http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34822666?ocid=socialflow_facebook&ns_mchannel=social&ns_campaign=bbcnews&ns_source=facebook
5 dead
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Next headline: "French politicians demand Positive Train Control".
Norm
Norm48327 Next headline: "French politicians demand Positive Train Control".
Maybe they were testing PTC. Fail!
Maybe this has something to do with the terrorist attacks in Paris? I wouldn't rule it out. Considering how long the TGV has been operating I would think the head end crew would know enough to slow it down at the appropriate times. A highjacking by suicidal maniacs would obviate that.
Hope I'm wrong.
BaltACD Norm48327 Next headline: "French politicians demand Positive Train Control". Maybe they were testing PTC. Fail!
Whatever the cause,at least 10 died. And you guys think it's appropriate to joke around because you dislike PTC?
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimm BaltACD Norm48327 Next headline: "French politicians demand Positive Train Control". Maybe they were testing PTC. Fail! Whatever the cause,at least 10 died. And you guys think it's appropriate to joke around becuase you dislike PTC?
Whatever the cause,at least 10 died. And you guys think it's appropriate to joke around becuase you dislike PTC?
Not disliking PTC - however, it is not the answer to ALL railroad incidents that the politicians and the media are playing it up to be. There WILL BE incidents that are CAUSED by PTC. Where, when and how remain to be seen.
schlimmWhatever the cause,at least 10 died. And you guys think it's appropriate to joke around because you dislike PTC?
Not joking, and I have nothing against PTC. Just commenting on how politicians usually react.
I'm fairly certain the TGV system has something akin to PTC in place which, given the speeds involved, would seem absolutely neccessary. And yes, I will go on record as not being a fan of PTC as it is being applied to the US rail system. My initial suspicion is mechanical/structural failure at high speed. Something PTC would be completely unable to prevent.
rfpjohn I'm fairly certain the TGV system has something akin to PTC in place which, given the speeds involved, would seem absolutely neccessary. And yes, I will go on record as not being a fan of PTC as it is being applied to the US rail system. My initial suspicion is mechanical/structural failure at high speed. Something PTC would be completely unable to prevent.
TVM-300 or TVM-430. Transmission Voie-Machine (TVM, English = track-to-train transmission, developed in the 1970s originally for French TGV lines (HSR).
Another article
http://www.railjournal.com/index.php/europe/ten-dead-as-test-train-derails-on-tgv-est-phase-2.html?channel=537
RailPictures.net Posted by Daniel Minaca on November 16, 2015 I was in the same kind of test trainset for Line Rhin Rhone speed tests on June 2011 (see RPN #369491 for details) where we have reach 359,2 kph this day ! What you must know is that on new line speed tests, the security systems regarding speed control are disabled to reach the max defined speed. The driver of the train is a special driver of the French "rail test agency" who's formed to respect protocols when the run speed is greater as standard commercial speed. The driver have specific instruments for speed control who's different with standard train equipment (see the cabview on my RPN #369491 picture). May be a technical problem appears in this case...
Posted by Daniel Minaca on November 16, 2015
I was in the same kind of test trainset for Line Rhin Rhone speed tests on June 2011 (see RPN #369491 for details) where we have reach 359,2 kph this day ! What you must know is that on new line speed tests, the security systems regarding speed control are disabled to reach the max defined speed. The driver of the train is a special driver of the French "rail test agency" who's formed to respect protocols when the run speed is greater as standard commercial speed. The driver have specific instruments for speed control who's different with standard train equipment (see the cabview on my RPN #369491 picture). May be a technical problem appears in this case...
Test conditions are not normal operating conditions.
Basic info is missing from those news articles: curve (how sharp ?) or tangent, near or over a turnout (switch), bridge, or other special trackwork, how many cars left the track, whether they turned over, "accordioned", or just plowed up the R-O-W, etc. Compare with the coverage of the Amtrak derailment at Frankford Jct. this past May.
- Paul North.
Paul_D_North_Jr Basic info is missing from those news articles: curve (how sharp ?) or tangent, near or over a turnout (switch), bridge, or other special trackwork, how many cars left the track, whether they turned over, "accordioned", or just plowed up the R-O-W, etc. Compare with the coverage of the Amtrak derailment at Frankford Jct. this past May. - Paul North.
Greater coverage might be found in French media, obviously.
schlimm Paul_D_North_Jr Basic info is missing from those news articles: curve (how sharp ?) or tangent, near or over a turnout (switch), bridge, or other special trackwork, how many cars left the track, whether they turned over, "accordioned", or just plowed up the R-O-W, etc. Compare with the coverage of the Amtrak derailment at Frankford Jct. this past May. - Paul North. Greater coverage might be found in French media, obviously.
Railway Gazette has been doing a quite comprehensive coverage, see it here ;
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/news/europe/single-view/view/late-braking-caused-tgv-derailment-says-sncf.html
The resaon, according with this source, seems toi have been a too late braking application, and judging by the tech daae of place where it happened (a curve of 1000 meter radii, normally good for 160 km/h, but in this test would be taken at 176 km/h), the unfortunate happening would be a more than probale causa
Railway Gazette The report has concluded that the ‘certain cause’ of the accident was ‘a late braking sequence’. The train derailed at 243 km/h after entering a 945 m radius curve over a canal at Eckwersheim at 265 km/h, instead of the 176 km/h limit applying to that point in the test run. The resulting centrifugal force destabilised the TGV causing the vehicles to derail, with some coming to rest in the canal. The curve forms the approach to the grade-separated junction between LGV Est and the Paris – Strasbourg main line at Vendenheim.
The report has concluded that the ‘certain cause’ of the accident was ‘a late braking sequence’. The train derailed at 243 km/h after entering a 945 m radius curve over a canal at Eckwersheim at 265 km/h, instead of the 176 km/h limit applying to that point in the test run. The resulting centrifugal force destabilised the TGV causing the vehicles to derail, with some coming to rest in the canal. The curve forms the approach to the grade-separated junction between LGV Est and the Paris – Strasbourg main line at Vendenheim.
schlimm Greater coverage might be found in French media, obviously.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Murphy Siding schlimm Greater coverage might be found in French media, obviously. Oh bien sur, mais pas tout le monde parle Francais.
Oh bien sur, mais pas tout le monde parle Francais.
Neither do I, but almost anyone can use the translator function on Chrome as your browser.
schlimm Murphy Siding schlimm Greater coverage might be found in French media, obviously. Oh bien sur, mais pas tout le monde parle Francais. Neither do I, but almost anyone can use the translator function on Chrome as your browser.
The most comprehensive coverage, with a technical insight, up untill now, has been the one provided by railway gazette. In a seach done on google using 'accident ferroviare tgv 14 novembre' (railway accident November 14) one gets news varying between 1 and 6 days old, with the most recent saying the same that's written on the Railway Gazette article I posted earlier
In a word, "Yes". Possibly somewhat distracted by extra people in the cab. Another factor might be his familiarity with the line since I believe it was newly built. It takes many trips before every little detail of several hundred route miles can be instantly identified.
cx500 In a word, "Yes". Possibly somewhat distracted by extra people in the cab. Another factor might be his familiarity with the line since I believe it was newly built. It takes many trips before every little detail of several hundred route miles can be instantly identified.
Trains, operating at track speed are not line of sight vehicles.
When you see the curve, it is already too late to begin to brake for it. You have to know the territory intimately to operate a train efficiently at the maximum authorized speeds - TGV or 20000 ton coal train.
BaltACD cx500 In a word, "Yes". Possibly somewhat distracted by extra people in the cab. Another factor might be his familiarity with the line since I believe it was newly built. It takes many trips before every little detail of several hundred route miles can be instantly identified. When you see the curve, it is already too late to begin to brake for it. You have to know the territory intimately to operate a train efficiently at the maximum authorized speeds - TGV or 20000 ton coal train. [emphasis added - PDN]
When you see the curve, it is already too late to begin to brake for it. You have to know the territory intimately to operate a train efficiently at the maximum authorized speeds - TGV or 20000 ton coal train. [emphasis added - PDN]
BaltACD Trains, operating at track speed are not line of sight vehicles. When you see the curve, it is already too late to begin to brake for it. You have to know the territory intimately to operate a train efficiently at the maximum authorized speeds - TGV or 20000 ton coal train.
blue streak 1 BaltACD Trains, operating at track speed are not line of sight vehicles. When you see the curve, it is already too late to begin to brake for it. You have to know the territory intimately to operate a train efficiently at the maximum authorized speeds - TGV or 20000 ton coal train. Could that be why we see speed boards on pictures of the Pacific north west BNSF lines ?
The standard for PERMANENT speed restriction boards is that they are placed at the beginning point of the restriction. The locomotive engineers qualification process teaches him where the 'normal' braking point is for that particular restriction. If he sees the PERMANENT speed restriction board and has yet to take actions to control the speed of his train - he is much too late in taking action. As I said - at track speed - trains are not line of sight vehicles.
For TEMPORARY speed restrictions, in addition to the boards at the initial point of restriction and the final point of restriction, our rules require an ADVANCE WARNING BOARD to be placed 2 miles prior to the initial point of restriction.
If anyone wishes, I've got the accident's preliminary report. The only issue is thta it's in frech. If any of you wants to have a look, just ask me by message
The report and diagrams are on the SNCF site as PDFs. Download it and run through any translator. The cause was excessive speed, even for a test train, not track or equipment. So appears to be human error.
SNCF were operating a series of test runs at 10% above the line speed limit before opening the line to the public. As their version of PTC would not allow this level of excess speed, the system would have been turned off.
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