Cool.. thanks for the detail SD70Dude..
Several variations of train length restrictions were implemented after the 2005 Cheakamus Canyon derailment (caustic soda spill, fish kill). I have never worked in that area, so I have no idea what restrictions are still in place today. But I suspect there is still a hard limit for conventional trains, and at any rate most freight traffic has been diverted off the ex-BCR line, onto the daily Vancouver-Prince George (via Kamloops, Blue River and McBride) M354/M355, which normally run with over 150 cars.
http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2005/r05v0141/r05v0141.html
Section 4.1.1 Regulatory Action Following the 05 August 2005 derailment, the TSB issued Rail Safety Advisory (RSA) 09/05 to Transport Canada (TC) on 07 October 2005. The RSA stated that, in consideration of the safety-critical nature of operating instructions, and the recent acquisition of this territory by Canadian National (CN), TC might wish to review and assess CN's equipment handling, train length and tonnage instructions to ensure that they are adequate for safe train operation over the sharp curvature and steep grades on the former BC Rail (BCR) territory. TC responded to the RSA on 08 December 2005 and to circumstances identified as a result of the three subsequent derailments on the Squamish Subdivision. TC's December 8 response discussed the Notices and Orders issued below: In response to the October 24th CN derailment at Mile 54 on the Squamish Subdivision (R05V0206), Transport Canada issued CN a Notice and Order on October 27th restricting northward conventional trains handling only empty cars to a maximum of 12 driving axles on steep ascending grades in the Squamish area. In response to the November 3rd CN derailment at Mile 15 on the Squamish Subdivision, Transport Canada issued another Notice and Order to CN on November 3rd to limit the length of its conventional trains to a maximum of 12 driving axles and 80 cars while operating northbound between Squamish and Clinton, B.C. CN Operating Bulletin No. 92 dated November 1 revised conventional train handling instructions on ascending grades between Cheakamus and Mons, Pemberton and Birken and Fountain and Kelly Lake to include this restriction. In addition: tonnage was limited to 2700 tons trailing any empty car 76 feet or more in length; a maximum number of 18 driving axles on trains handling loaded and empty cars provided tonnage of empty cars not exceed 4200 tons and the trailing tonnage inclusive of non-driving locomotives does not exceed 4600 tons; and a conventional freight train was defined as one either without Distributed/Remote Power, or trains with such power within the make-up of the train but not operative, or which has become inoperative en-route. The TC Notice and Order also required CN to provide TC with a detailed analysis of its distributed power (DP) train operations in the Squamish area and a comprehensive risk assessment of any changes CN has made to BCR's operating instructions. This analysis and assessment was to focus on train length, equipment, track conditions and speed. This assessment was done by a consultant (Rail Sciences) for CN and presented to TC on 22 November 2005. CN provided new training for four supervisors who prepared a revised DP training module for use in the ALERT (Advanced Locomotive Engineer Refresher Training) program. All locomotive engineers on this territory received this training. In addition, the four mechanical staff at Vancouver were retrained in DP setup. CN Operating Bulletin 100 was issued on 21 November 2005 following the 04 November 2005 derailment at Mile 15.5. This bulletin contained the same conventional train handling instructions as Operating Bulletin 92 except that the provision for 18 driving axles on trains handling loaded and empty cars was removed. TC issued another Notice and Order dated 07 December 2005 following the derailment on the Squamish Subdivision at Mile 57.9 on December 5. This order limited the length of all CN freight trains, including those using DP, to a maximum of 80 cars, 6400 feet in length and 3200 tons while operating northbound between Squamish and Clinton, British Columbia. The order also restricted all freight trains to a maximum of 12 locomotive driving axles. CN Operating Bulletin 103 covering DP-equipped northward trains on the Squamish and Lillooet subdivisions was issued on 10 December 2005 following the fourth Squamish Subdivision derailment on December 5 at Mile 57.9. It stated the following: trains restricted to a maximum of 99 cars and a total of 6000 tons with loads marshalled as close as possible to the head end of the train; long empty cars in excess of 76 feet must be marshalled in the last half of the train; no more than 3750 tons may be trailing any empty car that is 76 feet or more in length; all trains to be operated with a maximum of three working locomotives (2 head-end and 1 remote) with the single remote locomotive marshalled at least 2/3 deep in the train from the first rail car with the first 5 cars on either side of the working remote locomotive not to be greater than 76 feet in length; prior to departure from North Vancouver, the locomotive engineer will be provided with confirmation that DP is available and working on the train, and indication of the marshalled position of the remote locomotive within the train; a running test must be performed prior to departure to ensure the remote locomotive is responding properly; remote consist must not be placed in "isolate" mode in areas where a "COM loss" between the lead and remote locomotives is known to occur such as the tunnels at Horseshoe Bay and Seaton; and employees must monitor and ensure that communication is restored and verify that the remote consist is responding to commands from the lead locomotive. CN Operating Bulletin 104 was issued on 10 December 2005 providing instructions for trains in a high throttle position experiencing an imminent and/or unrecoverable stall situation. On 14 December 2005, TC revoked the Notice and Order issued on December 7 and issued a new Notice and Order that contained conditions for all northward freight trains operating between North Vancouver and Lillooet on the Squamish Subdivision. The order, in effect for a 60-day trial period, contained the following conditions for all northward freight trains operating between North Vancouver and Lillooet on the Squamish Subdivision in addition to instructions currently in place: Operating Instructions to be issued new or revised as mutually required. CN Officers to accompany all trains over the territory. Operating Crews to receive ongoing mentoring and hands on training. Trains will be provided with a form of exclusive occupancy to reduce stops. Trains will operate with distributed power with a maximum of 99 rail cars. Distributed power working consist will be 2X1 (2 head end locomotives and 1 remote). CN to provide Transport Canada daily a copy of the origin list of all train 471's operated. CN to provide Transport Canada event recorder data of each train 471 as timely as possible. CN to provide notification to Transport Canada of planned operation of train 471, 24 hours prior to operation so a Railway Safety Inspector can monitor for compliance. On 06 March 2006, TC revoked the Notice and Order issued to CN on 14 December 2005. This action followed completion of CN's 60-day trial period on the line on 11 February 2006 during which time there were no incidents. A new Notice and Order was issued to CN increasing the length of its DP northbound trains from 99 cars to a maximum of 114 cars in the Squamish area. The length of conventional trains operating northbound in the Squamish area remained restricted to 80 cars. CN issued Operating Bulletin 17 incorporating these operational changes. As of April 2007, the Notice and Order issued on 06 March 2006 was still in effect. TC is satisfied that the conditions contained in the Notice and Order appear to adequately address current operations throughout this territory. Railway Safety inspectors from the TC Surface Pacific Region, as part of their compliance activities, continue to monitor the railway's operations to ensure that the levels of compliance are maintained. One of the conditions contained in the Notice and Order requires that any operating instructions, whether new or revised, be agreed upon by both TC and the railway.
Following the 05 August 2005 derailment, the TSB issued Rail Safety Advisory (RSA) 09/05 to Transport Canada (TC) on 07 October 2005. The RSA stated that, in consideration of the safety-critical nature of operating instructions, and the recent acquisition of this territory by Canadian National (CN), TC might wish to review and assess CN's equipment handling, train length and tonnage instructions to ensure that they are adequate for safe train operation over the sharp curvature and steep grades on the former BC Rail (BCR) territory. TC responded to the RSA on 08 December 2005 and to circumstances identified as a result of the three subsequent derailments on the Squamish Subdivision. TC's December 8 response discussed the Notices and Orders issued below:
In response to the October 24th CN derailment at Mile 54 on the Squamish Subdivision (R05V0206), Transport Canada issued CN a Notice and Order on October 27th restricting northward conventional trains handling only empty cars to a maximum of 12 driving axles on steep ascending grades in the Squamish area. In response to the November 3rd CN derailment at Mile 15 on the Squamish Subdivision, Transport Canada issued another Notice and Order to CN on November 3rd to limit the length of its conventional trains to a maximum of 12 driving axles and 80 cars while operating northbound between Squamish and Clinton, B.C. CN Operating Bulletin No. 92 dated November 1 revised conventional train handling instructions on ascending grades between Cheakamus and Mons, Pemberton and Birken and Fountain and Kelly Lake to include this restriction. In addition: tonnage was limited to 2700 tons trailing any empty car 76 feet or more in length; a maximum number of 18 driving axles on trains handling loaded and empty cars provided tonnage of empty cars not exceed 4200 tons and the trailing tonnage inclusive of non-driving locomotives does not exceed 4600 tons; and a conventional freight train was defined as one either without Distributed/Remote Power, or trains with such power within the make-up of the train but not operative, or which has become inoperative en-route.
In response to the October 24th CN derailment at Mile 54 on the Squamish Subdivision (R05V0206), Transport Canada issued CN a Notice and Order on October 27th restricting northward conventional trains handling only empty cars to a maximum of 12 driving axles on steep ascending grades in the Squamish area. In response to the November 3rd CN derailment at Mile 15 on the Squamish Subdivision, Transport Canada issued another Notice and Order to CN on November 3rd to limit the length of its conventional trains to a maximum of 12 driving axles and 80 cars while operating northbound between Squamish and Clinton, B.C. CN Operating Bulletin No. 92 dated November 1 revised conventional train handling instructions on ascending grades between Cheakamus and Mons, Pemberton and Birken and Fountain and Kelly Lake to include this restriction. In addition:
The TC Notice and Order also required CN to provide TC with a detailed analysis of its distributed power (DP) train operations in the Squamish area and a comprehensive risk assessment of any changes CN has made to BCR's operating instructions. This analysis and assessment was to focus on train length, equipment, track conditions and speed. This assessment was done by a consultant (Rail Sciences) for CN and presented to TC on 22 November 2005.
CN provided new training for four supervisors who prepared a revised DP training module for use in the ALERT (Advanced Locomotive Engineer Refresher Training) program. All locomotive engineers on this territory received this training. In addition, the four mechanical staff at Vancouver were retrained in DP setup.
CN Operating Bulletin 100 was issued on 21 November 2005 following the 04 November 2005 derailment at Mile 15.5. This bulletin contained the same conventional train handling instructions as Operating Bulletin 92 except that the provision for 18 driving axles on trains handling loaded and empty cars was removed.
TC issued another Notice and Order dated 07 December 2005 following the derailment on the Squamish Subdivision at Mile 57.9 on December 5. This order limited the length of all CN freight trains, including those using DP, to a maximum of 80 cars, 6400 feet in length and 3200 tons while operating northbound between Squamish and Clinton, British Columbia. The order also restricted all freight trains to a maximum of 12 locomotive driving axles.
CN Operating Bulletin 103 covering DP-equipped northward trains on the Squamish and Lillooet subdivisions was issued on 10 December 2005 following the fourth Squamish Subdivision derailment on December 5 at Mile 57.9. It stated the following:
CN Operating Bulletin 104 was issued on 10 December 2005 providing instructions for trains in a high throttle position experiencing an imminent and/or unrecoverable stall situation.
On 14 December 2005, TC revoked the Notice and Order issued on December 7 and issued a new Notice and Order that contained conditions for all northward freight trains operating between North Vancouver and Lillooet on the Squamish Subdivision. The order, in effect for a 60-day trial period, contained the following conditions for all northward freight trains operating between North Vancouver and Lillooet on the Squamish Subdivision in addition to instructions currently in place:
Operating Instructions to be issued new or revised as mutually required. CN Officers to accompany all trains over the territory. Operating Crews to receive ongoing mentoring and hands on training. Trains will be provided with a form of exclusive occupancy to reduce stops. Trains will operate with distributed power with a maximum of 99 rail cars. Distributed power working consist will be 2X1 (2 head end locomotives and 1 remote). CN to provide Transport Canada daily a copy of the origin list of all train 471's operated. CN to provide Transport Canada event recorder data of each train 471 as timely as possible. CN to provide notification to Transport Canada of planned operation of train 471, 24 hours prior to operation so a Railway Safety Inspector can monitor for compliance.
On 06 March 2006, TC revoked the Notice and Order issued to CN on 14 December 2005. This action followed completion of CN's 60-day trial period on the line on 11 February 2006 during which time there were no incidents. A new Notice and Order was issued to CN increasing the length of its DP northbound trains from 99 cars to a maximum of 114 cars in the Squamish area. The length of conventional trains operating northbound in the Squamish area remained restricted to 80 cars. CN issued Operating Bulletin 17 incorporating these operational changes.
As of April 2007, the Notice and Order issued on 06 March 2006 was still in effect. TC is satisfied that the conditions contained in the Notice and Order appear to adequately address current operations throughout this territory. Railway Safety inspectors from the TC Surface Pacific Region, as part of their compliance activities, continue to monitor the railway's operations to ensure that the levels of compliance are maintained. One of the conditions contained in the Notice and Order requires that any operating instructions, whether new or revised, be agreed upon by both TC and the railway.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
I've read somewhere that CN trains are restricted to 75 cars on the former BC Rail lines. Can't remember where I read it, but can anyone confirm or dispute this?
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