schlimm No matter what gets shown on here or what the NTSB says, some people on here (and outsiders, like David Schanoes, who just might have his own agenda) will continue the merry-go-round of speculation. It's just a game for some, conspiracy time for others.
No matter what gets shown on here or what the NTSB says, some people on here (and outsiders, like David Schanoes, who just might have his own agenda) will continue the merry-go-round of speculation. It's just a game for some, conspiracy time for others.
BigJim A quote from Mr. David Schanoes: "We’re wasting money and we’re chasing phantoms, because, in fact, railroad radio communications are not distracting." Making a statement like that tells me that Mr. Shanoes has no idea what he is talking about!
A quote from Mr. David Schanoes:
"We’re wasting money and we’re chasing phantoms, because, in fact, railroad radio communications are not distracting."
Making a statement like that tells me that Mr. Shanoes has no idea what he is talking about!
I completely agree, Schanoes is exhibiting the classic ignorant railroad managment behaviour and attitude that is all too common across North America: Place 100% of the blame onto the employee(s) after an incident, because punishing someone makes them a better worker. Considering his employment history before RailwayAge it is not surprising that he has this attitude.
No incident/accident has one specific cause, and there are always multiple other contributing factors. That is why the NTSB takes such a long time to investigate every possible lead and leave no stone unturned.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
I recall you saying that, and it is understandable. Now I see that the actual interview relating to the approach to the curve is largely meaningless due to all the vague qualifiers to the memory, such as aserting a clear memory of what happened when approaching the curve, but not knowin whether that memory was from the night of the wreck or some other day.
He said this:
“So I don't know. I can't tell you with accuracy, with certainty that that was on the night of the accident. But in my mind, that's what I believe. That's when I believe that memory was from.”
Euclid wanswheel They had to discard his November memory because: “There's a very good possibility that could have occurred on a previous trip because that sort of mistake is something that could have happened on any trip. So I don't know. I can't tell you with accuracy, with certainty that that was on the night of the accident.” I looked at that and see what you are saying. After re-reading all of that section, I would not draw any conclusions. The engineer's claims of recalling things is so full of qualifications and limitations that it seems meaningless in trying to determine what happened.
wanswheel They had to discard his November memory because: “There's a very good possibility that could have occurred on a previous trip because that sort of mistake is something that could have happened on any trip. So I don't know. I can't tell you with accuracy, with certainty that that was on the night of the accident.”
They had to discard his November memory because:
“There's a very good possibility that could have occurred on a previous trip because that sort of mistake is something that could have happened on any trip. So I don't know. I can't tell you with accuracy, with certainty that that was on the night of the accident.”
I looked at that and see what you are saying. After re-reading all of that section, I would not draw any conclusions. The engineer's claims of recalling things is so full of qualifications and limitations that it seems meaningless in trying to determine what happened.
As I said long ago, a possible/likely retrograde amnesia makes his recollections of the entire period rather unreliable, through no fault of his own.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Here’s a slightly spooky irrelevant coincidence. Bostian crashed exactly 111 years after his college fraternity was founded.
http://missouriacacia.acaciaconnect.org/page.php?pageid=6
http://missouriacacia.acaciaconnect.org/page.php?pageid=12
wanswheelI doubt Bostian lied. His life as he knew it was in ruins. The truth couldn’t make it worse.
I see no way to conclude whether he was telling the truth. But I do see that the NTSB ignored his claim that he intened to accelerate to 80, and assumed that he intended to accelerate to 110. Then from that assumption, they concluded that the engineer was lost.
So, if Bostian's claim that he intended to accelerate to 80 is true, the NTSB conclusion as to the cause goes out the window.
I doubt Bostian lied. His life as he knew it was in ruins. The truth couldn’t make it worse.
Actually, the discrepancy between the engineer’s testimony and the narrative of the NTSB has a plausible explanation that centers on the shifting claim of memory loss. Perhaps this shifting is the result of memory changing over time. Or perhaps the engineer has not been truthful about the claim of memory loss.
For instance, the engineer now says he intended to accelerate to 80 mph. If that is true, he was not lost as the NTSB concluded that he was. But how do we know that the engineer actually did intend to accelerate to 80? How do we know that he did not mistakenly intend to accelerate to 110? He was indeed lost if he intended to accelerate to 110. I think that is the most plausible explanation. For one thing, it is complete.
On the other hand, the engineer’s claim of intending to accelerate to 80 is weak because he cannot explain why he continued past 80. For this flaw in his explanation, he reverts back to memory loss beginning just prior to reaching 80.
.
OvermodWe're starting to chase our own tails again. The reverse-throttle theory was taken up already -- I believe earlier in this very thread, although i'm not going to go all OCD and find and quote it -- and I believe that particular horse was abused fairly severely and may well be cat food by now.....schlimm has tried to establish some of the nature of retrograde amnesia, apparently to 'not enough avail', as the armchair experts seem to have forgotten it again in the past couple of days, but there is no contradiction with him being reasonably alert during the accident but having impaired memory afterward, or with his recollecting some details when suitably prompted (rightly or wrongly, if anyone still remembers the McMillin child-abuse case!)
My point made above is simple. The engineer gave one explanation for the details leading up to the wreck, and the NTSB gave a different explanation that conflicts with what the engineer said. The two conflicting stories lead to two entirely different explanations for the cause of the wreck. I wish somebody would consider this and understand this point. Maybe I am missing something.
In any case, it has nothing to do with confusion over the throttles or people performing their job when unconscious.
BaltACDIn a 'stress' situation an operator 'can' mishandle his controls.
You are missing the point.
If you were in an Audi or Lexus and reported uncommanded acceleration, and you had an event recorder monitoring all your accelerator control inputs and the system responses to them, it would be pretty quick to distinguish whether there was something about your driving that contributed to the issue.
This is EXPLICITLY not 'mishandling the controls' -- it's demonstrably correct control input for the time involved. The only problem with it was that it wasn't appropriate to accelerate 'correctly' to such high speed at that particular point on the railroad.
Overmod BaltACD Euclid: I see one other possibility here. With the distraction of the radio conversations he could have momentarily forgotten which type of locomotive he was operating. As I understand it, the acceleration rate on the Acela and AEM 7 power is considerably less than on the ACS. If it was normal for him to be operating one of the others his normal routing would be full throttle, then reduce as necessary. Then, by the time he realized his mistake it was too late. Pure speculation but food for thought. He operated an Acela on his SB trip and turned back NB on 188 with a ACS. I had read somewhere that the Acela and ACS throttles operate in reverse of each other - one you push forward to go faster and the other you pull back to go faster. Is this throttle operation correct? I think I got the quoting sort of right, but apologies in advance if it looks like I'm putting words in the wrong people's mouths. We're starting to chase our own tails again. The reverse-throttle theory was taken up already -- I believe earlier in this very thread, although i'm not going to go all OCD and find and quote it -- and I believe that particular horse was abused fairly severely and may well be cat food by now. One reason I suspect this is a 'red herring' of sorts is that we already know from the NTSB that the 'acceleration sequence' from the locomotive's event recorder was not only "correct" for the ACS64 but was typical of Bostian's 'style' (I presume when compared with tapes of his other trips, perhaps many other tapes from many other trips if I know my Government reports!) [Tinfoil Hat Alert: One might determine some interesting conspiracy-theory bait by comparing how exhaustively the NTSB reviewed Bpstian's acceleration style on different types of motive power with their apparent conduct regarding the windshield damage...] In short: Bostian did not make any 'mistake' with the throttle direction when accelerating the train, and I still maintain that the sounding of the appropriate 'alert' signal during the derailment shows he was not incapacitated or 'unconscious' at the time. schlimm has tried to establish some of the nature of retrograde amnesia, apparently to 'not enough avail', as the armchair experts seem to have forgotten it again in the past couple of days, but there is no contradiction with him being reasonably alert during the accident but having impaired memory afterward, or with his recollecting some details when suitably prompted (rightly or wrongly, if anyone still remembers the McMillin child-abuse case!)
BaltACD Euclid: I see one other possibility here. With the distraction of the radio conversations he could have momentarily forgotten which type of locomotive he was operating. As I understand it, the acceleration rate on the Acela and AEM 7 power is considerably less than on the ACS. If it was normal for him to be operating one of the others his normal routing would be full throttle, then reduce as necessary. Then, by the time he realized his mistake it was too late. Pure speculation but food for thought. He operated an Acela on his SB trip and turned back NB on 188 with a ACS. I had read somewhere that the Acela and ACS throttles operate in reverse of each other - one you push forward to go faster and the other you pull back to go faster. Is this throttle operation correct?
Euclid: I see one other possibility here. With the distraction of the radio conversations he could have momentarily forgotten which type of locomotive he was operating. As I understand it, the acceleration rate on the Acela and AEM 7 power is considerably less than on the ACS. If it was normal for him to be operating one of the others his normal routing would be full throttle, then reduce as necessary. Then, by the time he realized his mistake it was too late. Pure speculation but food for thought.
I see one other possibility here. With the distraction of the radio conversations he could have momentarily forgotten which type of locomotive he was operating. As I understand it, the acceleration rate on the Acela and AEM 7 power is considerably less than on the ACS. If it was normal for him to be operating one of the others his normal routing would be full throttle, then reduce as necessary. Then, by the time he realized his mistake it was too late.
Pure speculation but food for thought.
He operated an Acela on his SB trip and turned back NB on 188 with a ACS.
I had read somewhere that the Acela and ACS throttles operate in reverse of each other - one you push forward to go faster and the other you pull back to go faster. Is this throttle operation correct?
I think I got the quoting sort of right, but apologies in advance if it looks like I'm putting words in the wrong people's mouths.
We're starting to chase our own tails again. The reverse-throttle theory was taken up already -- I believe earlier in this very thread, although i'm not going to go all OCD and find and quote it -- and I believe that particular horse was abused fairly severely and may well be cat food by now.
One reason I suspect this is a 'red herring' of sorts is that we already know from the NTSB that the 'acceleration sequence' from the locomotive's event recorder was not only "correct" for the ACS64 but was typical of Bostian's 'style' (I presume when compared with tapes of his other trips, perhaps many other tapes from many other trips if I know my Government reports!)
[Tinfoil Hat Alert: One might determine some interesting conspiracy-theory bait by comparing how exhaustively the NTSB reviewed Bpstian's acceleration style on different types of motive power with their apparent conduct regarding the windshield damage...]
In short: Bostian did not make any 'mistake' with the throttle direction when accelerating the train, and I still maintain that the sounding of the appropriate 'alert' signal during the derailment shows he was not incapacitated or 'unconscious' at the time. schlimm has tried to establish some of the nature of retrograde amnesia, apparently to 'not enough avail', as the armchair experts seem to have forgotten it again in the past couple of days, but there is no contradiction with him being reasonably alert during the accident but having impaired memory afterward, or with his recollecting some details when suitably prompted (rightly or wrongly, if anyone still remembers the McMillin child-abuse case!)
In all the 'unintended acceleration' cases in the automotive world - how many were 'solved' wherein the operator was actually pressing the accelerator when they thought the were on the brakes (very nearly all).
In a 'stress' situation an operator 'can' mishandle his controls.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Norm48327 Euclid: I see one other possibility here. With the distraction of the radio conversations he could have momentarily forgotten which type of locomotive he was operating. As I understand it, the acceleration rate on the Acela and AEM 7 power is considerably less than on the ACS. If it was normal for him to be operating one of the others his normal routing would be full throttle, then reduce as necessary. Then, by the time he realized his mistake it was too late. Pure speculation but food for thought.
Euclid:
Norm
I think you have a valid point, and would additionally wish to point out that some people on some occasions do things while asleep or only semi-concsious that duplicated what they routinely do while awake.
Ever hear of sleepwalking?
The following in blue and red text is quoted from the accident report page 8:
The engineer’s throttle manipulation that accelerated the train to 106 mph was initiated about 27 seconds after the last radio transmission between the SEPTA engineer and the train dispatcher at 9:19 p.m.10 Clearly, this action was not appropriate at that time given that the maximum authorized speed was 80 mph and the speed-restricted curve at Frankford Junction was coming up. But if he had traveled another 2 miles, going through the Frankford Junction curve and an adjacent curve at appropriate speeds, he then would have been authorized to operate the train at 110 mph, a speed that he was accustomed to traveling at numerous points along the route.
11 Investigators used event recorder data to derive the engineer’s manipulation of the throttle.12 The method by which the engineer manipulated the throttle to increase the train’s speed to 106 mph was consistent with his description of how he normally made a significant increase in speed when it was appropriate to do so. He told investigators that he typically accelerated with full throttle and then backed off as he approached his target speed. Event recorder data indicated that he did execute this procedure with a slight throttle manipulation when the train reached about 95 mph. Therefore, NTSB concludes that the Amtrak engineer initially accelerated his train to a high rate of speed in a manner consistent with how he habitually manipulated the controls when accelerating to a target speed, suggesting that he was actively operating the train rather than incapacitated moments before the accident.
This entire analysis concludes that the engineer did not know where he was, and believed he was past the slow curve. The analysis therefore assumes that the engineer intended to accelerate to 110 mph, which would be the correct speed after the curve. Yet, the engineer has said in the interview that he intended to accelerator the train to 80 mph.
The part in red text is particularly flawed in my opinion. The fact that he accelerated while manipulating the controls as he habitually did is not evidence of the speed he intended to reach. He manipulated the controls the same way whenever he accelerated, no matter what speed he intended to accelerate to. The fact that he reached 106 while manipulating the controls, as he always does when accelerating, does not indicate that he intended to accelerate to 106 (or higher), as the NTSB concludes. It does not indicate anything about the intended speed. This conclusion by the NTSB is not logical.
But most importantly, the engineer testified that he remembered the start of the acceleration, and he stated that he intended to accelerate to 80 mph, which is the speed limit of the track at the location he was at.
However, the engineer says that he has no memory of any events between the somewhere in the phase of acceleration prior to reaching the intended 80 mph, and the point where the train entered the curve.
During this time that the engineer does not remember, he maintained acceleration continuing past 80 mph, and ultimately reached 106 mph at the curve.
Also, despite what the engineer said in the interview about remembering the start of the final acceleration, the NTSB says elsewhere in their final report that the engineer’s last memory was after passing the stopped SEPTA train. Yet the engineer testified that he remembers the start of the final acceleration which began 27 seconds after passing the SEPTA train.
From the report page 6:
His last memory until the time of the accident was at the end of the radio conversation (about 9:19 p.m.) between the disabled SEPTA train engineer and the dispatcher as he negotiated the right-hand curve preceding the derailment.
The NTSB has written their final report as though the engineer has no memory of the entire phase of the final acceleration. And because the NTSB observed that the engineer manipulated the controls as he always does during the acceleration, they conclude that must mean that he was cognizant, but had lost track of where he was. Therefore, because he was operating the train normally, they rule out incapacitation as the cause of the overspeed.
What the engineer actually said during the interview is that he did remember the start of the acceleration and intended to reach 80 mph. But his memory ends prior to him reaching 80 mph. That ending of memory prior to reaching his intended speed of 80, and then continuing past 80 to 106 is strong evidence of incapacitation. It could alternately be evidence of being lost, except the engineer’s testimony of intending to accelerate to the speed limit of 80 shows that he was NOT LOST.
Therefore, I believe the two fundamental conclusions by the NTSB are flawed as follows:
If the engineer intended to reach 80 mph maximum, as he says, he was not lost. And if he does not remember anything after some point prior to reaching 80 mph, and continued to accelerate past his intended maximum speed of 80 mph, he was not operating the train normally.
It is as if the NTSB was so focused on their narrative of how the wreck was caused that they ignored what the engineer actually said in his testimony without realizing that their narrative conflicts with the engineer’s testimony.
[quote user="wanswheel"]
Euclid I do not recall that the engineer ever stated what speed he intended to accelerate to.
I do not recall that the engineer ever stated what speed he intended to accelerate to.
1st interview http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/58000-58499/58167/585198.pdf
2nd interview http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/58000-58499/58167/585200.pdf
[/quote]
*******************************************************
Thanks for posting the links wanswheel.
Quote from second link:
“And that I pushed the throttle forward in order to accelerate from 70 to 80.
And I don't remember anything from that point until after the train was already in the curve.
And again, with that memory of bringing the train to 70, realizing a mistake and then making an attempt to bring the train from 70 to 80.”
Okay, if I understand this correctly, the engineer had no intention of accelerating to 106 mph. However, if he was lost and believed he was past the slow curve, as the NTSB says, he would have intended to accelerate to 106 mph and beyond that to the highest speed limit on the line, which was (as I recall) 110 mph. But the train entered the curve before reaching the top limit, and it derailed at 106.
However, according to the interview, his intention was to accelerate to the speed limit for the line he was actually running on (80 mph). So how can the NTSB conclude that he was lost?
If anything, the engineer’s testimony supports the theory that during his acceleration intended to reach 80, he became incapacitated prior to reaching that speed, and then kept on accelerating rather than leveling off at 80.
Overmod Deggesty I at last got around to clicking on the link--and was told that I did not have the authority to access it. Just goes to prove that even thinking you've checked something downloads doesn't mean it downloads for everyone... I find that my system is now telling me Yahoo (why I'm hearing from them, G-d only knows) doesn't 'approve' of me seeing this, but if I click the little indicated link 'anyway' it downloads the rulebook right to my system. (I'd be tempted to note 'if I send you a link it's safe to click through' ... but don't ever ever assume that can be true. In this particular case, I think it is.) Try this link to see if you get through. This is the 10th edition from 2011, but it contains enough about the subject of older speed control to make it worthwhile. The link will download a PDF to your system, which should open with a 'tab guide' to the sections on the left side. Let me know if this one fails to produce.
Deggesty I at last got around to clicking on the link--and was told that I did not have the authority to access it.
Just goes to prove that even thinking you've checked something downloads doesn't mean it downloads for everyone... I find that my system is now telling me Yahoo (why I'm hearing from them, G-d only knows) doesn't 'approve' of me seeing this, but if I click the little indicated link 'anyway' it downloads the rulebook right to my system. (I'd be tempted to note 'if I send you a link it's safe to click through' ... but don't ever ever assume that can be true. In this particular case, I think it is.)
Try this link to see if you get through.
This is the 10th edition from 2011, but it contains enough about the subject of older speed control to make it worthwhile. The link will download a PDF to your system, which should open with a 'tab guide' to the sections on the left side.
Let me know if this one fails to produce.
Johnny
Well none of us are elephants. 70 to 80.
Obviously the agenda theme of this NTSB episode is the need for PTC. They would not want this theme diluted by the theory of rock throwing contributing to the cause of the wreck, especially considering that the theory could not be proven without direct evidence which is not available. By the same token, the lack of that direct evidence makes it convenient to declare the more favorable theory as fact in that rocking never occurred.
They also did not want to dilute the PTC theme by focusing on any negligence on the part of the engineer. So they cited his loss of situational awareness as being based on a noble cause; that is the compassion and sensitivity to the welfare of his fellow crewmen as he listened to the disturbing news on the radio.
I would not assume what caused the windshield damage. The damage on the right half of the windshield appears to have been caused by collision damage that upset the window frame on the right side. The left half of the windshield appears to have been caused by small object striking directly against the glass. There certainly is no reason to assume that any of the damage was caused by rocks or gunshots.
I agree with Schannoes when he says that the NTSB did not prove their stated cause as being a distraction due to the radio transmission. He also makes a good point about the engineer’s loss of memory claim. This too cannot be proven to be true. Furthermore, there is inconsistency in it, as Schannoes points out.
Originally, the loss of memory was said to extend from the last station to the moment of derailment. Then suddenly, the engineer is said to have memory of the final process of acceleration, conveniently supporting the theory of loss of situational awareness.
Yet, even this is not as conclusive as the NTSB wants us to believe. The engineer says he remembers accelerating. I would have to read the interview again, but I do not recall that the engineer ever stated what speed he intended to accelerate to. As I recall from the interview, he said he only remembers starting the acceleration process, and remembers nothing from that point until the derailment began.
Firelock76 To use a Civil War phrase they'd "seen the elephant," and I couldn't help but respect that.
To use a Civil War phrase they'd "seen the elephant," and I couldn't help but respect that.
Based on the various links that were posted I will concede that the ATC system was used to protect selected permanent speed restrictions ("civil" speeds). I am not clear on when. The extensive description on ATC describing the ex-PRR system seems to indicate that the civil speed enforcement was implemented in respose to accidents after 1980, which would make it not on the PRR. To me that makes the timing a bit fuzzy. It also appears from that article that the PRR only had the 4 speeds available (max-45-25-15) and that the additional speeds happened later. The article also seems to say that the civil speed enforcement was on selected curves that had very low speeds (and probably an accident history).
I will concede that Mr. Klepper is correct, that there were civil speed restrictions built into the PRR system (or its successors). I don't believe that they were generally applied at any speed restricted curve and that they were only used in certain "low" speed curves.
P.S. My comments about Mr. Klepper's memories were not a comment on his age, just that memories often can "evolve". I am calling Mr. Klepper "Mister" because he is my elder and at 60 I find I have fewer and fewer elders so I want to take every opportunity I can to be younger.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Overmod... and most importantly of all, Schanoes' comments after the rebuttal,
I can't help but think Schanoe has missed the point on the radio calls distracting the engineer. Its not that radio calls themselves are distracting. The distraction isn't the call itself, its what the crew does with it, literally how they think about it, how much they focus on it.
One place I agree with Schanoe and disagree with the NTSB is the last radio conversation. I personally think the last radio conversation that was filled with static may have been distracting because the engineer was engrossed with the SEPTA rocking and would have had to concentrate on the poor transmission to try an hear it, thus reducing his focus on the here and now.
The engineer on 188 left his focus back at N Philadelphia station with the SEPTA train, the rest of him (and his train went on). Same thing happens with signals and bulletins/orders. The crew has several form B's, they start discussing them and are focused on a new one that is the last in sequence. In the mean time they run into the limits of the first one without permission. They weren't focused on where they were, they were focused someplace else. Happens all the time. If you ever have been in a meeting or at church service and somebody says something that you think about for a few moments and then realize you missed the last couple sentences of the speaker or sermon, that's the same thing.
OvermodThat's not to say I think there was any projectile at all, or a grassy knoll it was deployed from -- only that for the NTSB to have any credibility according to its own expressed criteria there needed to be at least a discussion, with a couple of pictures showing the damage and some comparative impacts of known objects in similar media, culminating in a reasoned dismissal of the idea that there was a rocking or shooting that affected 188's engine or distracted or injured Bostian.
Ironically this points out a contradiction with Schanoes position. He argues that the NTSB takes years to render a decision while he portends the railroad comes up with the cause in hours, days or weeks. He argues for a shorter time, but there have been numerous calls on this forum for chemical testing and ballistics, etc., etc. etc. on the windshield, all of which takes time. It they don't render a decision quickly, they are criticized for dragging their feet. It they render a decision quickly they aren't being thorough and jumping the gun. The NTSB is in a no win situation.
By the way, has anybody on this list actually looked at the windows ot the engine? There are multiple hits on the window. The engineer's window has a huge crush mark that radiates from a big ding in the window frame and carbody plus several smaller impacts and then a half dozen or more hits in the fireman's window. Which one of the hits is the one you think is the rock? Which is the one is the one that you say is the gunshot? Or are you saying multiple people rocked a train going 106 mph and hit the train all at the same time more or less the same place? How does the NTSB differenciate between a hit make by a rock as the train plowed up the right of way and a rock that was thrown at the windshield?
Firelock76 And you don't have to be insulting either.
And you don't have to be insulting either.
Are you sure? He might be set in his ways.
schlimm I'm not so young either.
I'm not so young either.
My pleasure David! You're a fine gentleman of the old school and sadly there doesn't seem to be a lot of them left in this day and increasingly hi-speed age.
Sam and Firelock and others, I really appreciate your consideration. If my memory about anything is incorrect, my reaction to being corrected is appreciation for the addiitonal kniowldege, not resentment. But the correction should be based on facts, like rulebooks, photographs, engineriing plans, engineers' recollections, etc. One thing I do know is that the PRR's ATC and at least part of the LIRR's was different than ATC elsewhere. Thus is probably had more safety features. Someone should do the research. Doesn't anyone know a recently retired Amtrak or SEPTA engnieer who ran under the PRR's ATC before it was removed? The cab-signal display and the wayside signals may have long been replaced but the ATC should have remained.
Thanks Sam.
Let me explain my "keep on listening" attitude.
Back in the 80's I worked in a gun shop in New Jersey. As most gun shops do ours attracted quite a few veterans, an in the 80's that meant quite a few World War Two veterans. It was quite an education, I heard things that didn't quite jibe with the official record, and quite a few things that never made it into the history books at all. Some hilarious things, some ugly things, but if there was a time in my life to keep my mouth shut and LISTEN it was certainly that time.
One thing I learned was what an amazing achievement it was for the Navy and Marine Corps (those vets were the most talkative it seemed) to take a bunch of kids who didn't know port from starbord, or knew how to throw a baseball and not a grenade, and turn them into some of the finest sailors and Marines this country has ever had. Forty years later their pride in their ships and their esprit de corps was still proudly evident. They all seemed ready to go out and do it all over again. Not that they wanted to, but the fire was still in all of them. It was priviledge to know them. What a group of men. To use a Civil War phrase they'd "seen the elephant," and I couldn't help but respect that.
One of the best stories was from a Red Army veteran. I'll tell it one day if anyone's interested.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.