Number out last Friday. CSX has plateaued. Train speed speed down a tick. Dwell up a tick. Cars on line up a tick.
All still below last May.
On the other hand, NS has been slipping and now has dwell and speed below CSX, and well below their 2013 levels when things were running smoothly. Over the years, NS has tradtionally been a tick better than CSX on speed and dwell.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
blue streak 1Oltmann: with both CSX and NS closing Chattanooga humps does that cause cross contamination for interchanges ? 1+1= -1 ?
Probably not. NS stopped doing car classification work there, but is still flat switching the local and interchange traffic as well as doing a lot of block swapping there. Chattanooga is a good, logical place for block swapping.
Hunter has changed trains on the A&WP sub. The trains have much more operating power than a few weeks ago.
Oltmann: with both CSX and NS closing Chattanooga humps does that cause cross contamination for interchanges ? 1+1= -1 ?
BaltACD oltmannd NS's numbers aren't anything to write home about. They still can't get the south end of the RR up to speed after closing the hump at Chattanooga. Running with one wheel on the shoulder.... Bold plans are great. As long as they encompass more than one 'bold action' and support the bold action with thousands of supporting elements. CSX and NS at Chattanooga appear to have made the bold plans of closing humps, without any of the supporting elements which makes the bold plan a humungos mess.
oltmannd NS's numbers aren't anything to write home about. They still can't get the south end of the RR up to speed after closing the hump at Chattanooga. Running with one wheel on the shoulder....
Bold plans are great. As long as they encompass more than one 'bold action' and support the bold action with thousands of supporting elements. CSX and NS at Chattanooga appear to have made the bold plans of closing humps, without any of the supporting elements which makes the bold plan a humungos mess.
Yep. Many issues, apparently.
oltmanndNS's numbers aren't anything to write home about. They still can't get the south end of the RR up to speed after closing the hump at Chattanooga. Running with one wheel on the shoulder....
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
This weeks STB posted numbers are out.
CSX basically treaded water Train speed and dwell off just a tick. Waycross really bad - holding cars for FL most likely. Cars delayed flat. Cars on line down a bit.
All things considered, not awful, but they are still in the ditch.
NS's numbers aren't anything to write home about. They still can't get the south end of the RR up to speed after closing the hump at Chattanooga. Running with one wheel on the shoulder....
BaltACD blue streak 1 oltmannd The good places to do block swaps often don't have yard air. They're more often just a "wide spot in the road". It's not do or die, just one more thing that needs managed. That could be of some expense. Electric, compressor, piping & probably at both ends of a siding ? $10k at least for each installation ? x 10 at least and probably closer to x 20.
blue streak 1 oltmannd The good places to do block swaps often don't have yard air. They're more often just a "wide spot in the road". It's not do or die, just one more thing that needs managed. That could be of some expense. Electric, compressor, piping & probably at both ends of a siding ? $10k at least for each installation ?
oltmannd The good places to do block swaps often don't have yard air. They're more often just a "wide spot in the road". It's not do or die, just one more thing that needs managed.
The good places to do block swaps often don't have yard air. They're more often just a "wide spot in the road". It's not do or die, just one more thing that needs managed.
That could be of some expense. Electric, compressor, piping & probably at both ends of a siding ? $10k at least for each installation ?
x 10 at least and probably closer to x 20.
Or use rental mobile compressor units and flexible hoses. That's what Uncle Pete did (and does) at certain points. Some places have since received permanent air plants, mostly at yards that originate trains. That way the car men can do the air tests without the power on.
A couple of places, one which has since received a complete air plant, are located outside yards where incoming trains would cut off the inbound power and take it to the house. The train is put on the yard air to maintain the air slip. (The air slip is placed in a mail box for the outbound crew.) The hostlers or outbound crew then put on the outbound power later.
Jeff
blue streak 1That could be of some expense. Electric, compressor, piping & probably at both ends of a siding ? $10k at least for each installation ?
Not to mention the ongoing cost of power to run it...
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
BaltACD1 - 2 & 3 are basic Old Time railroading
Well, sort of. One of the big changes that came from the scheduled operations rather than tonnage operations was the use of network models to optimize blocking and minimize handling. Before that, the classifications were decided by guys who "just knew". When railroads were smaller, this was possible. Not so much now with roads like NS and CSX.
Scheduing units trains is much harder than having schedules for merchandise trains because the RR and the shipper spend a lot of time not trusting each other. You don't win this game by just saying "trust me!" I have not heard any part of EHH's scheme that addresses this.
oltmanndThere is a snippet of a talk by a CSX commercial guy to a room of shippers that CSX posted on Facebook this morning. He explains PSR to the group. 1. Reduce intermediate handlings 2. Pre block at serving yards/long haul blocking plan 3. Make strategic en route set outs and pick ups to eliminate circuity 4. Don't force shippers into unit train service if cycle time is lousy 5. Integrate everything into the plan. MOW work, unit trains, etc. Items 1, 2 and 3 are basic tenets of scheduled railroading everywhere and have been for a decade. Item 4 is interesting but I doubt there is much "there" there. There have been times where marketing and operations have been at odds about service, i.e. discounts for large volume blocks drove lumpy traffic patterns. Item 5 is easier said than done. NS adjusts the plan for MOW gangs. Scheduling unit trains is hard work. Current efforts are less than rigourous efforts to "slot" them into the flow. There are probably some decent savings to be had if you can time the "launch" of unit trains around crew availability and track space. But, because 1-3 are already being done to a large degree, I'll stick to my original prediction that EHH won't get nearly the same sized operational "bump" on CSX that he did elsewhere. Most of the low hanging fruit was picked a decade ago.
1. Reduce intermediate handlings
2. Pre block at serving yards/long haul blocking plan
3. Make strategic en route set outs and pick ups to eliminate circuity
4. Don't force shippers into unit train service if cycle time is lousy
5. Integrate everything into the plan. MOW work, unit trains, etc.
Items 1, 2 and 3 are basic tenets of scheduled railroading everywhere and have been for a decade.
Item 4 is interesting but I doubt there is much "there" there. There have been times where marketing and operations have been at odds about service, i.e. discounts for large volume blocks drove lumpy traffic patterns.
Item 5 is easier said than done. NS adjusts the plan for MOW gangs. Scheduling unit trains is hard work. Current efforts are less than rigourous efforts to "slot" them into the flow. There are probably some decent savings to be had if you can time the "launch" of unit trains around crew availability and track space.
But, because 1-3 are already being done to a large degree, I'll stick to my original prediction that EHH won't get nearly the same sized operational "bump" on CSX that he did elsewhere. Most of the low hanging fruit was picked a decade ago.
1 - 2 & 3 are basic Old Time railroading
RE: 4 - Unit Train cycle times - who is the culprit for lousy cycle times? Shipper, Consignee or the carrier? A nonsensical statement from my vantage point
RE: 5 - When I was working the Operating Plan was changed on a weekly basis to account for and work around MofW curfews that were taking place at various places around the system. If necessary trains would be rerouted around work area, in some cases even rerouting trains over 'foreign' carriers.
EHH is not bringing anything new to CSX except terror.
Saturnalia oltmannd Pre-blocking is a wonderful thing and you only need a couple of hours planned dwell for a block swap, but there is only so much of it you can do and you have to run the trains on time to avoid having your air slip time out if you miss your connection. To what extent might pre-blocking save on car department forces? If you're in a hump you're going to Class-One every outbound airtest, whereas with blocking, so long as you have ground air, you in *theory* don't have to do a Class One ever, so long as the block swaps happen where your air is. Of course, new blocks would have to be Class-Oned, but if you hump your train, you start your air from scratch. It seems like most major yards these days have a significant amount of ground air, so I can't imagine that it'd be super expensive to extend the network in those cases where it doesn't reach to where you need it. But I have a hard time seeing how the departure yards in humps don't already have the air, in places where carmen make the airtest. If I have my airtest procedures wrong, by all means straighten me out! As to some of the former points, especially in terms of capacity for growth, I'd agree with the statement that eliminating a hump could make future growth more difficult. However, that'd only be the case in some places where traffic has the capacity to grow, and in places where there are enough different origin-destination pairs to make blocking inefficient, and where there are at least 1000 cars, if not 1500 cars per day, likely to pass through. I think there is little argument that CSX had too many humps - but in terms of getting it down to as few as two? Yeah I think that might be pushing it. 5-6 seems like a reasonable number to me. Willard, Queensgate, Waycross, Avon, minimum. Then pick your poison on which of the smaller ones to keep. Perhaps Selkirk or Nashville or Birmingham, to cover one or more of the "corners" not served well by those core four.
oltmannd Pre-blocking is a wonderful thing and you only need a couple of hours planned dwell for a block swap, but there is only so much of it you can do and you have to run the trains on time to avoid having your air slip time out if you miss your connection.
Pre-blocking is a wonderful thing and you only need a couple of hours planned dwell for a block swap, but there is only so much of it you can do and you have to run the trains on time to avoid having your air slip time out if you miss your connection.
To what extent might pre-blocking save on car department forces? If you're in a hump you're going to Class-One every outbound airtest, whereas with blocking, so long as you have ground air, you in *theory* don't have to do a Class One ever, so long as the block swaps happen where your air is. Of course, new blocks would have to be Class-Oned, but if you hump your train, you start your air from scratch.
It seems like most major yards these days have a significant amount of ground air, so I can't imagine that it'd be super expensive to extend the network in those cases where it doesn't reach to where you need it. But I have a hard time seeing how the departure yards in humps don't already have the air, in places where carmen make the airtest.
If I have my airtest procedures wrong, by all means straighten me out!
As to some of the former points, especially in terms of capacity for growth, I'd agree with the statement that eliminating a hump could make future growth more difficult. However, that'd only be the case in some places where traffic has the capacity to grow, and in places where there are enough different origin-destination pairs to make blocking inefficient, and where there are at least 1000 cars, if not 1500 cars per day, likely to pass through.
I think there is little argument that CSX had too many humps - but in terms of getting it down to as few as two? Yeah I think that might be pushing it. 5-6 seems like a reasonable number to me. Willard, Queensgate, Waycross, Avon, minimum. Then pick your poison on which of the smaller ones to keep. Perhaps Selkirk or Nashville or Birmingham, to cover one or more of the "corners" not served well by those core four.
There is a snippet of a talk by a CSX commercial guy to a room of shippers that CSX posted on Facebook this morning. He explains PSR to the group.
Paul_D_North_Jr How does the car get from Allentown to Pavonia ? Isn't that a lot of backhaul - Allentown to Reading to Philadelphia to South Jersey ? - PDN.
How does the car get from Allentown to Pavonia ? Isn't that a lot of backhaul - Allentown to Reading to Philadelphia to South Jersey ?
- PDN.
It's a bit of circuity. Allentown is in the wrong place in the network for current traffic. It would be better if it were in Reading. Allentown has been on the bubble for decades. I suspect if NS were to close Allentown, you'd see a lot of block swapping in Reading - provided the yard there could be beefed up sufficiently.
The circuity of Phila/South Jersey traffic from the west and south is the biggest problem of this kind on NS. (or was a couple of years ago, anyway)
An car trip example. A load of paper going from SE VA to South Jersey.
Local picks up car and takes it to Crewe VA, which is serving yard for the industry.
Car is classified "Allentown" at Crewe and picked up the next morning at 9AM by train 159.
159 drops Allentown block at Lynchburg VA.
6-1/2 hours later, 36Q picks up Allentowns and takes them to Allentown. This connection should be pretty good. It's not likely 159 will be too late into Lynchburg to miss 36Q.
Car is classified Pavonia at Allentown.
24-1/2 hours after arriving, it departs on 38G for Pavonia. This will be a very reliable connection. The inbound train can be 14 hours late and it will still likely make the right 38G.
Pavonia is the serving yard for load. It switches the car and builds the local train that departs 8-1/2 hours after arrival.
Total serving yard to serving yard trip time is 2 days 9-1/2 hours.
Car was had one intermediate classification at Allentown, and one block swap at Lynchburg.
Total dwell at Lynchburg and Allentown, 33 hours. Total time on a road train, 25-1/2 hours (if I did the math right...)
Serving yard to serving yard mileage, about 600.
This would be a slightly above average carload trip on NS.
Hump yards are a very efficient, cheap and fast way to classify cars. But, they are cheap only if you keep them busy.
It is expected that you can get a car from arrival to departing on the next train in 10 hours in a hump with great regularity. That yields an avg dwell of around 22 hours if all inbound and outbound trains run 7 days a week and distribution of cars "from" and "to" trains isn't lumpy (and generally, it is fairly uniform)
Pre-blocking is a wonderful thing and you only need a couple of hours planned dwell for a block swap, but there is only so much of it you can do and you have to run the trains on time to avoi- having your air slip time out if you miss your connection. One of the on-going activities in the service design groups is using the models to find block by-pass and pre-blocking. opportunities as the traffic slowly changes
The goal of your of you operating plan is to minimize the number-going of times you have to classify a car en route. The train service and train speed mean much less than the number of times you have switch a car. Roads like NS and CSX likely have it down to 1.5 to 2.0 times per trip (not counting serving yard or interchanges) with an average trip around 500 miles. That's pretty efficient.
CSX route structure and loose car network are not CP's or CN's or IC's. Square pegs and round holes
"If train A arrives at 8 AM with a mix of cars in it's 150 cars that need to depart on Train X at 12 Noon - that unless severe priority is given - the cars will make Train X tomorrow in the normal course of business."
However, if train A arrives at 8 AM with a block of 40 cars, it can set those out on a track ready for Train X to lift prior to its 12 Noon departure. Naturally the cars on Train A still have to be preblocked somewhere back on its route. That may mean a yard crew has to work a full shift rather than getting an early quit after 5 hours, and of course the arriving train crew has to do a little more work before booking off. But there is minimal additional labor cost and block swapping does seem to work fairly well now here in Calgary on the CPR. Because it works well in one place does not mean it will work as well for a more complex route network.
A hump requires a lot of maintenance to keep the retarders, power switches and other electronics working reliably, plus all the folks actually operating the humping process on the ground and in the control tower. Yet more yard crews are needed to move cuts from the class tracks over to the departure tracks to assemble a future train.
Modern unit trains and intermodals bypass hump yards and there is a lot less loose car railroading these days. Why the railroads have tried to discourage the latter is separate topic, but other threads have discussed how the railroads seem to ignore obvious business opportunities.
With or without Hump Yards - for the most part there is daily service between Origin-Destination pairs. That is a 'scheduled' 24 hour delay to the car that, for whatever the reason, misses today's train. The reality of train operations at virtually any yard (hump or otherwise) If train A arrives at 8 AM with a mix of cars in it's 150 cars that need to depart on Train X at 12 Noon - that unless severe priority is given - the cars will make Train X tomorrow in the normal course of business. To make a 12 Noon departure, Train X needs to have it's switching completed no later than 9-10 AM - thus giving the Car Department time to lace the air hoses and make a departure Class 1 air test - identifying shops and making any 'running' repairs that they are equipped to perform - while this inspection is taking place the track(s) Train X occupies will be Blue Flagged.
Flat switching does not increase switching efficiency. It eliminates the cost of maintaining the hump retarders and power operated switches and computer support of the operation - at the resulting increase in dwell and car hire as well as facilities being occupied for a longer period of time.
Paul_D_North_Jr oltmannd Numbers for the past week (STB724) are out. Train speed is up over 1 mph lead by intermodal speed. Cars on line are down about 4k. Loads and empties over 48 hrs are down a nice chunk. Dwell is the sticky one. Didn't really budge. Maybe because of traffic held over Labor Day? The numbers showed the improvment that can happen when you use a slack period to do a 'reset'. Do they have enough resources to hold these numbers and make more improvement? Might take a few weeks to find out with Irma disruption... On Labor Day (!) I saw or heard about a half-dozen CSX trains pass through Ohiopyle, PA in the 9 AM - 7 PM timeframe, though I was out of earshot from the tracks from about 2 PM to 6 PM. So despite the usual almost-shutdowns on major holidays, CSX was pretty active. FWIW, the 2 trains I actually saw were a double-stack and a multi-level, and 1 of the moves I heard could have been just a light-engine helper set. - PDN.
oltmannd Numbers for the past week (STB724) are out. Train speed is up over 1 mph lead by intermodal speed. Cars on line are down about 4k. Loads and empties over 48 hrs are down a nice chunk. Dwell is the sticky one. Didn't really budge. Maybe because of traffic held over Labor Day? The numbers showed the improvment that can happen when you use a slack period to do a 'reset'. Do they have enough resources to hold these numbers and make more improvement? Might take a few weeks to find out with Irma disruption...
The numbers showed the improvment that can happen when you use a slack period to do a 'reset'. Do they have enough resources to hold these numbers and make more improvement? Might take a few weeks to find out with Irma disruption...
On Labor Day (!) I saw or heard about a half-dozen CSX trains pass through Ohiopyle, PA in the 9 AM - 7 PM timeframe, though I was out of earshot from the tracks from about 2 PM to 6 PM. So despite the usual almost-shutdowns on major holidays, CSX was pretty active. FWIW, the 2 trains I actually saw were a double-stack and a multi-level, and 1 of the moves I heard could have been just a light-engine helper set.
When you are in the ditch, you use the holiday to try to get out and run everything you can. When things are good, but traffic is slipping, you try to lay down everything you can. In normal times, it's usually a blend.
daveklepper Sat: I do not see how converting hump yards into flat switching yards benefits loose-car railroading. Hump yards can take four inbound trains from different points and convert them into four outbound trains to different points a lot faster than a flat-switching yard.
Sat: I do not see how converting hump yards into flat switching yards benefits loose-car railroading. Hump yards can take four inbound trains from different points and convert them into four outbound trains to different points a lot faster than a flat-switching yard.
DaveK,
Yes, hump yards can do that with 30 hour or so average dwell, BUT hump yards are expensive so the object is to hump at as few places, or as few times as possible in any given trip. You need to think in blocks of cars not individual cars. Any yard builds or breaks down blocks of cars. If I can preblock to avoid a hump yard down stream I have probably cut costs. Now perhaps my thru train simply needs to set out a block of local cars for the former hump and pick up another block or two or three or four blocks that were flat switched. Some switching can be done here or there. Which is best, cheapest, quickest? This is almost impossible for an outsider to answer and is why the railroads have operations models that can test different plans, determine the best, and locate bottlenecks which may start an investigation of alternatives and costs to eliminate the bottleneck or relocate the work.
What you do not want to do is change a bunch of stuff all at once, expecially if you have not run your model. Others have talked about just making changes and seeing how it will work out. That is OK in moderation, after all the model may not be correct. The key is moderation and doing a series of changes incrementally so they can settle and you can see what the result was and prove or disprove the model.
It appears that EHH has simply issued orders based on his private theory of what will work. He could be right. Done incrementally if something doesn't work, it can be identified and reversed or modified. If you change a whole bunch of things all at once it is a formula for chaos. If EHH's vision is correct, the chaos will clear up. If vision is not correct, it will be tough to sort out the good changes from the bad. So far no one on the outisde, and perhaps on the inside too, knows if EHH vision is correct.
Mac
Sat: I do not see how converting hump yards into flat switching yards benefits loose-car railroading. Hump yards can take four inbound trains from different points and convert them into foiur outbound trains to different points a lot faster than a flat-switching yard.
The coal trains in general did not require the hump yards as much as general manafest trains. And both NS and CSX do have important lines capable high speed if the track, signals, and dispatching permit, New Jersey - Florida for example.
I think in general your reply more substiantiated what I posted rather than contradicted it. If HH does in fact go after new business and gets it, than CSX won't have to dump him to recover. I hope this is truly the case.
cx500Major holidays are irrelevant in the Precision World of EHH, just a nuisance and another way to harass the running trades.
Over the past several years the only Holidays CSX 'planned' for were Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years. Work during other 'holidays' were dictated by how the customers observed the holiday. If the customers for a particular job didn't work for the holiday, that job would not work for the holiday. Operationally, very few industries observe more than the traditional three - their backoffice and adminstrative positions may observe the holiday but operations continue normally.
Major holidays are irrelevant in the Precision World of EHH, just a nuisance and another way to harass the running trades.
oltmanndNumbers for the past week (STB724) are out. Train speed is up over 1 mph lead by intermodal speed. Cars on line are down about 4k. Loads and empties over 48 hrs are down a nice chunk. Dwell is the sticky one. Didn't really budge. Maybe because of traffic held over Labor Day? The numbers showed the improvment that can happen when you use a slack period to do a 'reset'. Do they have enough resources to hold these numbers and make more improvement? Might take a few weeks to find out with Irma disruption...
Saturnalia daveklepper Please let us return to the emphasis on cutting costs vs. growing the business. I think it is wrong to say that all Class Is emphasis the former. Certainly BNSF does not, NS and UP seem to be doing a balancing act. Both NS and CSX were heavily dependent on coal. Losing much of that business, before HH, both NS and CSX were trying to grow the business as well as cut costs. With HH, CSX changed to emphsise cutting costs over growing the business. NS did not change. So who is going be the major player in the years to come in the East? I think you're incorrect, daveklepper, on your assertion that since CSX came under the EHH spell that is has shifted from growth to cost-cutting. From all my observations, particularly since the merger noise a few years ago, is that CSX shifted into full cost-cutting, which definitely hurt their network in various ways, while NS kept their cool, and agreed to keep working, like they had, on cost control and asset utilization. So I think since EHH came on board, CSX is still of course in cost-cutting mode, albeit with an entirely different, and much more visible methodology. CSX of Yore wanted to run 28-hour trains, basically squeeze as much out of each train as possible. Harrison is also looking at the physical plant, and trimming the fat there. CSX of yore didn't look at closing humps, but by golly EHH did...and too fast, as previously discussed. Additionally, Harrison is on the record believing in growth in loose carloadings. Actually, I don't think he gives enough credit for that. CSX and many other Class One operations have despised loose carloading for years, due to its lower margins. But now that coal is no longer king, everybody is starting to warm back up to it. But CSX of yore? No way they were seriously contemplating real mixed carload growth the way they chose to operate their trains, particularly locals and the 28-hour schedule. So I'd argue that Harrison has pushed cost cutting in a different, more "cost control" direction, while believing that loose carloads can make plenty of cash. In fact, that's why he's closing humps: to lower costs for loose carloads, to improve those margins. Harrison rightly believes that coal is on the long slide towards being obsolete (much to the chargin of many forum members here), while also recognizing that mixed carloads can earn money - but they must reduce their costs, particularly the fixed costs, and modify the market to flatten out the weekly spikes in traffic, among other measures. I think part of the challenge in this respect - that is traffic growth - is that the Western Carriers not only have a long haul, but their networks were built more on connecting passenger and long-haul freight than CSX and NS's coal-centric routes. If you look at Union Pacific in particular, they've always been just as relient on coal as the eastern carriers. They've been mining in Wyoming from Laramie to Green River and beyond pretty much since the rails went down in the late 1860s. Coal from Hanna, Rawlins and Rock Springs (among others) literally fueled the railroad, and the bottom line. Fast forward and now they've got the Powder River. But - here's the thing. Erase from UP their lines dedicated to coal, and see how much dissappears. Almost nothing! Sure they'd be wise to really trim northwest of Sutherland, and perhaps Sutherland to Gibbon could also see trimming if other growth doesn't take up the slack, but really, UP hauls coal on the same tracks as everything else just about everywhere. There are actually very few places where coal is everything, and even on the main trunk east of Sutherland, there's still a huge amount of non-coal tonnage. Erase the Powder River, and it isn't an insurmountable hit. So, its very easy to see how in the long run, UP can most definitely afford plenty of traffic growth to offset coal. BNSF is the same way, albeit to a less beneficial extent, since their coal franchise sees much less traffic otherwise. But how about CSX and NS? Their whole cores are built for coal, and minus that, they've got a TON of track with nothing or almost nothing on it. The C&O isn't pushing a couple dozen stacks, racks and manifest trains daily. NS is mostly the same way - their networks just aren't built for speed or long distance, and tend towards modest traffic over many lines instead of a handful of long-haul, high density routes. This is the great spaghetti bowl everybody talks about when considering if EHH can implement PSR on a much less linear network. So if you look at CSX and NS, with their highest-density lines, they're not loaded up with coal. The B&O west of PA sees almost no coal - actually most of it is Western - while the Chicago-SE link certainly doesn't have much, and neither does the East Coast Run. So those lines, which they're relying on for their main trunks, it isn't like less coal means more space to run other things. Traffic growth without grinding the B&O to death is almost impossible now west of Greenwich. So where is that traffic growth going to come from, and where is it going to go?
daveklepper Please let us return to the emphasis on cutting costs vs. growing the business. I think it is wrong to say that all Class Is emphasis the former. Certainly BNSF does not, NS and UP seem to be doing a balancing act. Both NS and CSX were heavily dependent on coal. Losing much of that business, before HH, both NS and CSX were trying to grow the business as well as cut costs. With HH, CSX changed to emphsise cutting costs over growing the business. NS did not change. So who is going be the major player in the years to come in the East?
Please let us return to the emphasis on cutting costs vs. growing the business. I think it is wrong to say that all Class Is emphasis the former. Certainly BNSF does not, NS and UP seem to be doing a balancing act.
Both NS and CSX were heavily dependent on coal. Losing much of that business, before HH, both NS and CSX were trying to grow the business as well as cut costs. With HH, CSX changed to emphsise cutting costs over growing the business. NS did not change. So who is going be the major player in the years to come in the East?
I think you're incorrect, daveklepper, on your assertion that since CSX came under the EHH spell that is has shifted from growth to cost-cutting. From all my observations, particularly since the merger noise a few years ago, is that CSX shifted into full cost-cutting, which definitely hurt their network in various ways, while NS kept their cool, and agreed to keep working, like they had, on cost control and asset utilization.
So I think since EHH came on board, CSX is still of course in cost-cutting mode, albeit with an entirely different, and much more visible methodology. CSX of Yore wanted to run 28-hour trains, basically squeeze as much out of each train as possible. Harrison is also looking at the physical plant, and trimming the fat there. CSX of yore didn't look at closing humps, but by golly EHH did...and too fast, as previously discussed.
Additionally, Harrison is on the record believing in growth in loose carloadings. Actually, I don't think he gives enough credit for that. CSX and many other Class One operations have despised loose carloading for years, due to its lower margins. But now that coal is no longer king, everybody is starting to warm back up to it. But CSX of yore? No way they were seriously contemplating real mixed carload growth the way they chose to operate their trains, particularly locals and the 28-hour schedule.
So I'd argue that Harrison has pushed cost cutting in a different, more "cost control" direction, while believing that loose carloads can make plenty of cash. In fact, that's why he's closing humps: to lower costs for loose carloads, to improve those margins.
Harrison rightly believes that coal is on the long slide towards being obsolete (much to the chargin of many forum members here), while also recognizing that mixed carloads can earn money - but they must reduce their costs, particularly the fixed costs, and modify the market to flatten out the weekly spikes in traffic, among other measures.
I think part of the challenge in this respect - that is traffic growth - is that the Western Carriers not only have a long haul, but their networks were built more on connecting passenger and long-haul freight than CSX and NS's coal-centric routes.
If you look at Union Pacific in particular, they've always been just as relient on coal as the eastern carriers. They've been mining in Wyoming from Laramie to Green River and beyond pretty much since the rails went down in the late 1860s. Coal from Hanna, Rawlins and Rock Springs (among others) literally fueled the railroad, and the bottom line. Fast forward and now they've got the Powder River.
But - here's the thing. Erase from UP their lines dedicated to coal, and see how much dissappears. Almost nothing! Sure they'd be wise to really trim northwest of Sutherland, and perhaps Sutherland to Gibbon could also see trimming if other growth doesn't take up the slack, but really, UP hauls coal on the same tracks as everything else just about everywhere. There are actually very few places where coal is everything, and even on the main trunk east of Sutherland, there's still a huge amount of non-coal tonnage. Erase the Powder River, and it isn't an insurmountable hit.
So, its very easy to see how in the long run, UP can most definitely afford plenty of traffic growth to offset coal.
BNSF is the same way, albeit to a less beneficial extent, since their coal franchise sees much less traffic otherwise.
But how about CSX and NS? Their whole cores are built for coal, and minus that, they've got a TON of track with nothing or almost nothing on it. The C&O isn't pushing a couple dozen stacks, racks and manifest trains daily. NS is mostly the same way - their networks just aren't built for speed or long distance, and tend towards modest traffic over many lines instead of a handful of long-haul, high density routes. This is the great spaghetti bowl everybody talks about when considering if EHH can implement PSR on a much less linear network.
So if you look at CSX and NS, with their highest-density lines, they're not loaded up with coal. The B&O west of PA sees almost no coal - actually most of it is Western - while the Chicago-SE link certainly doesn't have much, and neither does the East Coast Run. So those lines, which they're relying on for their main trunks, it isn't like less coal means more space to run other things. Traffic growth without grinding the B&O to death is almost impossible now west of Greenwich.
So where is that traffic growth going to come from, and where is it going to go?
Somebody's smokin' too much wacky tabacky!
The progenitors of the 28 hour day are still employed from what I was able to gather on my recent visit. All terminals have been and were investigated for possible closure - the difference between those investigations and what EHH has done - they were looked at from the position of how the system would perform the functions of the closed terminal. What happens at Cumberland has an affect on what has to happen at Baltimore, Philadelphia, Willard, Cincinnati and Chicago.
There is no terminal that operates in a vacuum without affecting other terminals. EHH as done away with point & distributor ignition of the CSX engine, without installing the computerized iginition system that is required for any engine to continue to operate. Hacking terminal operations without a plan is a good way bring things to gridlock and PO your customers along the way.
BaltACD According to those involved - they have been given multiple move dates and move locations since it was announced that they were moving
According to those involved - they have been given multiple move dates and move locations since it was announced that they were moving
Whoever told you about "multiple locations" was incorrect. The company has given the ATDA one notification of the move, and the location was Jacksonville for those that are subject to the move. There have been numorous rumors of different locations since EHH said that 9 dispatching locations was too many, but nothing offical from the company.
An "expensive model collector"
And who wil be a major player, instead of even compitition, will eventully affect the bottom line and srock prices.
Numbers for the past week (STB724) are out. Train speed is up over 1 mph lead by intermodal speed. Cars on line are down about 4k. Loads and empties over 48 hrs are down a nice chunk. Dwell is the sticky one. Didn't really budge. Maybe because of traffic held over Labor Day?
No problem - you're welcome. I do appreciate our comments, too.
The brilliant move was adding IC to make the T-shaped system that uniquely connects all 3 coasts. I suppose he had vision for that, as IC was a 'friendly' acquistion. I'd agree that the incremental acquistions afterward - e.g., EJ&E - were good moves, and no, nothing to scoff at. But I've always understood - perhaps incorrectly - that the 'value added' came from the network and synergies created thereby as you point out, not from extending Precision Scheduled Railroading to them. Even so, it would have been incremental - not wholesale, as at CSX now - and I think that deliberate approach had a lot to do with it succeeding there.
So he did good work at CN, even if not wholly popular - his 'Hunter Camps' and 2 books were a definite innovation, that's for sure. But I fear that now he's either a "one-trick pony", or another example of the Peter Principle: he's been promoted to his level of incompetence.
Paul_D_North_Jr cx500 . . . CN had already achieved a great deal of improvement prior to buying the IC. It was only then that EHH joined the management team. And Paul Tellier remained the top guy, with EHH under him for a few more years. "+1" x 3 Thank you for pointing that out. I've done it many times before, but am tired of telling those who won't listen or would rather "drink the Kool-Aid" of EHH and his purported wizardry. I bought CN shares in the late 1990's shortly after it was privatized - when most of the OR decrease occurred - and still have the annual reports from back then to prove it in a box upstairs. Anyone who wants the truth instead of a PR legend is welcome to come review them - or find them on-line someplace.
cx500 . . . CN had already achieved a great deal of improvement prior to buying the IC. It was only then that EHH joined the management team. And Paul Tellier remained the top guy, with EHH under him for a few more years.
"+1" x 3 Thank you for pointing that out. I've done it many times before, but am tired of telling those who won't listen or would rather "drink the Kool-Aid" of EHH and his purported wizardry. I bought CN shares in the late 1990's shortly after it was privatized - when most of the OR decrease occurred - and still have the annual reports from back then to prove it in a box upstairs. Anyone who wants the truth instead of a PR legend is welcome to come review them - or find them on-line someplace.
Indeed, an honest oversight for me - I haven't correlated the dates and I've never seen somebody point this out before - thanks!
So let me ask this: would you give EHH credit for its application to the IC and the rest, as they were added to the fold? Clearly, extending the network by the greatest margin seen by any railroad short of a full merger isn't anything to scoff at.
I'm not gonna lie, I'm not super-well versed in the 90s, mostly I suppose because I only lived through the last two years of them! Haha
Saturnalia ...................... I can't believe that this point has been left out of this discussion thus far, but I totally agree. CN and CP were both extremely iffy operations when he joined on, so undoubtedly there was plenty of low-hanging fruit. .......
I can't believe that this point has been left out of this discussion thus far, but I totally agree. CN and CP were both extremely iffy operations when he joined on, so undoubtedly there was plenty of low-hanging fruit.
.......
I will more or less agree with you about CP, but CN had already achieved a great deal of improvement prior to buying the IC. It was only then that EHH joined the management team. And Paul Tellier remained the top guy, with EHH under him for a few more years.
Saturnalia, your response appears intelligent. I hope you are correct and my prediction proved wrong. It all depends on how quickly HH learns and applies wha the learns. Possibly the Jury is still out.
oltmannd Most of his magic isn't available to deploy at CSX - because they had already been doing it! CSX and all the other railroads made great gains in the past 15 years employing scheduled railroading. So, what's left is hunting down stuff around the margins, like tinkering with unit train service, yard conversions, and cutting some of the cushion out of the locomotive fleet and crew bases. Even if all this stuff worked out flawlessly, I'd bet you couldn't get more than 5 points out of the OR. Not nearly the huge change at his other gigs. But, not even that is happening. So far at CSX, it's been a failure.
Most of his magic isn't available to deploy at CSX - because they had already been doing it! CSX and all the other railroads made great gains in the past 15 years employing scheduled railroading. So, what's left is hunting down stuff around the margins, like tinkering with unit train service, yard conversions, and cutting some of the cushion out of the locomotive fleet and crew bases.
Even if all this stuff worked out flawlessly, I'd bet you couldn't get more than 5 points out of the OR. Not nearly the huge change at his other gigs.
But, not even that is happening. So far at CSX, it's been a failure.
One of the things I'm watching closely is how Harrison handles traffic in places where things could go more than one route.
Previously, since oh I'd say around 2005, CSX has heavily pushed towards getting as much out of as few lines as possible, which has left a number of secondary lines nearly devoid of traffic. Now of course the PRR, now CFE, made sense to dump at the time, but one has to wonder if CSX's long-term thinking might include grabbing that back, so they have a "Nickel Plate" backup to their B&O artery.
On the more current course, however, there seem to have been many places where the idea has been to move traffic to be more centralized. Let me use the Michigan Example. Some here are currently rolling their eyes because they've seen this before *cough cough CP run-through trains*, but let's look at how CSX has handled traffic for Flint and Detroit.
Now what CSX has in Michigan is essentially a Chicago-Detroit line via Grand Rapids, which is markedly longer that say the Michigan Central or NYC-Wabash routing via Butler. And then there is the other stem from Toledo north to Flint. You have major yards at Grand Rapids, serving West Michigan; Flint, serving that area and taking in the LSRC interchange, and Detroit, handled out of Rougemere. All of the traffic for these three points must come up from Chicago or Toledo.
In the past, each of these three cities ran trains to both Chicago and Toledo. Now as the automotive industry diminished, the trains from Flint and Detroit to Chicago were terminated by 2011 or so. Now Flint and Detroit only "flushed" via Toledo, while GR was still allowed to run in both directions.
Fast forward to the last two years, when the GR-Toledo trains were axed in early 2016. Now GR only could dump via Barr Yard. So what we had was everything had to go to the edge of the system, at Barr, even though a ton of GR traffic goes south and east to the rest of the CSX network. This was pure cost-cutting.
So now, we have tons of Michigan traffic crisscrossing Indiana and Ohio on the B&O mainline, since they cut the trains in Michigan. But now, CSX is maintaining all of this infrastructure for only a few trains. Yes, the B&O is now costing less per car mile, but it's also notoriously congested, particularly on the Chicago end.
This is just one example, but I'm sure there are more. CSX's stated goal was the big triangle, with as much as possible focused on those core routes. That works, except you're asking for congestion on those routes and leaving others shells of their former selves, for no real reason. And it's hard to spin off these secondary lines because they've still got traffic - just very little overhead compared to previously.
So now Harrison, within the last week, brought back the GR-Toledo train. Funny how the majority of GR outbounds now go the right way. But as part of this, GR can now process other overhead traffic again - Toledo has long filled out the GR trains with traffic for Chicago. So we're looking at traffic coming off the B&O, freeing up more space down there, while the infrastructure, including CTC, up in Michigan actually gets used. Signal systems in particular are pretty much fixed costs. Not running any trains? You're still paying for it, so you might as well use it.
So this purposeful avoidence of secondary lines seems to be waning under Harrison. There seems to be no direct aversion to something *just* because of cost. He seems to, at least in theory, value operations as well as cost.
Like has been said, it is all a grand experiment. We'll see where it goes, the implementation has been a mess, but I just can't find a way to count him out yet. If he can get implementation under control, he could certainly increase CSX's efficiency overall. I think you could actually see more fluidity on certain parts of the network, if secondary lines are no longer avoided on principle.
Maybe 5-10 points, but CSX has been talking about "low 60s" OR since I really started paying attention back in 2012 or so - yet in 5 years, they barely made headway, despite the changes they were making.
Maybe Harrison's methods are questionable, but if he pulls it off, he'll still have done what the previous management and their philosophies couldn't do.
As I have stated in other threads, I made an appearance at my old dispatching office last weekend - to say good bye just before they moved on to Jacksonville.
According to those involved - they have been given multiple move dates and move locations since it was announced that they were moving - really lets people plan their lives. [/sarcasm] There has been no 'relocation agreement' negotiated with the ATDA for the move. Once all dispatchers are in Jacksonville there will be high rated CSX Train Dispatchers working side by side with low rated former ConRail Dispatchers - I am certain that won't create controversy! [/sarcasm]
Discussing operations with multiple dispatchers - the scheduling and officer emphasis on maintaining those schedules vanished when the official's positions were terminated. Today's operations are in a chaotic unscheduled manner.
Service Design organization has yet to come up with any kind of a scheduled network that accounts for the the decreased switching performance of the closed hump yards; it is unknown how many experienced Service Design employees have been terminated. Those that remain have shown they are not up to the task.
New employee timetables were issued effective Sept. 1, 2017. Each subdivision has it's own timetable - with the resulting waste of 5 pages in each TT printed for information that is common to all subdivisions. The timetables do not contain the name of any Supervisor that is inchage - either at the Division level or at the subdivision level. Who do emplyees report to? Hunter himself? However, Hunter's name isn't on the timetable either.
Precision? Chaos?
But, this still leaves the question of how much cushion should you have and how much can you afford? I'd say the railroads don't really have a good handle on this and they tend to get complacent when things are going well. There is always tension between the requirements of the operating plan and the budget process and the resolution is quite often driven by judgement rather than numbers.
The railroads could use some better asset planning models and a bit more focus on the positive and negative "what ifs" and a bit longer planning horizon to drive a more scientific approach to resource planning and budgeting. But, what they are doing today is an order of magnitude better than what they did 25 years ago.
Saturnalia3. Implements a wide array of changes, focused on cutting excess capacity and costs. If it doesn't have a definite purpose, get rid of it. Get down to the bare bones of the operation, increase car velocity, decrease dwell, etc
Let's look at this one. What PSR has done at the other properties he's employed it is to start to run a fully scheduled railroad and insure that crews and locomotives are balanced, so high utilization is guaranteed. Te hen he looks for ways to increase the velocity of the flow by getting rid of non-7 day a week service as much as possible and allowing traffic to flow on whatever train on the network can handle it.
Most of the magic at CN and CP came from implementing scheduled operations.
What's different on CSX (and the same would have been true had heg gotten NS), is that the railroad was ALREADY running an efficient plan. So, there are not nearly so many underutilized assets out there.
Monkeying with unit train operation by merging some with merchandise is interesting, but not going to create much magic. Most unit train traffic moves on decent cycles with high utilization already. It doesn't matter that it doesn't generate a trainload 7 days a week. If the cycle is 5 days and there are three sets in the cycle and that does the job, there's nothing to "get".
Monkeying with yards by converting them to flat is interesting, too, but also not going to drive huge changes to the bottom line.
I'm sure he doesn't like the day of the week volume swings in the intermodal franchise. The is quite a bit if idle equipment and you could squeeze some there if you could come up with a way to flatten the peak and fill the valley. Perhaps day of the week pricing? Yield pricing? Platform reservations? These are marketing and IT changes, not operational. I'm pretty sure you don't want to get there by scaring away the peak so that it's level with the valley.
Gridlock improves the bottom line! Yea! Thats the ticket!
Saturnalia daveklepper Saturnalia: Your analysis makes sense, when applied to CN and CP. But it does not apply to CSX. Because CSX already had cut out most of the dead wood. Because CSX doesn't have a simple route structure, like CN and CP do. Because CSX exists in a much more competitive freight environment, not only vs NS, but also vs trucks and even water transportation. Because average frieght haul is not as long as it is on CN and CP. I predicted that if HH would focus on growing the buesiness, he would be a success. But if he tried to just duplicate what he did at CN and CP, he would fail. And he has tried to just duplicate what he did at CN and CP. And I put my predictions into postings on these forums. Alright, let's play with this, I like it, we're getting somewhere :) Point #1: CSX had already cut much of the dead wood. To that, I'd suggest that while they did cut a lot, they were cutting to cut. At least EHH is trying to make sense of it all - failing in many ways yes, but at CSX previously it was clearly more about cutting based on cost, not need. Harrison's cutting Hump Yards, but he intends to replace that work with flat switching. Previously, CSX just tried that 28-hour schedule, and said "whelp" whenever that hurt anything. They cut trains, forcing the remaining ones to just run huge barges. At least Harrison is a promoter of blocking: clearly he always creates his greatest effencies, and lowers the need for hump yards considerably, by blocking all new traffic. The end-goal is clearly to have most traffic move in two blocks throughout their time on CSX: Origin to middle, and middle to destination. At your origin and destination, you're still probably on another local train, bringing your total train count to four. But, you're not humping cars each time the enter your yards. There's a lot to be gained there, and previous management wasn't doing much to go after it. The biggest cut however, is management. CSX was very top-heavy and not very streamlined. Not that I like seeing people lose their jobs, but businesses have no obligation to keep more people than necessary. There are definite arguments to be made that less is more in management in many ways, including trying to cut down the fiefdom mentality prevailing amongst railroaders. One of Harrison's goals, and it shows with dispatching, is to create one network, not many divisions. If the dispatchers are in Jacksonville, then the whole network flows together, instead of "well it isn't on my division anymore" once the Dispatcher codes up the signals. Harrison cuts with a blunt weapon sometimes, but you have to admit that at least he tries to be somewhat targeted, aiming for "cost control" over "cost cutting". Accurate it isn't always, but at least it happens fairly often and many of the mistakes are eventually undone: see Avon. So consider us in partial agreement. Yes CSX cut some dead wood, but there was so much more to go. And in many cases, there is a huge amount of cost-benefit analysis going on...the actual outcome of which isn't always readily apparent. Point #2: Route Structure Here too there is definitely a case to be made for that. CP is pretty linear, while CN was a giant T. CSX is a triangulated spaghetti bowl. But that doesn't mean you can't optimize a network. I think this is where blocking really comes into play. Consider that Grand Rapids, MI now blocks for Cincinatti, Columbus, Willard, Chicago, the BRC and more. It used to just cut traffic into a "for Barr" and "for Stanley" pile and shove it out the door. This means that the system can definitely be optimized. Now I agree that it'll be more difficult to achieve, given the structure. But why would non-linear systems be disqualified from the principles of "keep 'er movin" and blocked traffic? In theory CSX is still a system with three legs of a triangle, so there is some framework there. What it's going to take is a lot of tinkering and probably some computer modelling. That's where EHH ran into trouble: he clearly knew many of the problems at CSX, but it's too much too quickly. The road requires changes at a slower pace, to allow floes to adjust. We're seeing that now, I think. Will it work as well? I think the jury is still out. But there's a lot more to be said before it is over. Point #3: CSX is tied to the short haul Again, I agree. But here as well I don't think this makes it more difficult. The hauls are shorter but the traffic is more dense. In theory, PSR should get you better results than the existing "system", so in theory competition would still work itself out. The way intermodal traffic isn't changing, and that's the primary competitive edge with trucking. Loose carloads are sometimes ripe for poaching, but not all traffic there is necessarily worth having, either. As for shorter hauls, it's something CSX and NS have to figure out how to deal with. Being honest, it's actually part of the case for transcontinenal mergers, since it would remove this Mississippi divide that largely sinks lanes such as Texas-Ohio for intermodal, since more than one carrier handles it. It's clearly time for more cooperation on intercarrier intermodal, but again railroad's long-standing fiefdom model isn't helping. That's a weakness on most roads. So I guess on all three points, we partially agree, but I think on these three particular issues, the topics run significantly deeper than a single sentence, and as far as Harrison's changes at CSX goes, the jury is still out, operationally. Before I wrap this up, a few points on railroading in general I'd like to make. The first is that railroads now have reached capacity on many routes - think the Southern Transcon, the Chicago Line, and the B&O. Unlike anything the industry has seen since WWII, there is now more traffic which could move by rail profitably than the railroads can handle. This is where the railroads have gained considerable pricing power since the 1990s, and is why overall traffic growth has become lackluster. The simple truth is that railroad capacity is finite and we've reach that point in a lot of lanes. So naturally, the law of supply and demand is kicking in. If railroads have 50 cars that show up, and they can only fluidly handle 40, they're going to raise their pricing until only 40 show up. Not every carload "lost" is a bad one, but merely the choice to take the higher-margin traffic, at least generally. So yes, there may be more competition at the fringes of railroad marketshare, particularly when it comes to boxcar shipments. But this is why the railroads are making great money without any real traffic growth. They've stabilized their traffic volumes, more or less, to the point where adding new customers isn't necessarily required. Now I'm not arguing that railroads should close down their marketing departments (if they even actually try to get new customers at all), but everybody has to realize that in many cases, that new customer might not be worth it once you expense the capital through switching them out, routing the cars, and of course lost track capacity if they're located out online. The goal is not to move the most traffic. It is to make the most money. Railroading has always been a business. Sure, you need traffic to move, but if you have too much, and lose fulidity, then that does you absolutely no good. So this is what I feel has given rise to EHH's model. I don't think it would have worked back in the 70s and 80s, but it is well suited to the optimization necessary today. It isn't a silver bullet and honestly some people probably give him too much praise, while others wail despite clear long-term benefits, often realized after he departs. But to a large extent, EHH fits the time, in the same way another EHH, EH Harriman, owned his time on the UP and SP back in the first days of the 20th Century. I'm never going to claim Harrison would best Harriman, but there's no way the Harriman model - as it existed - would work today.
daveklepper Saturnalia: Your analysis makes sense, when applied to CN and CP. But it does not apply to CSX. Because CSX already had cut out most of the dead wood. Because CSX doesn't have a simple route structure, like CN and CP do. Because CSX exists in a much more competitive freight environment, not only vs NS, but also vs trucks and even water transportation. Because average frieght haul is not as long as it is on CN and CP. I predicted that if HH would focus on growing the buesiness, he would be a success. But if he tried to just duplicate what he did at CN and CP, he would fail. And he has tried to just duplicate what he did at CN and CP. And I put my predictions into postings on these forums.
Saturnalia: Your analysis makes sense, when applied to CN and CP. But it does not apply to CSX. Because CSX already had cut out most of the dead wood. Because CSX doesn't have a simple route structure, like CN and CP do. Because CSX exists in a much more competitive freight environment, not only vs NS, but also vs trucks and even water transportation. Because average frieght haul is not as long as it is on CN and CP.
I predicted that if HH would focus on growing the buesiness, he would be a success. But if he tried to just duplicate what he did at CN and CP, he would fail. And he has tried to just duplicate what he did at CN and CP. And I put my predictions into postings on these forums.
Alright, let's play with this, I like it, we're getting somewhere :)
Point #1: CSX had already cut much of the dead wood.
To that, I'd suggest that while they did cut a lot, they were cutting to cut. At least EHH is trying to make sense of it all - failing in many ways yes, but at CSX previously it was clearly more about cutting based on cost, not need. Harrison's cutting Hump Yards, but he intends to replace that work with flat switching. Previously, CSX just tried that 28-hour schedule, and said "whelp" whenever that hurt anything. They cut trains, forcing the remaining ones to just run huge barges.
At least Harrison is a promoter of blocking: clearly he always creates his greatest effencies, and lowers the need for hump yards considerably, by blocking all new traffic. The end-goal is clearly to have most traffic move in two blocks throughout their time on CSX: Origin to middle, and middle to destination. At your origin and destination, you're still probably on another local train, bringing your total train count to four. But, you're not humping cars each time the enter your yards. There's a lot to be gained there, and previous management wasn't doing much to go after it.
The biggest cut however, is management. CSX was very top-heavy and not very streamlined. Not that I like seeing people lose their jobs, but businesses have no obligation to keep more people than necessary. There are definite arguments to be made that less is more in management in many ways, including trying to cut down the fiefdom mentality prevailing amongst railroaders. One of Harrison's goals, and it shows with dispatching, is to create one network, not many divisions. If the dispatchers are in Jacksonville, then the whole network flows together, instead of "well it isn't on my division anymore" once the Dispatcher codes up the signals.
Harrison cuts with a blunt weapon sometimes, but you have to admit that at least he tries to be somewhat targeted, aiming for "cost control" over "cost cutting". Accurate it isn't always, but at least it happens fairly often and many of the mistakes are eventually undone: see Avon.
So consider us in partial agreement. Yes CSX cut some dead wood, but there was so much more to go. And in many cases, there is a huge amount of cost-benefit analysis going on...the actual outcome of which isn't always readily apparent.
Point #2: Route Structure
Here too there is definitely a case to be made for that. CP is pretty linear, while CN was a giant T. CSX is a triangulated spaghetti bowl. But that doesn't mean you can't optimize a network. I think this is where blocking really comes into play. Consider that Grand Rapids, MI now blocks for Cincinatti, Columbus, Willard, Chicago, the BRC and more. It used to just cut traffic into a "for Barr" and "for Stanley" pile and shove it out the door.
This means that the system can definitely be optimized. Now I agree that it'll be more difficult to achieve, given the structure. But why would non-linear systems be disqualified from the principles of "keep 'er movin" and blocked traffic? In theory CSX is still a system with three legs of a triangle, so there is some framework there. What it's going to take is a lot of tinkering and probably some computer modelling.
That's where EHH ran into trouble: he clearly knew many of the problems at CSX, but it's too much too quickly. The road requires changes at a slower pace, to allow floes to adjust. We're seeing that now, I think.
Will it work as well? I think the jury is still out. But there's a lot more to be said before it is over.
Point #3: CSX is tied to the short haul
Again, I agree. But here as well I don't think this makes it more difficult. The hauls are shorter but the traffic is more dense. In theory, PSR should get you better results than the existing "system", so in theory competition would still work itself out. The way intermodal traffic isn't changing, and that's the primary competitive edge with trucking. Loose carloads are sometimes ripe for poaching, but not all traffic there is necessarily worth having, either.
As for shorter hauls, it's something CSX and NS have to figure out how to deal with. Being honest, it's actually part of the case for transcontinenal mergers, since it would remove this Mississippi divide that largely sinks lanes such as Texas-Ohio for intermodal, since more than one carrier handles it. It's clearly time for more cooperation on intercarrier intermodal, but again railroad's long-standing fiefdom model isn't helping. That's a weakness on most roads.
So I guess on all three points, we partially agree, but I think on these three particular issues, the topics run significantly deeper than a single sentence, and as far as Harrison's changes at CSX goes, the jury is still out, operationally.
Before I wrap this up, a few points on railroading in general I'd like to make.
The first is that railroads now have reached capacity on many routes - think the Southern Transcon, the Chicago Line, and the B&O. Unlike anything the industry has seen since WWII, there is now more traffic which could move by rail profitably than the railroads can handle. This is where the railroads have gained considerable pricing power since the 1990s, and is why overall traffic growth has become lackluster.
The simple truth is that railroad capacity is finite and we've reach that point in a lot of lanes. So naturally, the law of supply and demand is kicking in. If railroads have 50 cars that show up, and they can only fluidly handle 40, they're going to raise their pricing until only 40 show up. Not every carload "lost" is a bad one, but merely the choice to take the higher-margin traffic, at least generally.
So yes, there may be more competition at the fringes of railroad marketshare, particularly when it comes to boxcar shipments.
But this is why the railroads are making great money without any real traffic growth. They've stabilized their traffic volumes, more or less, to the point where adding new customers isn't necessarily required. Now I'm not arguing that railroads should close down their marketing departments (if they even actually try to get new customers at all), but everybody has to realize that in many cases, that new customer might not be worth it once you expense the capital through switching them out, routing the cars, and of course lost track capacity if they're located out online.
The goal is not to move the most traffic. It is to make the most money. Railroading has always been a business. Sure, you need traffic to move, but if you have too much, and lose fulidity, then that does you absolutely no good.
So this is what I feel has given rise to EHH's model. I don't think it would have worked back in the 70s and 80s, but it is well suited to the optimization necessary today. It isn't a silver bullet and honestly some people probably give him too much praise, while others wail despite clear long-term benefits, often realized after he departs. But to a large extent, EHH fits the time, in the same way another EHH, EH Harriman, owned his time on the UP and SP back in the first days of the 20th Century. I'm never going to claim Harrison would best Harriman, but there's no way the Harriman model - as it existed - would work today.
Saturnalia
It is nice to hear your ideas about the constructive intentions of Harrison, particularly how flat switching is basically a response to the anticipation of less need for switching. In that light, it seems like a legitimate reduction of unnecessary costs rather than a cynical conspiracy to rob the company of cash. Maybe the Harrison team should offer more explanation of what they are doing and how it will improve the company.
jeffhergertTo me, it's a strategy of a dying industry. Reminds me somewhat of what John Kneilling once wrote in a column many years ago. Something along the lines of don't invest in the business and pull out as much money as you can before it collapses completely. Maybe railroads are again on a downward trajectory. If so, it's mostly their own fault as they convince themselves that more and more business isn't worth having. Jeff
Jeff,
I don't see that happening on the well managed roads. I would buy stock in most of them in a heart beat but would be tenuous regarding CSX stock until I see an upturn. Given the path of destruction Harrison left at CN and CP I have my doubts he is the saviour of CSX. Harrison has a history of slash and burn and leaving the rubble for others to clean up.
In the end what will happen is anyone's guess at this point.
Norm
Growth? While EHH seems to be an extreme example, most of the other class ones are kind of on the same path. They aren't really looking to grow their business, that might require spending money to handle it. It might make the OR go up and the stock price go down. They seem rather to try to squeeze out every penny out of the dollars they already bring in, rather than try to bring in more dollars overall.
To me, it's a strategy of a dying industry. Reminds me somewhat of what John Kneilling once wrote in a column many years ago. Something along the lines of don't invest in the business and pull out as much money as you can before it collapses completely. Maybe railroads are again on a downward trajectory. If so, it's mostly their own fault as they convince themselves that more and more business isn't worth having.
Los Angeles Rams GuyHonestly, the people who portray this guy as some sort of hero or messiah is seriously misguided.
Or being paid.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
Saturnalia BaltACD EHH's view has become fuzzy from repeated oxygen shortages. He may have been a railroader in the past. His illness and physical condition have sapped the faculties he once had - the downhill slide stops at six feet below ground. Nice strawman you've got there. Let's stick to the actual points of railroading, please. I'd much rather read about the particulars of flat yard switching operations versus humping, instead of the constant "Evil EHH" montra railfans have gotten so great at. Go ahead and argue against Hunter Harrison, but do it with facts, not loathful comments which do nothing but fill up space and tack onto your post count. ------- As for the idea of the network "cushion", I'd love to see more dicsussion about that, because I do think it is one of the underappreciated flaws of PSR. Harrison has proven that he can clearly cut dead wood, and figure out the best *overall* layout for the network, but he seems to have a weak history when it comes to leaving enough capacity. I personally think that a case study of CP and CN reveal that he did indeed cut too much, but that I also think that this in the long-term has the benefit of ensuring the dead wood is cut away. Harrison has never been around long enough to see his model implemented beyond a few years. But I think one should not underestimate the EHH cycle, which I'll term it. The cycle seems to be: 1. Underperforming railroad exists 2. Uses some form of leverage to enter the railroad 3. Implements a wide array of changes, focused on cutting excess capacity and costs. If it doesn't have a definite purpose, get rid of it. Get down to the bare bones of the operation, increase car velocity, decrease dwell, etc 4. Fumble around a bit in the process of implementing #3, as many people get disguntled through layoffs and changes (or even eliminations) to their segment of the railroad fiefdom system. 5. (Some) metrics improved, after a few years EHH is squeezed out, or leaves, once his doings no longer help the bottom line, since the deadweight is gone. 6. The next generation now has a *very* lean footprint, which they can rebuild upon. Figure out where there needs to be more capacity. You're going to undo some of EHH's changes, but this is going to happen now that you know for sure that you actually do need that capacity or whatever it is. 7. Railroad sees traffic and revenue increases, while performance metrics remain about the same as the railroad resumes running, still leaner and better off than when EHH started. Now I'll be very interested to see what everybody else thinks of my analysis here. I liken it to pruning bushes: in getting it "into shape", you're going to cut off some healthy bits, along with the dead weight. This might be painful and hurt growth in the short-term, but in the long-term it tends to come back stronger. I don't think this is Harrison's intention, but it seems to have held true throughout his managerial history. Look at CN, which is now unrivaled in just about every operating category and reaches all three ends of the continent, or CP, which was a complete disaster. Did EHH leave these two railroads in perfect shape? Absolutely not! But I don't see where, beyond a few small areas in each case, places where EHH did tangible long-term "damage" to either CP or CN. On the whole, you have to consider his time in each case to be a net-positive. Thusly, I see it that EHH is following more or less the same formula at CSX. Yes, there will be short-term brew-ha-ha, without a doubt - we are seeing loads of it, and perhaps he's making more mistakes with the more complex CSX network. And the Wall St cats will get their Benjamins in the short-term. But I think what many forget is that CSX of yore was definitely the weaker of the two eastern giants, despite most analysts agreeing that CSX has the better network. So there is room for improvement, and we'll see how much of it EHH finds, and what his eventual sucessor finds. Remember, without a doubt railfans were flinging poo at CSX for years and years in a sort of sport, before EHH ever came around. I feel that perhaps even a majority of railfans are following the bandwagon on this one.
BaltACD EHH's view has become fuzzy from repeated oxygen shortages. He may have been a railroader in the past. His illness and physical condition have sapped the faculties he once had - the downhill slide stops at six feet below ground.
EHH's view has become fuzzy from repeated oxygen shortages. He may have been a railroader in the past. His illness and physical condition have sapped the faculties he once had - the downhill slide stops at six feet below ground.
Nice strawman you've got there.
Let's stick to the actual points of railroading, please. I'd much rather read about the particulars of flat yard switching operations versus humping, instead of the constant "Evil EHH" montra railfans have gotten so great at.
Go ahead and argue against Hunter Harrison, but do it with facts, not loathful comments which do nothing but fill up space and tack onto your post count.
-------
As for the idea of the network "cushion", I'd love to see more dicsussion about that, because I do think it is one of the underappreciated flaws of PSR. Harrison has proven that he can clearly cut dead wood, and figure out the best *overall* layout for the network, but he seems to have a weak history when it comes to leaving enough capacity.
I personally think that a case study of CP and CN reveal that he did indeed cut too much, but that I also think that this in the long-term has the benefit of ensuring the dead wood is cut away. Harrison has never been around long enough to see his model implemented beyond a few years. But I think one should not underestimate the EHH cycle, which I'll term it. The cycle seems to be:
1. Underperforming railroad exists
2. Uses some form of leverage to enter the railroad
3. Implements a wide array of changes, focused on cutting excess capacity and costs. If it doesn't have a definite purpose, get rid of it. Get down to the bare bones of the operation, increase car velocity, decrease dwell, etc
4. Fumble around a bit in the process of implementing #3, as many people get disguntled through layoffs and changes (or even eliminations) to their segment of the railroad fiefdom system.
5. (Some) metrics improved, after a few years EHH is squeezed out, or leaves, once his doings no longer help the bottom line, since the deadweight is gone.
6. The next generation now has a *very* lean footprint, which they can rebuild upon. Figure out where there needs to be more capacity. You're going to undo some of EHH's changes, but this is going to happen now that you know for sure that you actually do need that capacity or whatever it is.
7. Railroad sees traffic and revenue increases, while performance metrics remain about the same as the railroad resumes running, still leaner and better off than when EHH started.
Now I'll be very interested to see what everybody else thinks of my analysis here. I liken it to pruning bushes: in getting it "into shape", you're going to cut off some healthy bits, along with the dead weight. This might be painful and hurt growth in the short-term, but in the long-term it tends to come back stronger. I don't think this is Harrison's intention, but it seems to have held true throughout his managerial history.
Look at CN, which is now unrivaled in just about every operating category and reaches all three ends of the continent, or CP, which was a complete disaster. Did EHH leave these two railroads in perfect shape? Absolutely not! But I don't see where, beyond a few small areas in each case, places where EHH did tangible long-term "damage" to either CP or CN. On the whole, you have to consider his time in each case to be a net-positive.
Thusly, I see it that EHH is following more or less the same formula at CSX. Yes, there will be short-term brew-ha-ha, without a doubt - we are seeing loads of it, and perhaps he's making more mistakes with the more complex CSX network. And the Wall St cats will get their Benjamins in the short-term. But I think what many forget is that CSX of yore was definitely the weaker of the two eastern giants, despite most analysts agreeing that CSX has the better network. So there is room for improvement, and we'll see how much of it EHH finds, and what his eventual sucessor finds.
Remember, without a doubt railfans were flinging poo at CSX for years and years in a sort of sport, before EHH ever came around. I feel that perhaps even a majority of railfans are following the bandwagon on this one.
Wow. Am so glad yet another EHH apologist has come on here. Makes me feel warm and fuzzy all over that a functioning lunatic like EHH actually has fans such as yourself.
I don't know....Maybe it's just me but considering the nearly 5,000 jobs he cut at CPRS (including mine) and the nearly 3,000 jobs he's already cut in the nearly six months he's been at CSXT, not to mention customers who have been pretty much left high and dry by his tactics, doesn't exactly prod me to nominate this guy for Railroader of the Year. And his culture of fear that he created at CN and CPRS and now CSXT has morale at an all-time low. Having worked for CPRS for 20+ years, I know for a fact that there are MANY customers who will NEVER do business with CPRS (and perhaps with rail altogether) again.
Honestly, the people who portray this guy as some sort of hero or messiah is seriously misguided.
Euclid tree68 Saturnalia - One of your metaphors is an example of what many feel EHH and his handlers are doing - pruning. To slightly modify your metaphor, however, what if the pruner is getting paid by the pound for what he removes from the bush? Do you think he really cares if the bush recovers? Especially if this is a contract job and he won't be around next year to see the results of his efforts? So how do we determine whether that modified metaphor is actually happening?
tree68 Saturnalia - One of your metaphors is an example of what many feel EHH and his handlers are doing - pruning. To slightly modify your metaphor, however, what if the pruner is getting paid by the pound for what he removes from the bush? Do you think he really cares if the bush recovers? Especially if this is a contract job and he won't be around next year to see the results of his efforts?
Saturnalia - One of your metaphors is an example of what many feel EHH and his handlers are doing - pruning.
To slightly modify your metaphor, however, what if the pruner is getting paid by the pound for what he removes from the bush? Do you think he really cares if the bush recovers? Especially if this is a contract job and he won't be around next year to see the results of his efforts?
So how do we determine whether that modified metaphor is actually happening?
Ahh, great point! I think there is room in there for that model, certainly. He's definitely paid for what he removes in the form of performance bonuses tied to Operating Ratio (a clause almost certainly in his contract), among whatever earnings he's going to get from being a major stockholder, as the share price goes up as the OR falls, in theory.
So maybe paid by the pound, but he's still gotta be careful not to kill the bush. Cut as much as possible, though, certainly.
I don't know if EHH thinks about the long-term of the companies he controls, but I think part of the whole game, intentional or not, is like I said, that ultimately his sucessors get a very, very lean base upon which to build the company's long term future. We're still waiting to see how CP turns out, but CN is an absolute sucess, can't argue there. So I think EHH is just a catalyst for change - but you absolutely need people to come in after he's chopped off all of these branches to figure out where to go next.
Finally someone I can 100% agree with. I have been thinking this but you were able to put it to words. Thank you!
Saturnalia - One of your metaphors is an example of what many feel EHH and his handlers are doing - pruning. As you note, some deadwood is removed, but some useful stuff is necessarily removed as well. Yes, presumably the bush will recover.
Having viewed, 1st hand, what is taking place in the CSX workplace of today I know what is and isn't taking place operationally and who is and isn't in place to get the job done.
Financial ledger de maine is not my strong point beyond knowing figures can be manipulated, under 'generally accepted accounting principles' to prove any point some one wants emphasized.
Generating fake news and spin is what companies and the government are all about these days.
BaltACD Bare bones does not make a functional person. Bare bones is death after the vultures have picked everything nourishing from the corpse!
Bare bones does not make a functional person. Bare bones is death after the vultures have picked everything nourishing from the corpse!
Whatever...you're just spinning my metaphor.
You clearly have no intention of a rational discussion on the merits of actual railroad operations and finance. Shame, since it seems as though you could probably bring a lot of good stuff to such a discussion.
BaltACD Euclid oltmannd From EHH's point of view you close a hump and convert to flat when you can get the same number of cars classified with roughly the same labor hours paid for and you get to save the cost of maintaining all that hump machinery and jewelry. If you have a hump that's only doing 1000 cars a day, the hump and hump crew might be idle for a good bit of time. Same for the puller crews. Same number of guys might be able to flat switch those 1000 cars, although their slack time and will be much less and capacity "cushion" will also be much less. Having a bit excess capacity helps you catch up when something bad happens, like a derailment sends you slug of traffic after it's cleared up. By converting some many humps to flat so fast, EHH destroyed the "cushion" that helped keep the network fluid, and we get to see the result. To be fair, that's what PSR is all about. Utilize everything to the max. Dry up the "cushion". To be fair once again, EHH is smart enough, experienced enough and old enough to know better than to change so much so fast. He's even admitted it, a bit, lately. They have paid him WAY too much to have him be this sloppy. He should refund some of the money! I understood the premise of Balt’s comment to be about misrepresenting the performance statistics by an evil external villain like Harrison closing yards and claiming false savings while actually destroying the company. But if well-meaning people inside the company cannot agree on whether a yard should be closed for saving money or left open as a “cushion,” why is it so obvious that Harrison is wrong on the matter? How can we conclude that Harrison is causing damage by closing yards when the company can’t even tell us whether they are better off closed or left open? The 'well meaning' people inside the company have been silenced by termination, whenever their voice vary's from EHH's. The well meaning people agree EHH is wrong but are powerless to change EHH's autocratic rule. The changes that have been mandated, have be done without ANY PLAN as to how thing are to be done in light of the changes. Implementing changes is one thing. Implementing changes without a plan as to how those changes are to be performed and included into the operation of the plant as a whole, creates unmanageable chaos.
Euclid oltmannd From EHH's point of view you close a hump and convert to flat when you can get the same number of cars classified with roughly the same labor hours paid for and you get to save the cost of maintaining all that hump machinery and jewelry. If you have a hump that's only doing 1000 cars a day, the hump and hump crew might be idle for a good bit of time. Same for the puller crews. Same number of guys might be able to flat switch those 1000 cars, although their slack time and will be much less and capacity "cushion" will also be much less. Having a bit excess capacity helps you catch up when something bad happens, like a derailment sends you slug of traffic after it's cleared up. By converting some many humps to flat so fast, EHH destroyed the "cushion" that helped keep the network fluid, and we get to see the result. To be fair, that's what PSR is all about. Utilize everything to the max. Dry up the "cushion". To be fair once again, EHH is smart enough, experienced enough and old enough to know better than to change so much so fast. He's even admitted it, a bit, lately. They have paid him WAY too much to have him be this sloppy. He should refund some of the money! I understood the premise of Balt’s comment to be about misrepresenting the performance statistics by an evil external villain like Harrison closing yards and claiming false savings while actually destroying the company. But if well-meaning people inside the company cannot agree on whether a yard should be closed for saving money or left open as a “cushion,” why is it so obvious that Harrison is wrong on the matter? How can we conclude that Harrison is causing damage by closing yards when the company can’t even tell us whether they are better off closed or left open?
oltmannd From EHH's point of view you close a hump and convert to flat when you can get the same number of cars classified with roughly the same labor hours paid for and you get to save the cost of maintaining all that hump machinery and jewelry. If you have a hump that's only doing 1000 cars a day, the hump and hump crew might be idle for a good bit of time. Same for the puller crews. Same number of guys might be able to flat switch those 1000 cars, although their slack time and will be much less and capacity "cushion" will also be much less. Having a bit excess capacity helps you catch up when something bad happens, like a derailment sends you slug of traffic after it's cleared up. By converting some many humps to flat so fast, EHH destroyed the "cushion" that helped keep the network fluid, and we get to see the result. To be fair, that's what PSR is all about. Utilize everything to the max. Dry up the "cushion". To be fair once again, EHH is smart enough, experienced enough and old enough to know better than to change so much so fast. He's even admitted it, a bit, lately. They have paid him WAY too much to have him be this sloppy. He should refund some of the money!
From EHH's point of view you close a hump and convert to flat when you can get the same number of cars classified with roughly the same labor hours paid for and you get to save the cost of maintaining all that hump machinery and jewelry.
If you have a hump that's only doing 1000 cars a day, the hump and hump crew might be idle for a good bit of time. Same for the puller crews. Same number of guys might be able to flat switch those 1000 cars, although their slack time and will be much less and capacity "cushion" will also be much less.
Having a bit excess capacity helps you catch up when something bad happens, like a derailment sends you slug of traffic after it's cleared up.
By converting some many humps to flat so fast, EHH destroyed the "cushion" that helped keep the network fluid, and we get to see the result.
To be fair, that's what PSR is all about. Utilize everything to the max. Dry up the "cushion".
To be fair once again, EHH is smart enough, experienced enough and old enough to know better than to change so much so fast. He's even admitted it, a bit, lately. They have paid him WAY too much to have him be this sloppy.
He should refund some of the money!
I understood the premise of Balt’s comment to be about misrepresenting the performance statistics by an evil external villain like Harrison closing yards and claiming false savings while actually destroying the company.
But if well-meaning people inside the company cannot agree on whether a yard should be closed for saving money or left open as a “cushion,” why is it so obvious that Harrison is wrong on the matter?
How can we conclude that Harrison is causing damage by closing yards when the company can’t even tell us whether they are better off closed or left open?
The 'well meaning' people inside the company have been silenced by termination, whenever their voice vary's from EHH's. The well meaning people agree EHH is wrong but are powerless to change EHH's autocratic rule.
The changes that have been mandated, have be done without ANY PLAN as to how thing are to be done in light of the changes. Implementing changes is one thing. Implementing changes without a plan as to how those changes are to be performed and included into the operation of the plant as a whole, creates unmanageable chaos.
The “well-meaning people” I was referring to as not being able to determine whether a yard should be closed or left in operation are the ones prior to Harrison. So they were not silenced by Harrison. You described them this way:
“Throughout my career, I have seen one operating regime close a yard (flat or hump makes no difference) and then claim $X millions in savings. The next regime comes along and reopens the closed yard and also claim's $X millions in savings. This has happened more times than I care to count. Figure lie and liars figure.”
If these well-meaning regimes cannot agree on the yard closures, how can it be so clear that Harrison is wrong about yard closings?
Norm48327Bucky, Please, just once, give us a break. You switch directions faster than a rabbit being chased by a hungry coyote.
Dear Mr. Hungry Coyote,
You, as leader of the anti-Euclidians on this forum have been consistent in instantly snapping back with an attack immediately after every comment by Euclid, so I was surprised at your recent inconsistency on the thread about crude by open hopper. I was waiting for your response, but all I heard was crickets.
http://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/t/265013.aspx
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Euclid BaltACD Because you aren't a part of the industry, you can't see how the costs remain. They get shifted to other areas, but they remain nevertheless. Shuffleing deck chairs. I understand your point that anyone who closes a hump yard to save money will not save any money because the costs are shifted elsewhere. All I am asking is that if it is such a slam-dunk conclusion that hump yards are cost effective, how can anybody argue otherwise? I have not heard Harrison's case for this.
BaltACD Because you aren't a part of the industry, you can't see how the costs remain. They get shifted to other areas, but they remain nevertheless. Shuffleing deck chairs.
I understand your point that anyone who closes a hump yard to save money will not save any money because the costs are shifted elsewhere. All I am asking is that if it is such a slam-dunk conclusion that hump yards are cost effective, how can anybody argue otherwise? I have not heard Harrison's case for this.
It works like this. When you are hunting for cost savings in the budget, if you close a yard, you save nearly every line item on the budget and generally ignore the velocity effect on the network.
When you reopen the yard, you count all the congestion relief and car hire efficiencies and balance against the incremental cost.
This happened A LOT in the "old days" before network modeling made the exercises more "honest".
Pre-Staggers, cost was the only big "lever" available to pull to affect the financials.
Norm48327 Euclid Are you saying you would expect me to speculate on the switching accident rather than wait for the results of the investigation? I don’t see anything wrong with speculation as long as you acknowledge what you don’t know. But in this case, there is nothing to speculate on because nobody has reported what happened during the accident. It seems to me that what the union did was go beyond speculation to positive assertion that working conditions caused the accident, and yet they offered no explanation for how that actually occurred. Based on the letter from the union, I will speculate that they want us to believe the accident was caused by Harrison. Bucky, Please, just once, give us a break. You switch directions faster than a rabbit being chased by a hungry coyote. Do you remember the speculation you offered when the Lac Megantic disaster went down? You had all kinds of theoritical speculation back then. Now you are saying you will wait to see the final NTSB report. Why the sudden change in perspective? Is it just to feed your ego and your claim of having 'experience' that you are loathe to and will never divulge? You have been asked many times to show your qualifications to post your opinion as fact yet you are reluctant to do so. Consider it a 'personal attack' if you wish but in spite of many requests you have artfully dodged the questions other forum participants have asked of you either by denieing them answers to their query or totally ignoring them and changing the subject to fit your personal needs. You reminds me of Lucy in the comic strip Peanuts. I will, for what it's worth, offer psychatric help for five cents. You appear to need it. Wake up and smell the brewing coffee. Get a reality check. We are here to discuss railroads not for entertainment of your trolling.
Euclid Are you saying you would expect me to speculate on the switching accident rather than wait for the results of the investigation? I don’t see anything wrong with speculation as long as you acknowledge what you don’t know. But in this case, there is nothing to speculate on because nobody has reported what happened during the accident. It seems to me that what the union did was go beyond speculation to positive assertion that working conditions caused the accident, and yet they offered no explanation for how that actually occurred. Based on the letter from the union, I will speculate that they want us to believe the accident was caused by Harrison.
Bucky,
Please, just once, give us a break. You switch directions faster than a rabbit being chased by a hungry coyote. Do you remember the speculation you offered when the Lac Megantic disaster went down? You had all kinds of theoritical speculation back then. Now you are saying you will wait to see the final NTSB report. Why the sudden change in perspective? Is it just to feed your ego and your claim of having 'experience' that you are loathe to and will never divulge?
You have been asked many times to show your qualifications to post your opinion as fact yet you are reluctant to do so. Consider it a 'personal attack' if you wish but in spite of many requests you have artfully dodged the questions other forum participants have asked of you either by denieing them answers to their query or totally ignoring them and changing the subject to fit your personal needs.
You reminds me of Lucy in the comic strip Peanuts. I will, for what it's worth, offer psychatric help for five cents. You appear to need it.
Wake up and smell the brewing coffee. Get a reality check. We are here to discuss railroads not for entertainment of your trolling.
Norm,
Why don’t you read what I said before imagining an inconsistency of me denying that I speculate, while having speculated about Lac Megantic?
I have never denied that I speculate. I think that is you who always say you refuse to speculate. It is not me. I just said above that I don’t see anything wrong with speculation. So sure, I speculated about the Lac Megantic wreck, the Casselton wreck, and several others. At one level, speculation is simply a plausible explanation. It is part of any detective work. It is entirely different than a jury rendering a verdict based on their speculation.
But as I explained above, I see nothing to speculate about regarding the Nashville switching accident because no details have been given.
EuclidAre you saying you would expect me to speculate on the switching accident rather than wait for the results of the investigation? I don’t see anything wrong with speculation as long as you acknowledge what you don’t know. But in this case, there is nothing to speculate on because nobody has reported what happened during the accident. It seems to me that what the union did was go beyond speculation to positive assertion that working conditions caused the accident, and yet they offered no explanation for how that actually occurred. Based on the letter from the union, I will speculate that they want us to believe the accident was caused by Harrison.
zugmann Euclid , I will wait for the investigation to tell me what caused it and whether it was Harrison's fault. Who are you, and what have you done with Euclid?
Euclid , I will wait for the investigation to tell me what caused it and whether it was Harrison's fault.
Who are you, and what have you done with Euclid?
Are you saying you would expect me to speculate on the switching accident rather than wait for the results of the investigation? I don’t see anything wrong with speculation as long as you acknowledge what you don’t know. But in this case, there is nothing to speculate on because nobody has reported what happened during the accident.
It seems to me that what the union did was go beyond speculation to positive assertion that working conditions caused the accident, and yet they offered no explanation for how that actually occurred. Based on the letter from the union, I will speculate that they want us to believe the accident was caused by Harrison.
zugmannWho are you, and what have you done with Euclid?
Euclid, I will wait for the investigation to tell me what caused it and whether it was Harrison's fault.
Shadow the Cats ownerEuclid the overall physical costs of humping are higher yes however the total overall costs when you reach a certain point of cars IIRC it is somewhere in the 1000 cars a day range becomes cheaper than flat switching. Why does it become cheaper than flat 1 crew pushing a cut up the hill 1 car man uncouples the cars they roll unless prohibited down the hill on their own to their new track and into their new train. Then once there they are made up into a new train and prepared to leave for a new crew to take out of the yard. With flat switching you have multiple crews under EHH running all over the place throwing switches trying to make up new trains. It is harder on the crews and locomotives and cars. There already has been one serious injury due to his cutbacks in Nashville how many more do we need.
Maybe EHH is just eliminating excess capacity in hump yards and in the process, he has to do a little flat switching until things settle down. Regarding your comment on the Nashville accident, I will wait for the investigation to tell me what caused it and whether it was Harrison's fault.
BaltACDBecause you aren't a part of the industry, you can't see how the costs remain. They get shifted to other areas, but they remain nevertheless. Shuffleing deck chairs.
Euclid BaltACD Throughout my career, I have seen one operating regime close a yard (flat or hump makes no difference) and then claim $X millions in savings. The next regime comes along and reopens the closed yard and also claim's $X millions in savings. This has happened more times than I care to count. Figure lie and liars figure. How can there be such controversy over whether closing a hump yard saves money or costs more? In a complex industrial system, I can see how there can be fine points that might be changed to save money, and some controversy over whether they actually will save money. But how in the world can a grand gesture like closing a hump yard leave you with ambiguous results? That seems to show that the efficiency of hump yards is not at all that clear cut. Operationally, the principle should be much more efficient than flat switching, but maybe the staffing overhead just eats up the mechanical efficiency.
BaltACD Throughout my career, I have seen one operating regime close a yard (flat or hump makes no difference) and then claim $X millions in savings. The next regime comes along and reopens the closed yard and also claim's $X millions in savings. This has happened more times than I care to count. Figure lie and liars figure.
How can there be such controversy over whether closing a hump yard saves money or costs more? In a complex industrial system, I can see how there can be fine points that might be changed to save money, and some controversy over whether they actually will save money. But how in the world can a grand gesture like closing a hump yard leave you with ambiguous results?
That seems to show that the efficiency of hump yards is not at all that clear cut. Operationally, the principle should be much more efficient than flat switching, but maybe the staffing overhead just eats up the mechanical efficiency.
Because you aren't a part of the industry, you can't see how the costs remain. They get shifted to other areas, but they remain nevertheless. Shuffleing deck chairs.
BaltACDThroughout my career, I have seen one operating regime close a yard (flat or hump makes no difference) and then claim $X millions in savings. The next regime comes along and reopens the closed yard and also claim's $X millions in savings. This has happened more times than I care to count. Figure lie and liars figure.
Numbers for the week ending just before Labor Day:
Using the standard numbers published on the STB site...
Cars on line: Down 1500. About a thousand tank cars. The rest covered hoppers and open top hoppers. I suspect the tank cars are down due to Harvey. CSX has the chemical coast to chemical coast traffic - not NS.
Dwell: System dwell down almost an hour. This is good, but 27 hours is still way to high. All the humps are ill. Most are over 30 hours and Avon still over 40. Should be in the 22-24 hour range. Was 23 hours in mid May.
Train speed: Up 0.6. Also good. Driven by Merchandise up 0.7 mph. Overall, still not good. About 5 mph lower than mid-May when CSX was trumpeting "improvements"
Cars sitting 24 hours. Empties about the same but loads down about 1400. Still 50% higher than mid-May.
Conclusion: Still in the ditch. Inching upward. CSX's STB weekly report has considerable "happy talk" about improving operations. I'd say, they're still in the ditch with a long way to go.
BaltACDThroughout my career, I have seen one operating regime close a yard (flat or hump makes no difference) and then claim $X millions in savings. The next regime comes along and reopens the closed yard and also claim's $X millions in savings. This has happened more times than I care to count.
Yeah. Me, too! It's almost comical.
jeffhergert oltmannd overall Thanks to all that replied. I am writting this at 7:25pm on labor day. EHH said there would be "noticeable" improvement by labor day. So, how about it? Has anyone "noticed" improvement in CSX service? I would really like to hear from anyone that ships/recieves from CSX. We're gonna have to wait until next Wednesday to see the numbers... I would expect there would be improvement. Especially since CSX changed out they calculate their metrics. Jeff
oltmannd overall Thanks to all that replied. I am writting this at 7:25pm on labor day. EHH said there would be "noticeable" improvement by labor day. So, how about it? Has anyone "noticed" improvement in CSX service? I would really like to hear from anyone that ships/recieves from CSX. We're gonna have to wait until next Wednesday to see the numbers...
overall Thanks to all that replied. I am writting this at 7:25pm on labor day. EHH said there would be "noticeable" improvement by labor day. So, how about it? Has anyone "noticed" improvement in CSX service? I would really like to hear from anyone that ships/recieves from CSX.
Thanks to all that replied. I am writting this at 7:25pm on labor day. EHH said there would be "noticeable" improvement by labor day. So, how about it? Has anyone "noticed" improvement in CSX service? I would really like to hear from anyone that ships/recieves from CSX.
We're gonna have to wait until next Wednesday to see the numbers...
I would expect there would be improvement. Especially since CSX changed out they calculate their metrics.
A Fraudster's standard tactic. Publish numbers that have no historical basis for comparison.
Made an appearance at my former dispatching office - to say goodbye, before they leave for Jacksonville.
EHH when he closed the Cumberland Hump, decreed that the remaining Flat Switching had to take place in the 8 tracks of what had been the Recieving Yard. Virtually nothing got switched as there was no room to switch anything to. After a month of gridlock, they were authorized to use the 'trim' end of the Hump Yard to do flat switching. Hump computer and retarders are still in place but haven't been maintained since the hump was 'closed'.
Throughout my career, I have seen one operating regime close a yard (flat or hump makes no difference) and then claim $X millions in savings. The next regime comes along and reopens the closed yard and also claim's $X millions in savings. This has happened more times than I care to count. Figure lie and liars figure.
Murphy's Law:
Drive a train over a cliff and into a deep canyon, it will fall until it hits bottom....
At some point, even Superman cannot save it.
Despite early optimism over Hunter Harrison’s turnaround plan, CSX complaints gather steam
The Globe and Mail (Online) (Toronto, ON) By Eric Atkins September 3, 2017 Investors in Florida-based railway CSX Corp. have enjoyed 37-per-cent returns since news broke in January that noted turnaround man Hunter Harrison was seeking the top job. Since he became CEO in March, it's been a different story for some CSX customers. They complain about missed shipments, lost sales and trains that arrive late or not at all – problems that began with Mr. Harrison's efforts to change the railway's operating model. Mr. Harrison says service will improve as the railway completes the switch to what he calls precision scheduled railroading, a lean operating model he used when he led Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. and Canadian National Railway Co. But the U.S. regulator, the Surface Transportation Board, has taken note of the complaints from dozens of industry groups and has demanded that CSX provide it with weekly reports on how well its network is moving, including data on congestion at key gateways and interchange traffic with other railways. The STB has called CSX executives to a public hearing on Sept. 12 in Washington, D.C., to explain how the company is fixing the service problems. Rail customers are also expected to present their complaints to the STB, which is an independent government agency charged by Congress to resolve railway rate and service disputes. "The board has received a number of informal complaints from CSX customers regarding increased transit times, unreliable switching operations, inefficient car routings, poor communications and co-ordination with CSX customer service, and acute disruption to customers' business operations," the agency said in a statement. Forty-six U.S. industry groups in the Rail Customer Coalition complained to U.S. lawmakers about "chronic service failures" in the CSX rail network. The railway has "repeatedly" failed to pick up and deliver rail cars, jeopardizing the future of some businesses and the health of the U.S. economy, the group said in a letter. "Major service changes have been imposed with little advance notice, and CSX's response to customer complaints has been woefully inadequate," said the letter, signed by the American Petroleum Institute, the Corn Refiners Association and other groups. Mr. Harrison fired back at the coalition with a letter that called the complaints "unfounded and grossly exaggerated" but said CSX is "aggressively" tackling "some unfortunate disruptions to our service." Executives at Arch Coal Inc. said on a recent conference call with analysts that CSX's rail service deteriorated in the second quarter. The company is experiencing delays moving coal domestically and to ports for export, said John Eaves, CEO of the second-largest U.S. coal producer. "We need and we expect the railroad to perform in the back half of the year," Mr. Eaves said. "We've had a long-term relationship with those guys. It's been a partnership, and we've held up our end of the bargain. We expect those guys to hold up their end of the bargain in the back half of this year." U.S. passenger service Amtrak, which runs on parts of CSX's network, says the freight railroad is not living up to its agreements by delaying passenger trains and inconveniencing its customers, according to a news report last week. "The [on-time performance] and reliability of our service are major components of customer satisfaction and of critical importance to passengers in communities large and small," Amtrak spokeswoman Vernae Graham said in an e-mail, declining an interview on CSX's service. Mr. Harrison was not available for an interview last week, a CSX spokesman said. Under Mr. Harrison's leadership, CSX has cut hundreds of jobs, sidelined 900 locomotives and closed or revamped rail yards. It's a strategy he employed at CP, the railroad he left in January to seek the chief executive job at CSX, with the backing of investor Paul Hilal. News of Mr. Harrison's move sent CSX's share price to a new high, but since he was named CEO the share price has changed little. More than 80 per cent of rail shippers surveyed by U.S. investment bank Cowen Inc. said they have had service problems since Mr. Harrison arrived at CSX. Almost 40 per cent said they switched some shipments to CSX rival Norfolk Southern Corp., and 67 per cent said they moved freight to a trucking company. Jason Seidl, an equities analyst at Cowen, said CSX's problems could boost Norfolk Southern's profit in the second half of 2017. But he said he thinks CSX's problems are "transitory" and that the company will regain the business. "While it is painful for many shippers today, we expect that over the next 12 to 18 months CSX customers will be more pleased with the … service quality." In a letter to the STB, Mr. Harrison called the changes he was implementing at CSX "profound, transformational," adding that "changes of this magnitude tend to give rise to temporary challenges." He said the company's response to congestion and service problems includes adding staff at "challenged" parts of the network to improve communications with customers and restoring operations at one rail yard. "I remain confident that as CSX implements its [precision scheduled railroading] model, customers will receive a markedly superior product," he wrote.
By Eric Atkins
September 3, 2017
Investors in Florida-based railway CSX Corp. have enjoyed 37-per-cent returns since news broke in January that noted turnaround man Hunter Harrison was seeking the top job.
Since he became CEO in March, it's been a different story for some CSX customers. They complain about missed shipments, lost sales and trains that arrive late or not at all – problems that began with Mr. Harrison's efforts to change the railway's operating model.
Mr. Harrison says service will improve as the railway completes the switch to what he calls precision scheduled railroading, a lean operating model he used when he led Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. and Canadian National Railway Co.
But the U.S. regulator, the Surface Transportation Board, has taken note of the complaints from dozens of industry groups and has demanded that CSX provide it with weekly reports on how well its network is moving, including data on congestion at key gateways and interchange traffic with other railways.
The STB has called CSX executives to a public hearing on Sept. 12 in Washington, D.C., to explain how the company is fixing the service problems. Rail customers are also expected to present their complaints to the STB, which is an independent government agency charged by Congress to resolve railway rate and service disputes.
"The board has received a number of informal complaints from CSX customers regarding increased transit times, unreliable switching operations, inefficient car routings, poor communications and co-ordination with CSX customer service, and acute disruption to customers' business operations," the agency said in a statement.
Forty-six U.S. industry groups in the Rail Customer Coalition complained to U.S. lawmakers about "chronic service failures" in the CSX rail network. The railway has "repeatedly" failed to pick up and deliver rail cars, jeopardizing the future of some businesses and the health of the U.S. economy, the group said in a letter. "Major service changes have been imposed with little advance notice, and CSX's response to customer complaints has been woefully inadequate," said the letter, signed by the American Petroleum Institute, the Corn Refiners Association and other groups.
Mr. Harrison fired back at the coalition with a letter that called the complaints "unfounded and grossly exaggerated" but said CSX is "aggressively" tackling "some unfortunate disruptions to our service."
Executives at Arch Coal Inc. said on a recent conference call with analysts that CSX's rail service deteriorated in the second quarter. The company is experiencing delays moving coal domestically and to ports for export, said John Eaves, CEO of the second-largest U.S. coal producer.
"We need and we expect the railroad to perform in the back half of the year," Mr. Eaves said. "We've had a long-term relationship with those guys. It's been a partnership, and we've held up our end of the bargain. We expect those guys to hold up their end of the bargain in the back half of this year."
U.S. passenger service Amtrak, which runs on parts of CSX's network, says the freight railroad is not living up to its agreements by delaying passenger trains and inconveniencing its customers, according to a news report last week. "The [on-time performance] and reliability of our service are major components of customer satisfaction and of critical importance to passengers in communities large and small," Amtrak spokeswoman Vernae Graham said in an e-mail, declining an interview on CSX's service.
Mr. Harrison was not available for an interview last week, a CSX spokesman said.
Under Mr. Harrison's leadership, CSX has cut hundreds of jobs, sidelined 900 locomotives and closed or revamped rail yards. It's a strategy he employed at CP, the railroad he left in January to seek the chief executive job at CSX, with the backing of investor Paul Hilal. News of Mr. Harrison's move sent CSX's share price to a new high, but since he was named CEO the share price has changed little.
More than 80 per cent of rail shippers surveyed by U.S. investment bank Cowen Inc. said they have had service problems since Mr. Harrison arrived at CSX. Almost 40 per cent said they switched some shipments to CSX rival Norfolk Southern Corp., and 67 per cent said they moved freight to a trucking company.
Jason Seidl, an equities analyst at Cowen, said CSX's problems could boost Norfolk Southern's profit in the second half of 2017. But he said he thinks CSX's problems are "transitory" and that the company will regain the business. "While it is painful for many shippers today, we expect that over the next 12 to 18 months CSX customers will be more pleased with the … service quality."
In a letter to the STB, Mr. Harrison called the changes he was implementing at CSX "profound, transformational," adding that "changes of this magnitude tend to give rise to temporary challenges."
He said the company's response to congestion and service problems includes adding staff at "challenged" parts of the network to improve communications with customers and restoring operations at one rail yard. "I remain confident that as CSX implements its [precision scheduled railroading] model, customers will receive a markedly superior product," he wrote.
From outside looking in, CSX is in BIG trouble.
NS and CSX have parallel routes from Cleveland to Buffalo, near me. CSX usually has 3-4 trains per NS train on a normal day.
Last time I was trackside, NS ran 4 trains per 1 on CSX.
The 1 CSX train? Normal length. NS trains? Normal length, save for the trailer/container train. It was a bit longer than most had been on NS for a while.
Next group was again 3-4 NS and 1 CSX. This CSX train was shorter than most. (~45 intermodal cars.)
I did not see another CSX train that day.
The time before that? 3 NS, 0 CSX. The NS trains were long. (22K {intermodal} needed 3 loco's, 310 {manifest freight} had 3 as well, but was very long, with 100+ freight cars.) (I lost count....)
So, from my area anyways, CSX is in one big mess.
Not to mention the "runaway" issues they have had of late...
Ricky W.
HO scale Proto-freelancer.
My Railroad rules:
1: It's my railroad, my rules.
2: It's for having fun and enjoyment.
3: Any objections, consult above rules.
Of course IM dropped 300 shipments. That would be the close to 900 trailers and containers that UPS shipped a week between Boston and Chicago alone a week. CSX better get its crap together or their excutives are going to be going where did all our High paying customers go and then going how did we end up bankrupt in a hurry.
This weeks numbers: CSX is still in the ditch, but inched upward a bit. Looking at the EP-724 reports since CSX has decided to take it's marbles home from the AAR site,
Trains speed: Flat.
Dwell: System dwell dropped over an hour. This is good. Avon much better, but still not healthy. Waycross and Queensgate have caught a cold, though.
Cars on line: Down 1000. Nearly all covered hoppers.
Cars sitting 48 hours: dropped about 10%, but still an order of magnitude worse than NS.
Shipments: carload up about 1700, intermodal down 300.
Conclusion: A little bit better. CSX is hanging it's hat on Labor Day slack period to get everything sorted. We'll know in a couple weeks if that worked, and then about a month later, if it stuck. If you are under-resourced, these "resets" work for a bit, but then things slide back down hill.
Runaway derailment from early last month in Indianapolis
http://www.wthr.com/article/csx-employee-accuses-company-of-hurried-culture-leading-to-recent-accidents
Article includes a 20 minute clip of the Train Dispatchers wire during the incident.
No Injuries - only equipement and track damage.
PaulofCovington
Isn't all this turmoil just going according to plan?
jeffhergert Saturnalia Note also that for the railroads, growing traffic is not necessarily a good thing. Maury Kline pointed out Union Pacific's struggles with pricing between 1950-2000, as the railroad looked to balance profits, and eventually capacity. Our world runs on supply and demand, and today the major trunk lines are operating near capacity. Not all traffic is created equal. So, railroads have been raising rates to widen their margins and keep their railroads moving, forcing the customers looking for cheaper rates to look elsewhere. This is a natural consequence of any business which doesn't have the capacity to serve every potential customer. Not all business is good business! I didn't believe it for a good long time, but once you figure it out, you'll know why many banks don't want to hear about your risky startup idea! I wish we were near capacity on the Overland Route. At least they cut the pools down a bit. We have 40 trainmen borrowed out right now to two other seniority districts. Gives those hired and then furloughed (at least those who answered the recall) chance to work a few weeks before they get cut off again. Jeff
Saturnalia Note also that for the railroads, growing traffic is not necessarily a good thing. Maury Kline pointed out Union Pacific's struggles with pricing between 1950-2000, as the railroad looked to balance profits, and eventually capacity. Our world runs on supply and demand, and today the major trunk lines are operating near capacity. Not all traffic is created equal. So, railroads have been raising rates to widen their margins and keep their railroads moving, forcing the customers looking for cheaper rates to look elsewhere. This is a natural consequence of any business which doesn't have the capacity to serve every potential customer. Not all business is good business! I didn't believe it for a good long time, but once you figure it out, you'll know why many banks don't want to hear about your risky startup idea!
Note also that for the railroads, growing traffic is not necessarily a good thing. Maury Kline pointed out Union Pacific's struggles with pricing between 1950-2000, as the railroad looked to balance profits, and eventually capacity.
Our world runs on supply and demand, and today the major trunk lines are operating near capacity. Not all traffic is created equal. So, railroads have been raising rates to widen their margins and keep their railroads moving, forcing the customers looking for cheaper rates to look elsewhere. This is a natural consequence of any business which doesn't have the capacity to serve every potential customer.
Not all business is good business!
I didn't believe it for a good long time, but once you figure it out, you'll know why many banks don't want to hear about your risky startup idea!
I wish we were near capacity on the Overland Route. At least they cut the pools down a bit. We have 40 trainmen borrowed out right now to two other seniority districts. Gives those hired and then furloughed (at least those who answered the recall) chance to work a few weeks before they get cut off again.
Before EHH, CSX was a scheduled railroad. Car schedules and train schedules. With EHH at the controls, all schedules have been trashed.
First, EHH has begun to reinstate operations at the hump in Avon, and I'm hearing Boyle's may be soon if not already returning to service already.
I think that as usual in this day and age, the media, or in this case the railfans, are quick to form a singluar narrative about this huge complex of issues. There is no doubt that CSX is in the greatest Class I meltdown since the Conrail Breakup, but it isn't just Harrison telling customers off.
Primarily, at least in the last two days, EHH has been tossing potshots at a railroad shipper's union, whose stated goal is reciprocal switching. Shocker to nobody, they're not going to let a good crisis go to waste. So yes EHH "blamed the shippers" in a way, but the true story involves much more than just his too-quick run at running CSX over the last few months.
Nothing happens in a vacuum. Shippers have been charging the railroads over service and pricing for years. While service isn't always great, pricing seems to be a major gripe lately. While still far below pre-Staggers Act rates and with much better service then back in the day, prices have climbed over the last several years, as railroads, much like other industries, look to widening their margins in order to grow, instead of organic traffic growth.
Don't you guys get it? After enough customers have left, his railroad will run smoothly.
DeggestyHow infantile is Mr. Harrison going to be? He refuses to accept responsibility for the result of his actions.
Infantilism seems to be in vogue in many responsible positions these days.
How infantile is Mr. Harrison going to be? He refuses to accept responsibility for the result of his actions.
Johnny
BaltACD EHH spewing https://finance.yahoo.com/news/csxs-hunter-harrison-bashes-u-160343587.html
EHH spewing
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/csxs-hunter-harrison-bashes-u-160343587.html
Last month he blames the employees, this month he is dillusional enough to blame customers but of course, he is not to blame for any of this. He already has customers pulling away and I hear 2 MAJOR shippers have elected to not bother with CSX in 2018 and take the business elsewhere. I guess blaming he customers is a good way to deal with it....let see how pouringsalt into an open wound works out for him.
CSX is the USS Caine and Harrison is Captain Queeg
blue streak 1 Is it possible that we can smell a FBI raid in the offing ?
Is it possible that we can smell a FBI raid in the offing ?
Absolutely. There are no other problems and the FBI needs to keep busy..
These days sarcasm fuels the nation. We need an emoticon showing where sarcasm is missing.
I think any time you have some mischief on a message board/forum there probably sarcasm lurking nearby.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
mischief? or angry, since that is in theory the emotion underlying sarcasm. Some say it's passive aggressive, but I have doubts.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
This usually conveys the intention behind a comment.
Even though it isn't a real forum/html tag, [sarcasm] Sarcastic Remark [/sarcasm] usually works....
But you're right, those little inflections don't carry over well in print in most cases.
I'm with you on an indicator for sarcasm, it gets lost in printed form.
rrnut282rrnut282 wrote the following post 2 hours ago: schlimm, I had to re-read my post several times. I didn't mention EHH, you used him to create a strawman to argue against.
Hey, sorry, but nothing of the kind. It was just a (sarcastic) joke. I thought that was obvious but I'd better use the sarcasm emoji next time.
rrnut282I used the word 'mis-route' as I thought I heard the crew say their train, "was put on the wrong track out of Toledo."
Let me ask you to remember a bit more specifically. Did the crew say 'wrong track' or did they say 'wrong main'? The latter means something more specific and most certainly doesn't imply "misrouting".
Part of the problem here is that your post, innocently as it may have been intended, came right in the middle of a string of posts castigating Hunter Harrison for slowing down operations. It shouldn't be surprising that people presumed your intent was to demonstrate 'yet another' example of that, and (in part therefore) that schlimm understood your post as criticizing EHH even though you didn't name him implicitly. I had very much the same impression before I read your corrections.
Don't worry about people on the forum seeming overly prone to pounce. Some people, myself included, don't always use the niceties and netiquette we probably should in the heat of a discussion.
rrnut282schlimm, I had to re-read my post several times. I didn't mention EHH, you used him to create a strawman to argue against. n012944,I used the word 'mis-route' as I thought I heard the crew say their train, "was put on the wrong track out of Toledo." I tried to use a neutral term to make no inferrence as to intent or error, as I didn't have any more information than that to determine the reason. I apologize if it didn't sound that way. Is it any wonder participation here is slower than it used to be? I can't even say "this is what I saw and heard," without being rebutted.
I had to re-read my post several times. I didn't mention EHH, you used him to create a strawman to argue against.
n012944,I used the word 'mis-route' as I thought I heard the crew say their train, "was put on the wrong track out of Toledo." I tried to use a neutral term to make no inferrence as to intent or error, as I didn't have any more information than that to determine the reason. I apologize if it didn't sound that way.
Is it any wonder participation here is slower than it used to be? I can't even say "this is what I saw and heard," without being rebutted.
Having played in the arena for 26 years. Train ID's are a form of shorthand for all operating personal to identify the train, what it carries and its destination.
Anyone that thinks they can just 'throw any ID' on a train has no concept of how the railroad works. Certain Train ID's get operated on different route because of the ID - Train Dispatchers DO NOT REVIEW each trains 'wheel report' or consist to 'know' the actual destination of the cars in a train - they rely on the normal destination of the the Train ID to do that in 'shorthand form'.
IF a train is going to something different than its normal blocking and work - THE CHANGES HAVE TO BE EMPHASIZED to everybody that will have any contact with the train. The changes don't get trainsmitted by mental telepathy.
schlimm,
n012944,
I used the word 'mis-route' as I thought I heard the crew say their train, "was put on the wrong track out of Toledo." I tried to use a neutral term to make no inferrence as to intent or error, as I didn't have any more information than that to determine the reason. I apologize if it didn't sound that way.
n012944I hate to bring up facts in this conversation, since there seems to be so few. There was no "mis-routed" rack train. X276 was a detour because of the Sand Patch derailment, and its detour was the LONG way around. The track at Sand Patch was put back in service faster than anticipated, and it was decided to shove the track back at Deshler, and run on its normal route. It wasn't EHH, or a deliberate error. It was an operational decision.
Thanks for the correction. I should have realized that in any "heated" situation, truth is often a casuality.
n012944 schlimm rrnut282 Last Saturday, I drove two hours to Deshler to see how things were moving. They weren't. In five hours, only two trains on the two-track ex B&O Chicago line. the whole time I was there, they were trying to get a mis-routed rack train off the Toledo line and headed to Willard. It was still on the wrong track when I left. The locals said there were 3 dead trains between Deshler and Willard. I suppose the misrouting was EHH's doing? That, at least, seems to be an example of either an accidental or deliberate error by someone involved with traffic - a dispatcher? It takes very little to tie up traffic, as Balt has pointed out in the past. I hate to bring up facts in this conversation, since there seems to be so few. There was no "mis-routed" rack train. X276 was a detour because of the Sand Patch derailment, and its detour was the LONG way around. The track at Sand Patch was put back in service faster than anticipated, and it was decided to shove the track back at Deshler, and run on its normal route. It wasn't EHH, or a deliberate error. It was an operational decision.
schlimm rrnut282 Last Saturday, I drove two hours to Deshler to see how things were moving. They weren't. In five hours, only two trains on the two-track ex B&O Chicago line. the whole time I was there, they were trying to get a mis-routed rack train off the Toledo line and headed to Willard. It was still on the wrong track when I left. The locals said there were 3 dead trains between Deshler and Willard. I suppose the misrouting was EHH's doing? That, at least, seems to be an example of either an accidental or deliberate error by someone involved with traffic - a dispatcher? It takes very little to tie up traffic, as Balt has pointed out in the past.
rrnut282 Last Saturday, I drove two hours to Deshler to see how things were moving. They weren't. In five hours, only two trains on the two-track ex B&O Chicago line. the whole time I was there, they were trying to get a mis-routed rack train off the Toledo line and headed to Willard. It was still on the wrong track when I left. The locals said there were 3 dead trains between Deshler and Willard.
Last Saturday, I drove two hours to Deshler to see how things were moving. They weren't. In five hours, only two trains on the two-track ex B&O Chicago line. the whole time I was there, they were trying to get a mis-routed rack train off the Toledo line and headed to Willard. It was still on the wrong track when I left. The locals said there were 3 dead trains between Deshler and Willard.
I suppose the misrouting was EHH's doing? That, at least, seems to be an example of either an accidental or deliberate error by someone involved with traffic - a dispatcher? It takes very little to tie up traffic, as Balt has pointed out in the past.
I hate to bring up facts in this conversation, since there seems to be so few. There was no "mis-routed" rack train. X276 was a detour because of the Sand Patch derailment, and its detour was the LONG way around. The track at Sand Patch was put back in service faster than anticipated, and it was decided to shove the track back at Deshler, and run on its normal route.
It wasn't EHH, or a deliberate error. It was an operational decision.
The question was asked on the radio show "car talk" several years ago. If someone posts something that is clearly in error, and someone else responds with something that is equally wrong, do we know more or less as a result of the second post?
Schlimm do you have any clue on how logistics works at all. If a route is plugged you try and find a way around the blockage. The problem with railroads when one line gets plugged and the dispatchers start playing lets use this line they run out of crews and tracks they have in a hurry. We are both very familar with Chicago traffic patterns. Rush hour in Chicago can be a royal PITA on a good freaking day. Well say there is a major accident on the Ike inbound that is going to take 4 hours to clear up rolled over semi leaking cargo and such and those can take a while to clean up if it is hazmat. First off the Tristate is going to be jammed up to the Kennedy going north then inbound is going to be a mess on the Kennedy. If they can get in via 55 that is going to be a parking lot in a hurry from overloading. The side streets and roads are going to be jammed solid in a hurry. It happens then the delays and bad tempers happen.
That was one accident in a major city we are talking a systemwide melting down of a railroad that is starting to become paralized from their CEO's actions and orders. They are running out of places to stash cars and trains crews are becoming tired engines are going to start to breakdown and pretty soon it will spread across the nation as interchange between CSX and the Western railroads breakdown. Why am I saying this it is so simple. CSX can't take the cars they need to from UP and BNSF and they will have stash them someplace they will run out of places to hold them also. This meltdown unless something is done soon is going to dang near stop the railroads. I'm already seeing it on the BNSF trains I know that interchange with the CSX are shorter than normal. Their normal 12K footer that was run thru for the CSX has been cancelled until further notice due to service issues on CSX.
I am of the opinion that Harrison has "Peter principled out". His successes at CN and CP improved the railroads to a degree but there was a lot of 'cleanup' that had to be done after his departure from both.
Sure, getting operations on CSX's major corridors in order and delivering to customers in the promised time is admirable. Falsh back to when he took the reins at CN and ask what customers had to say about service in that era. It became so bad General Motors trucked production to Conrail in Utica, MI to avoid dealing with his dictatorial edicts that they capitulate to his demands.
CN, and to some extent CP have recovered from his dictitorial edicts but it has taken time for both of the above to resolve the problems he created.
CSX is a 'whole nuther kettle of fish' with I'm not sure Harrison in competent enough to deal with.
oltmanndThe numbers say CSX is in the ditch. Dwell is up. Train speed is down. Cars on line has increased even as business has dropped off. This is a classic congested railroad set of numbers. The trend seems to be in the wrong direction, as well. What we don't know is if EHH has monkeyed with any of the measures definitions. He was not a fan of the public numbers at CN and CP. They did not publish when he was there. He can't pull CSX out because they are mandated by the STB to publish. He CAN monkey with the definitions a bit to soften the impact of poor operations on the numbers, however.
The trend seems to be in the wrong direction, as well.
What we don't know is if EHH has monkeyed with any of the measures definitions. He was not a fan of the public numbers at CN and CP. They did not publish when he was there. He can't pull CSX out because they are mandated by the STB to publish. He CAN monkey with the definitions a bit to soften the impact of poor operations on the numbers, however.
If what we are seeing are EHH's 'sharpened' numbers, heaven help us on what the REAL numbers are.
The numbers say CSX is in the ditch. Dwell is up. Train speed is down. Cars on line has increased even as business has dropped off. This is a classic congested railroad set of numbers.
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4097968-csx-operational-woes-lead-customer-complaints-losses-harrison-apology?auth_param=1e0t0b:1cori3k:3741cfd693bdc5d0887c890f80fb007b&uprof=46&dr=1
Summary There are definitely naysayers looking for any opportunity to critique Harrison’s performance at CSX. My personal opinion is that CSX’s network is fundamentally different from that of the Canadian rails, so I am interested to see how well Harrison’s strategies will pan out. For investors, recent trends for CSX have been tough due to the public scrutiny of the company’s service issues and as geopolitical risks have intensified. Since CSX’s stock price peak at $55, it has fallen by 10 percent. Getting insights into the happenings as have been reported is good to keep tabs on, especially as time goes by.
There are definitely naysayers looking for any opportunity to critique Harrison’s performance at CSX. My personal opinion is that CSX’s network is fundamentally different from that of the Canadian rails, so I am interested to see how well Harrison’s strategies will pan out.
For investors, recent trends for CSX have been tough due to the public scrutiny of the company’s service issues and as geopolitical risks have intensified. Since CSX’s stock price peak at $55, it has fallen by 10 percent. Getting insights into the happenings as have been reported is good to keep tabs on, especially as time goes by.
CSX stock way up this morning for some reason. Funny how that is. Lately stock prices recede on good news and advance on bad news..Getting nervous now.. CN on track for another record breaking quarter..may be time to sell out.
Thanks for the replies. It's depressing to hear but thanks anyway.
slotracer Such is Eugene's "transitory hiccups" from his circumsision railroading. We have businesses to run. We have switched a bunch of traffic and as we work out some transloads and expand some truck unloading cpacity issues at a couple plants even more traffic wil come off the CSX. Once we invest what we ned to on those logisitcal assetts, we will enter into long term contracts with the truckers and that volume will be off CSX for a good number of years to come.
Such is Eugene's "transitory hiccups" from his circumsision railroading. We have businesses to run. We have switched a bunch of traffic and as we work out some transloads and expand some truck unloading cpacity issues at a couple plants even more traffic wil come off the CSX. Once we invest what we ned to on those logisitcal assetts, we will enter into long term contracts with the truckers and that volume will be off CSX for a good number of years to come.
Then EHH can sideline or sell more assets, furlough or fire more employees and run his "precision railroad".
It won't be long, and he can announce that he won't be buying anymore engines or equipment for this dying railroad business.
Absolutely not, they have been worse the last 2-3 weeks. Cars out of route by hundreds of miles. Cars sitting at Atlanta for 8-9 days, my Florida plant they shut down a week ago fo rnot switching them for over a week, almost did it again yesterday. I am losing track of al the trucks I ma running to keep plants going, having to act early on the trucks as so many are trucking to keep plants going due to CSX issues that trucks are hard to get in many places. One region in the Southeast is all gummed up, operations folks I know tell me it is the constant changes to the operating plan without sufficient fleshing out the details of how the operating plan is supposed to work is one culprit. PArking locomotives and trying to run long trains is another. Getting rid of helpers and having trains double the hill is congesting large sections of mainline.
Many of my CSX vendors are shipping rail very late as they are running out of empties due to significant delays.
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