Harding's manager has a responsibility to train Harding and audit Harding's work. That is normally done through "efficiency testing" where the manager tests the crews on their understanding of the rules. In the US the FRA mandates and audits the efficiency testing. The railroads also manage the testing. Woe be the manager that isn't up to date on his testing. But that's the US, don't have any idea what the requirements are in Canada. From the news reports, I get the impression its not as rigorous (just an impression, don't know from first hand experience.) The rules were not as restrictive as they are today
How many securement test have the managers performed? What requirements are there in a securement test? Have there been any failures? Caveat : Until Lac Megantic, securement was not as big of an issue as it is today. It is entirely possible that the managers were doing what was required pre-Lac Megantic, focusing on what was deemed critical at that time (stop tests, getting on an off equipment, air brake tests, etc) which meant that very few securement tests were being done.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Apparently Harding failed to comply with Rule 112 and the train ran away because of that. I wonder why the other two people are charged. What is it that they could have failed to do? I cannot think of anything. It seems entirely clear why they have charged Harding, but has the news reported why they charged the other two?
As Dave Husman mentioned, those other two people had no way of knowing that a loss of air pumping might cause the train to roll away. They were under no obligation to expect that.
But the only reason I can see for the other two people being charged is that indeed the prosecution does believe that they should have expected the securement to be in jeopardy because the engine had been shut off. That would be just bizarre if that is what the prosecution believes. But anything is possible.
Again, speculation, but if the police report is accurate, it seems quite possible that when Harding was told of the fire, he had one of those "Oh, s==t!" moments, and then asked if he should return, as Randy Stahl suggested, to CYA. Too bad he didn't.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
I too wonder whether relying on air to backup handbrakes was a common practice, not only with Harding, but with all engineers.
dehusmanI hope for his sake that he actually thought the train was secured,
The fact that he didn't set enough brakes to meet the railroad's (or anyone's) requirements notwithstanding, the train stayed in place for some period of time.
The end result makes it obvious that Harding didn't secure the train as it should have been secured. But he did secure the train, and until other circumstances changed the dynamics of that securement, all was good.
One could probably correctly suspect that this wasn't the first time this had happened (the inadequate method of securing the train). Each time that a train wasn't properly secured but was still there when the crew returned reinforced the bad habit.
If the locomotive hadn't caught fire, or if enough brakes had been set, we wouldn't be discussing this.
As for the locomotive brakes - depending on the locomotive, as few as one axle may actually be secured by the handbrakes. More likely would have been two - of six.
I think it's been reported that there were five locomotives. If they were six-axle locomotives, that means that when the independent brakes released with loss of main res pressure, fully two thirds of the 30 axles lost braking - which is probably what made the difference.
Obviously, if there were four-axle locos in the mix, the ratio changes, but the bottom line is that a whole lot of braking went away with the loss of main-res pressure as a result of the only running locomotive being shut down.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Of course it is pure speculation, but the fact that he asked Labrie if he should go back once he heard about the fire implies that he had a thought that maybe he should. Why or to do what, we do not know. Maybe he just had a hunch. After all, he was thought to be very skilled.
I am just asking. My point is not the question of working without pay. It is a question about rules compliance in performing work duty while not actually being on duty.
Euclid I am just asking how you would do it. Are you saying he should have just gone back and done some work to make it safe without going on duty and maybe without telling anybody?
I am just asking how you would do it. Are you saying he should have just gone back and done some work to make it safe without going on duty and maybe without telling anybody?
No one will admit it but many have gone back not on the clock to almost any job ?
schlimm The fire broke out less than two hours before the convoy began rolling to Lac-Megantic. Police say the railway's traffic controller, Richard Labrie, notified Harding about the fire while Harding was staying in a hotel room. "He (Harding) asked him if he could do anything, but he was told no," the document says, referring to Harding's statement. "So Mr. Harding did not return to make sure the ... train was safe." Given the obvious danger of a fire, Harding shouldhave returned on his own. Sounds like he thought about doing so, but Labrie told him not to. Both were wrong.
The fire broke out less than two hours before the convoy began rolling to Lac-Megantic. Police say the railway's traffic controller, Richard Labrie, notified Harding about the fire while Harding was staying in a hotel room. "He (Harding) asked him if he could do anything, but he was told no," the document says, referring to Harding's statement. "So Mr. Harding did not return to make sure the ... train was safe."
Given the obvious danger of a fire, Harding shouldhave returned on his own. Sounds like he thought about doing so, but Labrie told him not to. Both were wrong.
Euclid Making sure the train was safe would have required some time. Certainly there were too few handbrakes set to secure the train without air, as required. With the lead unit shut down, the engineer would be faced with either setting maybe 20-40 handbrakes to be sure of securement without air; and without the means of testing the set handbrakes. The other option would have been to start another engine to maintain the air. So making sure the train was safe might have required 2-3 hours. Should he have done that informally, not on duty, and without pay? How would that work? Would it be legal to do that? If he went on duty to make sure the train was safe, how would that work in terms of shift time and that time affecting a shift the next day? As I recall, when Harding asked the supervisor to return after the fire, the supervisor told him not to because Harding had to start a shift in the next day.
Making sure the train was safe would have required some time. Certainly there were too few handbrakes set to secure the train without air, as required. With the lead unit shut down, the engineer would be faced with either setting maybe 20-40 handbrakes to be sure of securement without air; and without the means of testing the set handbrakes. The other option would have been to start another engine to maintain the air. So making sure the train was safe might have required 2-3 hours.
Should he have done that informally, not on duty, and without pay? How would that work? Would it be legal to do that? If he went on duty to make sure the train was safe, how would that work in terms of shift time and that time affecting a shift the next day?
As I recall, when Harding asked the supervisor to return after the fire, the supervisor told him not to because Harding had to start a shift in the next day.
Ever heard of CYA ?
Shlimm is right, that was the last chance to save the day...
dehusman Why would he have told the engineer to go back to the train? The only person who knew how many brakes were actually set was the engineer. If the proper number of brakes had been set then the engine fire wouldn't have made any difference. A better question is, knowing that there was a fire, and knowing that he only set 7 handbrakes, why didn't the engineer go back to the train on his own, regardless of what the dispatcher told him, to make sure things were secured?
schlimm Harding failed to apply the minimum number of handbrakes called for in the MM&A manual by his own admission. The other rail official should have told Harding to go back to the engine after he told Harding of the engine fire. There is blame to go around and the questions seem to be answered. The other concerns are largely superfluous other than the degree of volatility of the oil.
Harding failed to apply the minimum number of handbrakes called for in the MM&A manual by his own admission. The other rail official should have told Harding to go back to the engine after he told Harding of the engine fire. There is blame to go around and the questions seem to be answered. The other concerns are largely superfluous other than the degree of volatility of the oil.
Harding did fail to apply the minimum number of handbrakes, and as you say, that alone is a violation. However, the push-pull test is the elephant in the room. Had Harding performed it with success, he would not have left too few handbrakes applied.
The question I have is whether the omission of performing a push-pull test was routine not only for Harding, but for other engineers. When they told the police that they normally would set 10-15 handbrakes, that alone does not mean that they did not test it with a push-pull test. But what is quoted says nothing about that most critical element of Rule 112. Instead, it refers to an apparent judgment call based on what engineers felt was adequate, and the special instructions minimum. So that is why I would want the police to ask all MM&A engineers if they performed push-pull tests when parking at Nantes.
The key question is whether it was routine to omit the push-pull test to save time and rely on the automatic air brakes as a backup to hold the train. If that was routine, I would want to know whether it was approved by MM&A management.
Quoted from the linked article:
“An MM&A instruction manual obtained during the investigation "states that there must be a minimum of nine manual brakes applied for a convoy of 70-79 cars," the court document says.
Most MM&A engineers interviewed by police said they would apply between 10 and 15 brakes when parking their convoy in Nantes.
Steve Callahan, an independent expert hired by police, recommended applying 15 brakes.
"Taking into account the (train's) weight, (the) length and slope of the railway, the convoy should have had 15 cars with manual brakes activated," police quote Callahan as saying.”
Rule 112 addressing train securement in Canada does not permit the number of handbrakes applied to be simply a judgment call on the part of an employee. Yet the above quotes indicate that method of determining the number of handbrakes.
A notion or estimate of the proper number of handbrakes, or the minimum number called for in the instruction manuals is only a starting point for applying the handbrakes. After they are applied, they must be tested by pushing and pulling on the train with the locomotive. Only that test can legitimately determine whether enough handbrakes have been set. Without that test, Rule 112 has been violated.
Assuming that handbrakes had not been released by persons unknown, that train would not have passed the push-pull test had it been performed. And from the quotes, it appears that no push-pull test was performed.
The police should ask the MM&A engineers that they interviewed whether the engineers performed push-pull tests when parking trains at Nantes and setting 10-15 handbrakes. If they say no, the police should ask them, “why not?” I believe that is the critical question.
You are correct in your first paragraph.
The Westbound train was not near the scene, it was parked on a siding called Vachon about 10 miles East of the wrecksite
Report states only 7 car brakes applied. Question when the engine fire caused engine to be shut down did all loco brakes finally release ?
Confusion was the train on the main as another westbound was parked on siding ?
All in all UP seems to be placing split rail derails anywhere haz mat cars is going to be parked ?
http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2014/06/13/21739721.html?cid=rssnewscanada
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