While I am finding definitive figures for different kinds of Amtrak consist (I suspect the effective braking rate will be very different for Superliners than for Amfleet, for example) there are general rules of thumb for higher-speed trains: the maximum achievable deceleration rate is somewhere around 6fpsps (ignoring passenger comfort) if we combine emergency with magnetic track braking just at permissible wheelslide. That produces about a half-mile stopping distance from 120mph, and about a mile and a quarter at 186mph. (This with lighter-weight consists and much better running gear than current Amtrak equipment.)
You may find this PDF reference from AREMA of some usefulness in understanding how to best implement emergency braking.
While I am finding definitive figures for different kinds of Amtrak consist (I suspect the effective braking rate will be very different for Superliners than for Amfleet, for example) there are general rules of thumb for HSR: the maximum achievable deceleration rate is somewhere around 6fpsps (ignoring passenger comfort) if we combine emergency with magnetic track braking just at permissible wheelslide. That produces about a half-mile stopping distance from 120mph, and about a mile and a quarter at 186mph. (This with lighter-weight consists and much better running gear than current Amtrak equipment.)
There are a number of factors involved, of course. On average, passenger cars will be lighter than freight cars, meaning the coefficient of friction between the car and rail is less. On the other hand, the brakes on a passenger car are going to get better attention than those on a freight car, which should theoretically mean better braking for each car. But I can say from experience that more cars equals more total braking.
Passenger trains, even ranging up to twenty or so cars, are shorter than the average freight train, but the speeds are higher, bringing momentum into the mix - an important consideration.
In the end, it's a complicated mix of factors that are above my meager physics education to evaluate as a package.
It appears the info I found came from the Minnesota Safety Council, which said: The average freight train is about 1 to 1¼ miles in length (90 to 120 rail cars). When it's moving at 55 miles an hour, it can take a mile or more to stop after the locomotive engineer fully applies the emergency brake. An 8-car passenger train moving at 80 miles an hour needs about a mile to stop.
The average freight train is about 1 to 1¼ miles in length (90 to 120 rail cars). When it's moving at 55 miles an hour, it can take a mile or more to stop after the locomotive engineer fully applies the emergency brake. An 8-car passenger train moving at 80 miles an hour needs about a mile to stop.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
A number of years ago, I was riding home from work on the Metra Southwest Service and was standing in the vestibule waiting for my stop at Oak Lawn. We had just crossed Kostner Ave when the train went into emergency. A semi blocked the crossing at Cicero Ave (about a half mile down) while stopped for a traffic light and we still managed to hit the back end of the trailer.
Speed was about 45-50 MPH with a consist of an F40PH and 7-8 gallery coaches.
tree68One uncited source I found said it would take a seven car passenger train doing 80 MPH almost a mile to stop.
Euclid I think that any realization and escape would have required ½ second minimum.
The rule of thumb back in driver's ed was that reaction time was on the order of 3/4 of a second. Now they have to turn and discover what they are reacting to, then move off the tracks, which would be up to 6-7 feet from inside the guage, and at least 4 feet if they were on the tie butts.
A train travelling at 100 fps has moved as much as 500 feet - add propogation time and the time it takes to actually apply the brakes to the wheels/disks, and you're not allowing much leeway.
One uncited source I found said it would take a seven car passenger train doing 80 MPH almost a mile to stop.
A post by an Amtrak passenger on the "Amtrak Unlimited" forum included this: "I heard a muffled PFOOSH! and a couple of seconds or so later you could feel heavy deceleration of the train, " Emphasis mine. The emergency application was reportedly due to a dynamiter in a private car on the train.
BaltACD Euclid So, what is the big deal about the emergency application being such a sacrifice that it must only be made when there is a certainty that it can save a life? If you saw the number of 'trespassers' engineers see on the tracks on a daily basis you would be amazed.
Euclid So, what is the big deal about the emergency application being such a sacrifice that it must only be made when there is a certainty that it can save a life?
If you saw the number of 'trespassers' engineers see on the tracks on a daily basis you would be amazed.
I have seen a lot of that and completely understand your point. You can't dump the air for every person that pops up along the right of way. The job is actually harder than that. An engineer has to read each situation and react accordingly. Each situation sends a set of signals that add up to whether an emergency application will help and to what extent. Part of the signals are body language, attitude, probable purpose for being on the track, etc.
But it is also possible to adopt what an engineer might consider to be a "safe" policy, and that is to not dump the air until actual impact. The reasoning is that you can't stop in time anyway, so why try unless it is assured to be necessary. That is "safe" because you will never go into emergency without a valid cause. Although this will result in going into emergency after the action has become irrelevant.
An engineer might conclude that since they see so many people on the track and they usually move out of the way, one can conclude that this will be typical. With that kind of conclusion, an engineer is likely to not read the cues of each situation with people on or near the tracks. And then one day, the engineer is surprised when a person does not move out of the way as the engineer always expects them to do.
So the seemingly safe policy proves to be not so safe after all. And it is not a safe policy at all if you end up in court.
EuclidSo, what is the big deal about the emergency application being such a sacrifice that it must only be made when there is a certainty that it can save a life?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I doubt that making the emergency application would only increase the time to escape by just a few milliseconds. That seems like an intentional exaggeration to justify not making an emergency application. A few milliseconds? That is a few thousandths of a second. It is not even measurable in practical terms. I think that any realization and escape would have required ½ second minimum. I suspect that an emergency application could have added 2-5 seconds.
Of course, there is no guarantee that a person would suddenly discover the train bearing down on them, even with more time. But the possibility always exists, so the longer the interval, the greater the possibility.
So, what is the big deal about the emergency application being such a sacrifice that it must only be made when there is a certainty that it can save a life?
Thanks, Zardoz. Good info.
Lithonia Operator I am wondering: How many engineers, traveling at 100 mph, would put their train into emergency IMMEDIATELY upon seeing a person on the track? You engineers out there, you tell me. It’s an honest question.
I am wondering: How many engineers, traveling at 100 mph, would put their train into emergency IMMEDIATELY upon seeing a person on the track?
You engineers out there, you tell me. It’s an honest question.
Lithonia Operator....I would think that the initial response would be the horn, not the brakes. One would expect the trespasser(s) to hear and react...... But she had so little time to make a decision.
In some locations where kids hang around the tracks, there are frequently instances of the brats playing 'chicken' (I've even seen drivers do it--sit on the tracks until they lose their nerve). If I am sure it is a game of chicken, I'd refuse to play. No horn, no brakes, no worries. Of course, this is from before those pesky event recorders and cameras came onboard.
Lithonia OperatorIsn’t there some danger of the train derailing when put into emergency? And what about any standing passengers? They would get injured, perhaps seriously.
243129 charlie hebdo I think we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death. The only benefit might be in reducing guilt feelings in the engineer. Maybe, maybe not. I' have treated two engineers for PTSD after they hit pedestrian, one a child with a bike, the other a young man. In both cases they did apply emergency brakes. They still felt guilty. Where did you see and how do you know "we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death."? There should be no guilt if you have done all the 'right things' i.e. sounding the horn, placing the train in emergency. You cannot take the train off the tracks to hit them, they should not have been there.
charlie hebdo I think we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death. The only benefit might be in reducing guilt feelings in the engineer. Maybe, maybe not. I' have treated two engineers for PTSD after they hit pedestrian, one a child with a bike, the other a young man. In both cases they did apply emergency brakes. They still felt guilty.
Where did you see and how do you know "we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death."?
There should be no guilt if you have done all the 'right things' i.e. sounding the horn, placing the train in emergency. You cannot take the train off the tracks to hit them, they should not have been there.
Of course they shouldn't have been there. As to the milliseconds, it was discussed. The likelihood it would have altered the outcome was very slim.
As to #175's guilt, it's not a rational, legal thing. It has to do with how humans react, especially with their emotional states in tragic situations. It is very complex. You may not understand any of this, but I am a clinical psychologist. It's what I deal with and have done so for 35 years. I had first-hand experience with treating two engineers involved in these incidents as well as many others suffering from PTSD. Doing all you can but to no avail may logically suggest "there should be no guilt" but our psyches do not necessarily work logically, consistently and rationally. Every person and situation are different.
charlie hebdoI think we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death. The only benefit might be in reducing guilt feelings in the engineer. Maybe, maybe not. I' have treated two engineers for PTSD after they hit pedestrian, one a child with a bike, the other a young man. In both cases they did apply emergency brakes. They still felt guilty.
EuclidIf I were to cross over a train, I would prefer using a covered hopper, from stirrup, to grabiron, over the cross running board, over the couplers, and down the other side....
NS has a specific codicil in one of their rules that proscribes 'riding a shove' if you're over the gauge: if you're up under the slope sheet of a hopper. That might be an option for crossing over, too.
But as I understand it, the two conductors rode the cars from the first inspection stop to the second stop at the accident site. So when they got off at that second stop, I assume they just both got off on that Amtrak side.
As I recall it, they walked back down the cut on opposite sides until they reached the car ... presumably at the end of the cut, as it was to be set out and left there ... finding one more partially-engaged handbrake on the way. Part of the likely 'attention problem' was that just about as they arrived all the way back there, they were told 'never mind' ... probably because someone realized the detector had gone off from friction of the handbrake, and when the wheels cooled there would be little to no operative reason to leave the car set out ... and would for some reason have to walk all the way back to the head end (instead of riding the cut back up to make the presumable joint with the 'rest' of the consist one track over). That may be mistaken, but it should be easy to find (or disprove) in the report or in interviews.
But I think there is good evidence in the CSX engineer interview that there was steep ballast leading down to a water-filled ditch on the non-Amtrak side. Walking there would require walking on a steep slope of loose ballast, and fighting the gravitational pull to slide down the slope and into water. Anyone with common sense would choose not to walk on that side.
I'm reasonably sure that could have been a factor.
So what to do? Their decision does not seem that irresponsible to me. They were not required to have protection to foul the Amtrak track. Their engineer said he did not how to acquire protection if they desired. They were not prohibited from walking on the Amtrak track by rule or trespassing law...
Except that ES23 required them to 'ensure protection' if more than 4' from a rail ... and that's any rail. It also requires them to KEEP looking in the direction a train could be expected to come from, and I don't think either train was running 'wrong main' at the point of impact. The general equivalent to NS rule 21(a) (which is like the old Southern Rule M) and 21(c)(6) which calls for vigilant lookout at ALL times, is in GS10 (the language includes 'be alert for and keep clear of', which they manifestly did not, did not, did not do, and no 'confusion' excused them from doing so)
What I hope to come out of this accident, apart from the new lesson written in blood that you take rules like GS10 seriously all the time, even when tired or PO'd, is more defined protocol for when protection needs to be granted, and a more formalized and easily-invoked procedure to get it, confirm it, and know how long to wait for it (or what to watch out for and when until you get it!). Combined with that, adoption of a rule for defined whistle signals involving specific 'off time' and clear patterns that are 'handed' by railroad direction, so one can be distinguished in direction by 'code' and not just reflected intensity in a noisy and multipath-ridden environment.
I don't think any rule that attempts to enforce vigilance will be much more successful than the old Army Air edict during the runup to WWI -- informed that hard landings were causing severe damage to the available aircraft, the commandant issued an order that there were to be no more hard landings thenceforth. The correct ways to instill things like vigilance have to come from more trusted, and non-adversarial sources, and not be fraught with punishments as the chief means of either reinforcement or enforcement.
243129 tree68 Even slamming the brake handle to emergency immediately would have had almost no effect on the forward speed of her train It could have afforded milleseconds to the victims. Her reaction, or lack of, afforded none.
tree68 Even slamming the brake handle to emergency immediately would have had almost no effect on the forward speed of her train
It could have afforded milleseconds to the victims. Her reaction, or lack of, afforded none.
I think we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death. The only benefit might be in reducing guilt feelings in the engineer. Maybe, maybe not. I' have treated two engineers for PTSD after they hit pedestrian, one a child with a bike, the other a young man. In both cases they did apply emergency brakes. They still felt guilty.
Overmod Euclid 3-step protection was not available nor required at this accident. The issue involved is how the conductors came to be on the 'foul' side of the train in the first place.
Euclid 3-step protection was not available nor required at this accident.
The issue involved is how the conductors came to be on the 'foul' side of the train in the first place.
Overmod,
If I were to cross over a train, I would prefer using a covered hopper, from stirrup, to grabiron, over the cross running board, over the couplers, and down the other side. I would never consider going under the cars.
But as I understand it, the two conductors rode the cars from the first inspection stop to the second stop at the accident site. So when they got off at that second stop, I assume they just both got off on that Amtrak side. So there would have been no reason to cross over.
But even if there was a reason to cross over, and even they did cross over, so what? It would not have violated any rule. And trainmen have done it since the beginning of time without considering it any more risky than typical switching activities.
Aside from that, the engineer stated that in lieu of 3-step protection, they had a discussion to agree upon a safety procedure that would accomplish the safety goals of 3-step protection.
They could have walked on either side, and if they had walked on the non-Amtrak side, indeed the accident would never had happened. But I think there is good evidence in the CSX engineer interview that there was steep ballast leading down to a water-filled ditch on the non-Amtrak side. Walking there would require walking on a steep slope of loose ballast, and fighting the gravitational pull to slide down the slope and into water. Anyone with common sense would choose not to walk on that side.
So they walked on the Amtrak side, and began in an area where they could walk on the empty CSX track rather than near the Amtrak track. But then in the last 300 feet, the CSX train was occupying the empty track they had been walking on.
So what to do? Their decision does not seem that irresponsible to me. They were not required to have protection to foul the Amtrak track. Their engineer said he did not how to acquire protection if they desired. They were not prohibited from walking on the Amtrak track by rule or trespassing law. I am sure they looked for trains while on the Amtrak track.
But one little thing blindsided them. It was something they never considered. It rarely happens. That was the approach not of a train expected, but of two trains simultaneously converging on them. Then the non-lethal train took all of their attention, leaving no chance for a sudden recognition of their peril. It was only that, which was the perfect storm in the perfect sense of the term.
I would think that when the lives of people are at risk, you would want the most qualified people available in charge of any situation, and you would endeavor to make certain that all such responsible people are fully qualified for the responsibility.
On the average, how long did firemen serve as firemen before being considered for promotion?
Johnny
In thinking more about this, I tend to agree with your point about the question of whether the engineer of 66 should have made an emergency application. With 66, there was no need for more time to allow for the possiblity of the conductors to become aware of 66, whereas there was that need with 175. I assume that the conductors were fully aware of 66 during the entire accident sequence.
Lithonia OperatorHow desirable are the Amtrak positions?
Here is the problem: some of the criteria Amtrak uses are, probably imposed at some level of twentysomething Government administrative action, concerned with 'furthering diversity' rather than finding and fully qualifying/training the best potential T&E people. As long as there is preference other than for the most reliable and qualified people ... assessed by railroaders or similarly 'distinctly qualified' people for strict railroad purposes ... you're likely to have strange attitudes when it comes to things that high-speed single person operation requires.
I don't think the 'three years experience' is likely to be much more valuable than a general guide, especially if it's with commuter agencies that are often likewise concerned with political or paper qualifications unrelated to performance or safety. Joe is right that both attitude and aptitude are of prime importance, regardless of whether the result matches key or desirable demographic targets or whatever.
Note that this has nothing whatsoever to do with outreach to diverse or underrepresented groups, or establishing programs perhaps early in education to foster and support the required character or skills to make running high-speed passenger trains a 'calling' instead of a mere career. There's almost no way you could spend too much on those, or go wrong employing the folks who 'get it.'
I do agree that it made no sense to go to emergency after the impact. She may have made some mistakes in the heat of a traumatic moment, but I hope she is not hung out to dry for this.
It does seem that Amtrak‘s training may be inadequate. Clearly it was, grossly, in the Cascade incident; so if that was indicative of national Amtrak standards, then, well, yikes.
How desirable are the Amtrak positions? If AMTK were to require, say, three years experience in Class 1 mainline or commuter train experience, would they get enough applicants?
Or is there some overriding reason to promote conductors from within?
Euclid3-step protection was not available nor required at this accident.
The issue involved is how the conductors came to be on the 'foul' side of the train in the first place. NS has a rule forbidding crossing 'under the train' unless "required", whereas CSX freely allowed it up to 2017 with nothing more than an acknowledged request for 3-step; my question to Balt includes what the direct rule post-Harrison's cancellation of three-step now involves.
Had the conductor on the 'Amtrak side' crossed over, this would not have happened. If they reached the end of the cut, crossing behind it away from the Amtrak side, this would not have happened. You yourself raised this a while back as a relevant point.
EuclidThe engineer of #66 had exactly the same need to make an emergency application upon seeing the two victims as did the engineer of #175. Neither engineer knew where the victims would be when the two trains reached their location area.
But this is completely missing the important point: there are only two possible outcomes for train 66 -- either they jump and are killed whether or not he goes to emergency, or they stay where they are and are unhit by his train. There is NO other meaningful thing that going to emergency other than full service would assure... other than giving them MORE time to get foul of 66 if they were to start jumping that way.
This is precisely what I mean by ruling out sentimentality here.
3-step protection was not available nor required at this accident.
In other news: Balt, do you have or can you procure the post-2017 language for rykes GS10 and ES23, which cover track fouling, and TS15, which was interesting in that it contained no qualifier on crossing under standing equipment with 'occupied locomotive' attached (as NS rule 20(b)(2) does, restricting it to 'unless duties require') other than three-step. What specifically governs crossing under or fouling standing equipment now? [Incidentally the 2012 Safe Way is extremely unhelpful about exactly what you do to implement the third step; the relevant section of TS15 says only 'place generator field in the off position' without indicating whether this is the generator-field SWITCH or the generator-field BREAKER. That seems like a weird oversight for a 'technical' rule]
Overmod 243129 He also saw, as he states, the situation unfolding so why did he not place his train in emergency? Two Amtrak engineers, graduates of Amtrak's training program and both of their reactions, or non reactions, are the same? Without in any way saying the Amtrak training is not inadequate... The reactions of the two engineers should have been different. Only Sahara "needed" to go to emergency (to give the conductors the milliseconds more time), and I would argue there was little point to use 'emergency' after the collision, where full service would do the necessary job as well or better. But the engineer on 66 had no reason to go to emergency at any point, since the only way the conductors would need "more time" would be if they jumped that way by mistake ... in which case they would have been just as dead, milliseconds or not ... they couldn't possibly have made it all the way across one and a half mains in the delta-T involved. So why go through all the equipment abuse and passenger discomfort that goes with emergency when EP blended service will do the job as well as needs to be done? Sentiment, not sentimentality needs to be the effective watchword of practical training.
243129 He also saw, as he states, the situation unfolding so why did he not place his train in emergency? Two Amtrak engineers, graduates of Amtrak's training program and both of their reactions, or non reactions, are the same?
Without in any way saying the Amtrak training is not inadequate...
The reactions of the two engineers should have been different. Only Sahara "needed" to go to emergency (to give the conductors the milliseconds more time), and I would argue there was little point to use 'emergency' after the collision, where full service would do the necessary job as well or better. But the engineer on 66 had no reason to go to emergency at any point, since the only way the conductors would need "more time" would be if they jumped that way by mistake ... in which case they would have been just as dead, milliseconds or not ... they couldn't possibly have made it all the way across one and a half mains in the delta-T involved. So why go through all the equipment abuse and passenger discomfort that goes with emergency when EP blended service will do the job as well as needs to be done?
Sentiment, not sentimentality needs to be the effective watchword of practical training.
243129He also saw, as he states, the situation unfolding so why did he not place his train in emergency? Two Amtrak engineers, graduates of Amtrak's training program and both of their reactions, or non reactions, are the same?
Just for reference, at 85 MPH, a train is travelling at 124 feet per second. Twenty seconds would mean the train would cover 2,480 feet in that time - nearly a half mile.
Perhaps someone has the means to figure out the line-of-sight distance coming off the curve southbound (or northbound, for that matter) at that location. I'm not sure that twenty seconds is accurate. It may be more like the "twenty minutes" it seems to take the fire department to reach your house when your house is on fire. Which is usually under half that.
The testimony of the engineers of 175 and 66 are so convoluted, somewhat indecipherable and contradictory that it is mind boggling. NTSB not picking up on the contradictory testimony is surprising (or not).
66 engineer statement(s):
"So maybe about 30 feet away, just before we passed, I noticed it was two people in the tracks, and that's when 175 struck them."
"I was also -- you know, 175 was also blowing and the light was so bright. That's why when I got about, like I say, about 30 feet away -- that's the only reason -- that's the only time I saw them, when I actually really saw it was two individuals"
NTSB question:Q. Great. This is Steve Jenner. Thank you so far. Just to clarify, how far away, either in distance or in seconds, from the impact when you first saw the first person on the tracks?
Engineer 66 answer:
A. I would say about maybe -- I am going to say about eight car lengths
EuclidThe engineer of #66 also believed he was involved in the accident, and yet he did not make an emergency application after impact. Instead, he stopped with a service applicatio
Good point. He also saw, as he states, the situation unfolding so why did he not place his train in emergency? Two Amtrak engineers, graduates of Amtrak's training program and both of their reactions, or non reactions, are the same? That gives credence to the fact that Amtrak's training program is inadequate.
Unfortunately over the course of my career I have been involved in several 'pedestrian'/trespasser fatalities and near misses. When presented with a situation that can cause death or injury you use every means available to you to mitigate the incident. 175's engineer did not and as Overmod implied the plaintiffs attorneys will home in on that fact. I highly doubt that any railroad would instruct their employees not to apply emergency brakes in an emergency situation such as this because of the danger of derailment and or passenger injury.
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