zardoz Phoebe Vet .......There is always some debris at the point of impact...... Which is why sometimes when a standing or walking pedestrian is hit by a train their footwear remains at the point of impact where the person was struck. They literally get knocked out of their shoes.
Phoebe Vet .......There is always some debris at the point of impact......
.......There is always some debris at the point of impact......
And what has always spooked me, the shoes are usually side by side (laced-up) like somebody just left them there for a moment.....
mudchickenAnd what has always spooked me, the shoes are usually side by side (laced-up) like somebody just left them there for a moment.....
Informed I appreciate the discussion over the past several days regarding this subject. I think you raised some good questions, but likely came to the wrong conclusion. This doesn't surprise me as you were not privy to all of the evidence and details that were presented in this case. Worse yet, I'm certain that I didn't present the data and subsequent findings in the detailed manner that it should have been in order for you to find fact in this accident. Worse yet, you have effectively heard much of the detail in this case from myself, and I'm not qualified in this highly technical subject matter, to effectively communicate all of the facts. However, the jury did get the benefit of reviewing all of the detail and physical eveidence that remained (minus that data and evidence that was either lost, altered, or destroyed by BNSF), and they've come to a different conclusion. Having seen the arguments on both sides, it is still my firm belief that the jury made the right call.
I appreciate the discussion over the past several days regarding this subject. I think you raised some good questions, but likely came to the wrong conclusion. This doesn't surprise me as you were not privy to all of the evidence and details that were presented in this case. Worse yet, I'm certain that I didn't present the data and subsequent findings in the detailed manner that it should have been in order for you to find fact in this accident. Worse yet, you have effectively heard much of the detail in this case from myself, and I'm not qualified in this highly technical subject matter, to effectively communicate all of the facts.
However, the jury did get the benefit of reviewing all of the detail and physical eveidence that remained (minus that data and evidence that was either lost, altered, or destroyed by BNSF), and they've come to a different conclusion. Having seen the arguments on both sides, it is still my firm belief that the jury made the right call.
Well as I said above, I cannot reach a conclusion as to whether the signals failed, so I have no idea whether the jury made the right decision. And while you have provided some specific details about the crash reconstruction and conclusion that the signals had failed, there are also other sources providing details on that matter, and those details fit what you have described. However, in this entire body of information, I see no convincing evidence that the vehicle was correctly positioned in its proper lane when it was struck. So I see no basis to conclude that vehicle did not run around the lowered gate. That is my only conclusion.
Apparently the State Patrol agreed with me in their 2003 investigation when they found that the vehicle drove around the lowered gate, but reversed themselves for some reason and arrived at their conclusion today that the gates had failed to lower.
I don’t doubt that there is a bewildering amount detail that transpired in the trial and is not readily available to the public. If it was, it might take years just to read it and understand it. Some of that inaccessible detail and evidence may indeed prove that the vehicle did not run around the lowered gate. But since that is the pivotal point in proving signal failure, I would think the evidence for it would be highlighted and presented to the public as a key component of the news story detailing the result of the trial. But I don’t see it.
I suspect that the actual process of the trial’s conclusion is so complex that it can never be communicated to somebody after the fact. It may be so complex that it cannot be explained or even comprehended by those who participated in the trial. With what has been mentioned by others regarding the spinning and splitting of hairs in this type of trial, I am not sure that the outcome can be logically and factually analyzed. Maybe it just is what it is.
So the news reporting is hopelessly lost is a quagmire of conflicting information with missing pieces. The news reported that the initial police investigation concluded that there was no way to know the speed of the vehicle when it was hit. Today, they say the vehicle had a black box that proved it was traveling 28 mph when it was hit.
The crossing is elevated substantially with the road rising on each side as it crosses the tracks. I would not be surprised if a car crossing it at 28 mph became airborne. I would be very surprised if a car could run around the lowered gates at 28 mph because the gates are only about eight feet from the nearest rail of each track. It may be that the vehicle was traveling at 28 mph and ran around the first lowered gate. And then, at that speed, it was destined fail to return to its proper lane in time to avoid hitting the second lowered gate; but got hit by the train before it got to the second gate.
Something else occured to me as I have reviewed this thread. Aside from the obvious physical evidence left on-sceen, if the vehicle which was struck was a 2000 plus vehicle, the technology to remove the "black box" can indicate if the vehicle was in fact in motion. If that is the case, that would definitely throw a wrinkle in the testimony. Frankly I am half tempted to do a open records request and allow the community to view actual testimony. Would anyone be interested in this?
Fact of the matter is, we do not know the following:
What was the driver doing inside the vehicle when the crash occured? Were they texting, on the cell phone, fiddling with the radio, eating, or involved in some other distracting action while operating their vehicle. And most importantly, how much of a role, if any did this play if that is the case.
What was in the mind of the engineer? What were they doing? Was all safety features utilized and complied with? Were policy and proceedure followed?
What I hope is that all relevant facts were brought forth during this trial. Somehow I do not think we are getting the "rest of the story." to quote the legend Paul Harvey.
Hey, if the BNSF was negligent, they should do the right thing by the family of the deceased. But somehow, with all the safety features in place, I doubt BNSF was negligent on this occasion. We live in a fast food culture and are constantly steaming down the line at full speed. In my training and experience, this unfortunately sometimes ends with catastrophic results.
J&S RRSomething else occured to me as I have reviewed this thread. Aside from the obvious physical evidence left on-sceen, if the vehicle which was struck was a 2000 plus vehicle, the technology to remove the "black box" can indicate if the vehicle was in fact in motion. If that is the case, that would definitely throw a wrinkle in the testimony. Frankly I am half tempted to do a open records request and allow the community to view actual testimony. Would anyone be interested in this?
The article linked to the first post says the vehicle had a black box that proved that it was traveling at 28 mph when hit by the train. As I mentioned above, that speed raises questions in my mind. It seems like it would be impossible to dodge the lowered gates at that speed. However, the speed-sensitive part of dodging the gates is clearing the second gate. Dodging the first gate is easy because you can start a couple hundred feet back from the crossing if necessary. But you would only have about 30 feet to swerve back and clear the second gate. If a driver miscalculated, he or she might successfully dodge the first gate, and yet fail to swerve back quick enough to avoid striking the second gate.
So I do not believe that a vehicle speed too high to dodge the second gate proves that the driver did not dodge the first gate and intended to dodge the second gate. He might have successfully dodged the first gate, but miscalculated by driving too fast, and was therefore destined to hit the second gate. If so, he did not hit the second gate because the train hit him before he reached the second gate.
If this scenario is what happened, the car would have left no skid marks as evidence of swerving too hard to dodge the gates. Yet, as I understand it, the State Patrol concluded that the 28 mph was too fast to dodge the gates without leaving skid marks, and therefore, since no such skid marks were produced, the driver was not trying to dodge the gates. I think that is a false conclusion considering my above scenario.
Regarding the court records, if you know how to get access to them, I would indeed be interested in seeing them posted here if possible. We have had a lot of discussions on this forum about these type of pedestrian and vehicle conflicts with trains, and how the railroad is often blamed, even though they would appear to have no responsibility for the mishap.
Hello,
I have read this thread thoroughly and then done some research as to what has happened here in comparable cases. Also, I wondered what the road codes say and my findings so far were quite interesting. They may not apply to the U.S. but are general enough so I share them with you:
In most european countries rr crossings with roads are usually protected by (in ascending order):
a) Andreas' Crosses only
b) Andreas' Crosses plus red flashing lights
c) Andreas Crosses plus lights plus arms - arms are mostly covering the entire width of roads als long as they are not wider than 2 spurs. If that is the case you normally have quad arms, anyway in most cases the full widht of the roads are covered.
The way warnings are applied are: red lights start to flash anytime between 20 seconds (light rail only) and more than a full minute before a train comes (depending on type of rail line). When there is the additional protection of arms these get lowered after about 6 to 10 seconds flashing time. A policeman explained it like that: if flashing starts it will be compared with amber traffic light where you are usually given 5 seconds into the phase before stopping is absolutely mandatory. Then the arms come down which again takes about 4 to 8 seconds. This is assumed plenty of time to clear the tracks.
Where there are no flashlights drivers are expected to heed the rr crossing by slowing down in a manner that they could stop in the event of a train approaching. Quite often there is a speed limit of as low as 20 or 25 mph posted 300 ft before the crossing. Also overtaking is prohibited within this distance to the rail tracks. The train in turn has to horn or whistle at least 3 times. The distance of the whistlepost to such a crossing usually is between 600 to 950 ft at secondary lines, less on light rail lines, the maximum speed on such lines usually is 50 mph and trains tend to be short (one or 2 RDC or loco plus 2 or 3 cars or 2 EMUs), so they can also stop rather quickly.
Where there are flashlights mounted there is an indication of their functioning towards the engineer of the approching train, by means of a sharp white light flashing. If it doesn't flash the engineer has to reduce the speed of the train immediately and also has to give long horn blasts, even at night in an urban area - safety first is the motto there.
At level crossings where there are no arms, additional STOP signs are mounted directly on the same post that carries the Andreas' Cross. This means an unconditional stop for all road traffic regardless of uncoming rail traffic. Failure to stop there will be fined when witnessed by a police officer (rather rarely) but if somebody runs a rail crossing and gets hit the fault is always with the road user.
Well, I am aware that the BNSF case is a little different because the railroads safety measures such as flashlights and arm may have failed. I tried to get hold of a similar case here but failed, it almost seems that there are no malfunctions, or at least there were none with major accidents documented. I am absolutely certain that if it happened here for as long as the engineer didn't speed or speeding wasn't the major cause of the accident a court here had not ruled in favor of the car driver.
Kiwigerd Hello, I have read this thread thoroughly and then done some research as to what has happened here in comparable cases. Also, I wondered what the road codes say and my findings so far were quite interesting. They may not apply to the U.S. but are general enough so I share them with you: In most european countries rr crossings with roads are usually protected by (in ascending order): a) Andreas' Crosses only b) Andreas' Crosses plus red flashing lights c) Andreas Crosses plus lights plus arms - arms are mostly covering the entire width of roads als long as they are not wider than 2 spurs. If that is the case you normally have quad arms, anyway in most cases the full widht of the roads are covered. Where there are no flashlights drivers are expected to heed the rr crossing by slowing down in a manner that they could stop in the event of a train approaching. Quite often there is a speed limit of as low as 20 or 25 mph posted 300 ft before the crossing. Also overtaking is prohibited within this distance to the rail tracks. The train in turn has to horn or whistle at least 3 times. The distance of the whistlepost to such a crossing usually is between 600 to 950 ft at secondary lines, less on light rail lines, the maximum speed on such lines usually is 50 mph and trains tend to be short (one or 2 RDC or loco plus 2 or 3 cars or 2 EMUs), so they can also stop rather quickly. At level crossings where there are no arms, additional STOP signs are mounted directly on the same post that carries the Andreas' Cross. This means an unconditional stop for all road traffic regardless of uncoming rail traffic. Failure to stop there will be fined when witnessed by a police officer (rather rarely) but if somebody runs a rail crossing and gets hit the fault is always with the road user.
Much of your traffic laws, protective devices, and signage pertaining to grade crossings sound quite similar to what we have in the U.S. You mention the need to slow down and be prepared to yield to a train at crossings marked only with an Andreas Cross, which I assume to be the equivalent of our “crossbuck.” Our crossbuck is equivalent in meaning to our YIELD sign, which is used in other traffic conflict situations. At our crossings marked only with crossbucks, motorists must look for approaching trains and be prepared to yield.
We also use the crossbuck at crossings with signals, and also at crossings with signals and gates. As some have pointed out in this thread, the crossbuck at signalized crossings still requires motorists to slow down, look for trains, and be prepared to yield to an approaching train. I confirmed this with the FRA and Operation Lifesaver. I guess the point of adding the redundancy of a full time yield requirement to a signalized crossing is to provide a backup in case the signals fail to activate. However, it does raise some interesting points and questions.
First point:
In order to yield, if a driver is to slow down enough to be able to stop short of an approaching train, the driver must know how fast the train is expected to be moving and reconcile that speed against the amount of visibility down the track the driver has while approaching the crossing. For example, if a driver somehow knows that a train on a given track will never exceed 20 mph, and the driver approaches a grade crossing on that track with a mile of visibility in either direction when the driver is a quarter-mile away from the crossing, then that driver can yield even while traveling at 65 mph.
But many crossings have quite limited track visibility for an approaching driver, and a driver has absolutely know way of knowing how fast a train might be approaching a grade crossing. So, a driver must anticipate the fastest possible train at every grade crossing, and be prepared to yield to it, even at crossings with automatic signals and gates.
That is why I asked the question earlier in this thread about the maximum speed of passenger trains in the U.S. that cross grade crossings. I understand the answer is 109 mph. At least that knowledge of practical top speed for trains would give drivers an idea of what to plan for. Many signalized crossings, in particular, have limited track visibility for an approaching driver. With these, in order for a driver to yield to an anticipated 109 mph train, the driver would have to slow down, pull up to the crossing, and stop to look as far down the track as possible. Yet, on a busy four-lane with closely spaced cars traveling at 40-50 mph, I wonder what the State Patrol would think about a driver who slows down and stops at an un-activated, signalized crossing with gates.
Second point:
With non-signalized crossings that happen to have limited visibility and/or see fast trains, planners compensate for the extra danger by adding stop signs to the crossbucks and/or adding LOOK FOR TRAINS signs in advance of the crossing to reinforce the need for the driver to yield to trains. Yet, I have never seen these signs added to signalized crossings that pose the same danger and yield requirement to drivers regardless of whether or not the signals are activated. That seems inconsistent to me.
Third point:
Stop signs added to non-signalized crossings impose a stop requirement that goes beyond a yield requirement, which might or might not require a driver to stop. However, sometimes a YIELD sign alone is added to the crossbuck at a non-signalized crossing. This is completely redundant because the YIELD sign means exactly the same thing as the crossbuck. So why do it? It almost seems like an acknowledgement that drivers often do not realize that a crossbuck means yield. Yet, if they don’t realize that a crossbuck means yield at a non-signalized crossing, they are certainly not going to realize that a crossbuck is telling them to look for trains and yield at a signalized crossing where they feel completely protected by the automatic warning system.
Fourth point:
Some have suggested that every non-signalized crossing should have a stop sign. Certainly this would reduce the possibility of a car-train collision by forcing the first element of the yield command, so why not do it? Planners will tell you that the reason they don’t do it is because any stop raises the danger of a rear end collision from a following vehicle, and they feel that extra risk exceeds the reduction of risk from getting hit by a train. The fact that stop signs are never applied to signalized crossings, even ones with short visibility, suggests to me that planners feel that the extra protection of the automatic warning system lowers the train collision risk to the extent that the addition of stop signs would create more risk from a rear end collision than the amount of risk they would reduce from a car-train collision. I have seen some non-signalized crossings with limited track visibility preceded with LOOK FOR TRAINS signs. I cannot see any reason why the same signs should not be applied to limited visibility signalized crossings. In fact, one could make the argument that all signalized crossings should be preceded by LOOK FOR TRAINS signs, because the legal requirement to yield at an un-activated signalized crossing is far from obvious to drivers.
Fifth point:
The Anoka crash occurred at a signalized crossing with gates and crossbucks. The crossbucks require a driver to look for trains and yield to any train that happens to be approaching, regardless of whether the signals are activated or not. The trial assigned most of the blame to the BNSF for an alleged signal failure, and yet apparently ignored the fact the driver broke the law by not yielding to the train.
If someone goes around a gate, that is NOT the railroad's fault and they should never be held liable for any accident of this type, unless there was a gate malfunction that they knew about and had not fixed.
My Dad always used caution at any crossing. Back in the day, only an engine could trigger the gate mechanism and a runaway freight car would not. He used to talk about one of Frisco's train crews letting a boxcar get away from them and they chased it around St. Clair, MO for a couple of miles, rolling through crossings until they caught up with it. We'd see people driving around gates sometimes as we'd wait and my Dad said they were stupid people in a hurry to get to their own funeral. It's sad but true, don't ever try to argue with a moving train-you'll always lose.
Yes, I agree with your points, particularly with your conclusion in the fifth point. Apparently the jurors found that the railroad has tempted with the proof in regard of the signals and thus saw it as evident that the gates weren't closed. If that were true indeed I would consider the judgement as valid. The same judgement would have been made here as well because the rr were clearly at fault.
So for the future the only certain method to prove this would be cameras in the locomotives themselves. I think that, following this, all rr will equip their locos now to have a clear proof in future.
[edited for content by selector...video link deleted]
penncentral2002 BNSF & DMIR 4Ever What really baffles me is that it's the prosecution's responsibility to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the gates didn't work. They didn't do that in any way whatsoever. They relied on non-existent evidence, and in spite of a police report and an eyewitness stating that the gates were down, they still prevailed. In the eyes of the judicial system, this shouldn't even be where it is now, and should have been dismissed years ago. Uh, you are thinking of criminal law (and the standard there is actually "beyond a reasonable doubt"). Civil cases generally operate under a preponderence of the evidence standard. If the signals were not properly operational, that would constitute negligence. Police on the scene are generally not trained in accident investigation. Police reports are also considered preliminary and are thus less persuasive (and can be totally discounted) if the later final investigation reaches the opposite conclusion - it sounds like that is what happened in this case is that the final investigation reached a different conclusion than the initial police report. That happens, especially when a police report may be based on self serving or incomplete information. Just because the lights were observed flashing doesn't mean they were working properly - the lights and gates could have come on too late trapping the car for example. When lights and gates are posted the railroad has the duty to ensure they work properly and to post signs warning them if they do not work correctly or to post alternative means to stop traffic such as an employee. If there is no admissible persuasive evidence showing the lights were functioning properly, the railroad is liable period. Statements by railroad employees are considered self serving and thus properly accorded less weight than other evidence. The absence of evidence can be just as important as the evidence which is there. If you were charged with murder and you had a motive and means to commit, but you didn't do it and was home alone at the time, there is a good chance you are still going to prison even though you are innocent. And criminal cases require a much more stringent burden of proof. In short, I think that you are misreading what happened - here the evidence suggested that the car did not go around the gates - no evidence was there that the gates were working properly other than the self serving statement of a railroad employee (which as I pointed out does not prove anything because it does not prove that the gates deployed at the proper time) and a preliminary police report that was later proven by subsequent investigation to be false. There is also the indication that BNSF may well have tampered with the evidence - at the minimum, they did not properly secure the evidence - both cases are absolute no nos. The only reasonable inference from that combination of facts is that the gates were not working properly. BNSF deserved to lose that case.
BNSF & DMIR 4Ever What really baffles me is that it's the prosecution's responsibility to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the gates didn't work. They didn't do that in any way whatsoever. They relied on non-existent evidence, and in spite of a police report and an eyewitness stating that the gates were down, they still prevailed. In the eyes of the judicial system, this shouldn't even be where it is now, and should have been dismissed years ago.
What really baffles me is that it's the prosecution's responsibility to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the gates didn't work. They didn't do that in any way whatsoever. They relied on non-existent evidence, and in spite of a police report and an eyewitness stating that the gates were down, they still prevailed. In the eyes of the judicial system, this shouldn't even be where it is now, and should have been dismissed years ago.
Uh, you are thinking of criminal law (and the standard there is actually "beyond a reasonable doubt"). Civil cases generally operate under a preponderence of the evidence standard. If the signals were not properly operational, that would constitute negligence.
Police on the scene are generally not trained in accident investigation. Police reports are also considered preliminary and are thus less persuasive (and can be totally discounted) if the later final investigation reaches the opposite conclusion - it sounds like that is what happened in this case is that the final investigation reached a different conclusion than the initial police report. That happens, especially when a police report may be based on self serving or incomplete information.
Just because the lights were observed flashing doesn't mean they were working properly - the lights and gates could have come on too late trapping the car for example. When lights and gates are posted the railroad has the duty to ensure they work properly and to post signs warning them if they do not work correctly or to post alternative means to stop traffic such as an employee. If there is no admissible persuasive evidence showing the lights were functioning properly, the railroad is liable period. Statements by railroad employees are considered self serving and thus properly accorded less weight than other evidence. The absence of evidence can be just as important as the evidence which is there. If you were charged with murder and you had a motive and means to commit, but you didn't do it and was home alone at the time, there is a good chance you are still going to prison even though you are innocent. And criminal cases require a much more stringent burden of proof.
In short, I think that you are misreading what happened - here the evidence suggested that the car did not go around the gates - no evidence was there that the gates were working properly other than the self serving statement of a railroad employee (which as I pointed out does not prove anything because it does not prove that the gates deployed at the proper time) and a preliminary police report that was later proven by subsequent investigation to be false. There is also the indication that BNSF may well have tampered with the evidence - at the minimum, they did not properly secure the evidence - both cases are absolute no nos. The only reasonable inference from that combination of facts is that the gates were not working properly. BNSF deserved to lose that case.
If what you say is true (and I have no reason to believe it isn’t), it certainly entirely explains the outcome of this Anoka crash trial. To me, the most surprising information that you have contributed is that the railroad company can be held liable for the crash if they cannot prove that the signals were working. If that is true, I am amazed that the railroads do not have a bomb proof, iron clad method of proving the signal functions. I would expect them to have a data line leading right into the police department or some similar witnessing vault destination.
This burden to prove that the signals are working would seem to mean that the railroad companies have a higher potential liability with signalized crossings that they do with un-signalized crossings per train event. I guess they can’t be blamed for signal failure or failing to prove that the signals worked, if there are no signals.
Although maybe they can be blamed for not providing signals at non-signalized crossings, since it could be argued that the hazard to drivers is the same, even though it occurs less frequently at those crossings that railroad companies typically decide do not warrant signals.
That was a long read. I share many of the above opinions, and I don't have any new ones to offer. But I would like to support two of them.
We, as a nation, should move more quickly to eliminate RR grade crossings. No crossings, no collisions!
The RRs should do whatever it takes to have forward-looking video cameras operating at all times. They should make up kits ASAP for locomotives that don't have them already installed. These days, video cameras and VCRs are relatively cheap. Insurance companies might well be willing to pay for them because of the protection they would provide against liability.
cordon That was a long read. I share many of the above opinions, and I don't have any new ones to offer. But I would like to support two of them. We, as a nation, should move more quickly to eliminate RR grade crossings. No crossings, no collisions! The RRs should do whatever it takes to have forward-looking video cameras operating at all times. They should make up kits ASAP for locomotives that don't have them already installed. These days, video cameras and VCRs are relatively cheap. Insurance companies might well be willing to pay for them because of the protection they would provide against liability.
I am afraid I must dissagree with this. Eliminating RR grade crossings will not completely eliminate collisions. I promise, just as sure as I sit here and type this, someone in their infinite wisdom will run directly into the side of a train. A perfectly functional car equipt with best safety equipment cannot compensate for a drivers inability to comply or react. That falls to the driver themself. It is like blaming the phone company for a driver who is in a collision when they are using their cell phone or texting while driving.
Regarding the video system, I do agree. There was once a time when I could testify in criminal or civil trials without the video system, the court and jurors assumption was always that what I said was factually accurate and truthful. That time unfortunately, in this day in age...has passed. I cringe at the thought of having to testify without it now. Yes, DVR systems are relatively creap and could very well protect the railroad industry.
A wise older Patrolman once told me a long time ago. (speaks in my best John Wayne tone) "Son, if there were only two cars in this great state, eventually they will run into each other."
Have a fantastic day you guys, this is a great conversation.
cordonThe RRs should do whatever it takes to have forward-looking video cameras operating at all times. They should make up kits ASAP for locomotives that don't have them already installed. These days, video cameras and VCRs are relatively cheap. Insurance companies might well be willing to pay for them because of the protection they would provide against liability.
The main point was to be able to apply them to existing locomotives with no modification to the locomotive, except for the addition of a small, exterior mounting bracket on the cab near the top. So the whole unit would be as independent of the locomotive as possible. This attribute would allow existing locomotives to be equipped with cameras as quickly as possible.
My concept would entail a battery powered, portable camera/recorder package about the size of a lunch bucket. It would be hung on the mounting bracket at the start of each run much like the official hanging of marker lamps on cabooses in the past. It would turn on automatically when plugged onto the mounting bracket, and an external indicator would light up to prove the unit is running. It would record in a continuous loop of some length. It would also have a STOP & LOCK button. In the event of a crossing crash or other major event, the stop & lock button would be pressed to cease operation and preserve the loop. Then the unit would be removed and processed to recover the data. Between runs, these units would be stored on a battery-charging stand.
Compared to a state of the art, comprehensive video surveillance system, this would have been relatively unsophisticated. But it would have been practical, simple, and capable of being quickly executed and applied at a relatively low cost. All you would need to do to the locomotives is screw the mounting bracket on to them.
Whether or not this concept could have been developed and marketed, I don’t know, since I never pursued it. I don’t know if any locomotives had video cameras in 1986, but with my concept, it seemed they could all have been equipped by 1990. Today, we have cameras gradually being applied to locomotives as an integrated system. From what I understand, though, we are still a long way from universal application to all locomotives. Considering the obvious financial benefit of reducing liability costs arising from crossing crashes, I would think that railroad companies would want to get their locomotives equipped as soon as possible. Maybe someone else here can explain how this is moving forward and some of the pros and cons.
One discouraging thought about this video idea occurred to me back in 1986. That was that the railroad companies might not want to have video evidence brought into the courtroom because the shear brutality of a crash may work against the company when it is processed by the jury.
Here is a link about the application of video cameras to locomotives:
http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_S_trains14.43587e5.html
I just bought a fairly full-featured cam-corder - all solid state, including the memory - for less than $300. The 4 Gig memory card (I got 2 on sale for $4 each) provides an hour of recording. Considering that I just bought a 2 Gig MicroSD card for my cell phone for about $12 (MicroSD cards are about 1/3 the size of a postage stamp), and even considering some special processing considerations, the idea of a camera in each locomotive capable of several hours of recorded images isn't all that daunting.
Granted, $1000 to $2000 per times 9000 locomotives adds up, but if a recording were able to prove that the deceased had, in the case under discussion here, run the gates, the visual evidence would be irrefutable. The money saved from that payout would pretty much equip the entire fleet. Of course, the possibility that the gates may not have operated would also be plainly seen, thus proving the plaintiffs case.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12549663
There is hope out there. UP appealled the appalling Missy Martin case and the upper court accepted the case. Hopefully they look at the merits this time instead of the attorney theatrics and warped assertions of the plaintiff's so-called experts this time.
mudchicken http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12549663 There is hope out there. UP appealled the appalling Missy Martin case and the upper court accepted the case. Hopefully they look at the merits this time instead of the attorney theatrics and warped assertions of the plaintiff's so-called experts this time.
Well, at least in this case, the facts seem fairly well established. If I understand this, the plaintiff’s lawyers argued that Missy Martin's car was in harm’s way by being on the “crossing.” The conductor’s argument was that she was not actually fouling the train, so he did not set the brakes when he was still far enough away to stop short of the crossing. Then Martin’s boyfriend tried to push Martin’s car ahead to get it off of the crossing, and he pushed it into the path of the train, but could not push it further into the clear. By that time, the train was too close to stop, so it struck the car.
It would seem that the debate centers around the difference between the area known as the crossing, and the area fouled by the train as it passes over the crossing. I would think that if an engineer saw a car stalled within the fouling area, the engineer would make every attempt to stop short of the crossing, even though the car might move out of the way before the train would arrive at the crossing if the engineer did not attempt to stop. But what would an engineer do if he saw a car that was standing unusually close to the fouling area, but not inside of it? Let’s say the car was stopped three feet short of fouling the train. What would the U.P. have wanted the engineer to do in that situation?
I also looked at this link to the story, which also gives links to several previous stories that explain the progression from the crash to the conclusion of the trial.
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/4643603/detail.html
Quick question:
The jury in this Anoka crash case concluded that the crossing flashers and gates had failed to activate for the train that hit the car.
Would it be accurate to say that the flashers and gates could not have failed to activate because the FRA requires them to be fail-safe?
If that would not be accurate, why not?
Fail-safe does not mean "never fails." It means that certain failure modes are designed to fail to the safest possible condition.
Some common failure modes for grade-crossing signals that do not fail to a safe condition are:
The most useful fail-safe mode is the shunt-to-activate mode. That means, the signal system is designed so that any detectable occupancy of the track -- even a false occupancy -- activates the signal. The relays are arranged so that they need to be "picked up" -- against gravity to turn the signal system off. Thus, the relays are "normally on". And so forth. Any place where there is a reasonable and effective way to make the system fail to the safe mode, it's done. But as listed above, not all failure modes can be made safe.
RWM
Railway Man Fail-safe does not mean "never fails." It means that certain failure modes are designed to fail to the safest possible condition. Some common failure modes for grade-crossing signals that do not fail to a safe condition are: Vehicle runs over the mast and knocks it over. It does not re-erect itself. Utility power fails, and for various reasons no one is available to repair the utility power or recharge the batteries when they poop out a few days later. Think "Katrina." Lightning strikes the instrument house directly. The instrument house has lightning arrestors to prevent high-voltage transients from strikes to the power lines or nearby ground from entering the house, but they will be overwhelmed by a direct hit. Vehicle runs through the gates and breaks them off. This happens so frequently that every signal-maintainer's truck carries a spare gate or two on the rack. Rail vehicle does not shunt the track. A major problem with DMUs after a weekend when they only run on weekdays and it rains, and special measures have to be taken such as a light grind of the rail head early every Monday morning. The most useful fail-safe mode is the shunt-to-activate mode. That means, the signal system is designed so that any detectable occupancy of the track -- even a false occupancy -- activates the signal. The relays are arranged so that they need to be "picked up" -- against gravity to turn the signal system off. Thus, the relays are "normally on". And so forth. Any place where there is a reasonable and effective way to make the system fail to the safe mode, it's done. But as listed above, not all failure modes can be made safe. RWM
Given this, it would be interesting to know if "The Plaintiffs' Counsel" came up with a theory on just how the system failed in the Anoka incident. A lightening stike would certainly be evident. It would be a very interesting theory since it proposes that the crossing signals failed just for that one particular train.
They worked before the incident and they worked after the incident. But for that one train, they didn't work. Of course, "Plaintiffs' Counsel" may not have had to explain anything like this. The legal system dismissed the testimony of the crewmember who said the gates were down. He was just assumed to be a liar. If a legal system can do that it can certainly just accept a one time isolated failure with no explination required.
I don't buy the assertion that the crossing signals failed. But what I "buy" or "don't buy" doesn't count for anything here. I'm convinced that a clever legal team convinced a jury to accept an alternate reality. We've seen it before. O.J. walked on the murders. We'll see it again.
RWM,
Thank you for that insight. That is more less what I had concluded because I cannot see how any system could be perfectly infallible. So it would seem that “failsafe” is sort of a term of art that can apply to some individual components of a system, but may not apply to the whole system. One reference that I found describes the failsafe principle as being a design using the closed circuit principle. I believe that this is what you refer to as a “shunt to activate” system. But then the reference mentions the problem of there being no way to use a closed circuit design in the warning system without going to an open circuit design in the final stage that activates the signals. In other words, a power failure drops the relay, but the contacts of the switch controlled by the relay could fail to close the activation circuit due to a number of possible causes.
But here is why I asked the question:
During this thread, others had mentioned the driver’s responsibility to yield by slowing down, looking for trains, and stopping if necessary to avoid being hit by a train that might be approaching. That is the meaning of yield, and the crossbuck is equivalent to a YIELD sign. While most people are aware of this responsibility at passive or non-signalized crossings, what was claimed by others in this thread is that the same responsibility applies at signalized crossings when the signals are un-activated. This is because signalized crossings also have a crossbuck, and its meaning prevails whether the signals are activated or not.
I sought confirmation of the premise (that divers must yield at signalized crossings when the signals are un-activated) to Operation Lifesaver and the FRA, and they told me this:
The only point that is missing is whether the yielding at a crossing with warning signals is necessary if the signals are un-activated. Logically, it would be necessary because the crossbuck is there with its yield command no matter whether the signals are activated or not.
I was sent a publication showing the rules, signs, and signals at grade crossings. It clearly spelled out the meaning of the crossbuck at non-signalized crossings. However, it did not even mention the crossbuck at signalized crossings. Nor did it mention a need to yield at signalized crossings when the signals are un-activated.
I contacted a representative from the State Patrol about this question. He said that he did not know how the law would apply to the situation, but he seemed skeptical that there was a legal requirement to yield at a signalized crossing when the signals are un-activated.
I have learned of a recent comprehensive study that has concluded that motorists do not recognize the crossbuck as a YIELD sign. Therefore, there are plans to add YIELD signs to the crossbucks at non-signalized crossings. Based on this development, I ask this question:
If there is a need to add yield signs to passive crossings because much of the public does not understand that the crossbuck means yield, then why is there not the same need to add yield signs to signalized crossings?
I posed this question to the state D.O.T. and was told that there is no need to advise a motorist to yield/stop at a grade crossing with active warning devices because those warning systems are required to be failsafe. Basically, it was explained to me that the failsafe attribute meant that the gates and signals cannot fail to activate. I was told that adding a YIELD sign to a signalized crossing would not only be unnecessary, but it would also confuse motorists.
This response raises these issues:
1) If it is true, there is no need for crossbucks at signalized crossings.
2) It cannot be true because failsafe does not mean that the signals cannot fail.
And it raises this difficult question:
Why would a YIELD sign added to the crossbuck confuse drivers at a signalized crossing, but add clarity at a non-signalized crossing?
There is more news on this case today in the Minneapolis Star Tribune about an attorney representing BNSF paying witnesses to testify in the case. It is written by Paul Levy and appears on page one of Friday June 26Th edition. Paul Levy is plevy@startribune.com. It is an excellent article.
Its really amazing,and sickening how people can blame the railroad, for the stupidity of their own actions.Gee seems to me,that these kids were in a hurry...oh God forbid if we can wait a few minutes for the train to pass.No they had to do the most stupid thing and go around the gates.As sad as it is......they got what they deserved.Gee does the same thing apply to 3 kids in Fond Du Lac,WI who went 65 over Lone Rock Road,and lost control of the car,which slammed into a tree nearby? Or better yet..a 17 year old in Birnamwood,WI is going 80 over hills,passes a slow moving pickup truck ,loses control,and slams into a 65 year old woman that instantly kills her.Guess what..that 65 year old WAS my great aunt !!!!!!!!!!!! Both of these incidents were for the what.... joy of it...and yet there were concequenses paid for it!!!!Anyone want to debate me on the fact that teenagers shouldnt get a drivers license,let alone dont know what a road is,or how to drive responsibly on one ?!!!! Better yet,how about the people already on the road, that dont care about the other drivers!!!!!Anyone..anyone that wants to be that stupid.....deserves to get what is coming to them.Gee im sorry ..YOU dont have the time to wait?!!! Yet you can wait for your fast food,or a stop light to change,yet you cant wait for a trian? HMMMM is the grim reaper gonna wait for you to decide when you are going to die?There is nothing, that is going to change from something like this to happen again,except common sense,responsibility,and the fact that people need to take the time and enjoy what they have.Some of us dont have the chance to live a second or third life. As upset as I am about this..I appologize for my outburst.Im just sick of people who dont care,and their own stupidity.
The article does not identify who these witnesses were nor what their testimony was. A very brief quote from the heart of the article:
"The two paid witnesses were paid $10,000 and $5,000, respectively, in what a St. Paul attorney representing Burlington Northern Santa Fe called a "reward" in court documents."
Without more information than is in the article, I don't think this advances either side's case very much.
cnwfan2 Its really amazing,and sickening how people can blame the railroad, for the stupidity of their own actions.Gee seems to me,that these kids were in a hurry...oh God forbid if we can wait a few minutes for the train to pass.No they had to do the most stupid thing and go around the gates.As sad as it is......they got what they deserved.Gee does the same thing apply to 3 kids in Fond Du Lac,WI who went 65 over Lone Rock Road,and lost control of the car,which slammed into a tree nearby? Or better yet..a 17 year old in Birnamwood,WI is going 80 over hills,passes a slow moving pickup truck ,loses control,and slams into a 65 year old woman that instantly kills her.Guess what..that 65 year old WAS my great aunt !!!!!!!!!!!! Both of these incidents were for the what.... joy of it...and yet there were concequenses paid for it!!!!Anyone want to debate me on the fact that teenagers shouldnt get a drivers license,let alone dont know what a road is,or how to drive responsibly on one ?!!!! Better yet,how about the people already on the road, that dont care about the other drivers!!!!!Anyone..anyone that wants to be that stupid.....deserves to get what is coming to them.Gee im sorry ..YOU dont have the time to wait?!!! Yet you can wait for your fast food,or a stop light to change,yet you cant wait for a trian? HMMMM is the grim reaper gonna wait for you to decide when you are going to die?There is nothing, that is going to change from something like this to happen again,except common sense,responsibility,and the fact that people need to take the time and enjoy what they have.Some of us dont have the chance to live a second or third life. As upset as I am about this..I appologize for my outburst.Im just sick of people who dont care,and their own stupidity.
Yes, but the jury found that the crossing gates failed to activate, and therefore, the jury found the BNSF to be at fault. Therefore, there is no basis that I know of to conclude that the kids were stupid, too impatient to wait for a train, lacked common sense, or were acting irresponsibly.
It is the jury’s job to find the truth, and they found the railroad to be at fault.
I don't know about the rest of you, but with the exception of our light rail I have never seen a train that didn't litterally make the ground shake under your feet. Even without a horn or a gate, it doesn't take a great effort to listen for an approaching train.
Dave
Lackawanna Route of the Phoebe Snow
Phoebe Vet I don't know about the rest of you, but with the exception of our light rail I have never seen a train that didn't litterally make the ground shake under your feet. Even without a horn or a gate, it doesn't take a great effort to listen for an approaching train.
I would not expect a driver to feel the ground shake from an approaching train. However, I would expect them to hear the horn and see the headlights, although, considering the horn, I wonder if drivers are required to be able to hear. They don’t test for hearing in my state. Nevertheless, the horn is effective for warning everyone who can hear, and that is most drivers. So it is an effective backup warning.
According to the FRA, the crossbuck alone requires drivers to yield by slowing down, looking for trains, and stopping if one is approaching. This is required even if the flashers and gates are not activated.
Therefore, the driver in the Anoka crash failed to yield to the train. Since the train had the right of way, and the driver failed to yield as required, one would logically conclude that the driver was at fault.
But, apparently in a civil case, some other elements enter the picture. I cannot explain it in legal terms, but apparently, once the railroad adds an automatic protection system to the crossing, they are responsible to make sure it works even though trains still have the right of way no matter whether the flashers and gates work or not.
Re: "But, apparently in a civil case, some other elements enter the picture. I cannot explain it in legal terms, but apparently, once the railroad adds an automatic protection system to the crossing, they are responsible to make sure it works even though trains still have the right of way no matter whether the flashers and gates work or not."
-- Perhaps that's why RR companies so often fight "tooth and nail" to convert their clangers by adding auto. gates. When gates are added, it adds one more thing that can go wrong and increases the RR's responsibility (and therefore liablity). A decision against the RR company in court can cost many times the capital cost of putting in new crossing signals.
Al:The railroad doesn't decide to add or remove gates, only the ICC (Illinois Commerce Commission) does. Any change to the crossing after an ICC decision is material breach of contract, including widening or shortening the crossing
The railroad gets stuck with the maintenance and inspection costs for the life of the installation.
M.C.:
Thanks for pointing out my error. I had meant to say that RR companies fight tooth and nail against the addition of gates to their flashing crossings. I think we agree with each other that a regulatory commission gets to decide what goes where and that the RR must do as they say.
But of course the railroads can, and often do, complain and lobby against paying more.
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