“Get there first with the most.” -- Nathan Bedford Forrest
I recently read a book about troop movements by rail and it is a great source for accounts of the ordinary soldiers who were riding the trains:
Rescue by Rail: Troop Transfer and the Civil War in the West 1863. By Roger Pickenpaugh. (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. Pp. xvii, 244, ISBN 0-8032-3720-0.)
Kevin
Yet another problem with the Confederate railraods was there was very rarely any sort of track connection between railroads serving a city. Freight would have to be unloaded and taken by wagon across to to be loaded on the outgoing train.
Quite true. Also, many (but not all) of the south's railroads weren't built to link cities and major towns together, but to bring agricultural products to the nearest river that could accomodate steamboats. The boats would take the products the rest of the way.
There's an example of one about two miles from where I live. There's a swamp and the old roadbed of a railroad that moved farm produce and coal from a local mine to the Kanawha Canal is visible as a treeline through the swamp. The canal took the products the rest of the way to Richmond, about 18 miles to the east.
And Mr. Moore, Jeff Davis should have known, he was there!
My understanding, was that the multiplicity of track gauges was the largest limiting factor in the South inability to effectively use railroads. While more of the North's railroads adhered to what we now know as Standard Gauge and thus entire train loads could be moved longer distances without any need to change to different cars.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Another book on the same subject is "Railroads in the Civil War" by John Clark. Similar view on the logistical abilities of North vs South and gives a very good review of Union troop movements to Tennessee by rail.
Firelock76 BaltACD dmoore74 Not just logistics, the CSA had many other problems. Here's a good start http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2009/06/25/review-dixie-betrayed-how-the-south-really-lost-the-civil-war/ Seems as if there are some parrallels with today At the heart of the problem is the life experience of these men. They are the “opposition”, a role that they cannot abandon when they become the nation. All of them had spent their political life fighting the United States of America, if their party was in power or not. Proud to a fault, ready to argue the smallest point of order and used to obstructing legislation they carry these traits to Richmond, damaging their cause and reducing any chance of winning the war. Good link and a good read! The only thing I'd take issue with is "All of them had spent their political life fighting the United States..." Not necessarily true, many were staunch patriots as long as the south was well-represented in the Federal government and had the requisite pull. When that began to change, so did they. No argument with the rest of the read. As I said earlier, it was almost the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation all over again. They didn't learn a thing from history. Pretty inexcusable really, considering a lot of them had fathers and grandfathers who fought in the Revolution, or they grew up surrounded by men who did. It's not like it was ancient history, it was still within living memory. The south was NOT well served by it's politicians at the time, that's for damn sure.
BaltACD dmoore74 Not just logistics, the CSA had many other problems. Here's a good start http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2009/06/25/review-dixie-betrayed-how-the-south-really-lost-the-civil-war/ Seems as if there are some parrallels with today At the heart of the problem is the life experience of these men. They are the “opposition”, a role that they cannot abandon when they become the nation. All of them had spent their political life fighting the United States of America, if their party was in power or not. Proud to a fault, ready to argue the smallest point of order and used to obstructing legislation they carry these traits to Richmond, damaging their cause and reducing any chance of winning the war.
dmoore74 Not just logistics, the CSA had many other problems. Here's a good start http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2009/06/25/review-dixie-betrayed-how-the-south-really-lost-the-civil-war/
Seems as if there are some parrallels with today
At the heart of the problem is the life experience of these men. They are the “opposition”, a role that they cannot abandon when they become the nation. All of them had spent their political life fighting the United States of America, if their party was in power or not. Proud to a fault, ready to argue the smallest point of order and used to obstructing legislation they carry these traits to Richmond, damaging their cause and reducing any chance of winning the war.
Good link and a good read! The only thing I'd take issue with is "All of them had spent their political life fighting the United States..." Not necessarily true, many were staunch patriots as long as the south was well-represented in the Federal government and had the requisite pull. When that began to change, so did they.
No argument with the rest of the read. As I said earlier, it was almost the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation all over again. They didn't learn a thing from history. Pretty inexcusable really, considering a lot of them had fathers and grandfathers who fought in the Revolution, or they grew up surrounded by men who did. It's not like it was ancient history, it was still within living memory.
The south was NOT well served by it's politicians at the time, that's for damn sure.
IIRC Jefferson Davis made the statement that the Confederacy was a country that died because of a theory.
dmoore74Not just logistics, the CSA had many other problems. Here's a good start http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2009/06/25/review-dixie-betrayed-how-the-south-really-lost-the-civil-war/
Not just logistics, the CSA had many other problems. Here's a good start http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2009/06/25/review-dixie-betrayed-how-the-south-really-lost-the-civil-war/
If I remember correctly in 1861 the US had about 40,000 miles of railroad, 30,000 miles in the North. The 10,000 miles in the south weren't necessarily connected with each other, and of couse weren't all gauged the same. That certainly didn't help matters.
And at the time the only industrial establishment in the south that could manufacture railroad supplies was the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond. They couldn't build locomotives but they could make just about everything else. Tredegar's problem was they couldn't make everything at once and they were heavily involved in war production, especially artillery.
Anyway, it's pretty remarkable how industry began to spring up in the south during the war years, really from almost nothing. To my knowledge the Confederates never lost a battle due to lack of weapons or ammunition.* However, much of that industrial development came too little and too late.
* There was a battle early in the war that took place in what became West Virginia. Most of the Confederate troops were armed with flintlocks (!) while their Union opponents had the newer percussion lock muskets. A heavy rain came up soaking the Confederates muskets. The wet flintlocks wouldn't fire so the Confederates had to withdraw.
Flintlocks? That's right. At the beginning of the war both sides had to scramble for weapons. Anything that would shoot was used.
My brother gave me a copy of The Railroads of the Cofederacy by Robert C Black III a few yeasr back - got around to reading it a couple of years ago. The book was originally published in 1952. Black's book obviously focuses on the railroad's contribution to logistics, and makes for a good read.
One of my takeaways from Black's book was also the Confederacy eally sucked at logistics. Another takeaway was that the Confederacy was pretty much doomed from the start with respect to railroads as they did not have enough industrial capacity to keep the RR's in service with rapid wearout of RR cars, locomotives and the rail itself. They made things even worse by not having an effective plan to coordinate RR logistics.
Anyway, thanks for the review.
The Boer war used trains as sort-of tanks- not much written about them that I can find. I imagine that didn't work out so well. And then there's the railway-mounted naval guns of 1914-1918.
I do recall reading about Sherman in Georgia-his troops would pull up the rails, heat them red-hot and wind them around trees. Sherman bow-ties they were called.
greyhounds............ I found it a little light. ............ ................Both sides went to war with the horses and mules they had, not the horses and mules they wished they had. Obviously, the last supply link to the soldier himself was overwhelmingly a team and waggon.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
"The Confederates flat out sucked at logistics..." Absolutely! Otherwise why should an army raised by an agrarian society be on the verge of starvation too many times? It seems to me that when the officer corps of the US Army broke up during secession, and 1/3d of the officers went south, the Confederacy got the better combat commanders but the Union got the better administrators. Good Union combat commanders would come "out of the woodwork" but it took time, and quite a lot of spilled blood.
The Confederates had their own constitution working against them as well, strong on "States Rights" but weak as far as a central government goes. Not much more effective than the Articles of Confederation of the Revolutionary War days the central government in Richmond just couldn't compel the individual Confederate states to share what surplus they had in the way of food and clothing to support any other states troops. A recipe for failure if ever there was one.
On the other hand, it's been said if the Confederacy had Seven-Eleven's and pickup trucks available to them the South just might have won!
The American Civil War is recognized as being the first major conflict in which railroads played a significant role. They certainly did that, but author Earl J. Hess includes all modes in this book. Railroads, river steamboats, coastwise ocean shipping, horses and mules, and the individual soldier carrying basic needs on his back.
My great grandfather, Cornelius Waggoner, served with the 26th Illinois Infantry from near the start of the war. He was at Vicksburg and on Sherman's March to The Sea. As far as I can tell, he walked from Memphis to Savannah, GA. I did five years as a lieutenant in the US Army Transportation Corps. Two years on active duty in Virginia, two in a rail reserve unit in Milwaukee, and one year as a platoon leader in a tractor trailer unit of the Illinois National Guard. I grew up in central Illinois, Lincoln Country. So I really wanted to read this book.
I found it a little light. It's probably a good primer, a good introduction and overview. But I've been focused as much as possilbe on moving freight since I was in a baby crib (literally) so other readers may find it very informative.
It did contain some "I Never Realized That!" information. Such as:
The Confederates flat out sucked at logistics. They had some bold and dashing generals, but the soldiers needed shoes, clothing, food, etc. Hess claims a major reason for the Confederate defeat was poor logistics.
Cavalry raids on enemy rail lines were ineffectual. The horse soldiers could get in and rip up some miles of track or wreck a train. But this could be repaired in a few days with no great effect. The Federals became very good at doing such repairs. The Confederates just didn't have such resources. The exceptions were provided by actions such as Sherman's March to The Sea. In that case infantry moved along rail lines and destroyed such lines in great detail as they went.
After Federal forces took control of the Mississippi River southern forces tried to harass the steamboats with rifles and cannon. They killed some folks indiscriminately, civilians, women, etc., but the Confederacy didn't have the resources to make a real dent in the supply line.
Both sides went to war with the horses and mules they had, not the horses and mules they wished they had. Obviously, the last supply link to the soldier himself was overwhelmingly a team and waggon. This is in addition to the animals needed for cavalry and artillery. Each horse or mule needed 26 pounds of food per day. Each soldier needed only 3.5 pounds of food per day. So keeping the animals fed was a major supply issue.
There was almost no possible way to breed a horse or mule for war service. The author cites an 11 month gestation period and three years to useful maturity. By the time the animal was ready for Army service, the war would be nearly done. Everybody went to war with the horses and mules on hand at the start.
I found the book interesting, but use your own discretion.
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