Murphy Siding In a nutshell, the author, who worked for GN/BN/BNSF from 1963 to 1999, says that GN made a mistake in 1929 with its new tunnel and alignment.
In a nutshell, the author, who worked for GN/BN/BNSF from 1963 to 1999, says that GN made a mistake in 1929 with its new tunnel and alignment.
Well, just because he was an employee of the railroad in question, doesn't mean his assertion earns any additional validity. The rebuttal by someone whose opinion really does matter, Robert W. Downing, retired Vice-Chairman and Chief Operating officer of Burlington Northern (and now deceased, unfortunately) appeared in the May 2010 issue of TRAINS, page 5. The first sentence is: "Contrary T. Michael Power's article 'Cascade Tunnel: An Engineering Mistake', the Cascade Tunnel was no mistake" and then convincingly explains why.
Mark Meyer
Murphy Siding BaltACD With the OP declaring the Cascade Tunnel was a mistake - what would have been the 'right' way to surmount the problems Cascade was intended to fix if it wasn't the Cascade Tunnel and the trackage leading to and from it. Well, I'm the OP and that wasn't me that was saying that.We'd have go back 11 years and read the article to find out all the details. Here's from my first post that started this thread: That's the title of an article in the current (Jan. 2010) Trains Magazine. In a nutshell, the author, who worked for GN/BN/BNSF from 1963 to 1999, says that GN made a mistake in 1929 with its new tunnel and alignment. He feels, that GN could have kept the old tunnel, and moved the west approach to the south side of the valley, and (?) stretched out the rise on the west side.
BaltACD With the OP declaring the Cascade Tunnel was a mistake - what would have been the 'right' way to surmount the problems Cascade was intended to fix if it wasn't the Cascade Tunnel and the trackage leading to and from it.
With the OP declaring the Cascade Tunnel was a mistake - what would have been the 'right' way to surmount the problems Cascade was intended to fix if it wasn't the Cascade Tunnel and the trackage leading to and from it.
Well, I'm the OP and that wasn't me that was saying that.We'd have go back 11 years and read the article to find out all the details. Here's from my first post that started this thread: That's the title of an article in the current (Jan. 2010) Trains Magazine. In a nutshell, the author, who worked for GN/BN/BNSF from 1963 to 1999, says that GN made a mistake in 1929 with its new tunnel and alignment. He feels, that GN could have kept the old tunnel, and moved the west approach to the south side of the valley, and (?) stretched out the rise on the west side.
Did the author do a detailed snow study? The original route on the north side of the valley would have been along south (sun) facing slopes, which have particular avalanch producing qualities. However, a line along the south side of the valley, along north facing slopes would have more long lasting snow and the original line was well up into the heavy snow level. In Colorado, the original Tennessee Pass line on the north end of the tunnel, ran along a north facing slope and had persistent snow and ice. They eventually relocated the line to a sunnier side of the valley.
BaltACD Murphy Siding BaltACD With the OP declaring the Cascade Tunnel was a mistake - what would have been the 'right' way to surmount the problems Cascade was intended to fix if it wasn't the Cascade Tunnel and the trackage leading to and from it. Well, I'm the OP and that wasn't me that was saying that.We'd have go back 11 years and read the article to find out all the details. Here's from my first post that started this thread: That's the title of an article in the current (Jan. 2010) Trains Magazine. In a nutshell, the author, who worked for GN/BN/BNSF from 1963 to 1999, says that GN made a mistake in 1929 with its new tunnel and alignment. He feels, that GN could have kept the old tunnel, and moved the west approach to the south side of the valley, and (?) stretched out the rise on the west side. It is easy to second guess decisons that were made a century ago based on data of the day in light of the data developed over the intervening century. People can only make decisions on the data presented to them - not guessing what the unknown of the next century will present.
It is easy to second guess decisons that were made a century ago based on data of the day in light of the data developed over the intervening century. People can only make decisions on the data presented to them - not guessing what the unknown of the next century will present.
Earlier in the thread there was mention of the new tunnel bypassing slide zones. Which would makes sense to include that in the survey of a new alignment. Given what happened at Wellington 19 years prior to the new Cascade Tunnel. I'm surprised this former GN employee didn't take that into account.. Along with lowering the summit for better operation compared to the even steeper and more dangerous profile of the original route..
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
MidlandMike Is the ex-NP route over Homestake(?) Pass still "intact"? Could it have been reactivated at that time?
Is the ex-NP route over Homestake(?) Pass still "intact"? Could it have been reactivated at that time?
No, couldn't've been used in 2009. Had already been out of service (from Spire Rock to Butte) for 26 years by then.
It is still intact, however. Of the 122 miles from Logan to Garrison: 50 miles (Logan to Spire Rock) operated by MRL; 20 miles Spire Rock to Butte, still owned by BNSF - rails in place badly deteriorated; 52 miles Butte to Garrison, operated by BNSF (Copper City subdivision).
The route over Homestake Pass was steep (2.2% grades each way), had very short sidings and was the curvature champion of the world. Not easily revivable or worth reviving.
From what I've read, Homestake Pass would have taken a lot of work to be put back in service in 2009.
VerMontanan In the summer of 2009 during the Mullan Tunnel collapse (and most MRL traffic was routed through Flathead Tunnel)...
Bruce Kelly MidlandMike, I've seen past figures from BNSF that say the practical capacity of Flathead Tunnel is something like 44 trains per day. It would not surprise me if there have been occasions when the tunnel has handled more than that.
MidlandMike, I've seen past figures from BNSF that say the practical capacity of Flathead Tunnel is something like 44 trains per day. It would not surprise me if there have been occasions when the tunnel has handled more than that.
Indeed, I am aware of several times when 54 trains have been operated through the tunnel in 24 hours in the mid-2010s. In the summer of 2009 during the Mullan Tunnel collapse (and most MRL traffic was routed through Flathead Tunnel), 45 to 50 trains daily was commonplace. One day in August 2009, BNSF dispatched 17 unit trains (coal and grain) west from Shelby in a 24-hour period from 0001 to 2359. During that same period, the westbound Empire Builder that operated arrived in Seattle on time the following day. While this is a better testimony to the superior operating characteristics of Marias Pass, it does show that, in the whole scope of things, Flathead Tunnel is just not that big of a headache. Grade is a more limiting factor, as was discussed earlier in this thread with regard to Cascade Tunnel. But the approach to Flathead is only 1% with a track speed through the tunnel of 50 MPH, in stark contrast to grades and track speeds on the UP over the Blue Mountains or westbound on MRL on Mullan Pass. Fifty trains a day - especially with many being heavy unit trains - doesn't work without a second main track, tunnel or not.
BaltACDLets remember one thing about such engineering projects as the Cascade Tunnel - they were laid out by men on the ground without the benefit (or curse) of any of the modern engineering tools (GPS, Google Earth and a host of other tools I can't comprehend).
MC is probably the best authority on this here. There was no lack of skill, and probably experience, laying out either the original or the revised Cascade Tunnel. As I recall there was at least one lower-grade alternative (which one of the surveyors favored) but management rejected it. And it's the men who manage money that manage the men who manage men who manage the men who manage things.
Lets remember one thing about such engineering projects as the Cascade Tunnel - they were laid out by men on the ground without the benefit (or curse) of any of the modern engineering tools (GPS, Google Earth and a host of other tools I can't comprehend).
The original lines for the route having be determined by men on horseback with their transits etc.
timzProbably there was no need for a steeper Flathead tunnel.
Reading the contemporary accounts of Cascade's construction, I got the clear impression it was the 'lowest grade' solution that made overall sense. There was an extensive line improvement (Chumstick?) conducted with the 'fill material' from the tunnel construction that was at least as important a route improvement.
No doubt Cascade's builders assumed it would always be electrified.
The sobering thing to me is that it's been nearly a half-century since the dual-mode-lite work was first undertaken, and no railroad has even considered it for this kind of situation. That puts teeth in what the 'practical men' have been saying in this thread, and it means that very great care in prospective design needs to be done to make the idea practical in future.
Probably there was no need for a steeper Flathead tunnel.
I have to wonder if Flathead tunnel was built with the much easier grade based on what the RR had discovered was limiting Cascade? Not being familar with the topography around Cascade would it have been possible to build it with an easier grade? It might have been built with the original thought that it would always be electrified ?
"IF" That was the original design thought then that might be the engineering mistake !
Bruce KellySo, even if the best laid plans of dispatchers and crew callers could manage to somehow send a fleet of eastbounds out of Hauser on generous 30-minute headways, they could easily stack up behind each other at East Algoma (the current east end of two main tracks on the Funnel) if there's a fleet of WBs approaching Sandoint off both the Hi Line and MRL, or just a single Z-CHCSSE-9 on its way.
With CBTC those 'three eastbounds' depart and are operated with the safe stopping distance, varied with speed, between them. There is no need, and no purpose, for 'generous thirty-minute headways'. Then they reach East Algoma to find ... what? A surprise? Westbounds out of nowhere, or a Z train someone forgot to mention? And the difference between CBTC separation at 30mph vs. that for 45-55? Calculable, and not showstoppingly different. Translate it into the difference, in seconds, that that space takes to pass...
What becomes of greater potential interest is, if the formal restriction against close, if not faster, operation through the tunnel is relaxed, and we were to 'prioritize' achieving closer spacing through the tunnel, how that changes scheduling and priority at other points on the railroad in conducting PSR. Even if the effort is made to produce 'blocks' of fleeted traffic across the section of line containing the tunnel at discrete times of day, the greater throughput might be significant.
I thought through the details of an addition to track machinery that would spot, prepare, form, and test proper nested bonds on the field side of siding rail in a semiautomated manner, probably requiring no more than a few hours to rectify the bond issue end-to-end. The integrity can then be confirmed at regular intervals, including the electrical and visual observation of the bonds to determine if any one is deteriorating unduly. (Of course, the issue of the grade crossings is a more serious one, with no particularly easy technical, or even political, answers.)
In theory, spacing train departures out of Yardley or Hauser to the west or even Whitefish (which is much closer to the tunnel) to the east in order to minimize delay at the tunnel sounds nice, and on some occasions there may have even be an effort toward doing that. But in actual practice, it would often become futile.
In the case of that eastbound fleet I described, consider how their journeys likely started at either Yardley or Hauser. More like Hauser, since the vast majority of eastbounds are recrewed there, rather than at Yardley. But both yards face the pressure of having to keep trains moving through on the their adjacent main lines. At Hauser, that includes trains that refuel and recrew on Mains 3-6. Hauser can get by with letting a train or two occupy a fuel track for hours, well beyond the nominal 10-20 minutes it takes to fuel the head end (and additional time to respot and fuel DPUs), as long as other fuel tracks remain fluid. But when traffic is heavy, there's rarely the luxury to let trains sit. It's quite common to have two, three, even four eastbounds all call up the dispatcher at about the same time, saying that they're ready to depart.
So, even if the best laid plans of dispatchers and crew callers could manage to somehow send a fleet of eastbounds out of Hauser on generous 30-minute headways, they could easily stack up behind each other at East Algoma (the current east end of two main tracks on the Funnel) if there's a fleet of WBs approaching Sandoint off both the Hi Line and MRL, or just a single Z-CHCSSE-9 on its way. Such delay will be somewhat remedied once the second bridge over Lake Pend Oreille is placed in service, but the territory beyond Sandpoint and up around the horn via Bonners Ferry is mostly single track, with several sidings that are still unbonded and/or have road crossings through them. That translates into excrutiatingly slow meets.
East of Bonners Ferry, there's the Kootenai River Canyon with its roughly 18 miles of 30mph max for freights. Barrying any meets against them, an eastbound fleet that somehow manages to reach the canyon on generous headways will eventually compress into tighter headways because the first train entering the canyon at 30 has the next train still closing in behind it at 45-55 until it too reaches the canyon, and so on.
That all being said, the dispatcher can somewhat balance the approach of WBs and EBs to the tunnel by how he or she executes meets on either side. But under the reality of circumstances, if there's a flow of traffic headed predominantly one way, a stack-up-and-wait cycle is pretty much unavoidable.
To say nothing of the many unexpected factors that can slow or stop the lead train in a fleet such as losing air, locomotive failure, signal malfunction, striking an animal (or automobile), etc.
Bruce KellyBy the time this whole process has played out, even if there have been no westbounds routed through, a third or fourth train in an eastbound fleet can see upwards of an hour or more of total delay when you add up the running times and flush times of the trains ahead of it, including the time it takes for standing trains to get moving again and moving trains to ease to another stop.
Smart begins when the calling time for the crews of the trains are considered and have to be based on the tunnel transit conditions.
Don't call the trains on 10 minute headway when you know you are going to have 40 minute cycle time on the tunnel operation.
MidlandMike, I've seen past figures from BNSF that say the practical capacity of Flathead Tunnel is something like 44 trains per day. It would not surprise me if there have been occasions when the tunnel has handled more than that. Mark Meyer can speak with more authority, experience, and current insight into this.
A more detailed explanation of the geography of the Flathead Tunnel area and its impact on train operations was provided in my earlier story on the subject, in another magazine, a little over a year ago.
My son and I have observed during our visits there in peak season / fall rush months how Flathead Tunnel's flush times can take a toll on the flow of traffic, hence BNSF's recent efforts to shorten those times.
Whenever there was a fleet of three or more eastbounds making good speed toward the tunnel, the first one would roll right through (if the previous flush was finished), while the second train would come to a stop at the east switch at Rock Creek (the siding just west of the tunnel), the third train would stop at the west switch at Rock Creek, and any other following eastbounds would be stopping somewhere behind all of that. After the first train exited the east portal, the flush would begin (10 to 20 minutes), and once the flush was finished the second eastbound would enter the tunnel while the third eastbound pulled up to wait, and so on for any others following behind.
By the time this whole process has played out, even if there have been no westbounds routed through, a third or fourth train in an eastbound fleet can see upwards of an hour or more of total delay when you add up the running times and flush times of the trains ahead of it, including the time it takes for standing trains to get moving again and moving trains to ease to another stop.
My comment about safe downgrade speeds has to do with brake fade. Assuming a train resistance of 0.2% of weight, a grade of 0.4% (Flathead tunnel) would need 0.2% of train weight worth of braking effort as opposed to ~1.4% of train weight worth of braking effort in the Cascade tunnel.
Erik_MagStill close to a factor of 4 steeper than the Flathead tunnel, which makes big difference in safe downgrade speeds as well as achieveable upgrade speeds.
The issue of short-following fleeting remains an issue for practical throughput, again hinging somewhat on the ability of CBTC to flexibly extend "block" length without compromising the ability to run alternating-direction traffic as a couple of posters have advocated.
The use of fixed (a larger version of "wayside") storage for trains that alternate through the tunnel becomes an interesting subject for Erik to contemplate. Even a magnetic-bearing flywheel arrangement might have enough persistence to accommodate 'pairs' of downhill/uphill traffic to substantially reduce peak required external power supply for the uphill running, or permit more cost-effective 'full electric' operation for the power actually transiting the bore.
SD60MAC9500 Cascade Tunnels grade is 1.57%.
Cascade Tunnels grade is 1.57%.
Thanks.
Still close to a factor of 4 steeper than the Flathead tunnel, which makes big difference in safe downgrade speeds as well as achieveable upgrade speeds.
Erik_Mag One difference between Flathead and Cascade is that Flathead has a 0.4% grade versus the 1.8% (?) grade in the Cascade tunnel. I'm assuming that Flathead has the higher speed limit due to the much lower gradient.
One difference between Flathead and Cascade is that Flathead has a 0.4% grade versus the 1.8% (?) grade in the Cascade tunnel. I'm assuming that Flathead has the higher speed limit due to the much lower gradient.
Bruce KellyHe (and others) said that the running time between the sidings determines capacity. Those being the sidings at opposite ends of the tunnel, Scenic and Berne,... Maximum authorized speed between Scenic and Berne is 30mph passenger and 25mph freight.
In your Februrary Trains article on the Flathead Tunnel, you mention that its tunnel speed limit is 50 mph. Also it takes 15-20 minutes to flush fumes. Can I presume this is why Flathead Tunnel (which is 9/10 the length of Cascade) still handles 40 trains a day? Could it handle more?
Yes, there is coal still going to Roberts Bank.
VerMontanan Having said that, three years ago BNSF completed raising clearance in tunnels south of Bellingham to accommodate doublestack equipment from the port of Vancouver should BNSF wish to attempt to wrest some business from CN or CP. Hasn’t happened yet that I know of, but since such traffic would go east at Everett, it shows acknowledgement that current capacity over Stevens Pass is sufficient.
Mark I'm glad you mentioned this. I always had it in my mind that maybe one day BNSF would make a go at the Port of Vancouver's container traffic. It always appeared to be a logical market for BNSF to crack. Is there any coal still going to Roberts Bank, B.C.?
PNWRMNM Mark's details about power experiments confirm the overall point I was trying to make, which is that since 1970 BN and BNSF have provided enough capacity to handle the traffic without expensive engineering solutions or exotic geegas.
Mark's details about power experiments confirm the overall point I was trying to make, which is that since 1970 BN and BNSF have provided enough capacity to handle the traffic without expensive engineering solutions or exotic geegas.
There have been “expensive engineering solutions” in the Pacific Northwest to enhance traffic flow, though admittedly “expensive” is subjective. BNSF has laid out a lot of money for improvements in Washington State along the route of unit trains. Sidings and or 2 MT CTC have been lengthened and created between Spokane and Vancouver, and the extra capacity added to accommodate Amtrak Cascades and Sounder trains have enhanced fluidity between Vancouver and Everett. And let’s not forget the $200 million or so for opening the Stampede Pass route which ultimately made the current operating scenario work. While some improvements were made along the Stevens Pass route including in Cascade Tunnel, the obvious intent was to focus elsewhere. In the end, “expensive engineering solutions” did occur. Having said that, three years ago BNSF completed raising clearance in tunnels south of Bellingham to accommodate doublestack equipment from the port of Vancouver should BNSF wish to attempt to wrest some business from CN or CP. Hasn’t happened yet that I know of, but since such traffic would go east at Everett, it shows acknowledgement that current capacity over Stevens Pass is sufficient. It also shows that there is some capacity available for new traffic, and that still hasn’t lured any loaded unit trains to the route.
The enhancements to infrastructure in Washington State individually don’t rise to the glitziness of a second Sandpoint bridge or doubletracking the railroad from Minot to Williston for sure, but over the course of the past two decades, similar billions of dollars have been spent. And despite these “expensive engineering solutions,” there are myriad valid reasons loaded unit trains still don’t operate via Wenatchee.
Shadow the Cats ownerThis might give you an idea of what the extra expenses are for the railroad based on what it costs an OTR carrier to run in the mountains. We have a dedicated team that runs out to SLC and back on an almost daily basis. Now going west they average about 1 MPG LESS than coming back East. Why the climbing of the mountains in WY and UT plus the gradual climbing going across NE. Their loads weigh the same each way trailers are maintained on a by monthly basis where they are shopped at our shop. Truck for now is a 2019 KW we have a new 2020 top of the line Volvo on order for them. Sorry I deal with figures all day long on MPG and you can be amazed on what can effect it. I discovered that we got worse MPG from a certain fuel stop chain than another and so we stopped getting fuel from them a .5 MPG average adds up very quickly on 250 trucks and can costs us thousands a week in extra expenses.
Of course there was one truck stop chain that was convicted of cheating their customers on the amount of fuel pumped vs the amount of fuel billed.
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