Executive Order solved PTC problem

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Executive Order, August 3, 1944

 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Act of August 29, 1916, 39 Stat. 645, the First War Powers Act 1941, and Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize the Secretary of War to take possession and assume control of the transportation systems of the Philadelphia Transportation Company, including all real and personal property and other assets, wherever situated, used or useful in connection with the operation of said systems and I authorize him to utilize such systems for such purposes connected with the war emergency as he may deem needful or desirable and to terminate the possession and control of such systems when he determines that such possession and control are no longer necessary for purposes connected with the war emergency.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

Excerpt from Industrialists in Olive Drab by John Olny

 

 

http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-32-1/CMH_Pub_70-32-1.pdf

 

The Philadelphia Transportation Company Case, August 1944

 

The seizure of the Philadelphia transit system in August 1944 was unique in that the War Department was forced to cope with a strike after it had taken possession. The seizure technique was put to its most severe test and only proved effective after many tense hours and several serious challenges to wartime labor and racial policies. Failure in this mission would have been a serious blow to government prestige because the racial factors of the underlying dispute could havecaused major domestic disorders in Philadelphia and other cities.

 

The privately owned Philadelphia Transportation Company operated virtually the entire public transportation system of the city, with the exception of taxi fleets and suburban rail lines. Its operations were divided into a so-called high-speed transit system, a combination of subway and elevated railroads having a scheduled peak of 85 trains during rush hour; a surface car system with 1,932 trolley cars and 59 trackless trolleys; and a bus system with 564 vehicles. It employed 11,000 persons and moved between 1 and 1.5 million people daily.

 

In March 1944 the CIO-affiliated Transport Workers Unionwon a State Labor Relations Board election against the independent Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees Union after a bitter fight and was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent. The losing group, having represented employees for many years, immediately sought to regain control. While the newly elected union tried unsuccessfully to work out its first contract with the company, the independent union continued fighting for control.In doing so it attempted to capitalize on racial issues it had injected into its unsuccessful preelection campaign, specifically the proposed program for the training and use of blacks, previously employed only for shop work, on operating jobs.

 

This training and employment program was the result of an order issued by the Committee on Fair Employment Practice (FEPC) on 27 December 1943 that directed the company to cease discrimination in the employment and promotion of blacks. The company, fearful of white reaction, only paid lip service to the order until 1 July 1944, when the War Manpower Commission promulgated a plan forbidding referrals to any employer whose practices were racially discriminatory. Noncompliance with an FEPC order was prima facie evidence of discrimination. The company, in urgent need of workers, capitulated, and on 8 July announced that it was accepting applications from blacks for employment as operators of cars and buses and for promotion to operator positions on the same terms as whites.

 

The company implemented this statement of intention by accepting applications and beginning the training program. This was the signal for further appeals to racial prejudice by the leaders of the independent union, who were finding fertile ground among the rank and file. Their speeches were all the more effective because they contained the unfounded charge that the program was being carried on in violation of seniority rules and that it would deprive returning veterans of jobs. Unfortunately, the leaders of the newly elected Transport Workers Union were still too inexperienced to successfully counter these charges.

 

The crisis came at 4:00 A.M. on 1 August 1944, when eight blacks who had completed their training course were scheduled to start trial runs. At that hour virtually all bus and streetcar operators reported ill, and the city awoke to find itself without public transportation. The impact of the stoppage on the city and its war activities was immediate. The Philadelphia Navy Yard recorded absenteeism of 72 percent and in many war plants less than 50 percent of the workers reported. Service employees in several downtown buildings joined the strike, and shortly after noon the high-speed transit system employees struck.

 

By evening every public transportation vehicle in the city was idle, stranding thousands of people. More serious still were indications that the labor dispute could turn into a race riot. The possible ramifications of the strike were promptly realized by federal and local officials, and the U.S. attorney in Philadelphia stated, "If this strike is not settled immediately Philadelphia will experience one of the worst race riots in the history of the country." As a contingency the mayor and the governor called out ten thousand auxiliary policemen and alerted the Pennsylvania State Guard. The sale of all liquor was suspended. Leading citizens of both races and groups, such as the Action Committee of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Interracial Committee of the Federation of Churches, took moderating actions in areas of high racial tension, but their efforts were undermined by inflammatory articles in both the black and the white press. The Army and Navy promptly made arrangements to transport workers employed in military and naval establishments, transferring fleets of buses from other locations.

 

As the petroleum administrator for war, Interior Secretary Ickes acted quickly to make more gasoline available, and car pools were hurriedly organized byemployers, trade unions, and civic groups. The National War Labor Board (NWLB) took jurisdiction of the dispute and ordered a return to work. Representatives of the NWLB and of the Army, Navy, and other governmental agencies appeared at numerous workers meetings during the day and made fervent appeals. Their pleas were met with stony silence, and international and local officials of the CIO were booed off the platform.

 

At a mass meeting on the evening of 1 August, 3,500 workers reaffirmed their intention of continuing the strike, and during that night sporadic racial disorders occurred. More than a dozen persons were hospitalized and several hundred others were arrested. There were increasing demands for the institution of martial law,and private groups began appeals to the federal government for combat troops.

 

The measures taken by the police, as well as the fortuitous outbreak of torrential rains, reduced the number of incidents on 2 August and lessened the likelihood of riots, but tension remained high and the strike continued. Efforts of a group of CIO workers to operate some of the transit lines during the early evening proved unsuccessful and were abandoned after acts of violence and intimidation. The heavy rains snarled auto traffic, which was eight times normal, and gasoline reserves were reported as running low. In spite of all these unfavorable developments, however, the situation in war plants improved as people found alternative means of getting to work. Attendance at Army and Navy installations rose to only 5 or 10 percent below normal and absenteeism in war plants was down to 18 percent.

 

Early on 2 August the NWLB gave up trying to obtain a settlement and by unanimous vote referred the matter to President Roosevelt. The War Department, anticipating efforts to designate it as the seizing agency, wrote War Mobilization Director Byrnes, strongly recommending that some other agency be named while emphasizing that measures such as the allocation of additional gasoline and the use of military vehicles could effectively remove any threat to war production. This request was disregarded. It was obvious that the situation could not continue, even if war plants were managing to limp along. No agency except the War Department was qualified to handle the emergency, and instructions were issued to prepare for an immediate seizure. A proposed executive order was radioed to Roosevelt, who was traveling in the Pacific.