HarveyK400 wrote: My question is how or why permission was given to a passenger train to enter an occupied block from a control point?
I have read all of the responses here and I don't believe this part of the question was ever addressed. I believe that a restricted proceed is commonly used to allow a train to enter an occupied block, regardless of freight or passenger equipment. The obvious reason to me (non railroader) would be to keep the traffic flowing more freely. It also seems to me (non railroader) that this is by no means an unsafe practice if the signalling rules are followed. Please note that I am not considering the non-standard signal issue in my reply, only the matter of the use of restricted proceed on its own merits.
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The piecemeal implementation of railroad signalling you point out is both the cause and opportunity for standardization. The issue is not so much the technologies as it is the signal aspects displayed at control points and approach signals.
My off-the-wall guess is that most current installations would be compliant given the industry and professional objective of making clear distinctions between signal indications and the applicable operating rules. Standardization can be an industry initiative decided by consensus. Hopefully this may deflect further federal involvement that proved to be obstructive in PTC and ADA requirements.
Cost is another matter and a greater challenge given the state of the economy. The federal government may be inclined to invest some money in national infrastructure with a new administration. No one wants to see another interstate bridge collapse; but the railroad industry can point to infrastructure needs as well in the examples of the M&B bridge collapse in Murtlewood, AL and of the Pere Marquette collision. Railroads are better for the environment and energy efficiency as well.
The problem is getting the money without the Catch 22. Zero percent loans? Open grants? A share or redirection of the fuel tax that may still be going into national debt reduction? A piece of an increase in the federal Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax? Any ideas?
Thanks for the insight.
Would it be desirable to install cab signals, automatic train control, on high speed passenger lines despite an overlay of ETMS just to satisfy the FRA while avoiding the qualification process?
Just to clarify, I was talking about the occupied signal block protected by the restricted aspect at a control point; not including all the intermediate blocks and signals to the next control point. The former Conrail main signal blocks in the City were about 1 - 1-1/2 miles long. I suspect this hasn't changed much with NS.
Had the freight train been in the second block ahead, a through approach or diverging approach would be appropriate. However, given the limited aspects with two signal head route signalling, the more restrictive rule would apply for a diverging route at the control point in question. Yes, the train engineer is supposed to know the applicable rule; but the difference from one location to the next is bound to lead to more accidents, it's human nature.
Train warrant operation addresses this problem by requiring radio acknowledgement for authority to move. Dispatcher permission by radio seems to be necessary to enter a block when the signal is red in ABS territory. A resticted aspect at a control point would be no different than a permissive stop indication at an intermediate signal.
Had the freight train been three blocks ahead, a clear, green-over-red, or clear diverging, red-over-green, would be appropriate with no possible confusion.
The patchwork of signal aspects and indications on railroads is bad enough already. Railroads seem to be in a constant state of change with regard to signals, so why not establish a standard? I for one think it's time for a national standard; and the discussion could begin with an evaluation of the Canadian standard and best practices world-wide. For the sake of continuity, adopting Canadian signalling aspects and rules would be desirable if suitable.
Given the report of a red-over-yellow aspect, it's safe to assume that the Red Team no longer rules, and color light signals have replaced the position light that had a 135-deg lower diagonal array under a horizontal, later red, array restricted indication.
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HarveyK400 wrote:If I have opinions, they come from questions that arise in an issue. I have work experience in transportation planning and dealt with a lot of railroad issues from abandonments to commuter services. This was a labor of love. I continue to be a rail advocate and keep trying to find out as much about the industry as possible and to get the facts when something dubiuous comes along. Many issues go beyond my experience and knoledge. This site provides a forum for discussion of concerns and for sharing information.You very well may have more experience than I. One of your valid concerns is cost-effectiveness of investments. PTC involves safety issues that must take into account aspects such as societal values that are difficult to quantify. PTC also can become a political question as well as a political hurdle. The last I heard Positive Train Control was close to acceptance in Michigan. The lack of success in Illinois on the Chicago-St.Louis Corridor led the State to cancel the program and to look to the proven cab signaling technolgy. I didn't know there was so much active interest in PTC among the railroads beside BNSF and UP. I am skeptical of PTC when companies get government R&D contracts to re-invent the technology avoiding someone else's patents. I can be cynical with a good reason too.
If I have opinions, they come from questions that arise in an issue.
I have work experience in transportation planning and dealt with a lot of railroad issues from abandonments to commuter services. This was a labor of love. I continue to be a rail advocate and keep trying to find out as much about the industry as possible and to get the facts when something dubiuous comes along. Many issues go beyond my experience and knoledge. This site provides a forum for discussion of concerns and for sharing information.
You very well may have more experience than I. One of your valid concerns is cost-effectiveness of investments. PTC involves safety issues that must take into account aspects such as societal values that are difficult to quantify. PTC also can become a political question as well as a political hurdle.
The last I heard Positive Train Control was close to acceptance in Michigan. The lack of success in Illinois on the Chicago-St.Louis Corridor led the State to cancel the program and to look to the proven cab signaling technolgy. I didn't know there was so much active interest in PTC among the railroads beside BNSF and UP. I am skeptical of PTC when companies get government R&D contracts to re-invent the technology avoiding someone else's patents. I can be cynical with a good reason too.
The Michigan PTC project is a one-off demonstration project created by the FRA and Amtrak in furtherance of the goal of achieving higher speeds for passenger trains first and a communications-based train-control system second. Not unsurprisingly, given its architecture, encountered severe technical problems. It is grandfathered and not subject to the requirements of 49 CFR 236 Subpart H, the FRA rule published on March 7, 2005, to establish risk-based performance standards for all processor-based train control systems. As a result it is a complete dead-end.
The IDOT project was another FRA effort, this time to create an open-architecture CBTC system and high-speed passenger and floating block. Not unsurprisingly, it encountered severe technical problems and is for all practical purposes shut down.
The BNSF, UP, NS, CSX, and Metra projects do not use government money, do not use government R&D, and do not ask the FRA for anything other than timely and realistic approval of the enormous regulatory hurdle the FRA has put into their path with Subpart H. Subpart H requires the railroad and the system manufactor to jointly and independently prove that their system is at least as safe as the system that came before. That sounds nice, but the systems that came before have no baseline established as the FRA did not require it. So first, you have to go prove the safety of what currently exists, examine all of its failure modes, and establish statistical methodology. The second problem is that signal failure as a cause of injury or property loss is so rare that using accepted statistical methods the events disappear into the noise where you can't prove whether they are explained by the statistical method, or merely random chance. You have to multiply the events by 100X just to bring them into the range where statistics will cover them.
To my knowledge, most of the railroads in the Chicago area have upgraded their automatic block signal systems to solid-state electronics and coded track circuits to eliminate costly wayside pole lines. Cab signalling amounts to a plug-in card, a building block in the system's architecture. It seems so simple. What am I missing?
While some of Chicago has been upgraded there's a heck of a lot that hasn't. Some of the signal engineers I work with are spending their entire careers in Chicago, replacing one interlocking after another. It's extremely expensive if not totally impractical to try to rewire instrument houses in place under heavy traffic because of the testing and interface requirements; we find it much more expedient to yank them out and put a new one done; the disruption to traffic is much less and the chances for things going wrong requiring days to figure out where the program went wrong are much, much, much lower. But Chicago is just one piece of the problem: if we're to standardize aspects, we can't stop there, we've only just extended the frontier outward by a few miles. Then we have to tackle Toledo, and Kansas City, and Pittsburgh, and Cleveland ...
Some of the houses will accept new cards and some won't. It depends on what kind of cards they have and how much room is in the rack. On one project I just completed we were able to add a head to a couple of absolute signals because we had lots of room in a big, new 10x12 house. At some of the other CPs where we are changing aspects and heads we are replacing 6x8 houses of slightly older vintage because they do not have enough room.
The Metra RID, UP West, and maybe the BNSF already have cab signalling for at least part of the lines. For years I have urge NICTD, RTA and CATS (now CMAP) to put cab signalling in their transportation plans for the rest of the network for speed compliance. Metra and Amtrak locomotives and cab control coaches already are equipped for use on lines with cab signalling around Chicago and around the country.
Cab signaling is a technology that won't disappear fast enough to suit me. It has horrible effects on locomotive utilization, it is extremely costly when overlaid onto a wayside signaling system, and it's positive enforcement is very weak. It does not know anything about temporary or permanent speed restrictions, only what the next signal gives you. It will not prevent rear-end collisions as it will happily let you proceed at 20 mph right up to the point where your train makes a hard coupling with the train parked in front of you. Worse, once you have it installed, the FRA will make your railroad cling to it until they pry your railroad's cold, dead fingers off the box and bury the company in a grave inscribed "Our Operating Costs Were Too High." CBTC is vastly superior in every respect, which is why the Class Is are going that way.
I think the problem is that the trade and railfan press has done a great job of reporting on the fancy-schmancy stuff instead of on the stuff that works. If you have a chance, take a look at any information you can find on BNSF's ETMS system (it's a CBTC overlay on existing train-control systems). The hardware and software is made by Wabtec and has been adopted also by BNSF, NS, and Metra, and I think (but am not sure) CSX too. US&S has a competitive system that is being developed for the Alaska Railroad and possibly others.
The NS handles sixteen Amtrak trains out of Chicago, fourteen to Porter, and four continue through Cleveland. Something is needed even if it may not be cost-effective for the entire railroad. This would entail the huge cost of installing cab Reply HarveyK400 Member sinceOctober 2006 1,123 posts Posted by HarveyK400 on Sunday, February 3, 2008 5:46 PM If I have opinions, they come from questions that arise in an issue. I have work experience in transportation planning and dealt with a lot of railroad issues from abandonments to commuter services. This was a labor of love. I continue to be a rail advocate and keep trying to find out as much about the industry as possible and to get the facts when something dubiuous comes along. Many issues go beyond my experience and knoledge. This site provides a forum for discussion of concerns and for sharing information.You very well may have more experience than I. One of your valid concerns is cost-effectiveness of investments. PTC involves safety issues that must take into account aspects such as societal values that are difficult to quantify. PTC also can become a political question as well as a political hurdle. The last I heard Positive Train Control was close to acceptance in Michigan. The lack of success in Illinois on the Chicago-St.Louis Corridor led the State to cancel the program and to look to the proven cab signaling technolgy. I didn't know there was so much active interest in PTC among the railroads beside BNSF and UP. I am skeptical of PTC when companies get government R&D contracts to re-invent the technology avoiding someone else's patents. I can be cynical with a good reason too.To my knowledge, most of the railroads in the Chicago area have upgraded their automatic block signal systems to solid-state electronics and coded track circuits to eliminate costly wayside pole lines. Cab signalling amounts to a plug-in card, a building block in the system's architecture. It seems so simple. What am I missing?The Metra RID, UP West, and maybe the BNSF already have cab signalling for at least part of the lines. For years I have urge NICTD, RTA and CATS (now CMAP) to put cab signalling in their transportation plans for the rest of the network for speed compliance. Metra and Amtrak locomotives and cab control coaches already are equipped for use on lines with cab signalling around Chicago and around the country.The NS handles sixteen Amtrak trains out of Chicago, fourteen to Porter, and four continue through Cleveland. Something is needed even if it may not be cost-effective for the entire railroad. This would entail the huge cost of installing cab signalling or PTC equipment on NS and foreign locomotives using the line. Furthermore, would NS use the same PTC system as Amtrak in Michigan? At least cab signalling shares compatibility whereas PTC seems to be highly proprietary and non-compatible. Reply BaltACD Member sinceMay 2003 From: US 25,292 posts Posted by BaltACD on Sunday, February 3, 2008 1:43 PM TRAINCATS wrote:The Railroads had the cost of changing over to air brakes. It was done for safty. Signaling is an old way of doing things and must be changed. The cost can be managable if done right.And how many billions are you willing to donate to keep the cost manageable? Even on one of todays Class I systems there are at multiplicity of signal system designs, even where the signals display the same aspects. Todays Class I's are made up of many included fallen flag carriers. On all these properties, no signal system was installed in one fell swoop all at the same time and all within the domain of one lead signal engineer with a single technology available. Railroad signal systems have been installed piecemeal over time. Each Subdivision or significant line segment was done as the press of traffic required more capacity and it was determined that the signal system was the most cost effective way to gain the capacity. One fact of life in any company is that leadership chages over time, and with each change in leadership there are changes in ideas, couple the changes in leadership with the ever changing offerings of technology in the area of signals and you begin to come up with compounding levels of signal design over the years. Even in updating antiquted signal systems with modern technology, the entire system cannot be done at the same time. As each year goes by, technology changes.When the Class I's decided to have their Centrailized Train Dispatching centers, one of the biggest problems that was encountered, was to make the multiplicity of signal systems installed in the field appear to operate in the same manner from the Train Dispatcher's view point. Without computers to accomodate the varying requirements of each system encountered it would not have been possible.Signaling is not cheap and it is not easy and it does not tolerate mistakes in design and implementation. Never too old to have a happy childhood! Reply TRAINCATS Member sinceOctober 2007 13 posts Posted by TRAINCATS on Sunday, February 3, 2008 10:03 AM The Railroads had the cost of changing over to air brakes. It was done for safty. Signaling is an old way of doing things and must be changed. The cost can be managable if done right. Reply n012944 Member sinceAugust 2004 From: The 17th hole at TPC 2,283 posts Posted by n012944 on Sunday, February 3, 2008 9:34 AM rrboomer wrote: Above all, the train dispatcher certainly doesn't have the time to tell every train that there is a train ahead.!!!!! I was thinking about this thread last night while I was at work, so I looked at a legnth fo acouple of track segments just after a control point. I found a couple on the desk that I was working that were over 30,000 feet long. This means that depending on the amount of intermediate signals in that block, it is very possible that a train entering that occupied block could be doing so on a clear indication. As a dispatcher, I do not know what indication is out in the field, and to start telling trains what signals they have will lead you to have to cash out your job insurance. An "expensive model collector" Reply rrboomer Member sinceDecember 2001 400 posts Posted by rrboomer on Sunday, February 3, 2008 1:45 AM The engineer is supposed to be qualified to operate upon the territory for which he/she takes the call to go to work on. Qualified, in part, means he/she understands the difference in the signal systems of the various roads they are to operate on. Lets be real, when you (as the engineer) start seeing PRR position light signals in front of the train it certainly should trigger some situational awareness, if it doesn't then perhaps this engineer wasn't fully qualified on this territory and never did understand the signal system. I personally do not feel that a national "One signal fits all" is needed. Above all, the train dispatcher certainly doesn't have the time to tell every train that there is a train ahead.Yes, I have operated over the PRR. Reply Railway Man Member sinceNovember 2007 2,989 posts Posted by Railway Man on Sunday, February 3, 2008 12:04 AM I think this has entered into the realm of opinion. You're arguing there's a need for change, that the cost-benefit threshold has been met, and the technical problems are not extraordinary. I don't see any of that, but I concede that my direct experience with Class I railroad operation, rules, engineering, traffic & marketing, wayside signaling design, construction, and modification, and CBTC design, adaptation, and implementation may have blinded me to the bigger picture. I'm often told by the young bucks that I'm "cynical" or "too negative." If you have any questions you'd like me to answer, or if I can help you in your pursuits, or if you'd like to know my insights why your program isn't happening, fire away. I find your knowledge of railroad operations, signaling, rules, and engineering fascinating. I'm here to help!RWM Reply HarveyK400 Member sinceOctober 2006 1,123 posts Posted by HarveyK400 on Saturday, February 2, 2008 11:18 PM What I call "simplified signaling" is the use of only two signal heads to indicate through or diverging movements. In many cases, this is a rationalization of previous "so-called 'speed signalling.'" Speed signalling was not a practice confined to Eastern roads. This practice was wide-spread, but is in a state of conversion in the case of Metra lines in the Chicago area, the UP, and former BN lines.Adding a signal aspect, whether old electro-mechanical relay-based or modern solid state would not require a complete re-equipping in most cases. In the first instance, additional relays might be hard-wired in the existing cabinet, and often there is room. The railroad may want to replace this equipment anyway; but you can't charge the full cost to adding another aspect. Money also would be spent on cabling and a signal lines; but an additional/replacment signal head can be mounted on the existing mast. The need to consider respacing signals seems moot inasmuch as the signal in advance of a restricted aspect at the control point would show approach. This requires being in contol and prepared to stop short of the next, control point, signal just as in the case of a stop aspect. As far as rulebook changes are concerned, this is virtually routine with every change that comes along. Unless the entire railroad has been converted, signal indications will depend on the rules for individual sites, control points. I do not dispute a rule for restricted speed for the signal indication at the location in question. The onus is on the engine crew to get it right. The point is that signal indications may be non-uniform or in a state of change even on the same railroad, and more so when crews operate over two railroads.Another inconsistency is that, under track warrant practices, orders must be acknowledged. Entering an occupied block strikes me as being similar to operating in track warrant territory and should require notification and acknowledgement.I understand the desire to speed operations, especially for commuter operations, and reduce radio communication by operating on signal indication. However, railroads also treat block signals as advisory, a safety adjunct to train order and timetable operation. I know there is a big push for positive train control. This may prevent a collision at more than restricted speed. I am bothered by a PTC system independent of or without electric track circuits that provide fail-safe features. Automatic train control cab signalling with speed control also prevents collisions above restricted speed. I heard cab signals were unreliable on the Rock Island in the 1960's; yet basically the same technology and hardware were used successfully on the PATCO Lindenwald Line. The North Western eliminated intermediate wayside signal hardware with cab signalling which is a big part of the cost and a hinderance to fixed block re-spacing. Reply Railway Man Member sinceNovember 2007 2,989 posts Posted by Railway Man on Saturday, February 2, 2008 5:17 PM HarveyK400 wrote:The Jon Roma article in the March, 2008 issue was good as far as it went. The simplified signalling used by some railroads is a penny-wise invitation to disaster. Furthermore, the argument that the cost of converting signals on tens of thousands of miles of track would seem to exaggerate the true proportion of an issue that is only relevant at control points with a restricted aspect, and only entails adding or changing a signal indication.My question is how or why permission was given to a passenger train to enter an occupied block from a control point? This was not a swiching move. Why wasn't the engineer at least advised by radio to proceed cautiously to stop short of the train ahead and made an acknowledgement before given a restricted signal? Would this allow a following train to advance or go around? I do this stuff for a living so I find your comments interesting. I don't know what you mean by "simplified signaling". Would you define that? How much money do you think is appropriate to spend to revise U.S. signaling systems, rulebooks, training, and track to provide standardized aspects and indications? Would a trillion dollars be worth it to you? I might underestimate. You probably are thinking I made that number up, so here's some facts. One cannot just "change aspects" at control points without understanding the ramifications of such a change. Unless the signal equipment at that CP is modern solid-state, it will require a complete re-equipping of the control point -- a one-switch end-of-siding control point, which is as simple as it gets, is $500,000. Even if it is solid-state the engineering and field work is easily $50,000-100,000. Before aspects are changed at a CP, it's necessary to consult the aspect charts to see if intermediate signals need to be reaspected and respaced. Respacing a pair of intermediate signals is $100,000 each. Signaling is a system, not a collection of discrete components. Changes to aspects have a dreadful way of rippling. This assumes that track itself doesn't have to move around. Track and signal are hand-in-glove; changes to one often require changes to the other.After all that, then there is new rulebooks, rules training, rules testing, and familiarization to update the train crews, signal department, engineering, and other parties with the new change.The FRA gets a vote too; changing signaling requires an application to those worthies. As to your second point, there is a rule requriring a train to operate at restricted speed with that signal aspect. If a train collides with another train, one or the other of the two trains has de facto disregarded the rule. There is no requirement in the rules for the dispatcher to give the train verbal warning in addition to the signal indication. The situation in Chicago is run-of-the-mill. Every day in the U.S., thousands of trains act on a signal indication that requires the train to proceed at restricted speed against another train in that track. This is commonly found at non-bonded sidings, entrances to yard limits, grade signals, cutting on helpers, work trains, work equipment, and switching off a main track. Most days not one of those trains collides with the other (or itself!). There are hundreds if not thousands of places in the U.S. where the best possible aspect is "proceed at restricted speed." The situation in Chicago is commonplace. If there is desire for a system to predictively brake trains in the case where an operating rule, signal aspect, or instruction is disregarded, then one installs Positive Train Control. The Class I and some Class III railroads are already doing that. NS, CSX, UP, BNSF, and Metra all have major Communications-Based Train-Control programs underway. In the long run this technology will supersede wayside signaling and the problem of nonstandard aspects will solve itself.All due respect to Mr. Roma, who is one of the premier signal historians in the U.S., but the article struck me as an editorial and presented only one side of the story, though he did acknowledge that it would be pretty hard at this point to standardize U.S. signaling. I am sympathetic to the engineman who has to operate over different railroads with different signal aspects. But the engineman in most cases operates on the same track every day, back and forth, and the signal aspects might change on that track maybe twice in his career. He has to qualify on the route. When in doubt, he has to take the safe course. He has to have his head in the game and remember where he is. When two trains collide on a track where they are required to operate at restricted speed, I have no sympathy. Someone disregarded the rules, common sense, and the safe course. The dollar cost in the U.S. on an annual basis of human casualty and property loss due to signal failure, or failure to regard signal indications, is in order-of-magnitude in the $10 million range. I don't think it's incorrect to spend a trillion dollars to reduce human casualty and property loss, but I think there are rather more cost-effective places to spend it than wayside signaling. RWM Reply HarveyK400 Member sinceOctober 2006 1,123 posts Role of signals in Pere Marquette collision Posted by HarveyK400 on Saturday, February 2, 2008 4:46 PM The Jon Roma article in the March, 2008 issue was good as far as it went. The simplified signalling used by some railroads is a penny-wise invitation to disaster. Furthermore, the argument that the cost of converting signals on tens of thousands of miles of track would seem to exaggerate the true proportion of an issue that is only relevant at control points with a restricted aspect, and only entails adding or changing a signal indication.My question is how or why permission was given to a passenger train to enter an occupied block from a control point? This was not a swiching move. Why wasn't the engineer at least advised by radio to proceed cautiously to stop short of the train ahead and made an acknowledgement before given a restricted signal? Would this allow a following train to advance or go around? Reply Join our Community! Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account. 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The NS handles sixteen Amtrak trains out of Chicago, fourteen to Porter, and four continue through Cleveland. Something is needed even if it may not be cost-effective for the entire railroad. This would entail the huge cost of installing cab
The NS handles sixteen Amtrak trains out of Chicago, fourteen to Porter, and four continue through Cleveland. Something is needed even if it may not be cost-effective for the entire railroad. This would entail the huge cost of installing cab signalling or PTC equipment on NS and foreign locomotives using the line.
Furthermore, would NS use the same PTC system as Amtrak in Michigan? At least cab signalling shares compatibility whereas PTC seems to be highly proprietary and non-compatible.
TRAINCATS wrote:The Railroads had the cost of changing over to air brakes. It was done for safty. Signaling is an old way of doing things and must be changed. The cost can be managable if done right.
Railroad signal systems have been installed piecemeal over time. Each Subdivision or significant line segment was done as the press of traffic required more capacity and it was determined that the signal system was the most cost effective way to gain the capacity. One fact of life in any company is that leadership chages over time, and with each change in leadership there are changes in ideas, couple the changes in leadership with the ever changing offerings of technology in the area of signals and you begin to come up with compounding levels of signal design over the years. Even in updating antiquted signal systems with modern technology, the entire system cannot be done at the same time. As each year goes by, technology changes.
When the Class I's decided to have their Centrailized Train Dispatching centers, one of the biggest problems that was encountered, was to make the multiplicity of signal systems installed in the field appear to operate in the same manner from the Train Dispatcher's view point. Without computers to accomodate the varying requirements of each system encountered it would not have been possible.
Signaling is not cheap and it is not easy and it does not tolerate mistakes in design and implementation.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
rrboomer wrote: Above all, the train dispatcher certainly doesn't have the time to tell every train that there is a train ahead.
Above all, the train dispatcher certainly doesn't have the time to tell every train that there is a train ahead.
!!!!! I was thinking about this thread last night while I was at work, so I looked at a legnth fo acouple of track segments just after a control point. I found a couple on the desk that I was working that were over 30,000 feet long. This means that depending on the amount of intermediate signals in that block, it is very possible that a train entering that occupied block could be doing so on a clear indication. As a dispatcher, I do not know what indication is out in the field, and to start telling trains what signals they have will lead you to have to cash out your job insurance.
An "expensive model collector"
The engineer is supposed to be qualified to operate upon the territory for which he/she takes the call to go to work on. Qualified, in part, means he/she understands the difference in the signal systems of the various roads they are to operate on. Lets be real, when you (as the engineer) start seeing PRR position light signals in front of the train it certainly should trigger some situational awareness, if it doesn't then perhaps this engineer wasn't fully qualified on this territory and never did understand the signal system.
I personally do not feel that a national "One signal fits all" is needed. Above all, the train dispatcher certainly doesn't have the time to tell every train that there is a train ahead.
Yes, I have operated over the PRR.
I think this has entered into the realm of opinion. You're arguing there's a need for change, that the cost-benefit threshold has been met, and the technical problems are not extraordinary. I don't see any of that, but I concede that my direct experience with Class I railroad operation, rules, engineering, traffic & marketing, wayside signaling design, construction, and modification, and CBTC design, adaptation, and implementation may have blinded me to the bigger picture. I'm often told by the young bucks that I'm "cynical" or "too negative."
If you have any questions you'd like me to answer, or if I can help you in your pursuits, or if you'd like to know my insights why your program isn't happening, fire away. I find your knowledge of railroad operations, signaling, rules, and engineering fascinating. I'm here to help!
RWM
What I call "simplified signaling" is the use of only two signal heads to indicate through or diverging movements. In many cases, this is a rationalization of previous "so-called 'speed signalling.'" Speed signalling was not a practice confined to Eastern roads. This practice was wide-spread, but is in a state of conversion in the case of Metra lines in the Chicago area, the UP, and former BN lines.
Adding a signal aspect, whether old electro-mechanical relay-based or modern solid state would not require a complete re-equipping in most cases. In the first instance, additional relays might be hard-wired in the existing cabinet, and often there is room. The railroad may want to replace this equipment anyway; but you can't charge the full cost to adding another aspect. Money also would be spent on cabling and a signal lines; but an additional/replacment signal head can be mounted on the existing mast.
The need to consider respacing signals seems moot inasmuch as the signal in advance of a restricted aspect at the control point would show approach. This requires being in contol and prepared to stop short of the next, control point, signal just as in the case of a stop aspect.
As far as rulebook changes are concerned, this is virtually routine with every change that comes along. Unless the entire railroad has been converted, signal indications will depend on the rules for individual sites, control points.
I do not dispute a rule for restricted speed for the signal indication at the location in question. The onus is on the engine crew to get it right. The point is that signal indications may be non-uniform or in a state of change even on the same railroad, and more so when crews operate over two railroads.
Another inconsistency is that, under track warrant practices, orders must be acknowledged. Entering an occupied block strikes me as being similar to operating in track warrant territory and should require notification and acknowledgement.
I understand the desire to speed operations, especially for commuter operations, and reduce radio communication by operating on signal indication. However, railroads also treat block signals as advisory, a safety adjunct to train order and timetable operation.
I know there is a big push for positive train control. This may prevent a collision at more than restricted speed. I am bothered by a PTC system independent of or without electric track circuits that provide fail-safe features.
Automatic train control cab signalling with speed control also prevents collisions above restricted speed. I heard cab signals were unreliable on the Rock Island in the 1960's; yet basically the same technology and hardware were used successfully on the PATCO Lindenwald Line.
The North Western eliminated intermediate wayside signal hardware with cab signalling which is a big part of the cost and a hinderance to fixed block re-spacing.
HarveyK400 wrote:The Jon Roma article in the March, 2008 issue was good as far as it went. The simplified signalling used by some railroads is a penny-wise invitation to disaster. Furthermore, the argument that the cost of converting signals on tens of thousands of miles of track would seem to exaggerate the true proportion of an issue that is only relevant at control points with a restricted aspect, and only entails adding or changing a signal indication.My question is how or why permission was given to a passenger train to enter an occupied block from a control point? This was not a swiching move. Why wasn't the engineer at least advised by radio to proceed cautiously to stop short of the train ahead and made an acknowledgement before given a restricted signal? Would this allow a following train to advance or go around?
The Jon Roma article in the March, 2008 issue was good as far as it went.
The simplified signalling used by some railroads is a penny-wise invitation to disaster. Furthermore, the argument that the cost of converting signals on tens of thousands of miles of track would seem to exaggerate the true proportion of an issue that is only relevant at control points with a restricted aspect, and only entails adding or changing a signal indication.
My question is how or why permission was given to a passenger train to enter an occupied block from a control point? This was not a swiching move. Why wasn't the engineer at least advised by radio to proceed cautiously to stop short of the train ahead and made an acknowledgement before given a restricted signal? Would this allow a following train to advance or go around?
I do this stuff for a living so I find your comments interesting. I don't know what you mean by "simplified signaling". Would you define that?
How much money do you think is appropriate to spend to revise U.S. signaling systems, rulebooks, training, and track to provide standardized aspects and indications? Would a trillion dollars be worth it to you? I might underestimate. You probably are thinking I made that number up, so here's some facts. One cannot just "change aspects" at control points without understanding the ramifications of such a change. Unless the signal equipment at that CP is modern solid-state, it will require a complete re-equipping of the control point -- a one-switch end-of-siding control point, which is as simple as it gets, is $500,000. Even if it is solid-state the engineering and field work is easily $50,000-100,000.
Before aspects are changed at a CP, it's necessary to consult the aspect charts to see if intermediate signals need to be reaspected and respaced. Respacing a pair of intermediate signals is $100,000 each. Signaling is a system, not a collection of discrete components. Changes to aspects have a dreadful way of rippling.
This assumes that track itself doesn't have to move around. Track and signal are hand-in-glove; changes to one often require changes to the other.
After all that, then there is new rulebooks, rules training, rules testing, and familiarization to update the train crews, signal department, engineering, and other parties with the new change.
The FRA gets a vote too; changing signaling requires an application to those worthies.
As to your second point, there is a rule requriring a train to operate at restricted speed with that signal aspect. If a train collides with another train, one or the other of the two trains has de facto disregarded the rule. There is no requirement in the rules for the dispatcher to give the train verbal warning in addition to the signal indication. The situation in Chicago is run-of-the-mill. Every day in the U.S., thousands of trains act on a signal indication that requires the train to proceed at restricted speed against another train in that track. This is commonly found at non-bonded sidings, entrances to yard limits, grade signals, cutting on helpers, work trains, work equipment, and switching off a main track. Most days not one of those trains collides with the other (or itself!). There are hundreds if not thousands of places in the U.S. where the best possible aspect is "proceed at restricted speed." The situation in Chicago is commonplace.
If there is desire for a system to predictively brake trains in the case where an operating rule, signal aspect, or instruction is disregarded, then one installs Positive Train Control. The Class I and some Class III railroads are already doing that. NS, CSX, UP, BNSF, and Metra all have major Communications-Based Train-Control programs underway. In the long run this technology will supersede wayside signaling and the problem of nonstandard aspects will solve itself.
All due respect to Mr. Roma, who is one of the premier signal historians in the U.S., but the article struck me as an editorial and presented only one side of the story, though he did acknowledge that it would be pretty hard at this point to standardize U.S. signaling.
I am sympathetic to the engineman who has to operate over different railroads with different signal aspects. But the engineman in most cases operates on the same track every day, back and forth, and the signal aspects might change on that track maybe twice in his career. He has to qualify on the route. When in doubt, he has to take the safe course. He has to have his head in the game and remember where he is. When two trains collide on a track where they are required to operate at restricted speed, I have no sympathy. Someone disregarded the rules, common sense, and the safe course.
The dollar cost in the U.S. on an annual basis of human casualty and property loss due to signal failure, or failure to regard signal indications, is in order-of-magnitude in the $10 million range. I don't think it's incorrect to spend a trillion dollars to reduce human casualty and property loss, but I think there are rather more cost-effective places to spend it than wayside signaling.
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