Went back over again today and took another look- side road opposite the derailment site is now open, so drove down and found where the engines are still sitting, buried up to the tops of the trucks...
Brian (IA) http://blhanel.rrpicturearchives.net.
jeffhergertIt's NOT track warrant territory. It's 2 main track - Centralized Traffic Control territory with Automatic Train Control and Positive Train Control in effect. ATC is now only used if PTC has failed. Only one system or the other is used, not both at the same time. The rail grinder would have had Track and Time to authorize occupying the main track (No. 2 MT in this case) and with a train(s) in the T&T limits, it would be issued "behind (train or trains if more than one)." It would seem that the person at the switch, working with the grinder but not on it, did not know there was a train ahead of it or thought it had already passed. The switch was being open to let the grinder leave the main track. Had it been to allow the grinder out, it would've been a far worse outcome. Someone at work said the crew saw the switch being opened. (If this is the case, ATC would've taken their air, but probably not any sooner than the crew being able to take action.) West of the switch, about 1/2 to 3/4 mile (give or take) the tracks curve to the right. With all the trees, and I was surprised how overgrown the area has become since I was last through about 3 or 4 years ago, someone at the switch only has a short time to spot something coming east. Some of those grinders have a triple headlight arrangement, so I could see a train being mistaken for the rail grinder. Jeff
The rail grinder would have had Track and Time to authorize occupying the main track (No. 2 MT in this case) and with a train(s) in the T&T limits, it would be issued "behind (train or trains if more than one)." It would seem that the person at the switch, working with the grinder but not on it, did not know there was a train ahead of it or thought it had already passed. The switch was being open to let the grinder leave the main track. Had it been to allow the grinder out, it would've been a far worse outcome.
Someone at work said the crew saw the switch being opened. (If this is the case, ATC would've taken their air, but probably not any sooner than the crew being able to take action.) West of the switch, about 1/2 to 3/4 mile (give or take) the tracks curve to the right. With all the trees, and I was surprised how overgrown the area has become since I was last through about 3 or 4 years ago, someone at the switch only has a short time to spot something coming east. Some of those grinders have a triple headlight arrangement, so I could see a train being mistaken for the rail grinder.
Jeff
Back in the early days of CSX dark territory operation under DTC there was a provision in the software for setting up 'after arrival' meets and line authorization. After several failures by crews to properly execute - especially when the train 'in the hole' was lined up to meet more than one train before having the authority to move on - it was found crews were mistakenly thinking after the arrival of the first train they had the authority to contiue - and met the subsequent train in the middle of nowhere - with catastrophic consequence.
Subsequently 'after arrival' meets were eliminated and the software was changed to prevent such authorities. The prohibition was carried forward when CSX changed to Track Warrant Control. Authority can only be given after the train or MofW person has confirmed and verified the arrival the 'critical' train.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
It's NOT track warrant territory. It's 2 main track - Centralized Traffic Control territory with Automatic Train Control and Positive Train Control in effect. ATC is now only used if PTC has failed. Only one system or the other is used, not both at the same time.
ChuckHawkinsI was probably not clear that my question concerns the original incident where "switch thrown in front of train past last signal." What type of order is issued to MOW concerning when and how they gain occupancy/control of trackage? What safety steps are required of MOW force and dispatcher?
Balt summed it up pretty well, actually.
MC threw some light on it as well.
If this is track warrant territory, then nothing moves unless the DS gives them a TW.
On CSX, manual switches are not thrown without specific permission of the DS, recorded on the EC1 (similar to a TW or Form D).
The derailed train already had permission to be there. The work train would have gotten permission next. The fact that the signal was unable to protect as designed is, in some ways, secondary. The incident would have occurred in dark territory. Full-fledged PTC would have prevented it.
As Jeff points out, someone jumped the gun.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
I was probably not clear that my question concerns the original incident where "switch thrown in front of train past last signal." What type of order is issued to MOW concerning when and how they gain occupancy/control of trackage? What safety steps are required of MOW force and dispatcher?
ChuckHawkinsWhat is the procedure for MOW in this situation? I assume they contact dispatcher and receive permission to control trackage between identifiable points for a defined period of time. Assume dispatcher enters data to control system that indicates territory "out of action," and signals set to red at either end of defined territory. Unless someone on MOW crew acted before defined start time, there should have been no problem.
Don't know other railroads procedures.
CSX issues formal train message instructions that the main track(s) between specified points or mileposts has been turned over to a specific named company official who is responsible for coordinating all the necessary operations for wreck clearance, interaction with the 3rd party contractors, interaction with company MofW personnel, interaction with company train operations including the movement of work trains that may be required for the 3rd party contractors and MofW to rebuild track(s). Depending on how long the wreck clearance takes, one named company official may be superceeded by another as necessary until the track(s) are returned to normal operations.
What is the procedure for MOW in this situation? I assume they contact dispatcher and receive permission to control trackage between identifiable points for a defined period of time. Assume dispatcher enters data to control system that indicates territory "out of action," and signals set to red at either end of defined territory. Unless someone on MOW crew acted before defined start time, there should have been no problem.
Stopped by the derailment site in Stanwood this morning on the way to Rochelle with grandson- they clean up really fast around here.
It's 2 main track CTC/ATC/PTC. ATC is only used now when PTC has failed or otherwise not available. Previously it was double track/current of traffic ATC.
The unofficial word going around is that the person who opened the switch thought they were opening it up for a rail grinder that was going to clear the main track. This person didn't realize there was still a coal train between the switch and the grinder outfit.
Unless something changed, this would be Automatic Block track warrant country - why are you opening switches without authority or proper protection? (something is not passing the smell test)
Smokey Joe can go clean honey pots with the bubbas that keep running Form B's (another one this week out here - why?)
It could have been worse at district speed.
charlie hebdoPerhaps Smokey Joe's dictum - "poor vetting, training and supervision " -applies to MOW even more so.
Had Joe been subjected to Joe's level of vetting - he would have been cleaning honey pots for the duration of his employment.
Perhaps Smokey Joe's dictum - "poor vetting, training and supervision " -applies to MOW even more so.
I imagine for the crew this one was a brown pants alert as my drivers would call it. Or in terms my drivers would say they are still pulling the seat cushions out from their butts from going how are we okay after this one. The MOW crew needs a lesson in not throwing switches in front of a train.
BaltACD https://www.railpictures.net/photo/699418/
Looks like those locomotives sure "headed for the woods" (usually "cornfield", but that expression won't work here).
- PDN.
https://www.railpictures.net/photo/699418/
CShaveRR I hadn't realized that the ATC was cut out after PTC was cut in. You're right--this is an obvious drawback to the technology, and a step backwards for our safety.
I hadn't realized that the ATC was cut out after PTC was cut in. You're right--this is an obvious drawback to the technology, and a step backwards for our safety.
ATC is only used if PTC has failed enroute. When running ATC, it seems like they aren't maintaing it as well. Lots of "rain" control, that is false restricting cab signal indications. (Rain control stems from the higher number of false restrictings during rainy or other high humidity periods.) I'm sure once PTC is fully operational ATC and CCS will both be gone.
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
Glad they are OK ....
Think this may have been the switch in question ..
Crew is OK.
jeffhergertThe derailed coal train was destined to the power plant that's been taking 270 cars at a time. This one was a more normal sized one.
Eastbound coal train derailed this morning at Stanwood, Iowa.
https://khak.com/train-derailment-closes-eastern-iowa-highway/
https://wqad.com/2019/06/06/part-of-highway-38-in-cedar-county-blocked-due-to-train-derailment/
I'm not sure how bad it is, different sources have said different amounts of cars involved. Suffice it to say, it's not good.
I happened to be in the grocery store this afternoon when the brother of the engineer of the derailed train, an engineer himself, came into my check-out line. I asked him, "What did your brother do?" He kind of smiled and said, "It's not what he did but what Maintenance of Way did. They opened a switch ahead of his train. His train was already past the last block signal before the switch, so PTC didn't drop out. They went into the house track at Stanwood at 40mph."
With that unofficial information, I think the pictures being posted by the news are of the rear of the train. The derailed engine being the DP unit.
If the above info is true, this is one time when Automatic Train Control or even plain cab signals would've at least lessened, if not prevented, the incident. The current PTC overlay only sees the next block signal. Once past a signal, it knows nothing of what's happening within that block. Cab signals, picking up codes from the rails themselves would've picked up the change in block conditions immediately.
The derailed coal train was destined to the power plant that's been taking 270 cars at a time. This one was a more normal sized one.
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