Railway ManPaul_D_North_Jr - 200 cars a day is one thing; that they're 286K cars is quite another thing (that detail wasn't in your earlier post). But that does change my initial response to the comment. It's long been known that 286K cars (and by extension, 315K cars) are disproportionately harder on the track than 263K cars that I referenced earlier - but no one on the executive floor (or the operating or marketing floors, either) wants to hear that, or more importantly, budget the appropriate $ and track time to fix up the additional wear-and-tear that the heavier cars cause - so why bother ? But I do concur with the 12MGT/ year figure - actually, I got closer to 14 MGT; [para. snipped] All due respect but I do not share that opinion (that the consequences of 286K are being discounted or ignored). But we were not talking about 263K vs. 286K, we were talking about 12 more MGT/year? [paras. snipped] Yes, it is tracked that closely and budgeted that closely. No one is going to sit there passively in the engineering department and let 12 MGT a year onto their territory without coming back with the specific budget increase it will take to accommodate it, . . . .[snip] . . . To recap where I'm at, I'm arguing the general case. In general, I am skeptical that the general rail line in the U.S., in normal economic times (which means normal traffic) can take 12 more MGT a year, and the engineering department saying "no problem, just an "x" percent increase in our costs based on the proportion increase to the existing MGT." Because the moment they say that, everyone is going to start doubting their veracity on every budget they publish. [snip] RWM
Paul_D_North_Jr - 200 cars a day is one thing; that they're 286K cars is quite another thing (that detail wasn't in your earlier post). But that does change my initial response to the comment. It's long been known that 286K cars (and by extension, 315K cars) are disproportionately harder on the track than 263K cars that I referenced earlier - but no one on the executive floor (or the operating or marketing floors, either) wants to hear that, or more importantly, budget the appropriate $ and track time to fix up the additional wear-and-tear that the heavier cars cause - so why bother ? But I do concur with the 12MGT/ year figure - actually, I got closer to 14 MGT; [para. snipped]
- 200 cars a day is one thing; that they're 286K cars is quite another thing (that detail wasn't in your earlier post). But that does change my initial response to the comment. It's long been known that 286K cars (and by extension, 315K cars) are disproportionately harder on the track than 263K cars that I referenced earlier - but no one on the executive floor (or the operating or marketing floors, either) wants to hear that, or more importantly, budget the appropriate $ and track time to fix up the additional wear-and-tear that the heavier cars cause - so why bother ? But I do concur with the 12MGT/ year figure - actually, I got closer to 14 MGT; [para. snipped]
All due respect but I do not share that opinion (that the consequences of 286K are being discounted or ignored). But we were not talking about 263K vs. 286K, we were talking about 12 more MGT/year?
[paras. snipped]
Yes, it is tracked that closely and budgeted that closely. No one is going to sit there passively in the engineering department and let 12 MGT a year onto their territory without coming back with the specific budget increase it will take to accommodate it, . . . .[snip] . . . To recap where I'm at, I'm arguing the general case. In general, I am skeptical that the general rail line in the U.S., in normal economic times (which means normal traffic) can take 12 more MGT a year, and the engineering department saying "no problem, just an "x" percent increase in our costs based on the proportion increase to the existing MGT." Because the moment they say that, everyone is going to start doubting their veracity on every budget they publish. [snip]
RWM
[emphasis added - PDN.]
Question (and let me be clear about this - with respect): Are the emphasized portions above consistent, with regard to whether the Engineering Department's view of the economics of certain matters are given credence by the operating, marketing, and executive levels ?
Or, do these statements instead reflect the positions of different personnel at different places - and with different functions - in the organization ? Specifically, is the Engineering Dept. is expected to advocate (within reasonable limits) for their legitimate needs ? And, are those needs indeed taken into account by the executive levels - such that if "that dog doesn't bark", then the executives begin to wonder if the engineers have been "crying wolf" ? (to mix the metaphors)
Not trying to back you into a corner here - just trying to harmonize what at first seem to be conflicting statements, for a better understanding of contemporary railroad management dynamics and processes.
- Paul North.
Since the line was originally built, much has been learned about soils engineering, construction over muskeg and in permafrost areas, and new materials, equipment, and techniques developed to cope with them, etc. - "Cold Weather Regions Engineering" is the term often used. This knowledge came from projects such as the Alasaka Highway, the Alaska Oil Pipeline, the oil exploration on the North Slope, and the tar sands projects themselves. Some of the methods used include first installing thick layers of gravel (and/ or insulation) to keep the permafrost from thawing in the summer, excavating and replaacing the muskeg with gravel, the geotechnical "filter fabrics" of various kinds, soil stabilization with bentonite, lime, cement, confinement, sheet pilings, etc. As long as the ground is (or can be made) to support a mostly uniform short-term load over a broad area - as in while a train passes over it - on the order of 1,000 lbs. per sq. ft. (6 PSI) at a depth from 3 to 5 feet below the surface without significant settlement, this can be done, albeit at some considerable expense.
In view of that, the past experience on this line is not a valid predictor of specific future problems - only that the underlying geotechnical challenges are still there, and will have to be addressed with the modern methods (which will undoubtedly then present their own set of problems . . . ).
AgentKidIn a TRAINS or CLASSIC TRAINS article within the last year or so there was a story about a man who took a round trip up there in about 1960.
While watching Curling on CBC.ca, I located the article I mentioned above. It is "Mixed Train Through The Muskeg" in the Fall 2007 edition of CLASSIC TRAINS page 80.
AgentKid
So shovel the coal, let this rattler roll.
"A Train is a Place Going Somewhere" CP Rail Public Timetable
"O. S. Irricana"
. . . __ . ______
My apologies. It was tatans who asked these questions.
AgentKid nanaimo73what was the incentive, beaver pelts? Like I mentioned in my first post in this thread, Waterways/Fort McMurray was the loading point for barges running up the Athabasca and Mackenzie River's to serve First Nation's and white resource hunting communities right up to the Arctic Ocean before the era of the DeHavilland Otter. nanaimo73Is/was this line maintained over the years? Based on what I found researching the post I made this morning; maintained? sort of, upgraded? not so much. AgentKid
nanaimo73what was the incentive, beaver pelts?
Like I mentioned in my first post in this thread, Waterways/Fort McMurray was the loading point for barges running up the Athabasca and Mackenzie River's to serve First Nation's and white resource hunting communities right up to the Arctic Ocean before the era of the DeHavilland Otter.
nanaimo73Is/was this line maintained over the years?
Based on what I found researching the post I made this morning; maintained? sort of, upgraded? not so much.
I didn't ask either of those questions.
tatans Is/was this line maintained over the years? Who would of thought a line to Ft.Mac. would ever exist? what was the incentive, beaver pelts?, bitumen to fix your canoe? What would entice anyone to construct a line to nowhere? remember the Alaska highway? when you drive it a lot of fill under the highway consists of highway construction vehicles, many tales of guys jumping off bulldozers as they sunk out of sight, this is the type of terrain around Ft. Mac.
Is/was this line maintained over the years? Who would of thought a line to Ft.Mac. would ever exist? what was the incentive, beaver pelts?, bitumen to fix your canoe? What would entice anyone to construct a line to nowhere? remember the Alaska highway? when you drive it a lot of fill under the highway consists of highway construction vehicles, many tales of guys jumping off bulldozers as they sunk out of sight, this is the type of terrain around Ft. Mac.
This website is informative-
http://railways-atlas.tapor.ualberta.ca/cocoon/atlas/Chapters-11-6/
sparky3I have heard it estimated that the upgrade of the line to the standards that would be required for day to day use of this type would be in the neighborhood of 1 billion dollars.
I don't know who his sources are but I don't think they're kidding. I've looked at the SPV Railroad Atlas for Western Canada and the 2007 Canadian Trackside Guide and the rail line from Fort McMurray right to Edmonton is a rail line with issues.
When you look at the atlas you cannot believe the number of named and unnamed bodies of water surrounding the old AN portion of the route. It hardly seems possible that the original A&GWR guys were able to find a strip of dry land for a ROW. And then there is the issue of sidings. They range from a length of 1380' to a whopping 2620' until you are right outside of Edmonton. There is a stretch of about 75 miles with Lac La Biche near the middle, that has only one siding 8.1 miles east of Lac La Biche that is a whole 1600' long. This problem seems to be mitigated somewhat by Lac La Biche having a yard, and knowing the size of that town, I use the term advisedly. I suppose the extra trackage would allow you to split a train for a meet. I'm wondering if this stretch is where the muskeg is.
Having read the original article that inspired this thread for a third time now, I cannot believe that the plan it refers to isn't actually some sort of position paper to base a request for government infrastructure money on, or as RWM suggests, a basis for a serious rise in shipping rates. But with a line like this, how do you increase service without a huge lag time before you can collect the higher rates?
nanaimo73There was an article in the Toronto Globe and Mail last July saying CN was going to be hauling an increasing amount of petroleum coke from the oil sands down to Edmonton and then west to Prince Rupert for export. I believe the forcast was to exceed 10 million tonnes/year.
There was an article in the Toronto Globe and Mail last July saying CN was going to be hauling an increasing amount of petroleum coke from the oil sands down to Edmonton and then west to Prince Rupert for export. I believe the forcast was to exceed 10 million tonnes/year.
There's a mountain of the stuff sitting there in Alberta as a byproduct of the refining process. A number of U.S. customers have looked at it as a substitute for oil, coal, or natural gas. My last look-see was in October. The rail rates have not yet been competitive with U.S. coal.
That kind of tells me that a rail rate for the oil itself wouldn't be competitive with other oil sources, either.
Railway Man All due respect but I do not share that opinion (that the consequences of 286K are being discounted or ignored). But we were not talking about 263K vs. 286K, we were talking about 12 more MGT/year?
We are, and I'm just pointing out that whether that 12 MGT is in 263K or 286K cars on 4 axles makes a significant difference in the wear-and-tear effect on the track, and whether that causes the track maintenance costs to rise more than just the mere pro rata increase in same from 12 more MGT (this in the context of the broader question by you of whether "only a pro-rata increase in maintenance is not overmaintained and overinfrastructured"). From your response, I now understand that those consequences are indeed considered by managements, so that concludes the point.
Railway Man Paul, do you really think I would make a general point based only on narrow regional experience? How do you know where the people I work with come from or what their experience is? I wouldn't do you like that if I thought their experiences were circumscribed. This isn't a debating society where I'm trying to score points. I'm only here to pass on what I think is useful knowledge. If it's knowledge that's contingent or narrow, I make sure I say so so the reader can consider the source. If it's knowledge no one wants, say so, and I'll do something else for fun.
Paul, do you really think I would make a general point based only on narrow regional experience? How do you know where the people I work with come from or what their experience is? I wouldn't do you like that if I thought their experiences were circumscribed. This isn't a debating society where I'm trying to score points. I'm only here to pass on what I think is useful knowledge. If it's knowledge that's contingent or narrow, I make sure I say so so the reader can consider the source. If it's knowledge no one wants, say so, and I'll do something else for fun.
So sorry to have given you that impression, because: No, I don't really think that - in fact, just the opposite - that it's my experience that is parochial. Of course I don't know anything about your colleagues, except that your individual and collective expertise is surely more than mine. But my experience is not trivial, and I was asking myself why rational and intelligent people are coming out so far apart on essentially the same technical question - where's the difference in facts, analysis, intuition, background, bias (can you tell I'm sensitive about 286K cars ?), etc. What I concluded is that it's probably my experience in a mainly PRR-influenced environment - you know, "The Standard Railroad of the World !" - that is the narrow experience, as I set forth above. I thought that insight into what influenced me and my background was worth sharing to explain, understand, and justify the differing engineering conclusions that are being reached here on this issue, and how they perhaps could be simultaneously valid (or not). Like you - so the reader can consider the source. And something I thought of over lunch to illustrate a little further: The 115 RE rail section never really caught on out here "back in the day" (although the transit agencies have pretty much adopted it over the last 20 - 30 years). By the time it came along, all the important lines here already had 130 lb. or larger. That's a statement that can't be made about a lot of trackage in the US, ergo it is not of general application. It does, however, illustrate where I'm coming from on this - and no disrespect at all is intended.
Paul, you've built a strawman case. What about the line with 90 MGT? How about 70 MGT? How about 50 MGT? But regardless, I can think of lines with 100-130 MGT where sticking two more heavy trains on them a day are going to have rather expensive consequences, because we've been going through that exercise lately. Where I part ways is the statement that this is usually possible. I wouldn't make that claim without knowing the specific line we're talking about.
Perhaps I have gotten too involved with this strawman case - unwittingly - and that's why I didn't want to go too far down this "ancillary to a sidetrack to the main point of this thread" in the first place, as I said above when I started my response. But that point was too troubling to me to let pass unchallenged (perhaps a poor judgment call on my part). We agree that imposing anything near the traffic volume that might result from this traffic source on a long-term basis - from 11 to 72 trains per day, one-way, per my calcs above - is going to require huge improvements in all aspects of the infrastructure. I'd much rather discuss that challenge and the other valid points you've raised above, than get bogged down in an arcane and moot debate over the effect of a mere 2 or 3 trains per day.
Yes, it is tracked that closely and budgeted that closely. No one is going to sit there passively in the engineering department and let 12 MGT a year onto their territory without coming back with the specific budget increase it will take to accommodate it, and no one in the marketing department is going to just sit there passively and take that kind of a hit to their pricing structure without seeing the numbers. Good Lord, Paul, we're the kind of people who argue with our Excel charts about whether a turnout off a minor main line to an industrial spur should be #15 to save on track maintenance cost or #9 to save on labor to grease it so the brakeman doesn't throw his back out and file an injury claim.
I'm not discussing marketing or pricing at all - concur on that; just the track maintenance / engineering budget aspects. I'm also not saying that added 12 MGT should be a "freebie" - just trying to better understand basis for arriving at "the specific budget increase it will take to accommodate it", to wit: Should the added maintenance budget be arrived at by using $X per additional MGT, or $Y per added MGT ? If it's $X on a straight-line basis, no problem - we're agreed, let's go home. But if it's $Y instead - and the $Y coefficient is significantly higher than $X for just 12 MGT more - well, OK, then the questions I'm asking in good-faith curiosity are, "Is that really so ?" "And why is that happening ?" And now I see you've addressed that below. [You edited this while I was responding to it, right ? ]
Somewhere I think the two of us got a bit tangled up on whether we were talking the specific case or the general. To recap where I'm at, I'm arguing the general case. In general, I am skeptical that the general rail line in the U.S., in normal economic times (which means normal traffic) can take 12 more MGT a year, and the engineering department saying "no problem, just an "x" percent increase in our costs based on the proportion increase to the existing MGT." Because the moment they say that, everyone is going to start doubting their veracity on every budget they publish. Sure, I can find specific lines that can take it, but those were already overbuilt for their current tonnage. RWM
Yes, we have gotten tangled up - see above. I now see where you're coming from on the general case proposition, i.e., that we can't say as a blanket statement that all rail lines in the US can take 12 MGT more annually with only a proportional increase in the engineering costs, even though I can point to a few around here that could, and I don't think those are overbuilt (those are likely the "exceptions that prove the rule"). But the veracity problem you refer to above isn't engineering, it isn't budgetary - it's institutional and administrative, and that's different. As you've noted before in another thread, people hate shades of gray, and too often engineering loses out on determinations that turn on those nuances. So I can see why engineering depts. are gun-shy of giving up the ability to claim a share of the new revenues to be allocated for extra costs for changes in baseload traffic volumes - and more power to them - but the administrative and budgetary battles don't determine what's actually happening out on the track.
Well, enough for one day. Thanks for participating in the extended debate discussion - it does sharpen the mind, and I trust you won't go and find something else to do for fun instead, because I really want to get back to your other points soon. Meanwhile, best wishes for a great weekend !
CN stock up 42% off of its recent lows. BNSF up 34%. UP is up 46%.
So, the market is probably not factoring in a oil sands catalyst, at least yet.
ed
So, just hypothetically speaking....200 cars per day (loaded) = 400 per day (with mts).
If the destination were say...Whiting, Indiana BP refinery, which is gearing up with a major rebuilding, or if it were the Louisiana area then CN would definately have some capacity issues in and around Chicago on the EJE and on the IC south of Chicago.
The IC was double tracked at one time and no doubt the ROW could go back to 2 tracks. The J would be a possible issue...wouldnt it?
UlrichAnd CP ...I look forward to seeing your own plan for oil in AB.
Ulrich,
Here is the link I was looking for to answer your question.
http://www.trains.com/trn/default.aspx?c=a&id=1996
Search engines and me do not get along, but I find myself on a bit of a roll at the moment. Yesterday I would never have guessed the keywords necessary to find this link. "Shell" and "upgrader."
Here are two of the links I was looking for regarding CN's operation up to Fort McMurray.
http://www.trains.com/trn/default.aspx?c=a&id=2530
http://www.trains.com/trn/default.aspx?c=a&id=2909
More to follow, I hope.
Paul_D_North_Jr- 200 cars a day is one thing; that they're 286K cars is quite another thing (that detail wasn't in your earlier post). But that does change my initial response to the comment. It's long been known that 286K cars (and by extension, 315K cars) are disproportionately harder on the track than 263K cars that I referenced earlier - but no one on the executive floor (or the operating or marketing floors, either) wants to hear that, or more importantly, budget the appropriate $ and track time to fix up the additional wear-and-tear that the heavier cars cause - so why bother ? But I do concur with the 12MGT/ year figure - actually, I got closer to 14 MGT; - With the bigger rail, improved metallurgy, and concrete ties & fasteners, etc., I think that going forward, most of the damage or effects from the heavier cars is now going to show up primarily further down/ deeper in the track structure instead - such as in the subgrade below the ballast section, or the main structural elements of the bridges, etc.
- 200 cars a day is one thing; that they're 286K cars is quite another thing (that detail wasn't in your earlier post). But that does change my initial response to the comment. It's long been known that 286K cars (and by extension, 315K cars) are disproportionately harder on the track than 263K cars that I referenced earlier - but no one on the executive floor (or the operating or marketing floors, either) wants to hear that, or more importantly, budget the appropriate $ and track time to fix up the additional wear-and-tear that the heavier cars cause - so why bother ? But I do concur with the 12MGT/ year figure - actually, I got closer to 14 MGT;
- With the bigger rail, improved metallurgy, and concrete ties & fasteners, etc., I think that going forward, most of the damage or effects from the heavier cars is now going to show up primarily further down/ deeper in the track structure instead - such as in the subgrade below the ballast section, or the main structural elements of the bridges, etc.
- I was going to make some snappy comeback about your Division Engineer friends, but on further reflection I suspect there's a regional and operational / historical disconnect between me, and you and them, such that we're not really discussing the same image in our respective minds. Here in eastern Pennsylvania and nearby areas all of the main lines and most of the branches have had 130 lb. or heavier rail (OK, the 122 CB on the B&O, but up to 155 PS on the PRR) to accomodate heavier "mineral" (coal, iron ore, stone, etc.) traffic since before I was born, and what ConRail kept didn't then suffer from much downsizing or degrading from that. We also have excellent and cheap ballast rock sources, and subgrade soil conditions that are generally as good as or better as those to be found anyplace else. So what we take for granted here and could easily accomodate 2 - 3 more trains a day for the most part perhaps would seem overbuilt and overmaintained someplace else, such as a single track line through the vast open spaces of the west.
- Accordingly, my 10 to 12 trains per day on 100 lb. jointed rail example was merely a fictional attempt to create a common scenario in both of our minds of a line that is "on the cusp", where that much more traffic is enough to push it over the maintenance edge (or be the last straw that breaks the back of the proverbial camel) from the standpoint of creating far more maintenance costs that merely a proprotional increase in the tonnage would indicate. I can only think of 1 line of that nature in this region - the former PRR DelMarVa Secondary from Wilmington to Cape Charles (a barge ride opposite Norfolk), which used to be just that in a mix of sand and stone ballast. But ever since the power plant at Indian River (Del.) was expanded for coal in the late 1970s, that too became 132+ CWR. So I have to reply on pictures of lines in the muskeg country, across (or through) the "gumbo" and other alluvial soils down south, etc. Recalling what happened to the ICG and others when they started running unit trains of grain hoppers on poorly surfaced jointed rail track (39-ft. lengths with staggered surface-bent joints ==> harmonic rocking off the track), the track getiing beat down into the mud, etc. - if my experiences had been with that stuff, I might well feel the same way; - That said, I still have to challenge that point in a couple of ways: Are you guys serious that a double-track main line with 136 RE CWR on concrete ties on 12"+ of trap-rock ballast, presently signallled and used for around 20 trains a day each way (say, 100 to 130 MGT annually total, including empties), is going to suffer disproportionately (= significantly more than just pro rata) higher maintenance costs from adding just 2 or 3 more trains to move those 200 286K cars (12 to 14 MGT) each day ? Or if that cost increase isn't happening, do you really mean to say that means the line is instead seriously overbuilt and/ or overmaintained ? (That reminds me of the response to a complaint about Mozart having too many notes in one of his operas: "OK, which ones should I take out ?")
- Accordingly, my 10 to 12 trains per day on 100 lb. jointed rail example was merely a fictional attempt to create a common scenario in both of our minds of a line that is "on the cusp", where that much more traffic is enough to push it over the maintenance edge (or be the last straw that breaks the back of the proverbial camel) from the standpoint of creating far more maintenance costs that merely a proprotional increase in the tonnage would indicate. I can only think of 1 line of that nature in this region - the former PRR DelMarVa Secondary from Wilmington to Cape Charles (a barge ride opposite Norfolk), which used to be just that in a mix of sand and stone ballast. But ever since the power plant at Indian River (Del.) was expanded for coal in the late 1970s, that too became 132+ CWR. So I have to reply on pictures of lines in the muskeg country, across (or through) the "gumbo" and other alluvial soils down south, etc. Recalling what happened to the ICG and others when they started running unit trains of grain hoppers on poorly surfaced jointed rail track (39-ft. lengths with staggered surface-bent joints ==> harmonic rocking off the track), the track getiing beat down into the mud, etc. - if my experiences had been with that stuff, I might well feel the same way;
- That said, I still have to challenge that point in a couple of ways: Are you guys serious that a double-track main line with 136 RE CWR on concrete ties on 12"+ of trap-rock ballast, presently signallled and used for around 20 trains a day each way (say, 100 to 130 MGT annually total, including empties), is going to suffer disproportionately (= significantly more than just pro rata) higher maintenance costs from adding just 2 or 3 more trains to move those 200 286K cars (12 to 14 MGT) each day ? Or if that cost increase isn't happening, do you really mean to say that means the line is instead seriously overbuilt and/ or overmaintained ? (That reminds me of the response to a complaint about Mozart having too many notes in one of his operas: "OK, which ones should I take out ?")
If the track maintenance budget can be tracked that closely and predicted that well - which I respectfully doubt - then someone tell me how the coefficient of the MGT component in that budget (or costs) - i.e., the "X" in the $X per MGT amount - changes significantly just because the traffic level changes from 120 MGT by a 10 % increase to 132 MGT or so. Further, in which component of the track is that cost increase chiefly occurring - rail wear ? tie deterioration / surfacing ? subgrade settlement ? If these questions can't be answered authoritatively, then there are at least several cases that disprove the general proposition, and we're back to where I started: "Maybe - it all depends on the existing configuration, condition, and usage of the line." - Paul North.
If the track maintenance budget can be tracked that closely and predicted that well - which I respectfully doubt - then someone tell me how the coefficient of the MGT component in that budget (or costs) - i.e., the "X" in the $X per MGT amount - changes significantly just because the traffic level changes from 120 MGT by a 10 % increase to 132 MGT or so. Further, in which component of the track is that cost increase chiefly occurring - rail wear ? tie deterioration / surfacing ? subgrade settlement ? If these questions can't be answered authoritatively, then there are at least several cases that disprove the general proposition, and we're back to where I started: "Maybe - it all depends on the existing configuration, condition, and usage of the line."
Somewhere I think the two of us got a bit tangled up on whether we were talking the specific case or the general. To recap where I'm at, I'm arguing the general case. In general, I am skeptical that the general rail line in the U.S., in normal economic times (which means normal traffic) can take 12 more MGT a year, and the engineering department saying "no problem, just an "x" percent increase in our costs based on the proportion increase to the existing MGT." Because the moment they say that, everyone is going to start doubting their veracity on every budget they publish. Sure, I can find specific lines that can take it, but those were already overbuilt for their current tonnage.
Railway Man Paul, I am skeptical that any line that can bite off an additional 12 MGT/year (the equivalent of 200 286K cars + empty return) with only a pro-rata increase in maintenance is not overmaintained and overinfrastructured. I'm sitting here with a couple of Division Engineers tonight, and they're rolling their eyes. A line with 100-lb stick rail and 10 to 12 trains a day? 2-3 more trains aren't going to be much of a problem there because they'll never be able to get past all the derailments from the 10-12 trains. RWM
A line with 100-lb stick rail and 10 to 12 trains a day? 2-3 more trains aren't going to be much of a problem there because they'll never be able to get past all the derailments from the 10-12 trains.
to that last paragraph above ! [emphasis and emoticon added - PDN.]
There's just too much fun to be had here, but this is ancillary to a sidetrack to the main point of this thread - and I've just gotten assigned to a "special project" at work that's likely to keep me busy through the middle of next week; So, briefly:
More to come later.
Brian, Yes, I admit it, my original post was grammatically unsound. I know where Fort McMurray is, as my uncle was an electrical foreman on the original Great Canadian Oil Sands plant, now Suncor, when it was built in 1966. As to Waterways distance from Fort McMurray I was going from my memory of the TRAINS article I mentioned.
I hadn't read the article posted in the link before I posted, so I mixed Mackenzie Northern with Athabasca Northern. MN has a similar history in north west Alberta; original builder-Northern Alberta Railway-CN-Mackenzie Northern-CN.
I was going to post all this and more once I was able to locate links to stories about CP's activities near Edmonton to answer Ulrich's question above. Mention of paper plant's above also got me looking at the Canadian Trackside Guide and SPV's Western Canada Railroad Atlas. I hope to get back to this thread later today.
AgentKid, I'm just curious, are you saying the Arctic Ocean is less than ten miles or so from Fort McMurray? Or that Waterways is? I think it's pretty obvious that the Arctic Ocean is much farther.....much, much farther. Also, Waterways is no longer the terminus of the line nor anywhere near that far from town. You might be looking at a mile, but it's more likely even less than that. The last railway serving town before CN reacquired the trackage was the Athabasca Northern.
First off, we need to figure out whether they are proposing to move oil, or bitumen by rail. They are not the same thing here at all. Very little bitumen is actually shipped by pipe right now, the majority is upgraded in the Fort McMurray area into a synthetic oil blend. That product is very easy to pump, easier in fact than conventional crude oil. Bitumen is more along the line of tar, but as I mentioned, very little is actually shipped in it's raw state anyhow. The material that is shipped in bitumen form, is diluted so that it will flow easily. No heating is required provided it is diluted, and it is pumped to upgraders north east of Edmonton.
My bet would be that they are planning on hauling the upgraded synthetic crude, as it would be easier to sell to people on a spot market type of situation.
The real issue with this plan, is the extreme state of decay associated with the current rail line to Fort McMurray. I have heard it estimated that the upgrade of the line to the standards that would be required for day to day use of this type would be in the neighborhood of 1 billion dollars.
Couple that with the fact that the current railhead is anywhere from 40 or so km from the nearest plant, and 80 or more from the most distant, and I think you would find costs to be a bit prohibitive.
Brian
Interesting thread! Thanks Paul/RWM.
If this idea of the oil train takes off and CN ends up with (picking an average) of 125-150 cars/day and I would wonder which route to refineries it would take: Central US or interchange elsewhere? If Central US I'd wonder how close to needing 2nd track/more sidings CN is through WI. With container traffic coming from the Pacific to Chicago & returning on the CN there are times when (to me anyway) it seems there are some botlenecks, especially if local/manifest trains stay near where they are in terms of quantity & lengty. That being said paper traffic is (was) declining through the same area at the same time. I'm not sure of how many carloads of material that generated (paper) but I'd imagine it was or had the potential to be in the neighborhood of ~100 carloads/day (total). So if the paper industry comes back and the oil is going strong...there you are again I suppose.
Either way...I think this will be an interesting story to follow.
Dan
Paul_D_North_Jr Meaning that the infrastructure was seriously overbuilt in some respects (kind of like the railroad verison of that proverbial glass that's half-full - it's twice as big as it needs to be !) That would be yet another illustration of a principle in many parts of life - if it has a name, I have not heard it - to the effect that you can get away with almost anything on a small scale. It either falls between the cracks, no one notices, no one cares, or if they do, they can work around whatever inconvenience or disruption that it may cause, etc. But when that "exception" becomes the norm, then things change drastically - it cannot always be scaled up from a small minority to a large majority of anything without disproportionate effects showing up. This is another example of that - 20 more cars can be fit in without too much trouble, but 200 are going to have real effects. Except that "It depends" on the "background" pre-existing configuration, condition, and usage of that infrastructure. 200 cars a day is only 2 or 3 decent sized trains. Most of the NS secondaries and mains that I'm familiar with around here could easily handle that with only a pro-rata increase in the maintenance - but then they're almost all 132 RE rail with good ties and ballast - and the traffic is only 2 to 4 trains a day on the secondaries, 30 to 50 trains a day on the 2 main tracks lines, so no new passing sidings, etc. would be needed. If the track(s) is(are) lightly used for what it is - remember, there's no such thing as a partial track, if it's there at all - then it's going to be sitting unused a lot of the time. But I can easily picture a single-track line with 100 lb. jointed rail and sidings at 30 to 50-mile intervals and 10 to 12 trains a day where adding 2 or 3 more trains is going to mean either drastic changes in the scheduling, or a lot of new sidings, etc. However, this doesn't appear to be such as middle or marginal case. Once CN gets past the current year's projection of around 20 cars a day and starts to ramp up on this, each 1 million bbls. per day looks like it will need around 18 trains a day - each way. I doubt those northern ALberta lines have anything near that capability now, and so that's going to force serious infrastructure investment to occur, regardless of what's there now and how it's being used, no question about it. - Paul North.
Meaning that the infrastructure was seriously overbuilt in some respects (kind of like the railroad verison of that proverbial glass that's half-full - it's twice as big as it needs to be !)
That would be yet another illustration of a principle in many parts of life - if it has a name, I have not heard it - to the effect that you can get away with almost anything on a small scale. It either falls between the cracks, no one notices, no one cares, or if they do, they can work around whatever inconvenience or disruption that it may cause, etc. But when that "exception" becomes the norm, then things change drastically - it cannot always be scaled up from a small minority to a large majority of anything without disproportionate effects showing up. This is another example of that - 20 more cars can be fit in without too much trouble, but 200 are going to have real effects.
Except that "It depends" on the "background" pre-existing configuration, condition, and usage of that infrastructure. 200 cars a day is only 2 or 3 decent sized trains. Most of the NS secondaries and mains that I'm familiar with around here could easily handle that with only a pro-rata increase in the maintenance - but then they're almost all 132 RE rail with good ties and ballast - and the traffic is only 2 to 4 trains a day on the secondaries, 30 to 50 trains a day on the 2 main tracks lines, so no new passing sidings, etc. would be needed. If the track(s) is(are) lightly used for what it is - remember, there's no such thing as a partial track, if it's there at all - then it's going to be sitting unused a lot of the time. But I can easily picture a single-track line with 100 lb. jointed rail and sidings at 30 to 50-mile intervals and 10 to 12 trains a day where adding 2 or 3 more trains is going to mean either drastic changes in the scheduling, or a lot of new sidings, etc.
However, this doesn't appear to be such as middle or marginal case. Once CN gets past the current year's projection of around 20 cars a day and starts to ramp up on this, each 1 million bbls. per day looks like it will need around 18 trains a day - each way. I doubt those northern ALberta lines have anything near that capability now, and so that's going to force serious infrastructure investment to occur, regardless of what's there now and how it's being used, no question about it.
Paul, I am skeptical that any line that can bite off an additional 12 MGT/year (the equivalent of 200 286K cars + empty return) with only a pro-rata increase in maintenance is not overmaintained and overinfrastructured. I'm sitting here with a couple of Division Engineers tonight, and they're rolling their eyes.
Railway Man 20 carloads a day is a nice-to-have for a division's revenue figures and will hit the radar screen (for a couple of minutes) on the executive floor. 200 carloads a day is an appreciable quantity, but that's also a threshold level where serious costs start appearing for infrastructure. 20 carloads a day might not be "seen" by the infrastructure for quite a while, but 200 carloads a day will quickly have effects. Generally speaking, if the infrastructure can support a new business with 200 carloads a day during ordinary economic times without a huge cost impact on the infrastructure (on a single-track railroad), someone had really missed the mark on building and maintaining that infrastructure. RWM
20 carloads a day is a nice-to-have for a division's revenue figures and will hit the radar screen (for a couple of minutes) on the executive floor. 200 carloads a day is an appreciable quantity, but that's also a threshold level where serious costs start appearing for infrastructure. 20 carloads a day might not be "seen" by the infrastructure for quite a while, but 200 carloads a day will quickly have effects. Generally speaking, if the infrastructure can support a new business with 200 carloads a day during ordinary economic times without a huge cost impact on the infrastructure (on a single-track railroad), someone had really missed the mark on building and maintaining that infrastructure.
Thanks to all for your thoughtful responses, and dialogue. My initial approach to this was, "Do we laugh at it, or take it seriously ?" I was just treating this as a "back-of-the envelope" exercise (I have big envelopes !) merely to see if this concept had any hope of working out, or if it was just wishful thinking - "Will it get off the ground ?" is a common expression that is used - and was only going as far into it as the results seemed to lead me.
It seems everyone thinks this idea has some merit, and concur that this is probably worthy of further study (by CN or someone). I'm seeing points that indicate a need for a 2nd stage of early study and refinement, not "show-stoppers", and I pretty much agree with all of them. For example, to address just one of the comments (what I think is the most glaring omission in my little exercise) - I was seeing if just the capital cost for the equipment would put this out of the running (it didn't). As a result, I didn't take the time to address the infrastructure needs and costs. But even using a "worst-case" scenario of having to upgrade the whole 2,000 route-miles from Edmonton to the U.S. Gulf Coast at RWM's figure of $2.5 Million per mile would add only $ 5.0 Billion to the $16 Billion for the equipment, for a total of $21 Billion for the rail move, as opposed to $24.7 Billion for the pipeline alternative.
If I have more time tonight or tomorrow morning, I'll try to respond further.
By the way: The 10,000 bbl. / day is the expectation for the end of 2009; 4 million bbl. / day is the ultimate possibility mentioned in the article. But as an "intermediate" or "unit" figure just to simplify the calculations, I used 1 million bbl./ day, since of course it is simple to scale up or down from a nice round figure such as that to other values that might be more applicable as this goes on.
Thanks again.
Paul_D_North_JrThe 1st Financial Post article linked above says that the pipeline charge from Alberta to the U.S. Gulf Coast is $17.95 (Canadian $ ?) per barrel. So let's work with that number a bit little to see what an equivalent rail rate would be, and to assess the possible competitiveness of an all-rail move: 1 barrel = 138.8 kilograms** x 2.2* = 305.4 lbs. / 2,000 lbs. per ton = 0.153 ton. * - Approximate or estimated value, subject to correction and refinement, as well as all subsequent figures that depend on it. (** - For Texas Crude, per WikiAnswers - http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_much_does_1_barrel_of_crude_oil_weigh - I couldn't find a comparable figure for oil sands crude very quickly or easily, so I'll use this one for the time being) 305.4 lbs. per (barrel = 42 gals.) = 7.27 lbs. per gallon (water is about 8.34 lbs. per gallon ["a pound a pint"] ), so this is a relative density of 7.27 / 8.34 = 0.872 - looks OK for now; $17.95 / (barrel = 0.153 ton) = $117/ ton. $117/ ton / 2,000* miles = 5.87 cents per ton-mile. For a 23,000 gal. tank car x 7.27 lbs. per gal. = 167,210 lbs. / 2,000 lbs. per ton = 83.6 tons - OK, well within capacity for a 263,000 lb. gross wt. car = 131.5 tons. 83.6 tons x $117/ ton = $9,780 per carload revenue. $9,780 per car / 2,000 miles = $4.89/ car-mile. For a 100 car train, that would be $489 per train-mile; at 20 MPH, that would be $9,780 per train-hour. Conclusion: Oh, yeah, this pipeline rate is a sitting duck for a well-organized rail move. There's probably a good amount of "monopoly profit" in the pipeline rate - since pipeline capacity is apparently limited and hence constrained and priced higher, so the pipeline rate likely could be lowered in response to rail competition, esp. since the pipeline is already built and in place and up and running - but I doubt if it would get so low as to undercut the rail rates. Definitely worth exploring further. Will be interesting to watch ! - Paul North.
The 1st Financial Post article linked above says that the pipeline charge from Alberta to the U.S. Gulf Coast is $17.95 (Canadian $ ?) per barrel. So let's work with that number a bit little to see what an equivalent rail rate would be, and to assess the possible competitiveness of an all-rail move:
1 barrel = 138.8 kilograms** x 2.2* = 305.4 lbs. / 2,000 lbs. per ton = 0.153 ton.
* - Approximate or estimated value, subject to correction and refinement, as well as all subsequent figures that depend on it.
(** - For Texas Crude, per WikiAnswers - http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_much_does_1_barrel_of_crude_oil_weigh - I couldn't find a comparable figure for oil sands crude very quickly or easily, so I'll use this one for the time being)
305.4 lbs. per (barrel = 42 gals.) = 7.27 lbs. per gallon (water is about 8.34 lbs. per gallon ["a pound a pint"] ), so this is a relative density of 7.27 / 8.34 = 0.872 - looks OK for now;
$17.95 / (barrel = 0.153 ton) = $117/ ton.
$117/ ton / 2,000* miles = 5.87 cents per ton-mile.
For a 23,000 gal. tank car x 7.27 lbs. per gal. = 167,210 lbs. / 2,000 lbs. per ton = 83.6 tons - OK, well within capacity for a 263,000 lb. gross wt. car = 131.5 tons.
83.6 tons x $117/ ton = $9,780 per carload revenue.
$9,780 per car / 2,000 miles = $4.89/ car-mile.
For a 100 car train, that would be $489 per train-mile; at 20 MPH, that would be $9,780 per train-hour.
Conclusion: Oh, yeah, this pipeline rate is a sitting duck for a well-organized rail move. There's probably a good amount of "monopoly profit" in the pipeline rate - since pipeline capacity is apparently limited and hence constrained and priced higher, so the pipeline rate likely could be lowered in response to rail competition, esp. since the pipeline is already built and in place and up and running - but I doubt if it would get so low as to undercut the rail rates. Definitely worth exploring further. Will be interesting to watch !
Paul, I think if you had free, spare infrastructure or very little new infrastructure to move this business, that's one thing. For large quantities, the costs will skyrocket. Moreover, this is a Catch-22 freight business: the bigger the volume becomes, the more economically incentived the shipper is to look for lower-cost alternatives. Long-distance movement of petroleum products by rail in North America has only occurred in special cases:
I know of just one long-term movement of significant quantities of petroleum products by rail in the U.S. not as a result of #2 or #3 above -- in other words, exactly one case where there was a solid economic case for rail versus pipeline. That economic niche is quite small; either the quantities are small and the move not significant, or the quantities large and the economics more favorable for pipeline. That example is the now going on 90-years move of refined petroleum from Denver to Grand Junction, Colo., which amounts to about 50 carloads per day at present, for what was at first Conoco, then Conoco and Vickers, then Conoco, Asamera, and Vickers, then Conoco and Total, and now Suncor. The business has never been quite enough to justify a pipeline, especially because there's truck competition out of North Salt Lake City/Woods Cross, Utah; Roosevelt, Utah; sometimes Sinclair (Parco), Wyoming; and Gary, Colorado, from 1958-1983 or so. And as the business grows, so does the cost of the pipeline; the pipeline economic case has always been just out of reach.
BTU input per ton/mile for pipelines is usually significantly lower than rail, ranging from 2:1 to 4:1 depending upon specific pipeline commodity and route characteristics. That's the Achilles heel of the rail cost delta, because it accumulates over time.
AgentKidhenry6Or does it have to be heated? To pump it, you heat it. Otherwise you use a shovel. AgentKid
henry6Or does it have to be heated?
To pump it, you heat it. Otherwise you use a shovel.
But on the bright side of things, when the unheated car derails, the oil doesn't go too far.
Paul:
Actually, if anyone was seriously thinking about moving 1mm bbl/day of heavy oil, one would probably say, "let's build refineries in Edmonton and push product through pipeline instead." It is highly economically undesirable to move large quantities of low-value unrefined commodities over land for long distances for long periods of time. Even iron ore, which ostensibly moves long distances, is usually only moving half-way to meet the coal, which is also moving half-way.
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