wanswheelThe LIRR prez did refer to the machine as a work car and a work train, so the exact right term for it just wasn’t important as long as everybody in the room knew he meant that thing that wasn’t a car or a train. Excerpt from MTA press release, April 30, 2014 [Patrick A. Nowakowski] is a career railroad professional with broad experience in operations, engineering, infrastructure and planning. For the past five years he has served as Executive Director of the Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project, which is building a 23-mile rail line to connect with the Washington, D.C. Metro system. He previously served more than 27 years with the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), including seven years as Assistant General Manager of Operations… Nowakowski began his career in 1975 at the freight railroad that would become Conrail, designing track layouts as a civil engineer. He joined SEPTA in 1981 as a senior civil engineer, where he developed a five-year capital plan for its rails and roadbed, and advanced through a series of positions with increasing responsibilities for delivering service, maintaining equipment and managing infrastructure. Nowakowski earned a bachelor's degree in engineering from the University of Delaware and a master's in business administration from Drexel University. He still holds a professional engineer license from Pennsylvania.
Excerpt from MTA press release, April 30, 2014
[Patrick A. Nowakowski] is a career railroad professional with broad experience in operations, engineering, infrastructure and planning. For the past five years he has served as Executive Director of the Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project, which is building a 23-mile rail line to connect with the Washington, D.C. Metro system. He previously served more than 27 years with the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), including seven years as Assistant General Manager of Operations…
Nowakowski began his career in 1975 at the freight railroad that would become Conrail, designing track layouts as a civil engineer. He joined SEPTA in 1981 as a senior civil engineer, where he developed a five-year capital plan for its rails and roadbed, and advanced through a series of positions with increasing responsibilities for delivering service, maintaining equipment and managing infrastructure. Nowakowski earned a bachelor's degree in engineering from the University of Delaware and a master's in business administration from Drexel University. He still holds a professional engineer license from Pennsylvania.
From the questions being asked - it sounded like he was trying to explain the incident to functional railroad idiots, if not just plain everyday idiots.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The LIRR prez did refer to the machine as a work car and a work train, so the exact right term for it just wasn’t important as long as everybody in the room knew he meant that thing that wasn’t a car or a train.
I would opine that the MofW folks would have the road channel available - at least the supervisor would. In most cases, if there are work limits, a train wishing to move through those work limits would need to contact the supervisor, or his designee.
That said - they were apparently in the process of moving the MofW equipment - not working as such. I would think that someone would have to be in contact with the DS for permission to make those moves.
I agree that the MofW crews might not be familiar with emergency radio procedures. It's also possible that the equipment in question was operating under the direction of someone else who had permission on the track, ie, the supervisor, and the individual pieces of equipment don't have the road channel.
Given the apparent timing, I'm not sure that even a warning over the radio would have completely prevented the collision once the MofW equipment fouled the adjacent track.
Many, many questions. As they say, though, the truth will out.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Balt, didn't Congress tell us that PTC will prevent all collisions?
Johnny
RME wanswheel Not to start up an exciting Buckyball flavor explosion ... but there was a particular line in that story that jumped out at me. Here it is late 2016, with PTC in the offing, and an accident like this not only doesn't provide a signal indication to the passenger train, the work-train crew doesn't have any communications to declare a prompt derailment emergency! Seems to me almost as if 'derailment detection' needs to have an implicit CBTC-like function to stop traffic near the point of accident.
wanswheel
Not to start up an exciting Buckyball flavor explosion ... but there was a particular line in that story that jumped out at me.
Here it is late 2016, with PTC in the offing, and an accident like this not only doesn't provide a signal indication to the passenger train, the work-train crew doesn't have any communications to declare a prompt derailment emergency!
Seems to me almost as if 'derailment detection' needs to have an implicit CBTC-like function to stop traffic near the point of accident.
Semantics, but the equipment was not a Work Train. A Work Train is defined by the defination of a Train in most every rule book. A Train is normally defined as a engine with or without cars displaying markers.
The equipment involved was MofW work equipment - not a train. Trains and MofW work equipment operate under different rules. As a practical matter MofW employees that have radios monitor the MofW designated channel for their area of operation. The road channel for train operations is a different channel. I have no idea if the MofW radios have access to the Road Channel and if they do what radio traffic might have been in progress at the time the emergency happend. I don't know of the MofW personnel are trained in the method of announcing an Emergency on the Road Channel.
Not knowing the specific physical characteristics of the Control Point involved, nor the specific interval of time between the MofW equipment observing the problem and the location of the accelerating train at the specific point in time that the movable point frog was breached it is not possible from afar to know if the signal system functioned properly or not and if it did, how close to the controling signal the train was at the time it dropped to STOP.
I get the impression that this was a 'bang bang' happening with minimal time between the frog breach and the impact.
Signal Maintainers and the signal deparment have a whole lot of explaining to do about why the switch points routed the MofW equipment through the crossover.
Even with the best PTC and communications - something that happens in a 'bang bang' fashion will still become a collision.
wanswheelhttp://www.theislandnow.com/great_neck/news/lirr-work-train-derailed-before-new-hyde-park-crash/article_c3c07b14-a1d0-11e6-946f-5f170550abf2.html
The operator got out of the train and ran toward the New Hyde Park station to try and stop train traffic, but by that time the 12-car Huntington branch train carrying about 600 passengers was already traveling east at 43 miles per hour, Nowakowski said.
wanswheel Fast forward to about 9:10.
Fast forward to about 9:10.
Answers a few of my questions, however, even when a control point is 'out of service' on a track - and the track is being used for either train or MofW operations - every manipulation of the signal apurtances logs its operation on my carriers signal log that is maintrained as a part of the CADS computer system. That log identifies when power is taken off a switch, when the switch is operated in 'hand' position.
If the passing train was operating at 43 MPH on #2 track, obviously it was operating under Signal Indication that was displayed by the absolute signals for the Control Point. Under my carriers rules, even though #1 track may be Out of Service, if the Signal Department or ANYONE else is intending to operate switches or other signal apurtances on #1 track at the control point, they MUST have permission of the Train Dispatcher to operate those devices. The Train Dispatcher must be contacted for permission to operate any signal device on the Train Dispatchers territory.
While the description in the video cleared up some questions, it causes the asking of a number of other questions.
BaltACDWhile what 'actually caused' the incident has been outed - it only raises a couple of thousand more questions of how that happenstance actually happened. A number of things aren't adding up.
My thoughts as well when I read the story.
mudchickenAha - Methinks a piece of the puzzle has been "outed". Now if only they would quit calling the work equipment a train. (It must have been travelling and not working to foul that badly. The signal tribe is getting concerned with the implication(s).)
While what 'actually caused' the incident has been outed - it only raises a couple of thousand more questions of how that happenstance actually happened. A number of things aren't adding up.
Aha - Methinks a piece of the puzzle has been "outed". Now if only they would quit calling the work equipment a train. (It must have been travelling and not working to foul that badly. The signal tribe is getting concerned with the implication(s).)
http://www.theislandnow.com/great_neck/news/lirr-work-train-derailed-before-new-hyde-park-crash/article_c3c07b14-a1d0-11e6-946f-5f170550abf2.html
Agreed - On top of everything else, if the track is less than 20-25 feet over from an adjoining track, you are supposed to not be working and in the clear watching the train by from a place of safety. What piece of the puzzle has not surfaced yet? Newsworkers aside, some of the images looked more like an RM-2000 liner instead of a PTS-62 shaker (bent up cab module & what appeared to be buggies)....Surfacing gang out of its limits instead of a work train?
tree68Just looking for potential angles to explain the incident.
One which occurs to me: if the stabilizer were in action, the vibrations might have opened facing crossover points enough to split under a train, maybe only just enough for one wheelset or truck to be diverted before they re-closed. That would almost certainly imply, though, that part of the stabilizer and perhaps following equipment in the work train were derailed toward the mutual centerline of the double track, and I have not seen any pictures so far that would substantiate that.
If the crossover opened with the two trains running substantially parallel (not one overtaking the other and fouling or colliding with it), which seems to be the situation, it is possible that very prompt-acting PTC would immediately detect the 'interlocking failure' (this is one reason the point position sensors need to be separate from the switch motor or linkage position sensing) and while there might have been insufficient time for a full stop of the passenger train before the stabilizer would run up the crossover into contact with it, much of the subsequent extent of derailment and damage might have been avoided.
BaltACDI have no personal knowledge of how the LI signal system is designed or operates.
Ditto.
Just looking for potential angles to explain the incident.
Other than in the area of the crossovers, the third rail appears to be between the two tracks. I would suspect that this would hinder any encroachment from one track to the other unless it was done over the third rail. Another possible reason to suspect the crossovers as a factor.
The crossovers appear to be here: N 40 43' 58" W 73 40' 18"
tree68 RME Looking at the satellite image of the tracks east of the New Hyde Park station, it appears that there are two crossovers there. Perhaps the track machine had wandered onto one of them? I am guessing here, but since getting the machine close enough to the passenger equipment is a point to be reckoned with, that's one possibility... If they are manual switches, throwing one on the track the track machine was on, but not the other, might not trip a red in the face of the eastbound passenger train...
RME
Looking at the satellite image of the tracks east of the New Hyde Park station, it appears that there are two crossovers there. Perhaps the track machine had wandered onto one of them? I am guessing here, but since getting the machine close enough to the passenger equipment is a point to be reckoned with, that's one possibility...
If they are manual switches, throwing one on the track the track machine was on, but not the other, might not trip a red in the face of the eastbound passenger train...
If the line is track circuited 'properly' opening any switch that can lead to access to a Main track SHOULD drop signals on that Main track. Opening the switch on one end of a crossover SHOULD drop signals to stop on the track where the other end of the crossover is in its Main track.
I have no personal knowledge of how the LI signal system is designed or operates.
RMEI am, regrettably, uncertain of how this could sideswipe a passenger set severely enough to cause the derailment in question. Someone please enlighten me.
For those who are unfamiliar with the PTS62, this is what one looks like
and here is a short video of the machine working (note the vibration)
and there is brief mention, and a view of a different model, here
Note that earlier in the last video, there is equipment that apparently extends far beyond loading-gage limits on the outer side of the double-track ROW, but is explicitly tolerant of traffic on the 'other track'.
I am, regrettably, uncertain of how a stabilizer could sideswipe a passenger set severely enough to cause the derailment in question. Someone please enlighten me.
I suspect the fire was caused by third-rail shoe contact from the derailing passenger consist rather than by the stabilizer contacting the third rail itself.
From what I gather from other forums, the M-7 set was sideswiped three cars back by a Plasser ballast stabilizer car operating in the same direction on an adjacent track which was out of service for maintenance.
Lots of unsanswered questions. I suspect the fire resulted from the third rail shorting.
Almost incredible how it can be this late and no one in "authority" knows or is willing to say what happened.
Appears that the work train had a tamper or other item of track equipment that fouled the adjacent-track clearance in some way, perhaps when operating. Note that the newsworkers doing the story still haven't figured out whether the work train was eastbound in transit, or eastbound doing something to the track structure -- anyone, post here if that has changed. My suspicion is that someone involved in giving the train clearance did not realize the work train's equipment would foul a parallel track.
The interesting detail to me is the sequence of events that caused the fire on the work train. Who has a detailed explanation that accounts for it?
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/09/long-island-train-derailment-scores-injured-after-collision
From the article:
“Cuomo said on Sunday it appeared a train doing maintenance work somehow violated the clearance space of a Long Island Rail Road train. Both trains were traveling east when they collided, just after 9pm.”
Update
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
A LIRR 12-car EMU collided with a work train, derailed, and shorted the third rail.
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2016/10/08/lirr-derailment/
The reports are as of this writing that 29 are injured, but that will probably change. It appears that the cars involved are M-7s.
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