The pattern prevails across virtually all commodity groups, with the notable exception of “Intermodal.”
There, the “yield” rose only 20%, tempered explicitly by truck competition. (The negative impact on IM margins has been dramatic.)
The industry has adopted (implicitly) a “going out of business” strategy by absolutely maximizing cash flow. To wit, the pricing strategy I have outlined, combined with the service-killing “monster train” cost-minimization strategy.
The volume collapse is almost certainly irreversible given the dramatic logistics demands of the new “Amazon economy” for unheard-of service levels.
(Funny, sorta: Just posted here on the Forum is the AAR’s weekly carloading report. It notes dramatic gains for all groups except Petroleum (DAPL has killed the CBR sector). The phrase “Dead Cat Bounce” comes to mind.)
466lex Current (nominal) dollars. "As recorded" on the books.
Current (nominal) dollars. "As recorded" on the books.
Using the bls.gov inflation calculator, inflation rose 19.6% between Dec 2006 and Dec 2016. Rail's revenue growth slightly beat inflation with 21%
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=100&year1=200612&year2=201612
466lex ... 2006 2016 %chg. Revenue: $48.2 billion $58.1 billion +21 ...
...
2006 2016 %chg.
Revenue: $48.2 billion $58.1 billion +21
Was that in constant or inflated dollars ?
Thanks for those thoughtful comments above, esp. the info from 466lex.
Note that the referenced 2007 study and report were before the circa 2008 'unfunded mandate' for PTC installation, which includes freight railroads. It's widely viewed to have been a major diversion of capital expenditures that could have been spent on capacity improvements instead (though the data suggests those might not have been necessary).
Maybe some other comments later.
- PDN.
It appears likely that infrastructure plans, etc. will be largely on hold until the investigations reach their conclusions.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Unbeknownst (and unknowable) to DOT, AAR, and the railroads, the year 2006 was the post-Staggers Act (1980) U.S. railroad volume “peak.” Structural changes in the U.S. economy; modal competition; logistical innovations; and strategic railroad industry pricing decisions combined to “cap” railroad industry volumes that year. Subsequent years, notably the recession years of 2008 and 2009 and the collapse of coal traffic in 2016, saw consistent declines.
Some data: (U.S. Class 1s)
2006 2016 % Chg.
Tons Originated: 1.956 billion 1.553 billion -21
Revenue Ton-miles: 1.771 trillion 1.584 trillion -11
Loads: 35.7 million 31.9 million -11
Had the U.S. DOT demand estimate been linearly correct, U.S. railroad tonnage in 2016 would have approximated 2.5 billion tons.
Ten years ago, September 2007, this report was published: “National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study.” Prepared for AAR by Cambridge Systematics, Inc., the study was requested by the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission. The Commission was charged by Congress to develop a plan of improvements to the nation’s surface transportation systems that would meet the needs of the U.S. for the 21st century.
“[The Study] provides a first approximation of the rail freight infrastructure improvements and investments needed to meet the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (U.S. DOT) projected demand for rail freight transportation in 2035. The U.S. DOT estimates that the demand for rail freight transportation—measured in tonnage—will increase 88 percent by 2035.”
A decade later, in the midst of another infrastructure “rush,” a status check may be of some interest. (Let me hasten to emphasize the source of the “demand estimate”: U.S. DOT, not AAR nor individual railroads. No criticism of the report, AAR, or its authors is intended.)
However, it is worth noting the following description by the study’s authors: “This study is a hallmark study, the first effort of its kind. The U.S. DOT and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) have developed national infrastructure needs and cost estimates for the publicly owned highway systems, but no comparable, long-term, national estimates have been developed for the rail system. The railroads are publicly traded or privately owned companies, and the planning horizons for railroad capital projects typically do not extend out 30 years. And neither the U.S. DOT nor individual state DOTs have comprehensive rail infrastructure databases suitable for long-term planning. This study is the first collective assessment by the major freight railroads of their long-term capacity expansion and investment needs.”
Some decadal statistical comparisons are made in a following post.
BaltACD Sounds like Chao want more toll facilities to be built - for profit, not for service.
Sounds like Chao want more toll facilities to be built - for profit, not for service.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
WASHINGTON — Transportation Secretary Elaine L. Chao said Monday that “There has never been a more exciting time to be involved in infrastructure. It’s a national priority, and has growing public support. There is also rare bipartis...
http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2017/05/15-us-infrastructure
Brian Schmidt, Editor, Classic Trains magazine
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.