Overmod rdamon Maybe tie that hot button to create a strobe effect with the ditch lights .. Read my post at 7:39. Yes, there should be a button that triggers 'autohorn' with patterned lights to accompany; yes, it should also trigger when the brakes are placed in emergency; yes, this 'tips the balance' over into using emergency position as a 'first response' when anything that can respond is seen fouling the track. Be interesting to see whether there are sources that could partially or wholly underwrite the cost of this as a 'voluntary mandate' from AAR. I suspect most of the programming and implementation on modern locomotives would be comparatively minor, depending on how the software and hardware currently implement 'autohorn'. Incidentally, based on critical-systems research in ITU group R10, you do NOT want to strobe the lights, especially if they are pseudowhite LEDs on 'bright'. All this does is blind people and ruin any dark adaptation they might need to avoid hazards as they react at night or under conditions of poor visibility or bad weather. What is preferable is to cycle the lights smoothly between bright and dim, or even normal and dim -- human peripheral vision is especially sensitive to motion, and will pick up the difference in brightness remarkably well. It might be possible to 'strobe' on bright for a very brief pulse at 'peak' light intensity in the smooth cycle, as one of the criteria that indicates 'danger' to the trained, and you will note that this is now well-differentiated from the effect of 'flashing ditch lights'. (Amusingly enough, there are potential legal issues to using brief flashes of LED light for this purpose; most secondary cameras are CCD with a fairly long interval between short capture periods -- this is why so many early pictures of the Siemens ACS-64s looked so strange; the LED multiplexing drive being out of phase with the effective capture periods so the lights often looked dim or 'out' when actually bright. Lawyers will doubtless use camera footage to establish 'the safety lights weren't working' when we all know better...)
rdamon Maybe tie that hot button to create a strobe effect with the ditch lights ..
Read my post at 7:39. Yes, there should be a button that triggers 'autohorn' with patterned lights to accompany; yes, it should also trigger when the brakes are placed in emergency; yes, this 'tips the balance' over into using emergency position as a 'first response' when anything that can respond is seen fouling the track.
Be interesting to see whether there are sources that could partially or wholly underwrite the cost of this as a 'voluntary mandate' from AAR. I suspect most of the programming and implementation on modern locomotives would be comparatively minor, depending on how the software and hardware currently implement 'autohorn'.
Incidentally, based on critical-systems research in ITU group R10, you do NOT want to strobe the lights, especially if they are pseudowhite LEDs on 'bright'. All this does is blind people and ruin any dark adaptation they might need to avoid hazards as they react at night or under conditions of poor visibility or bad weather. What is preferable is to cycle the lights smoothly between bright and dim, or even normal and dim -- human peripheral vision is especially sensitive to motion, and will pick up the difference in brightness remarkably well. It might be possible to 'strobe' on bright for a very brief pulse at 'peak' light intensity in the smooth cycle, as one of the criteria that indicates 'danger' to the trained, and you will note that this is now well-differentiated from the effect of 'flashing ditch lights'.
(Amusingly enough, there are potential legal issues to using brief flashes of LED light for this purpose; most secondary cameras are CCD with a fairly long interval between short capture periods -- this is why so many early pictures of the Siemens ACS-64s looked so strange; the LED multiplexing drive being out of phase with the effective capture periods so the lights often looked dim or 'out' when actually bright. Lawyers will doubtless use camera footage to establish 'the safety lights weren't working' when we all know better...)
Yes. We are programmed to notice sensory input changes more than constants. Also, strobe flashing can be disorienting and in some people (not only those diagnosed with a seizure disorder) could precipitate a seizure.
charlie hebdo Someone like Dave Klepper, a highly trained acoustic engineer, would likely know best, but changes in pitch would possibly also be more noticeable?
Someone like Dave Klepper, a highly trained acoustic engineer, would likely know best, but changes in pitch would possibly also be more noticeable?
Yes, I do think that something with a more distinct sound including pitch changes would be a good idea and use it as a special "red button" for emergencies, as you mentioned. Consider all the specialized audio warnings of police cars for instance.
rdamonMaybe tie that hot button to create a strobe effect with the ditch lights ..
It is interesting and perhaps telling that railroad tradition has led to using a series short toots or blasts to indicate the maximum warning to people on the track, rather than long and insistent sounding warning sounds. They must feel that the blank spaces between the sounds cause the sounds to have more punch. It is a principle of music, or even graphic art. Less is more. The most important parts are what you leave out.
There is also the light issue as the ones from behind were washed out from the one in front.
Maybe tie that hot button to create a strobe effect with the ditch lights ..
I agree with these points about making the horn signal more distinctive. Not only would it sound different and could be specialized for extreme danger alert, but it also could offer the advantage of not being able to be easily duplicated in perfect time with a second train sounding the same warning.
That is the effect of two engineers "laying on the horn" at the same time and making it sound like one train. Although, it is easy to understand why engineers would do that because time is running out, and they feel a need to get as much horn blowing done as possible in order to maximize the warning.
Then there could also be instructions for engineers to more carefully "read" the situation to determine whether two independent train warnings are better than one, or whether they may make the two warnings seem like one and cause a deception.
Overmod Part of the point here is that short blasts -- while preferable to 'leaning on the horn button' -- are not quite the right answer either. What is needed is (1) a definitive signal that means 'stop what you think you are doing and look around for danger', which (2) is discontinuous 'enough' that you will likely hear other sources sounding the same alert from different locations or directions that 'you should know'. You could do this with multiple short blasts sounded in intermittent groups, a bit like Morse "H" sounded with a lazy hand, but that's not immediately distinctive. I'd have suggested Morse "V" as I have in the distant past, as it has the 'take notice' blasts followed by a long one for "watch it!", but the NYC alert with gaps is shorter and, I think, better.
Part of the point here is that short blasts -- while preferable to 'leaning on the horn button' -- are not quite the right answer either.
What is needed is (1) a definitive signal that means 'stop what you think you are doing and look around for danger', which (2) is discontinuous 'enough' that you will likely hear other sources sounding the same alert from different locations or directions that 'you should know'. You could do this with multiple short blasts sounded in intermittent groups, a bit like Morse "H" sounded with a lazy hand, but that's not immediately distinctive. I'd have suggested Morse "V" as I have in the distant past, as it has the 'take notice' blasts followed by a long one for "watch it!", but the NYC alert with gaps is shorter and, I think, better.
Good points. Something distinctive, based on research, not just tradition, and it should be assigned an automated 'hot' button in each cab.
Paul of Covington Instead of the engineers leaning on their horns, I wonder if a series of short blasts (or double toots as used in work areas) by both of them would have made it more apparent that there were two trains.
Instead of the engineers leaning on their horns, I wonder if a series of short blasts (or double toots as used in work areas) by both of them would have made it more apparent that there were two trains.
Johnny
Paul of CovingtonInstead of the engineers leaning on their horns, I wonder if a series of short blasts (or double toots as used in work areas) by both of them would have made it more apparent that there were two trains.
I suggested this back at the beginning of this thread, with the added idea that emergency horn use should be formalized and 'trained'. In my opinion the emergency signal used on the NYC subways -- which is alternating long and short blasts with a space in between -- is hard to beat as the default choice.
As it happens, my daughter and I were almost in a crossing-related wreck a couple of months ago, when she had just gotten her license and I was helping her 'hone her skills'. Some nitwit had pushed onto a crossing (we never saw her) and I only noticed the continuous horn-blowing of the approaching train after a few seconds... it rapidly becomes tolerated for psychophysical reasons charlie hebdo can describe with some assurance. It took me several seconds to figure out what the heck was going on ... and in fact it took the 'bang' of the collision to tell me what it was. I told her to abort the left turn she was starting to make, and get out of the intersection and away from the crossing ASAP.
Which was a good thing: our moron floored it after getting hit, and went precisely across where we had been at high speed, winding up deep in someone's door on the other side.
So I have firsthand experience on both the need for and the value of a defined convention for emergency horn use that cannot blend into perceived ambient noise. The 'two little repeated toots' in work zones is just a note that an ostensibly-protected train is passing, more a heads-up than actual warning. What is needed is an actual imminent-danger code, specifically including quiet gaps, coupled with training that says in part 'look around you immediately if you hear it, and keep yourself ready to react appropriately'.
I might add that it should be possible to incorporate this into locomotive 'automatic horns', perhaps with its own dedicated control which would also flash the ditch lights in a comparable pattern. Once that 'logic' has been incorporated into the bus network, it might be useful to use it as an analogue of the red Mars lights on some midwestern steam, and activate it upon emergency-brake activation the same way 'autohorn' can be used approaching grade crossings. (This also resolves the moral question whether you go to emergency immediately when you see a life-threatening situation, I think -- now all the due-care actions with horn and lights happen automagically just by plugging the air, and any UDE is promptly communicated to any approaching passing train -- remember how useful this would have been to at least one oil-train BOOM accident)
BaltACDI cannot comprehend a legitmate reason for the Conductor not to look back - FREQUENTLY - once he and his trainee began walking on Amtrak property. Being a Qualified Conductor, he knew that he was not on CSX property at that particular location.
I assume he did look back, and probably frequently. How often should he have looked back while walking along the track? I would say every 5 seconds, look back for one second. That would seem necessary in a location where a train could come into view an be at your location in as little 5-10 seconds. So even if repeatedly looking back, there would be a danger of forgetting to look back just once.
The other main danger that develops is the approach of the train from ahead of them. That train would tend to be a great distraction because it triggers all your defenses to make sure you are clear of it. It could easily absorb all of a person's attention, and at the moment, the person would forget about looking back.
In looking back, the person is surely aware of the danger of a train approaching from behind. I don't think they are likely to just forget that danger. But when they spot a train coming toward them, they might mentally move that danger from behind to danger from ahead, and completely overlook the unlikely event of the danger behind doubling to include danger from ahead. In a way, it is not the train behind that sneaks up on you. What sneaks up on a person is the illusion that two trains are one.
Regarding the use of short horn blasts, that is what the rules call for; a series of short blasts in succession. Leaving some holes in the sound, would leave room for each train horn to separate from the other, and perhaps that may have been noticed by the two conductors.
I think that would grab attention better.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
The Conductor lived in the Baltimore-Washington area with his family with his father being a CSX company official. He graduated from HS in the BW area. I recall his father seveal times commenting on taking the family to New York on Amtrak for family fun times. I am certain the Conductor knew the speeds that Amtrak operated through the NEC having ridden it as well as being subject to the news media's reporting of the frequent occurrences of Amtrak hitting and killing trespassers up and down the NEC between Washington and the Delaware line. He had been working as a Conductor between Cumberland and Baltimore for almost five years.
I cannot comprehend a legitmate reason for the Conductor not to look back - FREQUENTLY - once he and his trainee began walking on Amtrak property. Being a Qualified Conductor, he knew that he was not on CSX property at that particular location. That is a question we will never get the answer to - but that answer, or lack thereof is the reason we are having this discussion - irrespective of all the Red Herrings many posters have thrown into the discussion.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I feel deeply sorry for the surviving family members of the deceased. This whole thing was a tragic mistake. But I think that all those who insist this should have been prevented are taking benefit of "monday morning quarterbacking"
Don't know if you have ever been involved in any intense litigation, but I have. And it's truly incredible the pointed questions that lawyers can dream up (after the fact) during the discovery phase leading up to a trial. Questions that would never even be pondered under routine circumstances.....yet they are presented in a frame of reference such that they believe have defacto relevance.
Trying to put myself in the shoes of the victims, I can see how they might have been lulled into a false sense of security walking within their own main up to the point where the front of the stopped CSX train crossed over to occupy that main, leaving them no alternatives other than to climb over a knuckle or veer out into the AMTRAK track as they did. It's likely I would have made the same decision they did.
I'd like to think that I would have been a little more careful, but going back to my earlier comment to Tree, self assuredness can be intoxicating. Those guys likely felt they were completely in control, and found out otherwise too late.
EuclidMy feeling is that, considering the danger of working so close to very high speed trains that can be upon a person only 5-10 seconds after becoming visible, it is most certainly negligent for CSX to require people to work under this condition. They should have provided protection in this Ivy City scenario. Therefore, I believe the probable cause of this accident was CSX sending the employees into danger without protection.
Euclid, I sometimes don't agree with you but I think this time, you are SPOT ON.
Convicted One Euclid It registers with me, but apparently not with the NTSB. The NTSB's recommendation per the report at your link address appears to me to adequately address the situation "going forward"...unfortunately it's a hard lesson learned...but some are just that. Question, I guess in order to comply with the NTSB's recommendation, the communication between the two railroads would take place at the "dispatcher" level...correct? The CSX dispatcher would be in Florida if I recall properly? Do you think that if dispatching had not been centralized, and CSX dispatchers were still "out in the field", that a local person with a more intimate familiarity with the way the tracks of both railroads are situated, might have been a little more proactive in arranging a precautionary communication with Amtrak? Or is that just wishful thinking?
Euclid It registers with me, but apparently not with the NTSB.
The NTSB's recommendation per the report at your link address appears to me to adequately address the situation "going forward"...unfortunately it's a hard lesson learned...but some are just that.
Question, I guess in order to comply with the NTSB's recommendation, the communication between the two railroads would take place at the "dispatcher" level...correct?
The CSX dispatcher would be in Florida if I recall properly?
Do you think that if dispatching had not been centralized, and CSX dispatchers were still "out in the field", that a local person with a more intimate familiarity with the way the tracks of both railroads are situated, might have been a little more proactive in arranging a precautionary communication with Amtrak? Or is that just wishful thinking?
To your question as to how and if CSX will provide protection as was concluded necessary by the NTSB, I don’t have an answer. Certainly I think it is necessary, and that it ought to be possible regardless of where dispatchers a located and how communication currently exists. However, it would not surprise me if they say it can’t be done.
Regarding the understanding of what NTSB has said about this issue in their report: The following are the five relevant quotes of the NTSB report. I listed the first four of these in the original post above. I should have included the fifth one that is listed in the following group.
#1) “The operating crews were not prohibited from walking either on or near the Amtrak tracks.”
#2) “The NTSB believes that the crew should have been prohibited from walking near the live tracks of the other railroad.”
#3) “However, there are circumstances when the operating employees cannot safely walk away from the other railroad’s tracks. In these situations, when the crew is fouling the other railroad’s adjacent track, they would need protection.”
#4) “A current process is readily available to provide this protection. For example, a train dispatcher will communicate with another train dispatcher from a different railroad if a derailed train has obstructed an adjacent railroad’s track.”
#5) “As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following new safety recommendation:
To CSX Transportation and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation:
Prohibit employees from fouling adjacent tracks of another railroad unless the employees are provided protection from trains and/or equipment on the adjacent tracks by means of communication between the two railroads.”
These points are written in a conversational style with a lot of unrelated material separating them. I have read through the report at least 25 times, and finally I think I understand these five points that it makes about providing protection. Originally, I saw several conflicts between them, and they did not seem to logically follow each other. But now I see that they are subject to multiple interpretations. Here is the (simplified) final interpretation that I think is what the NTSB intends to say:
Crews are not prohibited from walking on tracks.
NTSB wishes crews were prohibited from walking on tracks.
However, sometimes crews must walk on tracks, so cannot be prohibited.
A current process for protection is available, but not required.
NTSB recommends that the available process of protection be made mandatory, and that CSX forbids fouling tracks without it.
According to that interpretation, it all makes sense right up to and including their recommendation in point #5.
My feeling is that, considering the danger of working so close to very high speed trains that can be upon a person only 5-10 seconds after becoming visible, it is most certainly negligent for CSX to require people to work under this condition. They should have provided protection in this Ivy City scenario. Therefore, I believe the probable cause of this accident was CSX sending the employees into danger without protection.
I believe that factor is the greatest contributing factor in this accident, and that it far exceeds any failure of the two employees to “expect” trains.
Wishful thinking!
Amtrak's CNOC (their Dispatching Center) is in Philadelphia, I believe. When CSX Dispatching was in Baltimore on the BC Desk, the BC Dispatcher did not have any direct communications with Amtrak's CNOC; they did have direct communications with Amtrak's Operater at K Tower in Union Station. There was no established procedure for the CSX Dispatcher to attempt to notify CNOC of anything happening in the vicinity of F Tower. If there was a known derailment type situation, then the K Tower Operator would be notified of what was taking place.
In reading through the NTSB report, where the Dispatcher's names were mentioned - these were the same Dispatchers that held those positions when the Dispatcher's Office was in Baltimore.
On 'the other side' QN Tower where trains from the West enter Union Station, Washington Metro operates their right of way between CSX #1 & #2 tracks in a fenced in right of way that is equipped with derailment/intrusion monitors. The BC Dispatcher has a 'hot line' direct to DC Metro's control center to communicate with Metro about any activations of those sensors.
EuclidIt registers with me, but apparently not with the NTSB.
Common occurence under the old (pre-1996, pre- 19 ft rule for OTS) design standard. You can find it in just about any major terminal with more than two railroads.
mudchicken What part of "you were trespassing on the other guy's railroad" isn't registering here? They had no business being THERE. You were encroaching on ground controlled by somebody else that did not know you were THERE. If they were qualified on that territory, they should have known not to be THERE. (No idea if the conductor-trainee had any time on that territory in some other job classification.) The whole d*mned thing is troubling - situational awareness (again). PS - Don't try to erect a fence in the foul zone. If you do, you get the mess & dillema that METRA is stuck with.
What part of "you were trespassing on the other guy's railroad" isn't registering here? They had no business being THERE. You were encroaching on ground controlled by somebody else that did not know you were THERE. If they were qualified on that territory, they should have known not to be THERE. (No idea if the conductor-trainee had any time on that territory in some other job classification.) The whole d*mned thing is troubling - situational awareness (again).
PS - Don't try to erect a fence in the foul zone. If you do, you get the mess & dillema that METRA is stuck with.
It registers with me, but apparently not with the NTSB. As I mentioned at the start of this thread, they seemed to be dancing around variations on the theme of whether the two employees has a right to be where they were. They never made it clear. They said nothing about trespassing on Amtrak property. I see the property line marked in their diagram midway between the tracks of each company. But they say the diagram is not to scale, and they are right about that. The diagram makes it look like there is maybe at least 20 ft. between the nearest mains of the two companies.
But, in one of the photos related to the NTSB investigation, the adjacent mains of CSX and Amtrak appear no further apart than the two mains of each company. It looks like the property line is about 2.5 ft. from the side of a CSX train. It looks like a four-track railroad. How can they have the property line so closed to their trains? I was wondering if they might have some kind of agreement to allow joint use of the property there.
BaltACD Euclid The trains in this Ivy City accident were not quiet. They were both blowing urgent horn warnings that could probably have been heard a mile away.
Euclid The trains in this Ivy City accident were not quiet. They were both blowing urgent horn warnings that could probably have been heard a mile away.
Euclid Once they have experienced that, they will never forget it, and that will leave them always watching out for it
I can agree with most of your post, except that part. The potential for distraction is too big a variable to have 100% confidence that it will not be a factor.
Problems at home, problems with the boss, problems with creditors, etc...all are the types of things that a person might dwell upon spontaneously, at just the wrong moment. Even the most disciplined of minds ocassionally derail.
It would be nice to think that 100% of all accidents are preventable,...but due to the human factor I think that is a bit of a dream.
EuclidThe trains in this Ivy City accident were not quiet. They were both blowing urgent horn warnings that could probably have been heard a mile away.
Unless you have been in the Ivy City area, you have no idea just how noisy the area is. The highway New York Avenue runs parallell to the railraods on the East side of the right of way (if you consider the railroads running North-South) with all the noise that a urban 4+ lane highway generates. On the West side is Amtrak's Ivy City servicing facility for both cars and locomotives. Even if there were no operating trains in the area - the area is still noisy - how noisy on a sound meter, I have no idea. DC Metro operates in the near area and generates its own noise factor to add to the cacaphony of all the other noises.
The ambient noise factor does not excuse the appearant lack of 'personal attention' to the CSX employees. They were within a car or two of their trains locomotives, walking South they had full view of Amtrak 66 headed North - and according to testimony of Amtrak 175's Engineer, they never looked back to see 175 approaching.
I dare say the Conductor had more 'training' on his job functions than any of us have had. https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/62000-62499/62103/622765.pdf Unfortunately, the one real test of all this training - he failed and paid the ultimate price for his failure.
The trains in this Ivy City accident were not quiet. They were both blowing urgent horn warnings that could probably have been heard a mile away.
There is a category of accidents in which employees on the ground are struck by a train or rail equipment. I believe that at least 99% of them have heard and memorized the rule about expecting trains on any track, any time, etc., and they believe they are abiding by that rule all the time. It is a rule that requires no specific action or work other than to “expect.” It is also a rule that goes without saying. It is a rule that just can’t seem to know what real advice to give.
In the category of accidents in which employees on the ground are struck by trains, a more specific variation of this category is a subset in which employees have suddenly lost the protection of their hearing due to the sounds of two trains merging to the extent that they sound like one train. The mistake made by these victims is that they are not using their eyes enough when they encounter this blended sound of multiple trains. Yet, they are always “expecting trains on any track, at any time…” But here is the essence of the danger: People falling victim to it do not realize they are vulnerable. They don’t know what they don’t know. They don’t realize that they have suddenly, and by very rare circumstance, lost a critical part of their protection.
Other subsets of this category of accident have slightly different causes such as being distracted by one’s own thoughts to the extent that they completely lose situational awareness. Others are caused by sounds that simply drown out the sound of an approaching train. These could be the sounds of your own engine, the radio, or the wind.
There is another subset which involves the approach of trains that are so quiet that they are unlikely to be heard in time to get out of the way. Trains in snow fall into this category.
But for the one subset I am focusing on, the accident at Ivy City, DC is a perfect textbook example. Two nearly identical, opposing trains were approaching at the same speed, on parallel tracks. They met precisely where the two conductors were fouling one of the two tracks. Both trains blew the horn long and urgently. Both shook the ground under the two employees before the trains arrived at their location. Both were in plain sight. The two conductors undoubtedly head and felt both trains, but they only saw one of them; and they believed what they heard and felt was the one train they saw.
So how do you protect people from this unlikely, but possible death trap? The only way is to teach them ahead of time about it. They must be made to actually experience the terror of this amazing deception. Once they have experienced that, they will never forget it, and that will leave them always watching out for it.
Things that has made trains 'quieter' than they have ever been -
1. Welded Rail - no more clinking rail joints.2. WILD Detectors - (Wheel Impact Load Detectors) the thumping of flat spots are being eliminated.3. Quiet Zones - no more routine sounding the horn for road crossing.
When the breeze is blowing in the 'wrong' direction - a train can be there and you never heard it coming
It's truly amazing how quietly a "coasting" train can move along. I've been surprised a number of times standing trackside while facing one direction, only to have a train come by from behind me. First awareness being the blur as in comes into my field of vision.
So, I can kinda understand how a person who spends years walking along the side of trains for a living, could one day fall victim to their own complacency.
Few years ago NS was re-routing some east bound trains off the Waterlevel route and onto former NKP and PRR track to get the trains from Chicago into Ohio. They were operating a temporary fuel pad with a tanker truck near a fairly active junction with the former Wabash.
During the time that the fuel pad was in operation, passing trains on the adjoining tracks operated their bell function well before and well after the actual passing.
This seems like good practice to me. Making me wonder if something like this might have helped the conductors in the OPs story.
Of course in my example, all operating personnel were Norfolk Southern, so a coordinated solution was easy.
Convicted OneThat sense of self-assuredness can leave you vulnerable. Human nature, to a large extent.
That loss of situational awareness has cost its share of firefighters, who, unaware that the entire building is actually alight want to push on inside - "we got this."
A fellow has created a website (and does lectures) entitled "Situational Awareness Matters." It's something we all need to be reminded of from time to time.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
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