heavy service application, all while watching the crossing for the possibility of someone actually entering it.
I would opine that the engineer in question had probably run the route many times. I'm reminded of the story of an old hogger who, to the amazement of his cab mate (fireman, head end brakeman - I don't remember), fell asleep at the throttle, but never missed a crossing with the whistle...
As for distances - the crossing protection is usually activated one of two ways. One is a fixed circuit, with the distance set for normal operating speed to allow for a 20 second activation time before the train reaches the crossing. The second uses doppler timing to judge how long the train will take to reach the crossing, activating at the appropriate time. Thus is a train is doing 60 MPH, the gates will come down when the train is further out than if the train is doing 20 MPH.
Can a train at speed stop in time? There's big 'it depends' there - speed, size of train, relative traction (ie, wet rails), etc. The timing and distance are set so the warning devices activate in a timely manner, not so the train can stop.
As for how things are done with a known failure, that's more to illustrate that that's not how things are done without a previously known failure...
Has anyone else used Denver's PTC controlled grade protection system?
They covered something like this on a episode of CHiPs in the 70s
EuclidSo as I understand it, in order to charge the engineer, as they did, with a felony of manslaughter for causing the death of the motorist, the police would have had to conduct an investigation to determine that the engineer was able to stop the train before reaching the motorist’s vehicle.
Stopping the train in time may be impossible, dependent of speed, coefficient of friction, etc. The timing of the signal activation has zero to do with stopping distance. It's the same for a five car Amtrak as it is for a 200 car drag.
I would instead opine that the focus would be on when the engineer detected the failed crossing protection and when (and if) he took steps to deal with it by at least slowing down.
The tests on when the engineer would be able to determine the failure have already been mentioned.
Which brings us back to "was he paying attention?"
Signals have been known to "bounce." That is, everything activates per normal, then the lights go out and the gates go back up. In a case like that, the engineer can hardly be faulted. But, that doesn't appear to be the case here.
Today was a bright, sunny day. I noticed, depending somewhat on signalorientation, the white indicator lights, thru the portholes, was practically invisible until you were at the crossing. The red indicators were much more visible. On some crossings, the only indication of activation was being able to see the gates start down. And you really have to look sometimes to see the gates drop.
One must remember my experience is on a class one, heavy rail, freight operation. Light rail may have different characteristics.
jeffhergert Today was a bright, sunny day. I noticed, depending somewhat on signalorientation, the white indicator lights, thru the portholes, was practically invisible until you were at the crossing. The red indicators were much more visible. On some crossings, the only indication of activation was being able to see the gates start down. And you really have to look sometimes to see the gates drop. One must remember my experience is on a class one, heavy rail, freight operation. Light rail may have different characteristics. Jeff
Euclid jeffhergert Today was a bright, sunny day. I noticed, depending somewhat on signalorientation, the white indicator lights, thru the portholes, was practically invisible until you were at the crossing. The red indicators were much more visible. On some crossings, the only indication of activation was being able to see the gates start down. And you really have to look sometimes to see the gates drop. One must remember my experience is on a class one, heavy rail, freight operation. Light rail may have different characteristics. Jeff That is interesting that the porthole lamps are so limited in their visibility. You would think that if it was worth doing, it would be done with a robust approach such as making those lights visible out to the point of train activation. As it is, it seems a little half baked. Is train operational compliance with these indicator lamps addressed in the rules?
My personal observation is that the 'side port' light openings have been more of a afterthought than something designed create a bold warning to crews operating rail vehicles over the crossings.
EuclidIs train operational compliance with these indicator lamps addressed in the rules?
NORAC Rule 138 makes no mention of them. Only proper operation of the warning devices or the failure thereof.
NORAC Rule 19b reads as follows:
When approaching a public highway-rail crossing at grade and at a whistle sign displaying “W,” “W/MX,” or other specified aspect, with the engine in front, start whistle signal at least 15 seconds but not more than 20 seconds before occupying the crossing. The signal must be prolonged or repeated until the engine occupies the crossing. For multiple crossings, the signal must be prolonged or repeated until the last crossing is occupied. For trains and engines exceeding 60 MPH, the whistle signal must not be started more than ¼ mile in advance of the public grade crossing, even if the advance warning provided by the locomotive horn will be less than 15 seconds in duration. When a train or engine is stopped at a location such that it will take less than 15 seconds for the movement to occupy a public grade crossing, the whistle signal may be sounded for less than 15 seconds provided: a. The public grade crossing is equipped with automatic flashing lights and gates and the gates are fully lowered, OR b. There are no conflicting highway movements approaching the public grade crossing. 2.Approaching and passing standing trains.
displaying “W,” “W/MX,” or other specified aspect, with the engine in front,
start whistle signal at least 15 seconds but not more than 20 seconds before
occupying the crossing. The signal must be prolonged or repeated until the
engine occupies the crossing. For multiple crossings, the signal must be
prolonged or repeated until the last crossing is occupied. For trains and engines
exceeding 60 MPH, the whistle signal must not be started more than ¼ mile in
advance of the public grade crossing, even if the advance warning provided by
the locomotive horn will be less than 15 seconds in duration. When a train or
engine is stopped at a location such that it will take less than 15 seconds for
the movement to occupy a public grade crossing, the whistle signal may be
sounded for less than 15 seconds provided:
a. The public grade crossing is equipped with automatic flashing lights and gates
and the gates are fully lowered, OR
b. There are no conflicting highway movements approaching the public grade
crossing.
2.Approaching and passing standing trains.
Other rulebooks are probably similar. Sorry for the formatting.
AS a complete system ? - no. Well documented that implementation of that system failed badly and the people that wanted it were in over their heads.
Crossing protection normally activates (for us on my territory) about 20 seconds before the train reaches the crossing. All our main track crossings appear to now use the predictive circuitry, the slower you go the closer to the crossing before it activates. For trains running around 50 mph, the crossing signals activate about where the whistle post is located, roughly 1200 feet before the crossing.
A train going 50 mph isn't going to be able to stop.
The rules are set up to deal with known activation failures. The first train to observe an abnormality is supposed to report it. That abnormality could be a single light burnt out. That will get a crossing protection order placed on it until a signal maintainer can check it out.
The usual crossing order (ours) requires a stop only if it's a total failure. If the balance of protection is working a stop is not required, but trains must not exceed 15 mph until occupied. A signal maintainer on scene can give instructions that take place of the rule instructions.
We do have a protection order that requires to stop and protect even when signals are seen to be operative. Again, a signal maintainer on scene can override the rules.
The visibility ports are more of a help when approaching a crossing under a protection order than when operating at or near full track speed.
EuclidWas he blowing the horn? Can the horn be heard from near the crossing?
IF the equipment has an event recorder, information about the use of the horn would be available and has probably already been taken into consideration.
Looking at Street View, the crossing doesn't appear to be configured for a no horn zone.
One must also consider that the driver may have had the radio on, possibly loudly, which would probably override the sound of the train's horn.
I have used that particular crossing myriad times. My Dentist's office at one time was the large house on Maple Rd. East of the crossing. The station on the NW quadrant of the crossing, I believe is the original B&A station. The house I was brought home to after birth is about 0.3 miles West of the crossing on Hammonds Ferry Road.
https://earth.google.com/web/search/maple+road,+linthicum+heights,+md/@39.20517874,-76.65309672,41.0505511a,191.0115911d,35y,0h,0t,0r/data=CigiJgokCd2hgjQTQz5AEaNIUfDEQT5AGVmQuTJFWVTAIRrDpFMVWlTA
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.