Oil Train

[BaltACD]

tdmidget

It's called  "honesty"

A rare commodity these days!

[tree68]

Euclid

So what I find to be very strange, is that one of the manufactures has issued a statement from its president denying the benefits of his ECP product. 

He's not denying the benefits of ECP as a whole.  He's saying that ECP is not the solution for the problem at hand:

“While a New York Air Brake official said ECP technology is reliable, the company has said that ECP brakes aren't a solution for oil trains because most derailments are caused by a broken track, wheel or axle, and ECP brakes can’t stop an accident once a train starts to derail.”

[Euclid]

dehusman

 

Euclid

I find it very strange that New York Air Brake takes the same position as the AAR, and even goes so far as to misrepresent a fundamental truth about ECP brakes.

 

 

Why would you think that the people who design, build and test air brakes would have a different opiinion from the people who are their customers and helped them design and test the air brakes?

 

 

Well, they did have the same opinion and common interest prior to the mandate. But, since the mandate, the second set of people you cite (the railroads) are NOT the customers of the ECP manufacturers. They have turned on a dime and are running away from ECP with every argument they can think of. With the ECP mandate, the railroads suddenly do not agree with the ECP manufacturers. So that is a really good reason why I would think that they would have a different opinion about ECP than the manufactures. Doesn’t that make sense to you?

So what I find to be very strange, is that one of the manufactures has issued a statement from its president denying the benefits of his ECP product. I can understand why the railroads are running away from ECP, but I find it strange that one of the ECP manufacturers would run away with the railroads, and join their course of denouncing ECP.

[Euclid]

tree68

 

Euclid

So what I find to be very strange, is that one of the manufactures has issued a statement from its president denying the benefits of his ECP product. 

 

 

He's not denying the benefits of ECP as a whole.  He's saying that ECP is not the solution for the problem at hand:

 

“While a New York Air Brake official said ECP technology is reliable, the company has said that ECP brakes aren't a solution for oil trains because most derailments are caused by a broken track, wheel or axle, and ECP brakes can’t stop an accident once a train starts to derail.”

 

 

 

ECP brakes are made mainly by two U.S.-based manufacturers -- New York Air Brake, the U.S. unit of Germany's Knorr-Bremse AG, and Wabtec Corp. While a New York Air Brake official said ECP technology is reliable, the company has said that ECP brakes aren't a solution for oil trains because most derailments are caused by a broken track, wheel or axle, and ECP brakes can’t stop an accident once a train starts to derail.

"It's the wrong solution for the problem," company president Mike Hawthorne told Reuters.

 

The above comment that you quote from the article was apparently made by NYAB President, Mike Hawthorn.  Frankly, I don’t know exactly what he is saying because of the way he is stating it.  When you have a large safety problem, do you ONLY address the causes that contribute most to the problem?  Apparently Mr. Hawthorn thinks so.  Nobody has ever suggested that ECP should or can stop an accident once a train starts to derail, as Mr. Hawthorn says. 

He does not say anything in the quote about the benefits of ECP, as you seem to infer.  The part about ECP being reliable is apparently from another person in the company.  I assume that it rebuts the AAR charge that ECP is unreliable, and therefore compromises safety, as also stated in the article. 

You say that Mike Hawthorn is not denying the benefits of ECP as a whole.  So what?  The point is that he is denying the benefits of ECP as a whole, pertaining to oil trains. 

Then from that statement you and others here have clearly said that his statement confirms that the entire ECP industry agrees with Hawthorn and the AAR on the claim that ECP brakes will not provide any benefit to oil train safety. 

Yet, as I have referenced on the previous page, the entire ECP industry most certainly does not agree with Hawthorn.  I think it is absurd to believe that ECP is a benefit to train safety for all trains except oil trains.  I think that absurdity weakens the case that AAR is making against the mandate.

Not only are Hawthron’s comments contrary to the views of Wabtec and the rest of the ECP experience, but they are also contrary to the views of his own company-- New York Air Brake Co.  Here is a quote from New York Air Brake regarding their ECP product. It sounds much different than what their president said about ECP not being a solution (my emphasis in red):

“EP-60 has proven itself in the harsh climate of Northern Canada over years of revenue service on QCM iron ore trains, where very high reliability service continues to be demonstrated. The improved train handling significantly decreased fuel consumption, dramatically increased brake shoe life, and greatly decreased coupler and knuckle failures. It completely eliminated UDEs. EP-60 reduces in-train forces, prolongs wheel life, and safely permits higher operating speeds and shorter stop distances. The result is a proven technology that delivers a high return on investment, increased safety, and improved operation.”

Wouldn’t ECP also do that for oil trains as well as the iron ore trains of the QCM?  How does ECP greatly decrease coupler and knuckle failures on the iron ore trains?

[BaltACD]

Euclid

It completely eliminated UDEs.

I'll call absolute BS to that particular statement!  Only God can eleiminate UDE's and he is still trying to get qualified as a Train Dispatcher.

[wanswheel]

Reuters, July 14

"It's the wrong solution for the problem," company president Mike Hawthorne told Reuters.

Wall Street Journal, May 1

“We’re not breaking out the champagne yet,” Mike Hawthorne, president of New York Air Brake, said in an interview. “This is an opportunity for us to see one of our big technology investments get more play in the market, but we’d be absolutely doing it in support of our customers. We don’t want to sell product just to satisfy a regulation. We want to sell a product that would solve this safety problem.”

Railway Age, September 19, 2014

http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/mechanical/locomotives/new-york-air-brake-marks-125-years.html?channel=35

...NYAB “has launched research and development efforts to introduce new technology to make oil trains, and all freight trains, safer,” said Hawthorne. “Beginning Jan. 1, 2015, a new and safer air brake control valve will be manufactured in Watertown that ensures there is always air pressure available to activate freight car brakes, regardless of how long the engineer applies the brakes. This new control device, called the DB-60 II, is the most significant improvement to pneumatic air brake control valves in 40 years.”

[Euclid]

Thanks for posting that Wanswheel.

I now think I can see where New York Air Brake Co. is coming from in denouncing ECP as a component of the solution to the oil train problem.  They side with the AAR against the ECP mandate because the good will that engenders with their customers may boost sales of non-ECP product.  It may give them an advantage over their competitor, Wabtec.

But more directly, they are offering an alternative to ECP that will be palatable enough for the railroads to swallow.  That is their new Brake Cylinder Maintainer (BCM) known as the DB-60 II.  If NYAB and the AAR could get the ECP mandate changed to a DB-60 II mandate, then the AAR would be happy, and NYAB would come out a winner against their competition. 

The only question I have now is to ask how the DB-60 II makes oil trains safer.

[wanswheel]

DB-60 II

http://www.nationalcoaltransportation.org/component/rsfiles/preview?path=2015%2BOperations%2Band%2BMaintenance%2BConference%2B-%2BPinehurst%2BNC%252FConnellOM15.pdf

 

Excerpt from Watertown Daily Times, April 30

http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/news03/air-brake-chief-says-business-steady-despite-slowdown-in-railcar-orders-20150430

Earlier this year, Air Brake began to sell an enhanced control valve for pneumatic brake systems with a new safety feature that Mr. Hawthorne said he believes will soon have industrywide demand. He said the feature corrects leakages in brake cylinders and improves brake efficiency.

“We expect this feature on our control valve to become the standard you’ll see in the industry in 18 months,” Mr. Hawthorne said, adding that the valve is expected to be sold internationally in several countries, including Canada and Mexico. “From an economic standpoint, we feel this valve will enable the brake system to perform better, longer and with less downtime.”

The company received approval from the Association of American Railroads, a Washington-D.C.-based industry trade group, to sell 3,750 control valves with the new feature, he said, which will then be tested by clients in the field. This fall, the company expects to receive approval from the AAR to sell up to 10,000 more valves.

“We’ll monitor the 10,000 through most of 2016, and then we expect to receive unconditional approval,” said Mr. Hawthorne, who described the improved valve as “the safest in the industry.”

[schlimm]

Decisions seem more driven by sales than safety, i.e., appear to collude with AAR on ECP mandate (which will happen anyway) to sell new brake valves as well.

[Wizlish]

Fascinating.  In one of the patents for the ECP system that evolved into the EP-60 (issued in 1989) NYAB noted details of a computerized system in the 'prior art' that measured and maintained the brake-cylinder pressures dynamically (that patent being GSI's US4402047 from 1980).  Apparently they're just now coming to realize that maintaining applied brake pressure is a different thing from commanded application of pressure through the proportional valve.  I am looking to find information on how they implement their BCM (brake cylinder maintainer) feature in a way, as they note, that is easily retrofitted to the EP-60 valve.

Why this is an exciting addition to rail safety, especially in the context of the present exhausting discussion, is less clear.  All the issues we are concerned with involve reasonably prompt application and modulation of the brake pressure, effectively running the actual brake pressure in servo.  The NYAB BCM monitors the individual cylinder pressures separately, and trims each one if its pressure begins to fall minutes or more after a stop (at nominally-optimized brake presure per car) has been completed.  That will help keep it stopped ... but nothing of immediate concern in reducing observed types of oil train accident is really helped by that.  (Lac Megantic would have been prevented by other characteristics of an ECP brake long before the 'value' of keeping cylinder pressure applied via a BCM would have begun to matter...)

I have to wonder whether this fancy new feature introduces a possiblity of introducing 'maintaining' pressure to a cylinder that might cause either inadvertent application or an unexpectedly high cylinder pressure upon proportional application using, say, a load-sensing device or 'snow brake' setting to reduce expected application force.

[tree68]

Euclid

Then from that statement you and others here have clearly said that his statement confirms that the entire ECP industry agrees with Hawthorn and the AAR on the claim that ECP brakes will not provide any benefit to oil train safety. 

The quotes within my post are from you, or your quotes of others.

It's been my conclusion not that ECP is potentially a part of the solution with regard to oil train incidents.  And I think others will agree.

My conclusion (and apparently that of Hawthorn) is that ECP is not THE solution to the oil train incident issue.  There are other factors, most of which have already been noted here, which deserve equal consideration.

Nobody wants to be involved in the implementation of THE solution that down the road turns out to have been a wrong or incomplete solution.  What's going to be the reaction when an ECP equipped oil train wrecks?  "But we thought ECP would solve that problem!?!?!"

[Euclid]

tree68

Nobody wants to be involved in the implementation of THE solution that down the road turns out to have been a wrong or incomplete solution.  What's going to be the reaction when an ECP equipped oil train wrecks?  "But we thought ECP would solve that problem!?!?!"

 

I think that is probably a part of it.  While it is not practically attainable, the basic premise of the oil train safety features is to fix the problem.  So any part of the fix might be expected to be infallible.  I can see why a company might be reluctant to promote their product that goes into that mandate with an implied promise of fixing the problem. 

I talked to someone at NYAB today and asked him about what their President, Mike Hawthorn had said and how the company can reconcile it with their product mission.  My contact said that their company believes that ECP improves safety in a variety of ways including better train handling, reduced slack action, quicker stopping, and reduced UDEs— all of which can prevent or mitigate derailments. However, with the mandate, they have to walk a fine line with their customers who are lining up in opposition to the mandate.  As I understood it, NYAB does not want to appear to be piling on along with the DOT and their ECP mandate.  So in order to support the customers’ cause, Hawthorn appears to be proactively backing off on ECP as an oil train solution.    

I asked the person I was conversing with if the slack control benefit of ECP does not apply to unit trains, but only to mixed-consist trains.  He said there is plenty of opportunity for severe slack action in oil trains even if they are unit trains with all cars the same.  He said train handling has a lot to do with causing slack action damage.  He said that ECP can prevent hard slack action both by improved train handling characteristics and by the instantaneous application of brakes.  He said that he believes slack action could have contributed to any of the recent oil train wrecks, and that he certainly would not rule out the ability of slack action to cause derailments of oil trains or other types of unit trains. 

[schlimm]

That is a lot of valuable and likely definitive information from NYAB, which is more authoritative and valid than some posts on here.

[Anonymous]

Good Morning:

 

Here is an interesting article on recent New Yrk State train safety inspections in the Albany NY area:

http://blog.timesunion.com/business/nys-reveals-latest-round-of-train-safety-inspections/67917/

 

[narig01]

BaltACD

 

 

Euclid

It completely eliminated UDEs.

 

 

 

I'll call absolute BS to that particular statement!  Only God can eleiminate UDE's and he is still trying to get qualified as a Train Dispatcher.

 

A "UDE" is an UnDesired Emergency? 

The IGN 

[schlimm]

UDE - Undesired Emergency

When air pressure contained within the air brake system is released, resulting in the application of train brakes. [from  UPRR's glossary of terms]

 

So obviously that is one of the situations addressed by the newer equipment.

[jeffhergert]

On ECP equipment the control valve moves mechanically to an electronic signal instead of to pressure differential on conventional air brakes.  I think it's because of this it's thought ECP will eliminate UDEs caused by the control valve during a brake application. 

It probably will eliminate most of those UDEs, but I wouldn't say all.  Nothing is perfect, saying all sounds like a salesman's pitch.  

Jeff

[Wizlish]

jeffhergert

It probably will eliminate most of those UDEs, but I wouldn't say all. Nothing is perfect, saying all sounds like a salesman's pitch.

And note that it wasn't the NYAB guy who said 'completely eliminates UDEs'.  They said 'reduces' -- which as I understand the system's operation, would be accurate.

For those of you that don't recognize a "UDE" the old term 'dynamiter' might be more evocative.  The brake valve on the car goes to the full emergency position, usually without warning, and sticks there until its attitude is adjusted.  To the extent that 'emergency' can be commanded by dumping the trainline pressure on an ECP-equipped train -- which I believe is the default way the standard calls for it to be achieved -- there will still be 'valve functionality' in the ECP brake valve that could create dynamiting, and especially with lower maintenance attention over the years that functionality might result in some level of problem.

On the other hand, at least part of the UDE problem stems from the fact that all the functions in the 'traditional' Westinghouse system have to be discriminated via control signals (pressure and shock) sent via the air in the line.  We've already commented on the fact that this is a large percentage of the 'difference' in emergency response between conventional air and ECP:  if you adjust the brake valves to respond quickly to an 'emergency' signal, it's like putting hair triggers on a large number of weapons, and it becomes more likely that somehow, somewhere, one of them will fire unexpectedly when riding over somewhat arbitrarily rough and wet country cocked and unlocked...

The current argument about ECP is not that it doesn't provide some significant benefits.  It is that, for the cost and trouble, it does not provide 'enough' benefit in additional safety, in those areas that concern fireball explosions from HHFT accidents.

Yes, I do think there is an element of 'kill this before it multiplies' to a mandate for ECP on all interchanged cars.  Yes, I think the very high cost of ECP as an unfunded mandate is a concern to railroad management.  Yes, I think everyone is being very careful to establish their positions without causing upset at powerful political agencies.  In my opinion this is part of the normal give-and-take involved in doing business in the current United States, and I'm not quite sure why so much simplistic 'solution' discussion keeps being made about it.

[Euclid]

The following quote in blue is from Mike Hawthorn, president of New York Air Brake, and it appears in the Railway Age article cited on the previous page:

U.S. freight railroads are seeing a boom in the transport of crude oil from the oil fields to refineries and markets. However, a series of oil train accidents has raised questions about the safety of moving crude by rail. In response, U.S. freight railroads and car owners voluntarily proposed new safety standards that mandate the continued introduction of more robust tank cars and improved train control systems. These improvements are essential to the continued supply of safe, low cost energy for America and its economic engine.”

In response [to the oil train derailment problem], since the beginning of the oil boom, NYAB “has launched research and development efforts to introduce new technology to make oil trains, and all freight trains, safer,” said Hawthorne. “Beginning Jan. 1, 2015, a new and safer air brake control valve will be manufactured in Watertown that ensures there is always air pressure available to activate freight car brakes, regardless of how long the engineer applies the brakes. This new control device, called the DB-60 II, is the most significant improvement to pneumatic air brake control valves in 40 years. “

***************************************

 

So this means that while NYAB says ECP brakes are not a solution (or part of a solution) to the oil train problem, the new DB-60 II brake cylinder maintaining valve is part of the solution.  Clearly, the new valve would be much more preferable to the AAR than ECP brakes because it is far, far less costly.  The new valve can be put on any freight car and still operate in trains that have cars without the valve.  It does not require mass conversion like ECP does.  With the DB-60 II valve, the more of them you have in a train, the safer the train is.

So the natural inclination for the AAR would be to push the FRA to change the ECP mandate to a DB-60 II mandate.  But there is one little problem with that strategy.  The AAR has been promoting the fact that ECP brakes are not the proper solution.  To bolster that position, the AAR says in their literature that the entire category of brake failure is all but irrelevant to oil train derailments.  This is a bit misleading because if conventional air brakes produced a slack run-in that derailed the train, that would not be considered to be brake failure.  And yet ECP could prevent such a slack run-in.  So the premise of the AAR in disconnecting oil train safety from brake failure is somewhat flawed.  Here is what they say:

Safety Data Do Not Support an ECP Mandate

Less than 1 percent of all train accidents are related to a failure in brake equipment, and there have not been any brake-related accidents involving a crude oil or ethanol train.

**************************************

 

Therefore, overall, the AAR has backed themselves into a corner where they cannot come out in favor of the DB-60 II brake system valve as an alternative to ECP braking, as NYAB suggests, because they have dismissed brake performance as being part of the oil train problem. 

[Wizlish]

Euclid

Therefore, overall, the AAR has backed themselves into a corner where they cannot come out in favor of the DB-60 II brake system valve as an alternative to ECP braking, as NYAB suggests, because they have dismissed brake performance as being part of the oil train problem.

I discussed the BCM (and its effective uselessness to any context we are discussing in this thread) several posts ago.  You seem to have missed this, or misunderstood what the BCM actually does.

No one has 'dismissed brake performance as being part of the oil train problem'.  What is being "deprecated", in a nutshell, is that a 3% maximum improvement in brake application time, without modulation, is worth a mandated $8-10K cost per car and loss of default compatibility with non-ECP locomotives or car consists.  I happen to agree that it is not.

In order for an ECP 'mandate' to make any sense, the actual, practical, improvements that ECP can make in emergency oil-train handling have to be expressed and then developed.  One of those things, in my opinion, is a system of differential braking after derailment detection.  Another might be a system that performs better 'active' monitoring and control of slack run-in and run-out, and perhaps drawbar forces (both longitudinal and torque).  THOSE are the things the ECP (or 'electronically-accelerated pneumatic') discussion ought to be focused on, in my opinion...

... and NYAB BCM is only peripherally concerned with that, regardless of the valve system to which it happens to be applied, so PLEASE stop mentioning it until you can describe just how it 'improves' stopping derailed trains in minimum time or distance, or with better safety.

[Euclid]

Wizlish,

My point is that I do not believe that the BCM valve is a significant part of the oil train solution.  However NYAB is offering it as such, and that offering is the current news.  So why should I not mention that?  

When I say that the AAR has dismissed brake performance as being part of the oil train problem, I agree that that is not entirely true, as you suggest.  They do allow that it is somewhere between zero and 1% of the problem. 

I do believe that the 3-7% quicker stopping of ECP would add be a significant part of solving the oil train problem.  However, the AAR is apparently not accounting for that quicker stopping advantage in their pie chart showing how much of the derailment problem is related to braking.

As to ECP, I am not much advocating it as the whole or partial solution to the oil train problem.  I think it would be a partial solution, but maybe not cost effective overall.  I will leave that battle to AAR vs. FRA, and I will be an interested spectator.

You suggest that the discussion should be focused on DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING.  I have strongly advocated differential braking in this thread and others.  In early 2014, I started an extensive thread on a safer oil train concept, and differential braking was the centerpiece of that proposal.  I have made many posts here and elsewhere defending the feasibility and effectiveness of differential braking in the face of fierce criticism.  I have written proposals about differential braking and shared them with New York Air Brake and with Wabtec. 

As far as I know, nobody else has conceived of the concept or advocated it. I am currently working on a project to illustrate and describe the concept of differential braking.  I have revised the concept with new thinking since introducing it here in 2/2014.  That is why I was asking about dynamic braking a couple pages back in this thread.   

However, the solution of differential braking flies in the face of railroad paradigms.  The main one is that once the first wheelset leaves the rails, nothing can be done that will control or mitigate the derailment process.  It has been said so often that it has been accepted as truth.  But the same faulty logic might be applied to air bags in vehicles, for instance.        

[schlimm]

Wizlish

The current argument about ECP is not that it doesn't provide some significant benefits.  It is that, for the cost and trouble, it does not provide 'enough' benefit in additional safety, in those areas that concern fireball explosions from HHFT accidents. Yes, I do think there is an element of 'kill this before it multiplies' to a mandate for ECP on all interchanged cars.  Yes, I think the very high cost of ECP as an unfunded mandate is a concern to railroad management. 

I would not be surprised to discover the same  "kicking and dragging" resistance by the rails to most of the other major MANDATED safety appliance adoptions of the past (Janney coupler, air brakes, etc.).

[Wizlish]

schlimm

I would not be surprised to discover the same "kicking and dragging" resistance by the rails to most of the other major MANDATED safety appliance adoptions of the past

Don't be -- if anything, it was far worse (certainly with respect to Westinghouse brakes!)  We have no Lorenzo Coffin to take up the cudgels for ECP, and until we do I expect continued resistance.

The thing is that modern management is well aware of the advantages of ECP.  A number of for-profit companies, including the aforementioned firms in Australia, voluntarily paid to convert their equipment, and were there an effective way to provide 'dual-mode' ECP I suspect the changeover of HHFTs would not be so stringently resisted. For Janney couplers there were slotted 'universal' knuckles that took a pin for the link.  For air brakes it sufficed to put a blind hose from end to end, and use operating rules that bunched the unbraked stock to the rear (where, presumably, brakemen would still work them as long as necessary).  When gauge was converted, they could get 5000-plus men standing by with hammers and crowbars to pull spikes and bang them into predrilled holes to accomplish the thing in days.  There is, as yet, no comparable way to accomplish that sort of thing with 'standard'-compliant ECP systems.

I would note, however, that the operational benefits of knuckle couplers/internal buff gear, practical single-pipe pneumatic-control air brakes, and some other things -- roller bearings come to mind as a rather pointed example -- were not realized until there were scale or scope changes in railroading itself... that were made practical, or even possible, only after the technological change became reasonably pervasive.  (There is a similar reason for the widespread adoption of Walschaerts valve gear after the end of the 19th Century.)   I'd like to think that railroads learned that, but it is also clear from history that they dislike 'subsidizing' anything that gives their competition an easier ride.  Anyone remember the history of the BCR coal-turbine development?  The railroads involved 'kicked' increasingly at the idea that they would be subsidizing detail design fixes that they considered the responsibility of the for-profit locomotive manufacturers -- and I happen to agree with them in principle.  Nobody in that game wants to be the early adopter of an expensive technology with enormous stranded costs and limited applicability in most of its initial phase, unless there are recognizable, and perhaps justifiable-to-scockholders, benefits from that adoption. 

The Esch Act 'quasi-blackmail' imposition of ATS, and more recently the imposition of PTC, are attractive on the surface as examples of how to coerce the Class I community to 'do right' (or perhaps 'straighten up and fly right').  But if the FRA wants ECP mandated on its merits, the discussion needs to take that form, not reflect Sarah's preference that 'ECP's merits self-evidently warrant its mandated application to HHFT trains'.  Someone like Lorenzo Coffin might be persistent enough to get adoption of a properly 'convertible' ECP system on ECP's actual merits in modern railroading.  But it will take that level of persistence and access, and probably at least that span of time.

[wanswheel]

What’s the worse risk financially?  That too few ECP cars will be available at the deadline and the railroads’ common carrierness will compel them to transport oil everywhere at 30 or 40 mph?

Meanwhile on the political front, excerpt from Reuters, July 22

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/22/usa-train-regulations-oil-idUSL1N10224E20150722

Senator John Thune, Republican chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, had proposed repealing the ECP requirement last month with a measure that orders new research to justify the technology's benefits until a permanent decision is made.

But the legislation unveiled this week by Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell preserves the ECP requirement. It still requires the study of braking technologies, and calls on the transportation secretary to repeal the ECP requirement eventually if the research does not justify its use.

[BaltACD]

wanswheel

What’s the worse risk financially?  That too few ECP cars will be available at the deadline and the railroads’ common carrierness will compel them to transport oil everywhere at 30 or 40 mph?

Meanwhile on the political front, excerpt from Reuters, July 22

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/22/usa-train-regulations-oil-idUSL1N10224E20150722

Senator John Thune, Republican chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, had proposed repealing the ECP requirement last month with a measure that orders new research to justify the technology's benefits until a permanent decision is made.

But the legislation unveiled this week by Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell preserves the ECP requirement. It still requires the study of braking technologies, and calls on the transportation secretary to repeal the ECP requirement eventually if the research does not justify its use.

What kind of idiot does McConnell believe the railroads are?  Congressional!  You have to install ECP while we study to see if it is actually effective and at sometime of our choosing (after it has all been installed on the private dollar) Congress can say it's not effective and you should not have spent the billions to install it and you can remove it at further expense.  And the GOP is pro business!  BS  they are pro spending other peoples money, just like all the other parties.

[Euclid]

It is well established that ECP increases train safety.  So the only thing to study is whether the cost is worth it.  Can this be determined in a way that is true, accurate, and unquestionable? What neutral party has the expertise do this study and also be trusted by both sides to come to a fair and objective conclusion? 

[schlimm]

Yes.    And why (as one employee wants) should the taxpayer subsidize a long overdue safety appliance for private rails?

[jeffhergert]

Euclid

It is well established that ECP increases train safety.  So the only thing to study is whether the cost is worth it.  Can this be determined in a way that is true, accurate, and unquestionable? What neutral party has the expertise do this study and also be trusted by both sides to come to a fair and objective conclusion? 

 

The railroads still are testing ECP.  There is a big difference between deciding to use something and being forced to use it.  If it wasn't for the PTC mandate, maybe you would be seeing more ECP equipped trains.

A lot of the benefits of ECP come from using them.  That is slowing the train using the train brakes.  Currently, that is the last of the three methods they want an engineer to do.  First is thottle modulation and using the lay of the land, second is dynamic braking, third is using air.  That third alternative is usually in conjuction with dynamics.  They do allow air alone in certain situations, but would rather see you in dynamics first.  (It's stressed so bad that I've had a couple of students who needed to use air right now due to unforseen circumstances, but wanted to get into dynamics first.  I've heard other engineers run across the same thing.)  It's all about saving fuel.  Power braking a train uses up fuel and I'm sure that's one thing they're trying to figure out.  Is it worth it?  Some of the savings touted by the salesman seem counterintuitive.  Maybe in reality it isn't, but I'm sure the railroads are going to make sure of it.

Some are going to say that the shorter stopping distance in emergency situations alone is enough to warrant the implimintation.  How often does an engineer use emergency to avoid hitting something?  I've been one for 10 years and I can only think of two instances when I had to throw it into emergency, other than when responding to in-train induced emergency applications. 

I think eventually you will see ECP on some trains, even without any mandate.  With all other demands for the railroad's money it just may take longer, absent an ECP mandate.  

Jeff       

[Euclid]

Jeff,

I agree with all of your points, and definitely understand the railroads’ reaction to the mandate.  Although I am curious about your comment that ECP salesmen make claims that are counterintuitive.  What claims are you referring to?  I would not be surprised that salesmen may be exaggerating the benefits of ECP.  For instance, they always mention 70% shorter stopping distance without qualifying that it is only for service applications.  Without that qualifier, it leaves the clear impression that it applies to emergency stopping, since that is typically where the issue of stopping distance applies most.  So the claim, while true, is misleading.  I get the impression that DOT may have been misled by the claim.

My comment that you quoted is to ask who will do this ECP testing to determine the vital conclusion about whether the mandate stands.  Who would be the neutral third party to conduct the test?  I can’t think of any.  The question of the actual ECP performance would be complicated enough, but when you add in the question of cost/benefit, I doubt that any two parties would agree.   

[Jim200]

Euclid

It is well established that ECP increases train safety.  So the only thing to study is whether the cost is worth it.  Can this be determined in a way that is true, accurate, and unquestionable? What neutral party has the expertise do this study and also be trusted by both sides to come to a fair and objective conclusion? 

 

Booz, Allen, Hamilton analysed ECP in 2006. See Table I-1, (page I-11), and especially part III.4 fuel savings, part III.5 wheel savings and part III.6 brake Inspection savings. You need to double the numbers to have relevance to today, but the payback time for ECP is the same. 3 years times $170 million savings equals $510 million which more than pays for the ECP cost of $432 million for a Powder River Basin, (PRB), fleet of 2800 locomotives and 80,000 railcars owned by the railroad in 2006. Every year after that, the railroad pockets $170 million, (about $340 million in 2015). If the railroad doesn't own the cars, only the $78 million fuel savings and $45 million inspection savings minus some railcar repairs would be pocketed.

https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L02964 

 

If we say that today it costs about $900 million for a PRB fleet to be fitted with ECP, then according to Fred Frailey's accounting of 2014 stock buybacks, which largely benefits upper management and wall street: 

1. UP and BNSF could have each paid for 3 PRB fleets.
2. CP could have done 2 PRB fleets and put $300 million in the bank.
3. CN could do 1 fleet and put $600 million in the bank.
4. CSX and NS could each do 1 fleet, but would have to add cash from their bank.

Thus, 30,800 locomotives and more than half or 880,000 railcars of the North American fleet could have had the ECP brakes paid in just one financial year.  In 2020 and beyond, UP and BNSF could each be pocketing something like $1 billion extra each year, but presently we are only talking about the smaller oil train segment.

 

http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/fred-frailey/archive/2015/05/13/railroads-and-their-money.aspx

 

 (I can't light up the link. Look in Frailey's blog,"Railroads and their money" 5-13-15)