daveklepperIn the case of this locomotive, the smoke and oil drops were severe enough to indicate a major problem. And indeed a hole in the cylinder head and a non-working valve are major problems. Before you commented, did you read the whole thread and the report?
The state the locomotive was found in after the incident, was not the state the locomotive was dispatched from origin in nor was it the state the Mr. Harding left it in at Nantes when he went to the loding facility - it was not on fire at origin or during the trip nor when Mr. Harding left in the taxi for lodging.
Yes the engine had issues when dispatched, it had issues during the prior trip and probably several trips prior to that. The issues didn't become 'terminal' until after Mr. Harding left the engine at Nantes.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
In the case of this locomotive, the smoke and oil drops were severe enough to indicate a major problem. And indeed a hole in the cylinder head and a non-working valve are major problems. Before you commented, did you read the whole thread and the report?
.
My experience with EMD and Alco-GE power on the B&M was opposite to yours. The defect had been reported by the engineer that used it earlier, and my understanding is that it was supposed to go into the shop.
daveklepperBecause after starting it up it started exhaling black smoke with oil drops in it. According to other testimony, it had already been tagged to go into the shop, and the only reason it was not inside is that the shop was closed for the holiday. At least that is my understanding of the testimony to date.
At least that is my understanding of the testimony to date.
My experience with the Fairbanks-Morris yard engines that were normal yard power in Baltimore when I was transferred there - everyone of them smoked and spit out oil drops with the smoke. I understand the the Lac Megantic unit wasn't a FM, however, smoking and spitting oil is not a defect worthy of taking a unit out of service as the only defect.
Because after starting it up it started exhaling black smoke with oil drops in it. According to other testimony, it had already been tagged to go into the shop, and the only reason it was not inside is that the shop was closed for the holiday.
daveklepperIf whatever the "power desk" would assign a defective locomotive to a consist when one in good condition is available,
How do we know that the power desk knew the locomotive was defective? Or, more to the point, defective to the point that it should not have been used?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
[quote user="Euclid"]
I don’t think the locomotive failure has anything to do with the case. Taking chances on causing further damage to a locomotive by running it when it has a problem is done all the time. It is the company’s choice, to take that financial gamble, and no law forbids it.
If anything mitigates Harding’s blame, it will be the company culture of engineers failing to properly securing the train. That detail leaves the possibility that the company coerced this behavior. So if Harding’s defense raises the point that Harding was doing what the company had requested, and if the court cannot disprove this claim, then I don’t see how the case against Harding is not damaged.
The key point is that an employer has power over its employees by the threat of job loss. That is why sexual harassment in the workplace is a big issue. All of these well-seasoned engineers acting in a pattern of negligent safety practice is a giant red flag suggesting that they are being coerced by a force outside of their normal intent.
[/quote above]
That is why the locomotive failure is important. If whatever the "power desk" would assign a defective locomotive to a consist when one in good condition is available, that would further indicate a system-wide failure to have "Safety First Culture." The fact that if the locomotive had been a good one, Harding's failure to PROPERLY secure the train would not have been noticed and the tragedy would not have occured DOES NOT, I agree, absolve Harding from failure to PROPERLY secure the train. I agree with you about that. But the other reason is important. The "company" did not make that choice. The individual employee who assigned power made that choice. The "company" is guilty of a system-wide failure to make "Safey First" First.
Again, a second example is the failure to install a permanent derail, to be activated any time a train was parked unmanned at the location. And that would also have averted the tragedy. (At least one of the locomotives would have derailed even if most locomotive trucks climbed across. The following train would have thus derailed. Or it could have been the split-rail type.) Here also this does not absolve Harding from failure to have secured the train but does demonstrate a lack of system-wide Safety First.
BigJim BaltACD Train's are to be secured and the locomotive consist IS NOT a part of the securement plan. YES! THEY ARE!!! They are to be left tied down just like the train. Other than that, I agree with what you said, especially about the "problem locomotives". Had it happen many a time.
BaltACD Train's are to be secured and the locomotive consist IS NOT a part of the securement plan.
YES! THEY ARE!!! They are to be left tied down just like the train.
Other than that, I agree with what you said, especially about the "problem locomotives". Had it happen many a time.
I am not saying that the locomotives should be left unsecured, they have their own securement rules that need to be complied with. What I was pointing out is that train's that are tied down account engine trouble frequently have the power removed before a crew with new power shows up to finally move the train.
SunnylandA friend who is retired BNSF engineer said that engineer should never have left the train in that situation, even if he was timing out. And should have set the mandatory number of hand brakes according to the usual formula depending on how many cars. And dispatch or Supervisor should never have let him leave without sending a replacement to keep watch on the train. He could have stopped the FD from turning off the engine, they did not know about the connection between power and brakes.
Different company procedures. What the BNSF does and what the MM&A does are two different things. The two company's facing two different financial realities and each have their own standard practices. If the MM&A train had been properly secured with hand brakes on the train, the Fire Dept. shutting down the engine would have been of no consequence.
Since it appears that it was a common ocurrence to tie trains down at Nantes it would be interesting to see the record of MM&A Efficiency Tests done to test the employees properly securing trains at that location.
I wonder if that question has been asked in Court? If so, what has been the response and if that response was that securement had been tested the next line of questioning would be for the MM&A Official that performed the efficiency test as to how they determined that the train was secured or not?
A friend who is retired BNSF engineer said that engineer should never have left the train in that situation, even if he was timing out. And should have set the mandatory number of hand brakes according to the usual formula depending on how many cars. And dispatch or Supervisor should never have let him leave without sending a replacement to keep watch on the train. He could have stopped the FD from turning off the engine, they did not know about the connection between power and brakes.
BaltACD I can't speak to Mr. Stahl's procedures while on the MM&A. At one time CSX used to have a easily accessable file (for employees) on 'Infant Mortality' - locomotives that failed shortly after being 'fixed' in the shops. Ocurrences of Infant Mortality were not isolated, and in some cases one would see the same locomotive on the report over, over and over agin. I don't have the answer on why this happens - I just know that it does. Locomotives are complex pieces of technology and for some reason some have more issues than others - even though for all extents and purposes they are identical. Certain automobiles, even on marques that have a good overall repair record, can be considered lemons and need to be repaired over and over again. The reason the locomotives issues aren't germaine to this incident is because PROPER SECUREMENT does not rely on the operation of any of the locomotives. Proper securement of the train applies to the cars of the train itself, not to the locomotive consist. In my experience, when trains experienced locomotive issues that prevented the train from completing its normal run and the train was tied down enroute - in many cases another train would pick up the defective power to hasten its movement to the shops for repair while a plan is being formulated to get fresh power to the train. Train's are to be secured and the locomotive consist IS NOT a part of the securement plan.
I can't speak to Mr. Stahl's procedures while on the MM&A.
At one time CSX used to have a easily accessable file (for employees) on 'Infant Mortality' - locomotives that failed shortly after being 'fixed' in the shops. Ocurrences of Infant Mortality were not isolated, and in some cases one would see the same locomotive on the report over, over and over agin. I don't have the answer on why this happens - I just know that it does.
Locomotives are complex pieces of technology and for some reason some have more issues than others - even though for all extents and purposes they are identical. Certain automobiles, even on marques that have a good overall repair record, can be considered lemons and need to be repaired over and over again.
The reason the locomotives issues aren't germaine to this incident is because PROPER SECUREMENT does not rely on the operation of any of the locomotives. Proper securement of the train applies to the cars of the train itself, not to the locomotive consist. In my experience, when trains experienced locomotive issues that prevented the train from completing its normal run and the train was tied down enroute - in many cases another train would pick up the defective power to hasten its movement to the shops for repair while a plan is being formulated to get fresh power to the train. Train's are to be secured and the locomotive consist IS NOT a part of the securement plan.
Balt,
We in the aviation industry prefer the term "Maintenance induced failure" purely because things mechanical will fail shortly after repair or overhaul because the person doing the work thought a part was servicable when it was not and the defect couldn't be seen. Many reasons for such failures but I'm of the opinion Randy Stahl's work was beyond reproach.
Norm
BigJim BaltACD Train's are to be secured and the locomotive consist IS NOT a part of the securement plan. YES! THEY ARE!!! They are to be left tied down just like the train.
Standing equipment must be secured. In our case, we regularly run around our trains at each end of the run. We test securement with the locomotive attached (of course) but all of the brakes, including the independent, released. So, in effect, the handbrakes on the cars are not only holding the consist, but the locomotive as well. If it's the end of the day and we're tying things down for the night, we do the same thing, then we set the handbrake on the locomotive...
BaltACDTrain's are to be secured and the locomotive consist IS NOT a part of the securement plan.
daveklepperWhy are my questions regarding the defective locomotive's use related solely to securing the train? Continued use of such a locomotive is itself an unsafe practice and can lead to increased repair costs.
I didn't understand what question you were asking. I can only speak to what I actually know.
I was asked by the defense about locomotive hunting. I answered that hunting in itself is not a major issue, most of the time its caused by an out of adjustment governor. That said I also told the jury that I was always available by phone to talk to crews in the US and Canada 24/7. If Francois sincerely felt that the locomotive was seriously ill I would have supported his decision, or helped him make a decision to shut it down.
Do not forget that in addition to repairing locomotives I also operated them. I do not casually dismiss complaints. A practice I continue to this day.
It was not uncommon to work on a locomotive one day and have it in my consist the next.
I was not called or notified.
Why are my questions regarding the defective locomotive's use related solely to securing the train? Continued use of such a locomotive is itself an unsafe practice and can lead to increased repair costs.
regarding the first question I asked, I can understand why Randy is reluctant to answer the question. Answering the question might result in extending the mandate of the prosecutor. I do not believe that Randy was in any way responsible for the use of that locomotive or its non-use. The shop was shut down and I do not believe he was contacted.
ruderunner Uh, maybe. I'd like to hear from an engineer or conductor about how long it takes to secure a train. How long to wind up the hand brakes poer car? Assuming you set the automatic brakes and released them for the pull test, how long to recharge the air line? Maybe small amounts of time but they may add up.
Uh, maybe. I'd like to hear from an engineer or conductor about how long it takes to secure a train.
How long to wind up the hand brakes poer car? Assuming you set the automatic brakes and released them for the pull test, how long to recharge the air line?
Maybe small amounts of time but they may add up.
A minute per car to set the handbrake would be liberal. Plus the time to walk to the next car. So let's go big and say three minutes per car. Ten cars then takes 30 minutes. Fifteen minutes would be more like it.
Recharging the train includes some variables. Assuming a "tight" train - maybe ten minutes from a service application, perhaps a little longer. (Charging a train from zero, or an emergency application, takes a lot longer) I forget the specifics in the air brake rules (and my grip is in the back of my truck), but that's pretty close. A leaky train, potentially due to cold weather, could take longer.
So, on the outside, setting 7-10 brakes and getting a full release and recharge on the train (on the way to that hold test) might run something over a half hour under normal circumstances.
Of course, I'm used short trains with the brake handle/wheel in a vestibule. Still, I think it'll be fairly accurate.
Modeling the Cleveland and Pittsburgh during the PennCentral era starting on the Cleveland lakefront and ending in Mingo junction
BaltACD The TSB report states that Harding went on duty at 1330 and the train departed Farnham at 1355. The train arrived Nantes at 2250. Harding would have had 2 hour and 40 minutes until his HOS time at 0130. The Hours of Service has no bearing on his failure to properly secure the train.
The TSB report states that Harding went on duty at 1330 and the train departed Farnham at 1355. The train arrived Nantes at 2250. Harding would have had 2 hour and 40 minutes until his HOS time at 0130. The Hours of Service has no bearing on his failure to properly secure the train.
Ahh alright, good to clear this point up regardless!
EuclidThis suggests that it was not due to a lack of knowledge, but rather something quite possibly related to the fact that it was one man doing the securement work instead of two men.
I think you will find that one man would have been doing the securement on a two man crew - the conductor. The engineer would have remained in his seat.
Now, this is pure conjecture on my part: It could be that with a two person crew, the conductor can set brakes, then call for a roll test. If it fails, he's right next to the next car to be set - not back on the locomotive. Tie a few more brakes and try the test again. Eventually the test will be good. That's how we do it.
With a one person crew, that would mean more round trips, although one could argue that if the securement was done right every time, then the number of brakes normally necessary would be known quantity and only one trip would be necessary.
End of conjecture.
Saturnalia Norm48327 I can't and wont speak for the jurors but I also feel perhaps Harding was under orders from above to take his rest purely because his HOS were timed out and he was given no time to secure the train without violating HOS. That fault may rest with the dispatcher. Does that absolve Harding from responsibility? Not in my judgement. Were I in his shoes (and I realize hindsight is always 20/20) i would have taken upon myself to do the right thing and make certain the train was not going anywhere. Norm, I've seen you and a couple of others bring up this question on securing the train beyond HOS requirements, and the law is more flexible than you're thinking. Current GCOR rules state (Page 1-7, Rule 1.17 Hours of Service Law) that: 1.17 (B) Exceeding the Law -- Employees must not exceed the hours of service law without proper authority. However, they must not leave trains, engines or cars on the main track without proper protection. Employees must secure trains properly and, if possible, do so before they exceed the hours of servide. Except as provided by this paragraph, employees are then relieved of all duties (end quote) This is an industry standard, and should not have, to the best of my knowledge and understanding, prevented Harding from securing the train. That's a very specific carve-out in the HOS law for that very purpose.
Norm48327 I can't and wont speak for the jurors but I also feel perhaps Harding was under orders from above to take his rest purely because his HOS were timed out and he was given no time to secure the train without violating HOS. That fault may rest with the dispatcher. Does that absolve Harding from responsibility? Not in my judgement. Were I in his shoes (and I realize hindsight is always 20/20) i would have taken upon myself to do the right thing and make certain the train was not going anywhere.
I can't and wont speak for the jurors but I also feel perhaps Harding was under orders from above to take his rest purely because his HOS were timed out and he was given no time to secure the train without violating HOS. That fault may rest with the dispatcher.
Does that absolve Harding from responsibility? Not in my judgement. Were I in his shoes (and I realize hindsight is always 20/20) i would have taken upon myself to do the right thing and make certain the train was not going anywhere.
Norm,
I've seen you and a couple of others bring up this question on securing the train beyond HOS requirements, and the law is more flexible than you're thinking.
Current GCOR rules state (Page 1-7, Rule 1.17 Hours of Service Law) that:
1.17 (B) Exceeding the Law -- Employees must not exceed the hours of service law without proper authority. However, they must not leave trains, engines or cars on the main track without proper protection. Employees must secure trains properly and, if possible, do so before they exceed the hours of servide. Except as provided by this paragraph, employees are then relieved of all duties
(end quote)
This is an industry standard, and should not have, to the best of my knowledge and understanding, prevented Harding from securing the train. That's a very specific carve-out in the HOS law for that very purpose.
The TSB report cites a history of engineers admitting that they occasionally violated the securement rules, and this was more frequent with the one-man crews. If the failure to properly secure trains was evenly distributed among one-man and two-man crews, one might assume that the failure was based on a lack of knowledge. But statistically, the failure to produce adequate securement is more frequent with one-man crews. This suggests that it was not due to a lack of knowledge, but rather something quite possibly related to the fact that it was one man doing the securement work instead of two men.
If that were the reason, I wonder what would be the exact nature of the thought process of why a person would decide to not produce an adequate securement of their train.
Would they work until overcome by fatigue, and then quit without finishing the job, without telling their supervisors that they could not finish the job?
Would they just refuse to complete the securement in protest, thinking that the unfairness of being asked to do the extra work entitled them to not do it?
tree68Perhaps his higher-ups were operating under the assumption that the train was properly secured. If that was the case, there would be no need for him to go to the scene. The train could sit until morning, when perhaps the mechanical department would be summoned to deal with the problem. As you note, though, it will all probably come out in the wash, as they say.
As you note, though, it will all probably come out in the wash, as they say.
We have a saying in aviation circles regarding assumptions. "They make an ass of you and me". I think under the circustances regarding the train being secured that mantra makes sense. Whether of his own volition or under orders Harding failed to do his job.
OTOH, the method of securement appears to have been common practice at Nantes and was practiced by other engineers. The "wet stacking' of the lead locomotive and resultant fire may have been the camel's final straw. GE locomotives of that era were known for that and the firefighters couldn't be reasonably expected to know the outcome of shutting the engine down nor would they have suspected that enough brakes were not set to prevent the train from moving once the air bled off.
The whole thing IMO was an unfortunate comedy of errors any of which could have been prevented led to fatal consequences for 47 people.
The above is strictly personal opinion. I will await the jury's verdict.
The man that knows best what the situation IS and what needs to be DONE is the MAN THAT IS ON THE SCENE.
Crew (1 or 2 or more men) report they have arrived at their tie up point and are ready for tranportation to the lodging facility - that statement presumes that the crew has secured their train.
Dispatchers do not have the technical knowledge to instruct Engineers on how to handle 'misbehaving' locomotives - which to leave running, which to shut down - company policy and the MAN ON THE GROUND make that decision.
Harding was the MAN ON THE GROUND and made all the wrong decisions.
As information , I was under no compulsion to testify. I was not under supeona.
I felt that doing and saying nothing to help the people of Megantic and helping in whatever way could my friends and ex co-workers would make me a morally bad person. I don't wish to live like that so I volunteered to testify for the crown.
I was a horrible thing, just horrible in every way
Randy
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.