It's listed on the Trains' Newswire, but no one else has posted it here yet.
http://www.kentucky.com/news/local/counties/scott-county/article205810789.html
On another site, someone said PTC is active on this line. That doesn't necessarily mean that one or both trains involved had working PTC. We have PTC active in my territory, but not all engines are equipped yet. If an engine has working PTC, we run using it.
Jeff
The trains collided where two parallel tracks turn into one track, according to video. The northbound train ran through a switch where the tracks split and hit a stopped southbound train head-on, according to WKYT, the Herald-Leader’s reporting partner.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Here, I think: N 38 10' 28" W 84 32' 27"
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Georgetown Police@gtownkypolice On scene at the train collision. 2 trains have collided near Lisle Road. Crews are on scene and evaluating. The initial fire has been extinguished. 12:51 AM - Mar 19, 2018 16 24 people are talking about this
On scene at the train collision. 2 trains have collided near Lisle Road. Crews are on scene and evaluating. The initial fire has been extinguished.
Read an account of this accident in a local paper, and afterward had no clue as to railroad, line, train, or location. Journalism at its finest. It was a free sample to get me to subscribe. Since I had to come here to get the basic who, where, how and why answered, you can guess where my money went.
According to the information I have CP Akers is at the South end of a stretch of two-main track. If the train was Northbound, it was on single main entering double.
If it was a head-on collision, why was the switch lined to the occupied track? If it were a rear-end collision, it would make sense that the leading train had an uncommanded emergency stop. I live near a permanent speed restriction (a town) and many times I hear the crew of the "leading" train call the following train if they have an issue and aren't in Notch 8 pulling away.
That said, have they confirmed train symbols involved?
rrnut282 According to the information I have CP Akers is at the South end of a stretch of two-main track. If the train was Northbound, it was on single main entering double. If it was a head-on collision, why was the switch lined to the occupied track? If it were a rear-end collision, it would make sense that the leading train had an uncommanded emergency stop. I live near a permanent speed restriction (a town) and many times I hear the crew of the "leading" train call the following train if they have an issue and aren't in Notch 8 pulling away. That said, have they confirmed train symbols involved?
To me it looks like a glancing head on collision. It appears that the one leaving the two tracks ran past the signal just as the other one reached the switch and started through the divirging route.
jeffhergertTo me it looks like a glancing head on collision. It appears that the one leaving the two tracks ran past the signal just as the other one reached the switch and started through the divirging route.
Like this?
That's possible, except the account I read stated the Southbound was stationary. I wouldn't take that to the bank. So far, details seem long on speculation and short on facts.
Info I have recieved is that the SB had trouble controlling his train in response to the STOP signal - and had communicated with the NB who stopped just short of the Control Point. SB slid through the STOP Signal.
BaltACD Info I have recieved is that the SB had trouble controlling his train in response to the STOP signal - and had communicated with the NB who stopped just short of the Control Point. SB slid through the STOP Signal.
It looks like both are in the CP. The NB signal appears to be resting on a tank car behind the engine consist. I would say the frog for the switch was about where the BNSF engine is.
That does not look like a "head on" collision... unless the NS unit was being run Long Hood forward. That looks like the train with the BNSF engine ran into the rear of the NS train.
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
Yeee-ouch! Someone get that loco a new Cannon Shell.
Semper VaporoThat does not look like a "head on" collision... unless the NS unit was being run Long Hood forward. That looks like the train with the BNSF engine ran into the rear of the NS train.
My understanding from another forum was the BNSF was the leader of the NB. The frame was the leader of the SB, the 2nd unit of the SB is the one in the air. How the SB crew survived, the Almighty only knows.
I wasn't there so everything I have said could be wrong.
BaltACD Semper Vaporo That does not look like a "head on" collision... unless the NS unit was being run Long Hood forward. That looks like the train with the BNSF engine ran into the rear of the NS train. My understanding from another forum was the BNSF was the leader of the NB. The frame was the leader of the SB, the 2nd unit of the SB is the one in the air. How the SB crew survived, the Almighty only knows. I wasn't there so everything I have said could be wrong.
Semper Vaporo That does not look like a "head on" collision... unless the NS unit was being run Long Hood forward. That looks like the train with the BNSF engine ran into the rear of the NS train.
From another site.
Train on double ran his stop. Train on single (running on approach diverging) hit the stopped train. Perfect storm. The train on single was to close when the train on double announced they were by it. Word is they were running out the back door. Emergency at 38mph & hit at 32.
Also on this site, they are talking that the engineer who overran the stop signal did so once before and served time off. That this location is the same place where his first violation happened.
jeffhergert BaltACD Semper Vaporo That does not look like a "head on" collision... unless the NS unit was being run Long Hood forward. That looks like the train with the BNSF engine ran into the rear of the NS train. My understanding from another forum was the BNSF was the leader of the NB. The frame was the leader of the SB, the 2nd unit of the SB is the one in the air. How the SB crew survived, the Almighty only knows. I wasn't there so everything I have said could be wrong. From another site. Train on double ran his stop. Train on single (running on approach diverging) hit the stopped train. Perfect storm. The train on single was to close when the train on double announced they were by it. Word is they were running out the back door. Emergency at 38mph & hit at 32. "...Also on this site, they are talking that the engineer who overran the stop signal did so once before and served time off. That this location is the same place where his first violation happened..." Jeff Call me a little paranoid, but it seems to suggest, that on the basis of the time [local: 11PM], and no indications of limitions to his vision; there may be an underlaying undiagnosed medical condition in the 'overrunning engineer' ? Might even be a problem with distance of the signal's visibility; due to, maybe, some local condition?
"...Also on this site, they are talking that the engineer who overran the stop signal did so once before and served time off. That this location is the same place where his first violation happened..."
Call me a little paranoid, but it seems to suggest, that on the basis of the time [local: 11PM], and no indications of limitions to his vision; there may be an underlaying undiagnosed medical condition in the 'overrunning engineer' ? Might even be a problem with distance of the signal's visibility; due to, maybe, some local condition?
samfp1943Call me a little paranoid, but it seems to suggest, that on the basis of the time [local: 11PM], and no indications of limitions to his vision; there may be an underlaying undiagnosed medical condition in the 'overrunning engineer' ? Might even be a problem with distance of the signal's visibility; due to, maybe, some local condition?
I would tend to wonder if the previous incident occurred under similar conditions - as you say, it might be something this particular individual has a problem with.
Or, if there is something in the physical characteristics that causes a problem. I wouldn't think it's a signal issue - the train would have gotten an approach aspect of one sort or another at an earlier signal, and assuming familiarity with the line, the engineer would have known where to make the stop.
So I wonder if he miscalculated speed/weight/stopping distance. I've never been faced with a pending collision, but there have been times when I wondered if that application I put on was ever going to take...
Crew saw the stop signal when they woke up. Another fatigue caused accident.
Anti climbers do not alway work do they ?
I think it is a known fakt that anticlimbers don't always work as intended. The 2011 Red Oak accident is an example.
Research by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center of the US DoT have shown that push-back couplers and deformable anticlimbers show better results.
That is on reason that passenger locomotives like EMD F125, Siemens Sprinter and Charger are equipped with push-back couplers and Crash Energy Management Anticlimbers. Animation conventional versus CEM couplers:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JPXtOUWPWWg
And a report: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/12370/dot_12370_DS1.pdf?Regards, Volker
Edit: Replaced the second identical link with the right one
blue streak 1 Anti climbers do not alway work do they ?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlqZDkOTUDQ
Thank you for posting. The video is much easier understood than my links.
BTW what you see in the video are CEM constructions according to European standards.Regards, Volker
23 17 46 11
And comparing the tests in the video to the actual NS collision is also a illusion.
1 car vs 1 car and even 5 cars vs 5 cars. One question not illuminated in the video - was the standing car(s) secured by hand brake?
In the NS collision you are dealing with a probably 10K ton or more train that is stopped, most likely with air still applied and a 10K or more train moving at 30 or so MPH. Real world vs the tests are apples and oranges.
edblysardWhat is the average weight in imperial tons of a European freight locomotive?
four-axle locomotives around 100 tons, six-axle units about 140 tons.
The question was the failure of the convenional FRA-compliant anticlimber. There are a lot of accident reports and tests showing that this kind of anticlimber often doesn't work as intended.
The push-back coupler and the deformable anticlimber allow the vehicles to interlock and prevent overriding, while the FRA-anticlimber inhere the danger that a vehicle is deflected upward.
And so far this is independent of locomotive weight. In this case the push-back deformable anticlimber combination is not used as CEM element but an overriding prevention.Regards, Volker
BaltACD Real world vs the tests are apples and oranges.
Real world vs the tests are apples and oranges.
More like apples and battleships.
It seems like a left or right diversion would be better in this case. Aside from fouling another line, which usually happens anyway with the other cars.
BaltACDAnd comparing the tests in the video to the actual NS collision is also a illusion.
First of all we were talking about the overridung problem and nothing more. Push-back couplers and deformable anticlimbers can avoid it.
BaltACDIn the NS collision you are dealing with a probably 10K ton or more train that is stopped, most likely with air still applied and a 10K or more train moving at 30 or so MPH. Real world vs the tests are apples and oranges.
The other question, could CEM have minimized the damage and saved the live of the crew? I don't know.
As I said before there are accidents the best crashworthiness design can handle.
When Europe developed its EN 15277 the commitee checked about 900 accident reports. The EN crash scenarios would have covered about 80%. The FRA has similar scenarios in their Alternative crashwortiness design.
If the NS collisions falls into the not to handle category I don't know.
You can design a CEM system to run against an unmovable wall. Up to which energy (mass and speed) depends on the availabe space and material.
The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center of the US DoT and others have done a lot research on CEM crashworthiness design that led to the FRA Alternative Crashworthiness Design and passenger car CEM requirements.
One of the results was that you are better of in CEM passenger cars than in conventional American equipment: https://www.fra.dot.gov/Elib/Document/2125
Hopefully the number of these kinds of accidents will be reduced by PTC.Regards, Volker
VOLKER LANDWEHR BaltACD And comparing the tests in the video to the actual NS collision is also a illusion. First of all we were talking about the overridung problem and nothing more. Push-back couplers and deformable anticlimbers can avoid it. BaltACD In the NS collision you are dealing with a probably 10K ton or more train that is stopped, most likely with air still applied and a 10K or more train moving at 30 or so MPH. Real world vs the tests are apples and oranges. The other question, could CEM have minimized the damage and saved the live of the crew? I don't know. As I said before there are accidents the best crashworthiness design can handle. When Europe developed its EN 15277 the commitee checked about 900 accident reports. The EN crash scenarios would have covered about 80%. The FRA has similar scenarios in their Alternative crashwortiness design. If the NS collisions falls into the not to handle category I don't know. You can design a CEM system to run against an unmovable wall. Up to which energy (mass and speed) depends on the availabe space and material. The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center of the US DoT and others have done a lot research on CEM crashworthiness design that led to the FRA Alternative Crashworthiness Design and passenger car CEM requirements. One of the results was that you are better of in CEM passenger cars than in conventional American equipment: https://www.fra.dot.gov/Elib/Document/2125 Hopefully the number of these kinds of accidents will be reduced by PTC.Regards, Volker
BaltACD And comparing the tests in the video to the actual NS collision is also a illusion.
BaltACD In the NS collision you are dealing with a probably 10K ton or more train that is stopped, most likely with air still applied and a 10K or more train moving at 30 or so MPH. Real world vs the tests are apples and oranges.
The tonnages of todays Class 1 freight trains posess more force in their momentum than virtually ANYTHING designed and built by man can withstand at the point of impact.
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