Oil Train

[dehusman]

Ironically both the Lynchburg and the tornado accidents are classic examples why differential braking won't be effective.  The reasons have been explained time and time again. 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

oltmannd

 [snipped - PDN] . . . "How much quicker" is going to depend on train size and crew reaction, but likely diference would be on the order of few seconds.  I'll leave the kinematics to you.

What's being overlooked here is the astoundingly complex - almost random - train-force interactions via the couplers/ draft gear as the 1 ft. or so of slack per car accumulates and runs in/ out (push/ pull, tension/ compression, buff/ draft, etc., respectively). 

I remember seeing a plot (in Railway Age in the early 1970's) of the instantaneous magnitude of those forces throughout a numerically simulated train (by either WABCO or NYAB) at just one instant of time - and only in a normal braking mode.  It looked like a mountain range - with several higher peaks, a bunch of smaller ones (all = compression), and some valleys below the 0 line (= tension). 

Add in the effect of an undulating profile, and whatever the state of the train-forces are when the emergency braking starts.  The actual results and effects are practically impossible to know or predict, except in a probabilistic range - and that's only by simulation, which is merely an estimate of reality, since no such train is fully instrumented (except on a test track = artificial operating environment).  

This is one of those things where the quote from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is pertinent: [New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, at 349 (1921]*, or as I would adapt it for this instance: "A page of actual operating experience is worth a volume of logic and mathematics."  

*From https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Oliver_Wendell_Holmes,_Jr.#1920s  (Actually, this whole page is worth reading for a lot of insights into many things, and quite a few are in cases with a railroad as one of the parties to the litigation.)

- Paul North.        

[Euclid]

dehusman

Focusing on the braking systems and train dynamics to prevent pileups only works if the braking systems and train dynamics determine whether there is a pileup.

If you read the AAR statistics and actually look at the actual causes of the oil train derailments with pileups it becomes pretty evident that the braking systems and the train dynamics had very little to do with there being a pileup.  It depends on what caused the derailment in the first place.

The accidents where the track was obstructed or the track/roadbed was the cause ended up piling up.  If you have a big hole in the roadbed or something fouling the track, then no amount of differential braking or slack control will help the situation.  The only thing that will help the situation is stopping the train. 

 

Well, the point is to intervene with differential braking before the big hole in the track gets to the point where it causes the pileup.  I agree that once the pileup begins, getting stopped is the only thing that mitigates the damage.

But there is a window of opportunity between the first wheelset leaving the rails and the start of a pileup.  Sometimes that window is prolonged for miles, and other times it may only be a split second.   

However, action taken within this window of opportunity requires derailment sensors to define the start point of the window.  Without derailment sensors, there is never any window in which to take action prior to the onset of the pileup.

You mention that the statistics and causes of oil train derailments show that brake systems had little to do with the pileup.  While it may be true that a braking failure had nothing to do with the pileup, that does not prove that a specialized braking response would not have delayed or prevented a pileup.  The reason why differential braking is not shown to have reduced the pileups of oil train wrecks is that the oil trains were not equipped with differential braking.  The oil trains were also not equipped with derailment sensors which are essential to providing the time window for which differential braking can act.   

I agree that getting the train stopped as fast as possible is generally beneficial.  But relying on the current air brake system to stop the train quickly by an “Emergency” application requires that the application usually does not begin until the onset of the pileup.  To the extent that the pileup was preceded by a derailed-dragging event, the opportunity to stop or reduce speed during that event is lost with conventional brake systems. 

If you add derailment sensors, then that window of opportunity provided by a derail-dragging event will be available.  So then initiating an “Emergency” application at the onset of that time window will get the trains stopped quicker than if there were no derailment sensors.  That is they system of the Spanish derailment sensor/detectors.

However, the Spanish system does not include ECP brakes and differential braking.  So, the Spanish system relies on an “Emergency” application of the brakes occurring the instant the first wheelset leaves the rails.  The only benefit of the Spanish system is that it gets the earliest possible starting time for the braking, and thus may limit damage of the pileup by ending the pileup process sooner.

But, when the Spanish system introduces the “Emergency” application at the onset of the derailment, the application is quite likely to cause a pileup right at that moment.  Whereas, without that “Emergency” application, the derailed-dragging condition initiated when the wheels first left the rails might have continued long enough to significantly slow the train with a brake application that is less likely to cause a pileup than the “emergency” application.  In that way, the rolling energy is given time to dissipate during braking phase of the derailed-dragging process, so when the pileup finally does begin, it there will be less rolling energy available to inflict damage during the pileup.  

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

"The occasional crumpled boxcar serves to remind us that the agreement between theory and practice is, at times, poor."

- quote from Dr. Norman H. Vautz, Senior Scientist (IIRC), Westinghouse Air Brake Co., in a Letter to the Editor of Trains after articles titled "The Westinghouse Air Brake Story" by David G. Blaine in the Oct. and Dec. 1975 issues.  

- Paul North.   

[dehusman]

Euclid

Well, the point is to intervene with differential braking before the big hole in the track gets to the point where it causes the pileup. I agree that once the pileup begins, getting stopped is the only thing that mitigates the damage. But there is a window of opportunity between the first wheelset leaving the rails and the start of a pileup. Sometimes that window is prolonged for miles, and other times it may only be a split second.

You are assuming the "hole in the track" is caused by the derailed wheel.  That is the problem.  If you read the derailment statistics, track problems are the largest cause.  If the cause of the derailment is the "hole" then the window of opportunity to prevent cars from derailing due to the hole is zero.

In the Lynchburg derailment the cause appeared to be weak subgrade (literally a hole) and in the tornado the "hole" was a hole in the train, a car was blown out of the train.  You can't keep the train stretched if the train is uncoupled.

[schlimm]

I  think there is some confusion between prevention of derailment and mitigation of the effects of a derailment.

[Euclid]

dehusman

 

Euclid

Well, the point is to intervene with differential braking before the big hole in the track gets to the point where it causes the pileup. I agree that once the pileup begins, getting stopped is the only thing that mitigates the damage. But there is a window of opportunity between the first wheelset leaving the rails and the start of a pileup. Sometimes that window is prolonged for miles, and other times it may only be a split second.

 

 

You are assuming the "hole in the track" is caused by the derailed wheel.  That is the problem.  If you read the derailment statistics, track problems are the largest cause.  If the cause of the derailment is the "hole" then the window of opportunity to prevent cars from derailing due to the hole is zero.

In the Lynchburg derailment the cause appeared to be weak subgrade (literally a hole) and in the tornado the "hole" was a hole in the train, a car was blown out of the train.  You can't keep the train stretched if the train is uncoupled.

 

Dave,

You are the one that brought up a “hole in the track.”  You have mentioned it in the past as being the “hole” that is dug deeper by the cars derailing sequentially at the point of the derailment.  That is what I thought you referring to again a on the previous page.  Now you are referring to a “hole” as being something preexisting like a washout or a missing trestle.  And then you also refer to a “hole” as being a hole in the train, as in missing consist, which is not the same type of hole as your “hole in track” examples.  

The missing consist did play a role in the tornado wreck, however.  Being that it left the track intact and runnable, it allowed a time frame in which the locomotive had time to stop as the trailing cars caught up with it.  It is true, as you say, that differential braking cannot stretch the train if a car is missing in the stretch zone. 

However, differential braking would have applied very limited braking to the cars and locomotives ahead of the derailment.  That would have allowed them to keep moving and not be overtaken by the trailing cars.  So, in that way, the system would have prevented the pileup that occurred when the train caught up with the locomotive.

In another sense, the tornado video demonstrates the effect of differential braking causing cars to be dragged under tension as we see with about 5-8 cars on their sides, coupled together, and skidding over the landscape at about 40 mph.  The point is that they are not digging in, stopping on a dime, and jackknifing.  Instead, they are dissipating their rolling energy in the least destructive way. 

Certainly if a train falls into a hole and begins a pileup, it is too late for differential braking to work.  Here is my point about the Lynchburg wreck: 

Let’s assume that a weak roadbed (or “hole”) caused the derailment.  The hole did not cause a pileup until 8 cars passed over it, derailing there one by one.  The point is that those 8 derailed cars were dragged and thus did not buckle and pile up.  They were under tension similar to the effect of differential braking, except that it occurred as a natural consequence of the train dynamics.  If the train had happened to have been in dynamic braking with the slack bunched, those 8 cars would not have been dragged.  You can’t drag cars with slack bunched ahead of those cars.         

[Wizlish]

schlimm

I  think there is some confusion between prevention of derailment and mitigation of the effects of a derailment.

I'm largely staying out of this ... but everything now under discussion is 'following' a patent 'derailment'.  The question is whether the train should be braked as quickly as possible (i.e., hard, in almost any case) before the derailed wheels/trucks get far enough misaligned to cause cars to tip or plow (in both cases decelerating quicker than any brake could stop the trailing cars) or whether some more careful form of braking can keep the cars 'in line' and coupled, and without digging in, until the derailed part can be safely decelerated at least to where other forms of car protection have a chance at working.

I don't think there's any question at this point (or, perhaps, ever in the discussion) that preventing derailments is a much more effective approach to making HHFTs safe; what is now under discussion is a next step, trying to reduce either derailment severity or the consequences of a derailment that cause, for example, tank-car breaching and ignition.

[Euclid]

Wizlish,

You sum it up well.  It is impossible to prevent all derailments, so why not add another approach that reduces the damage that causes spills and fire?  Neither prevention or mitigation will entirely solve the problem, but the two approaches combined are better than either one of them alone. 

[dehusman]

Wizlish

The question is whether the train should be braked as quickly as possible (i.e., hard, in almost any case) before the derailed wheels/trucks get far enough misaligned to cause cars to tip or plow (in both cases decelerating quicker than any brake could stop the trailing cars) or whether some more careful form of braking can keep the cars 'in line' and coupled, and without digging in, until the derailed part can be safely decelerated at least to where other forms of car protection have a chance at working.

My contention is that if the cause of the derailment is a track related cause, then the point of derailment is fixed.  Subsequent cars passing over that point are liable to derail.

The whole "keep the train stretched" scheme only works if the number of derailed cars is limited and there are cars on both sides of the derailed car on the rails to keep it in line.  The more cars derailed, the probablility of the following cars staying in line goes way, way down.  Once you get a significant number of cars derailed, the force it takes to overcome the friction of dragging the cars will stop the train or rip it in two or both.

Pretty much if you have the type of derailment in which differential braking would work, the train would stay upright, in line even without differential braking (as some derailments do now).

As far as the tornado video goes, I am a loss at how differential braking would have worked since there was only one car coupled to the engine and it was off its trucks, almost on its side.  There was no train to differentialy brake.  Other than the engines, there wasn't a single brake shoe that could be controlled from the head end of the train.

[Euclid]

Dave,

I understand your point about the tornado video.  Differential braking would not have directly intervened much because the train quickly parted.  So it is not an ideal demonstration of differential braking. 

But nevertheless, differential braking would have prevented the pileup in a relatively indirect way by naturally suppressing the brake application on whatever was left of the train ahead of the point of derailment.  In this case, it was only the locomotives.  But with their braking suppressed by the ECP differential braking program, the locomotives would have outrun the cars coming ahead from behind the point of derailment.

Also, in this tornado wreck, the cars down in the ditch apparently did not pile up because of their tendency to stay coupled together while being pulled along by their own momentum and the momentum of the locomotives which remained coupled to them for some time.  This demonstrates the desired effect of differential braking even though it was merely produced naturally by the train forces.  Had there been differential braking, that would have added to the effect to the extent that the cars in the ditch remained coupled and in line.

In any case, the tornado video does not prove that differential braking will never work.    

[Wizlish]

dehusman

My contention is that if the cause of the derailment is a track related cause, then the point of derailment is fixed. Subsequent cars passing over that point are liable to derail.

But for every cause that is fixed in the track, there are others that are not -- broken wheels, lozenging, burned journals -- and a large subset of these don't produce prompt track damage like spread gauge or overturned rail ('marks on the ties' or even fractured concrete ties don't count.  For every tornado video there's likely to be a Marysville acrylonitrile fire.

The whole "keep the train stretched" scheme only works if the number of derailed cars is limited and there are cars on both sides of the derailed car on the rails to keep it in line.

This is of course true, and to paraphrase your following point a bit more forcefully, it isn't just 'friction' that causes cars to slow down more quickly than trailing cars can brake; the moment a truck frame digs in or a car's 'nose' rotates out, you're very likely to see deceleration greater than the trailing 'brake action' can accommodate.

As far as the tornado video goes, I am a loss at how differential braking would have worked since there was only one car coupled to the engine and it was off its trucks, almost on its side. There was no train to differentially brake. Other than the engines, there wasn't a single brake shoe that could be controlled from the head end of the train.

The only part of 'differential braking' that would have affected the train in the tornado video would be better control over that "leading' tank car that derailed and swung but then merrily stayed in line with the track.  In that particular case, the differential braking would have been of marginal if any use, even if it had been set up to put power on the head end to accelerate it away from collision.  (Similarly, it might not have mattered in the 1987 Chase wreck if the diesels had accelerated after splitting the switch, or even had their brakes released at the moment of impact, but under other circumstances -- remember the near-miss with the LRC? -- those actions might have made a difference.)

Differential braking is no more a 'cure-all' for derailment accident damage than ECP brake technology is.  Its proponents, at least those who are wise, don't present it that way, and in the absence of better statistics I'm not going to say its prospective benefits would justify its cost on top of the ECP equipment needed to implement it properly..  But I think there are many potential situations where it might be beneficial if ECP turns out to become mandated.

[tree68]

Euclid

Also, in this tornado wreck, the cars down in the ditch apparently did not pile up because of their tendency to stay coupled together while being pulled along by their own momentum and the momentum of the locomotives which remained coupled to them for some time.

The cars were blown off the track en masse by the tornadic winds.  Whether they were under tension or in buff is of little or no consequence.   

In any case, the tornado video does not prove that differential braking will never work.    

It would seem, however, that there is a very limited subset of derailments where differential braking would be useful.  The question, as already mentioned, is whether the cost is worth the return.

[Euclid]

tree68

 

Euclid

Also, in this tornado wreck, the cars down in the ditch apparently did not pile up because of their tendency to stay coupled together while being pulled along by their own momentum and the momentum of the locomotives which remained coupled to them for some time.

 

 

The cars were blown off the track en masse by the tornadic winds.  Whether they were under tension or in buff is of little or no consequence.   

It most certainly is of consequence.  After the cars were blown off the track by the tornado, they cars skidded along at 40 mph dissipating their rolling energy without piling up.  That would not have happened without draft force.  It was not the tornado that moved them along with the locomotives.

As far as being worth it, I have no idea on that call.  I think the system would mitigate pileup damage with most derailments to varying degrees, and even prevent some of them altogether.  Of course the industry would fight it tooth and nail.  But part of the cost will already be inevitable in the form of the ECP mandate (if it is not overturned), so the actual cost of differential braking is the derailment sensors and the program development and other R&D.       

 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Regarding the lessened effectiveness of ECP braking in derailment situations, see this recent pointed column/ blog by David Schanoes, dated August 10, 2015, which is pretty clear and solid analysis, IMHO:

"Friction" - http://ten90solutions.com/friction 

- Paul North. 

[Euclid]

Paul,

 

Thanks for posting that piece by David Shanoes.  I skimmed through it, but will read it more carefully later.  I will also study that simulation study.  Generally, I would likewise conclude that the US DOT might misunderstand the stopping distance issue, as improbable as that would seem, given the technical expertise at their disposal.

 

I am referring to the stopping distance large advantage with ECP being confined to “Service” braking applications and not to “Emergency” applications.  However, ECP does nevertheless offer some degree of advantage in the “Emergency” applications as well.  And every second counts critically in situations calling for an “Emergency” application.

 

I am also not convinced that multiple EOTs or distributed power matches the stopping performance of ECP in “Emergency” applications, and is therefore a perfect alternative as of often implied by those arguing against the ECP mandate.

 

Also, there is more to the ECP safety advantage than just stopping distance.  Those advantages include the large reduction of slack action forces, the near elimination of UDEs, and the enabling of safer train handling.  In my opinion, those three advantages of ECP far outweigh the derailment mitigation advantage of slightly quicker stopping.  But, author David Schanoes has chosen to not address those other advantages and focus only on stopping distance.

 

For a derailment mitigation benefit of quicker stopping, I believe the answer is what I call “Differential Braking,” which consists of ECP brakes, derailment sensors, and the differential braking control system.  It is what I call The Higher Purpose of ECP Brakes.

 

This system of Differential Braking would significantly mitigate or even prevent the most destructive phase of derailments.   In addition, as a part of the Differential Braking system, the basic abovementioned three advantages of ECP alone; involving slack, UDE’s, and train handling; will prevent some derailments altogether.   

[tdmidget]

but that is because this has taken on the ferocity of a middle eastern religion to you.

[Paul of Covington]

Euclid

I am also not convinced that multiple EOTs or distributed power matches the stopping performance of ECP in “Emergency” applications, and is therefore a perfect alternative as of often implied by those arguing against the ECP mandate.

   Look at page 25 of the PDF of the study.   By initiating the application at just two points instead of one, the performance goes approximately two-thirds of the way toward matching the ECP performance which initiates it at every car.   You may not be convinced, but I think that by initiating application at three or four more points, performance would be mighty close to that of ECP.

   I'm not going back to read this whole thread, but I don't remember anybody claiming that multiple EOT's would be a perfect alternative to ECP.

[BaltACD]

Paul of Covington

Euclid

I am also not convinced that multiple EOTs or distributed power matches the stopping performance of ECP in “Emergency” applications, and is therefore a perfect alternative as of often implied by those arguing against the ECP mandate.

   Look at page 25 of the PDF of the study.   By initiating the application at just two points instead of one, the performance goes approximately two-thirds of the way toward matching the ECP performance which initiates it at every car.   You may not be convinced, but I think that by initiating application at three or four more points, performance would be mighty close to that of ECP.

   I'm not going back to read this whole thread, but I don't remember anybody claiming that multiple EOT's would be a perfect alternative to ECP.

The 'standard' EOT in today's world of railroading is the 'two-way' EOT that is connected by radio to the locomotive - Emergency application detected by either device will trigger the emergency application on the other device.

[Euclid]

Paul,

 

I don’t know if anyone in this thread claimed that any EOT approach would be a “perfect alternative”, but I get that general implication sometimes with the single two-way EOT approach, both here and in other reports and articles.  Let’s just say it is often implied to be an acceptable alternative to ECP.  I am not sure how that judgment call should be made as to what is “acceptable” as an alternative to ECP if the performance is less than that of ECP.

 

I agree that your multiple EOT idea may match the stopping ability of ECP.  I am not saying that the multiple EOT approach is a bad idea.  We did discuss multiple EOTs again just a couple pages ago.  Wizlish had some comments about it.  If remember right, he was wondering what might be the effect of multiple, distributed EOTs sending brake dynamiting waves in both directions from different points throughout the train.  I believe the concern was about how that would affect in-train forces and their ability to cause trouble.  It is a way to compete with ECP stopping ability.  There seems to be a lot of fine points in the argument.    

 

There is one other point that I noticed in the Simulation download in David Schanoes’ blog:  The Simulation download said that stopping distance can be reduced by increasing brake shoe pressure.  It is referred to as improving the “net braking ratio.”  I was under the impression that it is common practice for brakes to be applying with as much force as possible without causing the wheels to lock up and slide when the cars are empty.  Or; with load sensors, the NBR would increase braking force to the appropriate level for when the car is loaded. 

 

Beyond that, how can you further increase the N.B.R., as the simulation piece says?  How can this already maximum brake force condition be further increased even more without causing excessive wheel slide?

 

That strikes me as odd that they would toss out that idea for quicker stopping. 

 

http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=429570&docketID=55926&mkey=88606

[schlimm]

Given recent news that very little Bakken (and maybe also Canadian) will be shipped by rail within five years (if shipped at all), much of this issue will be a moot point.

[Wizlish]

Paul of Covington

I'm not going back to read this whole thread, but I don't remember anybody claiming that multiple EOT's would be a perfect alternative to ECP.

That's because it's not.

On the other hand, my father has been advocating multiple in-line brake valves for many years, and Dave Klepper and I had a discussion on the idea when he re-introduced the idea ... I believe earlier in this thread. 

Then, as now, I tried to get consensus on what the term for these midtrain devices should be.  For the moment assume they are dedicated device modules called MTDs.  They are obviously not "EOTs" even if you were to adapt a FRED so it could be used in midtrain (a sensible device recognizing it was in 'midtrain' because it was in the middle of two hoses and not just connected to one).  On the other hand, they would contain a GPS core for independent location (etc.) and, ideally, an addressable proportional valve (that would follow the position or setting of the 'master' valve in the cab, or the setting passed via a train control system), and some means of reasonably assured power and communication.

These get spaced every 20 or so cars in the train as it is made up - all the practical details having been worked out in detail for the patent applications.  Note that the valves do not all 'have' to respond the same when commanded, and the MTD action is separate from the 'emergency' action between the head end and DPU/EOT.

This produces a number of the benefits of ECP -- the most notable one that is missing being one of the greatest benefits of ECP for general train handling, full graduated release.  "Theoretically" you can have an approximation to that, too, using the same technology that can provide the equivalent of constant trainline supply pressure to ECP equipment in a conventionally-braked consist ... but I digress.  The answer is that DEPENDING ON THE BENEFIT YOU WANT a MDT system can provide much the same 'benefit' that can be achieved at much higher cost from ECP.  But it is certainly not a 'perfect replacement' for ECP.

[Euclid]

New Invention for Safer Oil Trains

 

Here is some new thinking about another approach to the problem.  It does not prevent derailments or pileups.  It does not prevent sparks for ignition in a wreck.  It does not prevent tank cars from rupturing or prevent oil from spilling.  It does not extinguish a fire.

 

What it does is instantly convert the oil cargo from flammable to much less flammable upon the sensing of a derailment.  At the same time, it also turns the oil into a gel which slows down its ability to leak and spread upon a breaching of the tank.

 

The concept uses sensors to trigger the response, but it does not explain these sensors or how they command the response.

 

Is this possible or practical?  Could the entire oil load be converted quickly enough?

 

General background of story:

 

http://news.engineering.utoronto.ca/safer-rail-car-wins-engineering-student-top-prize-at-minerva-safe-design-awards/

 

Detailed description of invention:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BH9BuMZaEg0

[Electroliner 1935]

Next comes the cost study. How much does it cost to install all this added equipment and weight to the cars. What's the cost that the shipper can accept before he says "No, if you want me to do that, then I can't sell my oil" ? It's an interesting proposal but it may be uneconomical. 

 

[Deggesty]

Another question: how fast will the gel flow out of the car once you have the car in a safe place for emptying? Is there a compound that can be added so that the contents will again be liquid? Or will you perhaps have a trainload of unusable and unrecoverable gel?

[MidlandMike]

Years ago a system that turned jet fuel into gel during a plane crash was proposed, but never adopted.

[Euclid]

What I don’t understand is that he uses surfactants which I understand would tend to thin the oil. But then at the same time, he uses the Norborene to thicken the oil.  

[Wizlish]

Part of the 'answer' is that you, like the flack who wrote the news story, haven't quite understood what the inventor was saying.

The system only uses one of the two 'agents' at a time, not both, depending on what is desired.

The surfactant approach uses a biodegradable detergent to form an oil-water emulsion, not to 'thin' the oil, but to reduce its tendency to ignite.

The norbornene (that you can't spell it indicates to me that you don't know what it is or what it does) does not form a "gel" - it crosslinks the liquid alkanes in the oil.  It is an example of a class of materials known as 'solidifiers', and I suspect Midland Mike among others will be very familiar with the existing use of these in cleaning up oil spills on water.

Neither of these approaches appears to address what I consider a major actual problem with these light crudes: the high volatile and gas content.  Light hydrocarbons in the gas phase are unlikely to form emulsions or be dissolved in them;  I also wonder whether norbornene, which is a crystalline solid over much of the range of expected shipping temperatures, can be made to admix with vapor effectively.

There is also the question of the technology which rapidly injects these agents and assures full turbulent mixing.  This either involves high gas pressure or some means of near-explosive gas generation.  I would be concerned with the range of safety problems that providing this on existing tankcar shells (which is the primary stated initial intent of the inventor) would entail.

I am glad to see that the discussion of the sensor suite is no longer a 'hot' topic.  It does not matter to the invention what methods or systems of sensing are used, only that at some point an accident condition is detected and the pressurized mixing of the agent in the "mini-tanks" is initiated.

[Euclid]

Wizlish,

You said this: “Part of the 'answer' is that you, like the flack who wrote the news story, haven't quite understood what the inventor was saying.”

How am I supposed to understand what the inventor is saying and know that the “flack who wrote the news story” does not understand what the inventor is saying when all I have to go by is what the “flack who wrote the news story” says the inventor is saying?  In any case, the invention is also explained in the video.  Perhaps the same “flack who wrote the news story” also produced the video, and that’s wrong too.  But I doubt it.

You said this: “The system only uses one of the two 'agents' at a time, not both, depending on what is desired.”

On the contrary, the explanatory video, which I assume was produced by the inventor and not the “flack who wrote the news story”, says that the surfactants and the Norbornene are both released upon impact.  That sounds to me like the two chemicals are both used at the same time. 

Can you explain how the two chemicals are only used one at a time, depending on what is desired (as you say) when both are released upon impact?

You said this: “The norbornene (that you can't spell it indicates to me that you don't know what it is or what it does) does not form a "gel"

Both the explanatory video and the news story refer to the Norbornene converting the oil into a “gel.”

So overall, I don’t know how you know that the inventor was not saying what he said.   

[Wizlish]

All this longwinded ... discussion.  Go back and watch the video again, and think about what you're watching this time.  I grant you I find it a bit difficult to read the blurred text while that music is playing, but it can be done.

It would obviously make no sense to attempt to emulsify and crosslink at the same time -- you're quite correct to say your BS detectors go off.  The inventor's syntax could be clearer, but he makes clear these are two different options that use the same tank and dispersal technology.  If in doubt, we could always contact the inventor directly -- he can't be hard to find, and apparently has an actuve YouTube presence -- and ask for better technical details.

Spend five minutes googling 'norbornene' or the category of solidifiers, and then google crosslinking and polymerization if you are not familiar with how that works, and then review what a gel is, chemically and physically.  I suspect the Canadian material just uses the word 'gel' to make people understand that the invention "thickens" the oil, but a gel is a specific phenomenon and what is happening here is different.  (That is good, because I suspect a true gel would be poor at resisting the forces in a typical railroad tank-car accident, but that's another discussion).

You HAVE to do more than literary criticism when understanding engineering discussions.  Both the sources and the science are freely available on line -- so use them, instead of whining about why you don't understand, and raising further confusions.

So overall, I don’t know how you know that the inventor was not saying what he said.  

This being a classical example.  Attempting to actually answer this statement would not produce any particular light.

If you understand what the invention is supposed to do (which is possible from the video) and how the chemistry involved works (which is not exactly rocket science) you can figure out what the inventor meant, and not get lost in the sauce of 'saying what he said' according to what you thought he said.

This is distracting from the actual point here, which is whether a system that injects an agent ... or a combination of agents that are complementary, either together or sequentially ... to make the oil less hazardous in situ or as released can work to decrease the risk of explosion and fire on impact.  This should be separated from the use of such a system for other purposes mentioned in the video and story, such as the health of responders who might be exposed while clearing up an accident minutes or hours after it occurs, or the health of wildlife or people whose drinking water is affected by runoff after a spill.  Personally, I think there are problems with injecting anything at high speed (and presumably reasonable volume) into Bakken or Eagle Rock crude, and those problems should be addressed and, if possible, some solutions developed for them that would work in the 'real world' of oil shipment.