About less than carload freight

[cx500]

carnej1

 

 

 

The White Pass & Yukon is in serious discussions about resuming freight (ore) service:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2010/06/28/whitepass-yukon-rail-freight.html

Although it's not mentioned in the linked article, they are seriously considering rebuilding the line to standard gauge...

I have also heard knowledgeable comments that this is a mostly a serious pipedream.  A large amount of the construction costs would have by government investment, and Canada is no different from the US in the unequal treatment of transportation investment and support.

John

[carnej1]

greyhounds

Paul_D_North_Jr:

Meanwhile, the Canadian railroads - unhampered by the ICC - went ahead and started the modern container era, even before Malcolm MacLean and his Sea-Land Service.  See:

Integration in the north

How White Pass & Yukon, Alaska, and CN-Newfoundland interchange

by Hilton, George W. 

from Trains July 1971  p. 36

ARR  CNR  container  ferry  WP&Y

and, an even better article from Toronto in 2006 that I just found today (while looking for something else, of course) that has some interesting tidbits about the development of the various systems - see esp. the comments below it:

http://readingt.readingcities.com/index.php/toronto/comments/the_magic_box_the_real_history_of_shipping_containers 

While lots of libraries around here have Marc Levinson's 2006 or 2008 book "The Box", none appear to have Peter Hunter's "The Magic Box".   So another 'snipe hunt' for me, I suppose . . .  

Fascinating history, at least to me.

- Paul North.

 

Yeah!

First, let me say that i consider Marc Levinson's "The Box" as a must read for anyone interested in the "Science and Art" of moving freight.  It's not perfect, but it's very close to perfect.  If you want a better understanding, you'll gain such from reading this wonderful book.  At least twice. 

One of the things that isn't perfect is Levinson's insistence that Malcom McLean's (Sea-Land) Ideal-X was the first container ship.  It wasn't.  The White Pass Company's "Cliford J. Rogers" was the first container ship.  I have no idea why Levinson dismisses the Rogers, but he does.

The White Pass company was headquartered in Winnipeg and functioned as the main suppy carrier in to the Yukon Territory.  The White Pass would load freight on to a ship at Vancouver.  The ship would sail to Skagway, Alaska.  (Skagway was the "natural" port to serve the Yukon, despite being in the US.)  The small containers would be transferred from the Rogers to the narrow guage railway owned by the White Pass company.  The railroad would move the containers up a steep 4% grade though about 25 miles of US territory and on to Whitehorse, Yukon Territory.  About 110 rail miles total.  At Whitehorse the containers would be transferred to trucks for final delivery.

Through this efficient system people living in one of the most remote places on earth got their coffee, canned peaches, boots, shovels, whatever.

AFAIK, the company still functions today.  They just don't use the narrow guage railroad.  In 1982 some spoilsports built a paved highway into Skagway.  There was no longer an economic reason to transfer the containers twice.  They simply loaded the containers from ship to truck in Skagway.

That integrated ship/rail/truck system could not have been done in the US.  The government would have blocked it.  For no discernable good reason.  In the US integration was allowed just a little bit.  The Federal honcho saw it as "dangerous".  Say What?

The Canadian government didn't have a problem with integrated transportation companies.  The chief of transportation regulation in the US, one Joseph B. Eastman, "Saw the dangers of intermodal transportation."  I'm still waiting on his biography from Amazon.  This one ought to be good for some laughs and quite a few sighs.

And it wasn't just the smallish White Pass in Canada, the Canadian Pacific became an intigrated transportaiton company with ships, trains, and trucks.  Using each transportation tool where it's most efficient to use that particular tool.  That's been the Canadian way.  It would have been the American way too, except our government wouldn't allow such a thing.

 

The White Pass & Yukon is in serious discussions about resuming freight (ore) service:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2010/06/28/whitepass-yukon-rail-freight.html

Although it's not mentioned in the linked article, they are seriously considering rebuilding the line to standard gauge...

[greyhounds]

Paul_D_North_Jr

Meanwhile, the Canadian railroads - unhampered by the ICC - went ahead and started the modern container era, even before Malcolm MacLean and his Sea-Land Service.  See:

Integration in the north

How White Pass & Yukon, Alaska, and CN-Newfoundland interchange

by Hilton, George W. 

from Trains July 1971  p. 36

ARR  CNR  container  ferry  WP&Y

and, an even better article from Toronto in 2006 that I just found today (while looking for something else, of course) that has some interesting tidbits about the development of the various systems - see esp. the comments below it:

http://readingt.readingcities.com/index.php/toronto/comments/the_magic_box_the_real_history_of_shipping_containers 

While lots of libraries around here have Marc Levinson's 2006 or 2008 book "The Box", none appear to have Peter Hunter's "The Magic Box".   So another 'snipe hunt' for me, I suppose . . .  

Fascinating history, at least to me.

- Paul North.

Yeah!

First, let me say that i consider Marc Levinson's "The Box" as a must read for anyone interested in the "Science and Art" of moving freight.  It's not perfect, but it's very close to perfect.  If you want a better understanding, you'll gain such from reading this wonderful book.  At least twice. 

One of the things that isn't perfect is Levinson's insistence that Malcom McLean's (Sea-Land) Ideal-X was the first container ship.  It wasn't.  The White Pass Company's "Cliford J. Rogers" was the first container ship.  I have no idea why Levinson dismisses the Rogers, but he does.

The White Pass company was headquartered in Winnipeg and functioned as the main suppy carrier in to the Yukon Territory.  The White Pass would load freight on to a ship at Vancouver.  The ship would sail to Skagway, Alaska.  (Skagway was the "natural" port to serve the Yukon, despite being in the US.)  The small containers would be transferred from the Rogers to the narrow guage railway owned by the White Pass company.  The railroad would move the containers up a steep 4% grade though about 25 miles of US territory and on to Whitehorse, Yukon Territory.  About 110 rail miles total.  At Whitehorse the containers would be transferred to trucks for final delivery.

Through this efficient system people living in one of the most remote places on earth got their coffee, canned peaches, boots, shovels, whatever.

AFAIK, the company still functions today.  They just don't use the narrow guage railroad.  In 1982 some spoilsports built a paved highway into Skagway.  There was no longer an economic reason to transfer the containers twice.  They simply loaded the containers from ship to truck in Skagway.

That integrated ship/rail/truck system could not have been done in the US.  The government would have blocked it.  For no discernable good reason.  In the US integration was allowed just a little bit.  The Federal honcho saw it as "dangerous".  Say What?

The Canadian government didn't have a problem with integrated transportation companies.  The chief of transportation regulation in the US, one Joseph B. Eastman, "Saw the dangers of intermodal transportation."  I'm still waiting on his biography from Amazon.  This one ought to be good for some laughs and quite a few sighs.

And it wasn't just the smallish White Pass in Canada, the Canadian Pacific became an intigrated transportaiton company with ships, trains, and trucks.  Using each transportation tool where it's most efficient to use that particular tool.  That's been the Canadian way.  It would have been the American way too, except our government wouldn't allow such a thing.

 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Meanwhile, the Canadian railroads - unhampered by the ICC - went ahead and started the modern container era, even before Malcolm MacLean and his Sea-Land Service.  See:

Integration in the north

How White Pass & Yukon, Alaska, and CN-Newfoundland interchange

by Hilton, George W. 

from Trains July 1971  p. 36

ARR  CNR  container  ferry  WP&Y

and, an even better article from Toronto in 2006 that I just found today (while looking for something else, of course) that has some interesting tidbits about the development of the various systems - see esp. the comments below it:

http://readingt.readingcities.com/index.php/toronto/comments/the_magic_box_the_real_history_of_shipping_containers 

While lots of libraries around here have Marc Levinson's 2006 or 2008 book "The Box", none appear to have Peter Hunter's "The Magic Box".   So another 'snipe hunt' for me, I suppose . . .  

Fascinating history, at least to me.

- Paul North.

[MP173]

Greyhound:

The mailman delivered "Organization and Traffic of the Illinois Central System" today.  This is a very good look at how one railroad operated during the late 1930's.  The book was written by a series of key personnel within the IC and covers various topics such as 1.  IC Property (including in depth review of the Chicago operation)2.  Operations of the company. 3 Traffic Department functions 4.  Passenger Traffic 5.  Freight traffic (including chapters on all major commodities such as coal, lumber, grain, automotive 6.  Traffic outlines by areas in which certain geographic areas are reviewed.

This is a very interesting look at the IC at one period of time with very detailed explanation of why this company was in business.  This book was compiled for training and educational purposes for the IC employees.

Does anyone know of any similar books published by other railroads? 

I picked this up for $15 including shipping from Abebooks.  Well worth it.

 

Ed

[greyhounds]

Paul_D_North_Jr

A few posts above someone essentially asked why the PRR and NYC didn't set-up autonomous businesses to run the container/ LCL operations so as to evade - no, comply with - the ICC's rulings.  An obvious response is, "How do you then keep enough control to prevent it from becoming a monster that turns around and eats you up ?"

That got me to wondering about how much the NYC and PRR would have trusted each other not to do something like that - based on their past mutual enmity as demonstrated some 30 years earlier by the South Penn RR vs. West Shore RR standoff, etc. 

But more worthwhile - I also wondered what the extent and volume of their respective container operations were.  They really served separate and different territories from New York City west to about Buffalo - and pragmatically, as far west to mid-Ohio; west of there, they weren't far apart, and both served the major cities as far west as Chicago of course and St. Louis.  So were these containers used mainly for short-hauls within a couple hundred miles of the Big Apple, or did they go to Chicago frequently ?  Did any other western - or southern - railroads handle them, or was that the extent the organized operation ? 

Interesting subject, and thanks again for the links and copy of that article, Mike.

- Paul North. 

I didn't understand the post saying the railroads should have formed a forwarder and then sold it off either. 

Duplicating Acme Fast Freight (a forwarder) would do what?  Acme was started in 1926 and within the next 10 years  grew to handle more LCL than any railroad save the Pennsylvania.  That's pretty good growth in a depression   The growth indicates there was a strong market need for forwarder services.

85% of the New York Central's container traffic was forwarder business and that railroad had its own forwarding company, Universal Carloading and Distributing.

What the regulators didn't like was the rates the railroads charged their customers for container service.  These customers included the forwarders.

There were other forwarders who competed with Acme and Universal.  Forwarders basically confused the regulators.  On one hand the fowarder was a shipper that bought services from railroads and truckers.  On the other hand, the forwarder held itself out to handle freight from hither to yon - did that make it a carrier?

In 1938 the ICC said forwarders should not exist (299 ICC 201).  But it lacked the authority to force them out of business.  Despite the regulators' opinion, there was obviously a need for forwarder services or people wouldn't have used forwarder services.  The whole thing was settled badly in 1940 when congress regulated forwarders as carriers.  Forwarder growth ceased.  Acme no longer is in business.

With regard to where container services were offered, the Ludite's worst fears were coming true.  Other railroads besides the New York Central were adopting the container for LCL.  These lines included the Boston & Maine, Lehigh Valley, Chicago & North Western, Pennsylvania, and the Missouri Pacific.

I don't have a list of container terminals, but any system that cut costs by 75%-85% was going to spread rapidly.  It did so until it was just stopped by government regulation.

 

[henry6]

In today's conglamorated and merged railroad map, Paul, you do bring up a point the youngen's can't fathom.  That is that individual railroad used to be much more territorial measured in miles and feet than by states and regions.  The NYC and the PRR did serve the same end points defined as Chicago and New York City but by and large the space between those cities was not at all the same.  Yes, there was incursions of NYC into PA and W.VA coal country and PRR branches lapping the shores of the Great Lakes; and it was competitive but there was room for it.  If you take NJ as an example, going west from tidewater each railroad commandeered a valley  or pathway across the state often within sight of each other yet setting themselves seperate and apart from each other, not interfering in the others business (not saying they didn't compete for business and traffic in towns and the state, just that they were seperate).  Thus loading a container in NY for Philadelphia or Atlanta or New Orleans would most likely have been the PRR's job while Albany, Buffalo, and Cleveland would go to the NYC ( yes, for this arguement I am ignoring Erie, LV, DLW, B&O et al.)  But the point is that there were more railroads giving more communities more choices.  And while the routes were seperated there were many opportunities for competition among railroads (which help keep prices down) encouraged service.  

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

A few posts above someone essentially asked why the PRR and NYC didn't set-up autonomous businesses to run the container/ LCL operations so as to evade - no, comply with - the ICC's rulings.  An obvious response is, "How do you then keep enough control to prevent it from becoming a monster that turns around and eats you up ?"

That got me to wondering about how much the NYC and PRR would have trusted each other not to do something like that - based on their past mutual enmity as demonstrated some 30 years earlier by the South Penn RR vs. West Shore RR standoff, etc. 

But more worthwhile - I also wondered what the extent and volume of their respective container operations were.  They really served separate and different territories from New York City west to about Buffalo - and pragmatically, as far west to mid-Ohio; west of there, they weren't far apart, and both served the major cities as far west as Chicago of course and St. Louis.  So were these containers used mainly for short-hauls within a couple hundred miles of the Big Apple, or did they go to Chicago frequently ?  Did any other western - or southern - railroads handle them, or was that the extent the organized operation ? 

Interesting subject, and thanks again for the links and copy of that article, Mike.

- Paul North. 

[wanswheel]

Just one more thing, said Columbo, the link to a patent granted in 1925 is supplemented by this link to a patent granted in 1922. I guess NYC's contract with the Post Office was proof to the Patent Office that "Smith's invention" was highly patentable.

http://www.google.com/patents?id=HvdNAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=1#v=onepage&q&f=true;

Excerpts from Transportation (1940)

Most of the tonnage moved on the railroads consists of bulk freight transported in carload lots. The American railroad freight facilities, including the freight car, have been developed to accomplish the movement of heavy freight long distances at minimum cost per ton mile. There is, however, a not inconsiderable volume of less-than-carload and package freight for which appropriate terminal and transportation facilities have to be provided. Before the improved highways and the motor trucks transferred from rail to road half or more of this l.c.l. freight, it constituted about 5 per cent of railroad tonnage and yielded about 15 per cent of railroad freight revenues. While freight will continue to move in large and increasing quantity by highway and truck, it is, nevertheless, possible for the railroads to adopt methods and use facili- ties that will increase l.c.l. traffic. The methods being adopted provide for the transportation of freight, not merely from station to station and only by rail, but directly from shipper to consignee by a coordinated motor and rail service. To facilitate, and lessen the cost of, this coordinated and complete service, provision is being made for the loading of package freight at the shipper's platform into freight containers or into demountable truck bodies and the transport of the loaded containers and truck bodies by motor-rail-and-motor to the platform of the consignee.

A railroad freight container is a metal weather-proof, theft-proof box in which two to seven tons of freight (depending on the kind of freight) can be placed. The container is of such size as to form a definite sub-division of the surface area and the capacity of a railroad flat car. It can be transported upon a motor truck chassis. The container being a sub-division of a car's loaded capacity, the contents of the container can be given freight rates that are less than the standard l.c.l. rates per hundred pounds, but higher than carload rates. The container provides an improved service by simplifying the transfer and handling of package freight and by reducing the packing requirements. For those shippers who can make regular shipment of l.c.l. freight of considerable volume, and for freight forwarders who can combine several shippers' packages consigned to a common destination, the container has real advantage.

The use of freight car containers is not rapidly increasing, because satisfactory arrangements have not been made for the interchange of containers among connecting railroads, and a standard type of container has not been adopted by the railroads. The general inauguration of container car facilities and services and the interchange of containers by connecting carriers would require a larger investment in equipment than present traffic conditions seem to warrant.

Some railroads, the New York Central, the Lehigh Valley, the Reading, the Baltimore and Ohio, lease containers from the L.C.L. Corporation which designs, builds and leases equipment. The largest user of containers is the Pennsylvania Railroad, which has between four and five thousand of the approximately eleven thousand containers used by all railroads. While all of the Pennsylvania Railroad's freight containers can be employed in coordinated rail and motor service only one-eighth are so used, the other seven-eighths being loaded and unloaded at station platform. This station-to-station use of containers eliminates the sending of l.c.l. freight from the receiving stations to a transfer freight house for classification and consolidation by stations of destination. Freight not carried in containers may sometimes also be rehandled at transfer freight houses en route, with the consequent delays....

Originally rates upon freight shipped in containers were made upon a straight line rate per container per mile transported. These rates were found to disrupt the class rates upon goods shipped in regular services and were held to be unjustly discriminatory by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1931. The freight rates established by the railroads upon merchandise shipments transported in containers are based upon the third class rates applicable upon the net weight of the freight in the containers subject to a minimum charge equal to the third class rate upon 4000 pounds.

In no case, however, may the rates applicable to shipments in containers be less than: (1) the highest carload class rates applicable to any article in the container; (2) the class rate next lower than that specified for any article in the container as an any quantity rate; or (3) the rate applicable to the highest rated commodity in the container applied to the entire contents of the container, when articles referred to in the first two alternatives are loaded in the same container.

[MP173]

Just ordered Organization and Traffic of the Illinois Central System thru Abe Books.

 

Thanks for the info Greyhound.

 

Ed

[wanswheel]

Paul_D_North_Jr

Or was he sharp enough to have thought it up and worked it all out himself ?    

Paul, thanks again to you, sir. I wonder if Mrs. Smith's car was attached to a regular NY and Boston train that split at Albany. 

ALFRED HOLLAND SMITH (1863-), American railway official, was born in Cleveland, 0., April 26 1863. He began work on the New York Central railway system as a messenger-boy in 1879. After serving as a foreman of construction and in various capacities in the engineering department, he was in 1890 appointed superintendent of the Kalamazoo division of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern railway. He was successively division superintendent, assistant general superintendent and general superintendent of the Lake Shore road. In 1902 he became general superintendent of the New York Central railroad; in 1906 vice-president of the New York Central system; and in 1914 president. When the American railways were taken over by the U.S. Government Dec. 27 1917, he was appointed assistant director-general and it was he who worked out the form of central and regional administration under which the railways of the country were managed during the 26 months of Government operation. His aim, in which he succeeded, was to keep the management of the roads with their 2,000,000 employees, nearly all voters, in the hands of practical railway-men and, above all, out of politics. He divided the country into two regions and later into seven, each region being in charge of a railway officer of experience and reputation, he himself taking charge of the most important region, the Eastern. These regional directors had complete authority and only broad matters of policy and inter-regional questions were handled by the central (political) administration at Washington. In this way the railways were conducted throughout the war without great blunders or disorganization. On the completion of this important national service he was reelected president of the New York Central Lines in June 1919. It was largely due to him that the New York Central Lines were greatly strengthened in operating efficiency and financial credit.

Title: RAILWAY ADVISORY BOARD. STANDING: HALE HOLDEN; EDWARD CHAMBERS; WALKER D. HINES; JOHN BARTON PAYNE; OSCAR E. PRICE. SEATED: A.H. SMITH; JOHN SKELTON WILLIAMS; HENRY WALTERS; W.G. McADOO

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/pnp/hec/10200/10239v.jpg

More about the bridge.

http://www.railarchive.net/nyccollection/greene_calendar_3292.htm

http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F70E17FE3B5511738DDDA80B94DB405B898DF1D3

Mike

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Mike, you continue to amaze me . . . all great stuff . . . very interesting.  Until this, I doubt if much of it had ever seen the light of day in the last 50 years or so - certainly I've not seen it or a reference to it before.  Not only John Kneliling's book, many columns and several articles, but George Hilton's article in Trains on containerization*, David Deboer's book, Ernest Robl's reference website, "The Intermodal Container FAQ" at - http://www.robl.w1.com/Transport/intermod.htm - and his book, and some others I can't think of right now or don't yet know about - could have benefitted from access to this information. 

*Integration in the north

How White Pass & Yukon, Alaska, and CN-Newfoundland interchange

by Hilton, George W. 

from Trains July 1971  p. 36

ARR  CNR  container  ferry  WP&Y 

Apropos this thread - note the name stencilled on the tops of that wonderful photo of the container cars:  "THE L.C.L. COMPANY".  Heavy-duty riveted side cars built like battleships - with truss rods, too - they weren't taking any chances.

Re: Mr. Smith's patent - note that it wasn't granted until Dec. 8, 1925 = 5-1/2 years after the application was filed, and 1-1/2 years after his death.  Love that old drawing style, too (which I understand has largely been retained for patent applications). 

Do we think that Mr. Smith really came up with this idea - or one of his staff engineers or marketing people - and took the credit for it ?  I don't mean to impugn the man's integrity - I know very little about him - but was that the custom back then ?  I believe that for patents, for a long time they could not be granted to companies, only individuals, so that may have been the way around that restriction - today, the individual inventor is named, as is the "assignment" to the company or institution, etc.  Or was he sharp enough to have thought it up and worked it all out himself ?    

 ( Wonder if that woman on the horse in Central Park was talking on a cell phone at the time ?)

Pity the widowed Mrs. Smith, who then had to rush back from LA to NYC for the funeral.  That running time doesn't seem too astounding, though, considering that the last lap would have been on her late husband's railroad - anad how did the B&A become a part of it ?  (Then again, whuy the big hurry - what was she going to do that necessitated great speed ?  He was dead already, and she wasn't going to be able to bring him back to life.)  How did the LA - Chicago timing - presumably over the Santa Fe - compare with Death Valley Scotty's Special and Nellie Bly's "Around the World in 80 Days" trip, and when were those in comparison ? 

Nice photo of the bridge, too.  I have an elderly aunt and a cousin and family who live just about 10 and 5 miles east of it respectively, and I'll be going up to see them sometime this spring - and I usually drive right along the bridge on the Massachusetts Turnpike extension of the New York State Thruway, I-90 - it's bridge is in the background of that photo.

Thanks again, Mike.

- Paul North. 

[henry6]

What appears to be forgotten in this discussion is the sfifling effect the ICC had on transportation competition and operation.   Railroads were not allowed to own trucking or bus companies and vice versa.  A manufacturer could not just call the railroad and say he had a boxcar load of widgets or considered he would have a boxcar load everyday and wanted a price quote or even a handful which had to be shipped daily.  The railroad would have to have a tariff rate on file.  So if the widget wasn't on file in a tariff, the railroad would have to petition the ICC to set a rate; that petition was open for challenge  and opposition by any other carrier be it rail, motor carraige, or air or water.  This process took years in some cases. What started out as an agency to protect shippers from rate gouging by railroads became a bureau to prevent so called unfair competition by rate setting and not necessarily  working for favor of the shipper.  There were no long term contracts, no real competitive rate making or service provision: the tariff had to state the service and the price and was firm for both.  So to say that any given railroad was short sighted in marketing is in error, that they didn't market or turned thier backs on marketing is wrong. Simply put the ICC process was too encombering to be too innovative and often the guy with the already established cheaper rate stood in your way, so why bother, just keep on railroading (trucking?) the way you always have, there's plenty of time for innovation in the future,  Maybe.

[wanswheel]

Thank you Greyhounds.  Thank you Paul.

The award for Best Picture of a container car goes to...

http://www.canadasouthern.com/caso/images/nyc-5996.jpg

The earliest patent application date: June 9, 1920

http://www.google.com/patents?pg=PA1&zoom=4&id=Nb1TAAAAEBAJ#v=onepage&q&f=true

Alfred H. Smith, President of the New York Central Lines and one of the best known railroad men in the United States, was killed late yesterday afternoon when he was thrown from his horse in Central Park. Mr. Smith met his death in pulling up suddenly to avoid running into a woman, mounted on a horse, who had ridden across his path. (NY Times, March 9, 1924)

1924: Santa Fe steam train "Mrs. A. H. Smith's Special" ran from Los Angeles to New York City, March 9-11, (via New York Central and Boston & Albany) 3,197 miles in 69 hours 7 minutes, average speed 46.3 miles per hour. (Chicago Daily News Almanac)

Alfred H. Smith Memorial Bridge

http://www.railpictures.net/viewphoto.php?id=194030

Mike

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

wanswheel

  Speaking of the Erie, their New York freight house was just a couple blocks from the New York Central. Here are links to pictures about construction of the High Line. In each photo there is an incidental glimpse of my favorite container car crane,

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3074/3251450708_e01a87f781_b.jpg?rand=144355463

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3535/3250627159_c3c147a69d_b.jpg?rand=125673791

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3373/3251453372_13d03edb61_b.jpg?rand=692970177

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3258/3251453652_f937880f54_b.jpg?rand=92915794

  I can see why it's your favorite - those guys would recognize its progeny all over the US today !  What was it - 60 - 70 years until they came back in force ?

greyhounds

  Before this thread slips off into oblivion I'd like to publicly thank wanswheel for the photos and articles he added to the discussion.  They well illustrated and documented how intermodal service was developing in the 1920's.  [snip]   

+1

greyhounds

  A train and a truck are but tools to do the same job.  Which tool should be used depends on the situation.  Combining the tools for use on the same job of moving a lot of goods from point A to point B is often more efficient than using just one of the tools for the whole job.  

Well said.  Too bad that's too complicated - or different, or threatening, etc. - for some people and institutions to comprehend and implement.

- Paul North. 

[daveklepper]

I think if PRR and NYC had had more business acumin, they would have set up a freight forwarding comopany, selling stock to make it independent, which would have owned the containers and possibly the specialized flatcars, established a wilingness to work with all railroads, and overcome the ICC objections.   So it was not only the ICC's fault, but also cold feet of the railroads involved.

[narig01]

Just a few comments about  Less than carload/truckload shipments.

In the truck business there are a whole bunch of LTL carriers in addition there are whole bunch of consolidators. The later gets shipments headed more or less in the same general direction and consolidates.    Some of these will have deliveries to receivers and some to depots or warehouses for delivery by a third party.

       In my end of the business(I drive a refridgerated truck) there are 4 or 5 LTL truck load carriers who do both LTL & consolidation.     In addition there a mulittude of consolidators.    To steal a quote from Star Trek Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations. (or something like that)

        Also a little history,   Purolater Air was bought by Emery in the late 1980's , Emery in turn was bought by Consolidated Freightways(currently CF)  to be merged with there CFAir division.   Emery/CF Air is still in the Air Freight Forwarding business I believe.

       Also in the same time period Federal Express bought Flying Tigers (late 1980's) primarily to get better access to the Far East.   That purchase got Federal Express past Japan in the Far East. They got a lot more as well.     Federal Express was the 1st company in the overnite business nationwide.  And Fred Smith only got a B- for the college paper describing the concept.    

        If I remember correctly, Federal Express started out with the authority of REA's messenger/ courier authority. purchased out of bankrupcy court.     FedEx started out with Falcon 20's for aircraft the reason was that it had the right cargo capacity(4000lbs more or less) (in addition to financial support).      There was a little loophole in the CAB / ICC regulations about courier companies could operate both ground vehicles and aircraft with the proviso that the cargo capacity could  not exceed 4000 lbs (I think) . Fred Smith found the loophole and flew an airplane thru it.

Thx IGN

[erikem]

greyhounds

I still haven't seen a good explination for the effective banning of container service by the ICC.  I've seen some excuses, but never a good explination.  I believe they just kicked the can down the road.  They had this revolutionary change in transportation going on, they had no idea how to handle it, and at the time they had no authority over motor carriers.  So they just ordered the railroads to stop.

One downside of container service was that it favored shipments that could fill a container, whereas LCL shipments could be as small as a child's bicycle. That would mean that towns and cities with enough traffic to fill containers would be getting cheaper rates than smaller towns and thus could be considered as discriminating against small towns. This is similar to how the Southern Railway had to fight the ICC over rates for the "Big John" hopper car. Also remember that this was just a few years before the SCOTUS ruling on Wickard v Filburn with respect to the Interstate Commerce clause.

Please bear in mind that the previous paragraph is why I think the ICC ruled the way they did, but not emphatically not because I'm in agreement with the ICC ruling. I'm in complete agreement with you in that the US would have been much better off had container rates been allowed to reflect the lower cost of service.

- Erik

[Victrola1]

http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20110223/NEWS13/302230007/Old-time-photo-of-the-day-Rock-Island-freight-backup

Definitely more labor intensive.

 

[henry6]

Stop trying to rationalize our country's transportation system, greyhounds, it is unAmerican to do so.

[greyhounds]

Before this thread slips off into oblivion I'd like to publicly thank wanswheel for the photos and articles he added to the discussion.  They well illustrated and documented how intermodal service was developing in the 1920's.  That's about as soon as the motor truck became able to handle a decent amount of freight.

Look at that photo above the article "For Less-Than-Carload Freight"    A container being lifted between road and rail in the early 1920's.  Oh well, it's another case of what might have been.  Heck fire, they were even using a spreader bar and four corner posts on the container.

A train and a truck are but tools to do the same job.  Which tool should be used depends on the situation.  Combining the tools for use on the same job of moving a lot of goods from point A to point B is often more efficient than using just one of the tools for the whole job. 

The railroads (at least some of them) understood that in the 1920's.  Unfortunately the government czars didn't.

 

[FUSE-]

GLAD THAT SOMEONE REMEMBERS THE FORWARDER WHO WERE VERY LARGE

BEFORE  THE CROSS-COUNTRY TRUCKERS  AND DEREGULATION

HENRY ALSO EX ACME FAST FRIGHT   

FUSE-

[wanswheel]

Speaking of the Erie, their New York freight house was just a couple blocks from the New York Central. Here are links to pictures about construction of the High Line. In each photo there is an incidental glimpse of my favorite container car crane,

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3074/3251450708_e01a87f781_b.jpg?rand=144355463

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3535/3250627159_c3c147a69d_b.jpg?rand=125673791

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3373/3251453372_13d03edb61_b.jpg?rand=692970177

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3258/3251453652_f937880f54_b.jpg?rand=92915794

[greyhounds]

Paul_D_North_Jr

The paper referenced below asserts that the ICC's goal was to protect the weaker railroads from ruin - who protested the PRR's usage of containers  in that instance - and "save" the health of the entire railroad industry, regardless of the loss of efficiency by one carrier.  See just the summary/ abstract on the top half of the 1st page to see that for yourself.  - PDN.   

Paul_D_North_Jr:

  greyhounds, thanks for those histories above - both Merchant Shippers' and yours - and those insights.  I expect that you're aware of the paper I'll cite and link to below, but others may not be, and may be interested in seeing it - it's only 16 pages (approx. 95 KB in size), and not too tough of a read.  A big thanks    to Mike/ wanswheel for finding and posting at the current end of the thread here at the bottom of page 2 of 2 on "Question about Gondola Load" at: http://cs.trains.com/TRCCS/forums/t/156787.aspx?PageIndex=2 

"Saving the Railroad Industry to Death: The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Unfulfilled Promise of Rail-Truck Cooperation" by Albert Churella, Assoc. Prof. in Social and International Studies at Southern Polytechnic State University, as published by the Business History Conference in "Business and Economic History On-Line", Vol. 4, 2006, at: 

http://www.h-net.org/~business/bhcweb/publications/BEHonline/2006/churella.pdf 

and/ or,

http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2006/churella.pdf 

 - Paul North.   

Yes, I've seen that before and I strongly disagree with Churella. 

One of his main points is that the weaker railroads, such as the Erie, could not adopt a container system because they lacked the financial resources to do so.  The regulators at least percieved that they had a mandate to keep railroads such as Erie financially viable.  (Good luck with that.)  So those regulators had no choice but to ignore the sea change brought on in transportation by motor freight operated over improved roads.  The regulators  just had to destroy the Pennsylvania Railroad's container system in order to protect the Erie.  Well, the Erie never was financially successful and the Pennsy went under costing the taxpayers a bundle.   In short, the government economic regulators were attempting to do something that could not be done and brought on a disaster in the process.

First, the up front investment required to operate a container system was minimal.  You could lease the containers, as the Lehigh Valley did, and avoid any capital outlay.  The cranes needed only a 5 ton capacity are were largely already in place at freight terminals to handle things such as lumber and steel shipments.  The  containers could be moved in existing gondolas.  There was no need for the railroad to buy trucks.  They could simply contract the trucking service on a per load basis.

For this, the railroad achieved a 75%-85% reduction in costs!

Just what was preventing the Erie from offering container service?   Churella doesn't say.  But he hangs his hat on it.

I still haven't seen a good explination for the effective banning of container service by the ICC.  I've seen some excuses, but never a good explination.  I believe they just kicked the can down the road.  They had this revolutionary change in transportation going on, they had no idea how to handle it, and at the time they had no authority over motor carriers.  So they just ordered the railroads to stop.

The railroads had to watch the truckers take the high revenue shipments.  The government regulators wouldn't let them do much else.

 

[henry6]

CSSHEGEWISCH

Business regulation often has a political component.  It's possible that there still was a strong public antipathy to railroads as businesses that influenced that 1931 decision regarding containers.

Even in the 50's and 60's there were those who believed the evil rail barrons of the late 19th and early 20th Century were still at the helm raping industry and farmers of their hard earned profits.  And they were being fed the propaganda of the highway/oil lobby that King Rail was evil, that the only real way for an American to be free was to have a go at the open road be it to haul his family wherever they wanted to go or raw materials and  manufactured goods where it needed to be.

[wanswheel]

 

BURGLAR-PROOF CARS PUT IN MAIL SERVICE

The New York Times, Jan. 21, 1922

http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F00716FD3A541B7A93C3AB178AD85F468285F9

[BaltACD]

Business regulation ALWAYS has a political component.  If it didn't it would not be regulated.

CSSHEGEWISCH

Business regulation often has a political component.  It's possible that there still was a strong public antipathy to railroads as businesses that influenced that 1931 decision regarding containers.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

The paper referenced below asserts that the ICC's goal was to protect the weaker railroads from ruin - who protested the PRR's usage of containers  in that instance - and "save" the health of the entire railroad industry, regardless of the loss of efficiency by one carrier.  See just the summary/ abstract on the top half of the 1st page to see that for yourself.  - PDN.   

Paul_D_North_Jr

  greyhounds, thanks for those histories above - both Merchant Shippers' and yours - and those insights.  I expect that you're aware of the paper I'll cite and link to below, but others may not be, and may be interested in seeing it - it's only 16 pages (approx. 95 KB in size), and not too tough of a read.  A big thanks    to Mike/ wanswheel for finding and posting at the current end of the thread here at the bottom of page 2 of 2 on "Question about Gondola Load" at: http://cs.trains.com/TRCCS/forums/t/156787.aspx?PageIndex=2 

"Saving the Railroad Industry to Death: The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Unfulfilled Promise of Rail-Truck Cooperation" by Albert Churella, Assoc. Prof. in Social and International Studies at Southern Polytechnic State University, as published by the Business History Conference in "Business and Economic History On-Line", Vol. 4, 2006, at: 

http://www.h-net.org/~business/bhcweb/publications/BEHonline/2006/churella.pdf 

and/ or,

http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2006/churella.pdf 

 - Paul North.   

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

Business regulation often has a political component.  It's possible that there still was a strong public antipathy to railroads as businesses that influenced that 1931 decision regarding containers.