https://thewest.com.au/business/mining/bhp-derails-268-car-pilbara-train-which-travelled-92km-without-driver-ng-b881012020z
Probably the best thing that could have done with an unmanned train. Brings up the question why isn't the route protected by a few runaway train turnouts much like SOU RR's Saluda ?
Maybe UP needs one or more after its runaway ?
Anyone know how long this single down hill grade was ? What are some of the US long ones as well ?
Video of the derailment. Take a week to clear up the mess. No indication how long to replace rail ?
https://www.9news.com.au/2018/11/06/06/34/bhp-runaway-train-derailed-in-wa
b The runaway track mentioned could have a prediction circuit that would divert a train above a set speed onto the runaway track much like SOU RRs
The UP track is not considered "Mountain Grade" territory because the gradient is only 1.55%. It is in the category of "Heavy Grade" which is greater than 1% but less than 2% which also has a minimum distance requirement as well.
The switch for the runaway track on Saluda Grade was kept set to divert any eastbound train to the runaway track; if an engineer of an eastbound signaled that he had the train under control the switch was thrown so that the train could continue downgrade. (I do not recall seeing or hearing how the switch was handled for westbound trains. The time that I rode up to Asheville I did not ask the conductor about that matter). Originally there were two runaway tracks, but over the years one was taken out.
It may be possible to have a system which gauged the speed of the descending trains and diverted a train that was running too fast for safety.
Johnny
Of course, if the train had a two-person crew.....
Instead, perhaps they will make the train crewless, which of course will prevent such accidents in the future.
zardozOf course, if the train had a two-person crew..... Instead, perhaps they will make the train crewless, which of course will prevent such accidents in the future.
Being crewless will not prevent the runaway - it will prevent the death of the crew.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD zardoz Of course, if the train had a two-person crew..... Instead, perhaps they will make the train crewless, which of course will prevent such accidents in the future. Being crewless will not prevent the runaway - it will prevent the death of the crew.
zardoz Of course, if the train had a two-person crew..... Instead, perhaps they will make the train crewless, which of course will prevent such accidents in the future.
Being crewless will certainly prevent the death of the crew in the case of a runaway. But it will also prevent runaways that happen to be caused by the crew.
Euclid BaltACD zardoz Of course, if the train had a two-person crew..... Instead, perhaps they will make the train crewless, which of course will prevent such accidents in the future. Being crewless will not prevent the runaway - it will prevent the death of the crew. Being crewless will certainly prevent the death of the crew in the case of a runaway. But it will also prevent runaways that happen to be caused by the crew.
Then it will be caused by computer programmers that had an error in their braking algorythem. Man is falible. Machines made by man are also falible.
To err is human, to really foul up requires a computer.
DeggestyIt may be possible to have a system which gauged the speed of the descending trains and diverted a train that was running too fast for safety.
That's how I udnerstood it worked (using a simple timer). I may be mistaken, though. Wouldn't be the first time.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
EuclidBut it will also prevent runaways that happen to be caused by the crew.
And crews can prevent runaways that happen to be caused by the computer. But you will never hear of those.
BaltACD wrote the following[in part]:
"Then it will be caused by computer programmers that had an error in their braking algorythem. Man is falible. Machines made by man are also falible."
An "...al gory rythem..."
Prophetic? Maybe? Certainly forward looking!
Seems Balt has coined a new term for railroading in this computer age of screw-ups?
The saying of an old head SF engr told me a generation ago when I entered the industry: uphill slow, downhill fast, tonnage first, safety last.
zugmannThat's how I understood it worked (using a simple timer).
So described in the training video for Saluda Grade with the coal train.
Cleaned-up audio: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9IABM8UPplY
SFbrkmnThe saying of an old head SF engr told me a generation ago when I entered the industry: uphill slow, downhill fast, tonnage first, safety last.
Always heard - Safety Fast, Quality Cheap!
zardozInstead, perhaps they will make the train crewless, which of course will prevent such accidents in the future.
My apologies--I tried to make this statement as sarcastically as I could, but I think I failed; I needed a "tongue-in-cheek emoticon.
SFbrkmnThe saying of an old head SF engr told me a generation ago when I entered the industry: uphill slow, downhill fast, tonnage first, safety last
On the CNW, and because the railroad's motto was, "Safety First", we used a variation: "Tonnage first, safety last; run 'em slow instead of fast".
Thank You.
The news contains this provocative nugget:
“While the driver was off the train, it began moving. Every safety mechanism on the train failed as it hurtled driverless through the Pilbara desert.”
This, and the second accident, have me thinking sabotage.
There was an accident with an early Geep many years ago that was reminiscent this -- a large number of 'coincidences' all adding up to produce an incident. Too many coincidences, at least for me.
And I think with the quasi-terrorist intent that rational people would surely conclude, but not quite be able to prove to the police or a judge, that it's intentional...
OvermodThis, and the second accident, have me thinking sabotage.
Can you think of a motive for sabotage? What would it be?
1) Extremist opposed to automation ...Luddites
2) Extremist opposed to Mining
3) Economic terrorism
4) Message to BHP over some grievance
...there are more. No shortage of kooks out there.
I have had an engine where PTC kept cutting out the automatic air brake valve. I've had engines with defects in the automatic brake valve, one was mechanical, the other on an electronic valve where the handle sometimes wouldn't close the contacts. (I've had plenty where the horn button has to be pressed just right for the contacts to make, but that's relatively minor compared to control of the train.)
A coworker of mine had an engine where the Energy Management System (Auto Throttle that operates the throttle/dynamic braking) was engaged and wouldn't disengage.
I was still a conductor when they had a few instances of electronic automatic air brake valves that would go to release by themselves. (When I first read of the train running away with the driver out checking a car, that's the first thing I thought of.)
Last trip I had PTC giving me ghost restrictions while running on clear wayside signals.
I'm sorry, but while I wouldn't completely rule out sabotage, it would be low on the list. A lot of what went wrong seems to be systems that, especially on modern engines, rely heavily on the onboard computer. That's where I would start looking. And the last place those looking to automate the operation will.
In one of the articles linked, I found it funny that someone had the ***** to say that Rio Tinto's automated system they would have more control over a train in that situation. I would guess with everything else failing, communication with a robot train would also be likely to fail. Or not respond to commands.
Jeff
PS. Last Friday afternoon/evening, a manifest derailed at Grand Mound, IA. It took out the power crossovers, signals and shut down both main tracks. I heard $1.5 million worth of damage. Stuff happens.
Investigations of these railroad accidents are always tight lipped, and seem to be getting tighter these days. So I thought it quite unusual that this runaway train investigation would volunteer the incredible detail that “every safety mechanism on the train failed as it hurtled driverless through the Pilbara desert.”
One point that I have not seen mentioned is whether this train began moving because brakes released and it rolled; or whether power was also applied.
Looking at the official curve and gradient diagram book that I was issued with in 1976, the location at 120km is called "Turner" after the nearby (112km) Turner River. This was a 2km long passing siding in 1976 but is now just a location on the double track line. The points may have given access to a short siding for track machines or damaged wagons or may have been a crossover between East and West tracks.
The train consisted of four locomotives and 268 cars each loaded to 160 tonnes in two consists of two units and 134 cars coupled. It weighed more than 40 000 tonnes. The train had ECP brakes. The train was stopped at 211km on a falling 1 in 66 grade (1.5%, the steepest on the line) at an elevation of 450 metres. The line was almost continuously falling gradients to Turner, at an elevation of 210 metres. It is assumed that the brakes remained applied and that the locomotives remained in idle. The train used ECP brakes, so it is unlikely that any change in the brake setting occurred in the relatively short time the train was being inspected. It appears that while the brake application was enough to stop the train it was not enough to continue to hold it on the steep grade. Since the locomotives were in idle and the brakes were applied, the vigilance control (Alertor) system was probably not activated. An early statement suggested forty wagons were destroyed. It may be more than two hundred. Had the train stopped at 216 km, the train would have been on level track. I think it was a bad choice by the train driver to stop on the steepest grade on the line, but presumably he had been advised to stop (by a hot box detector?) and Control agreed to his stopping.
Why the train ran away isn't clear but clearly neither the driver nor control (dispatcher) anticpated the runaway. Loaded trains are normally limited to 30mph but this train was doing 70 with no power applied when it derailed. The location seems well chosen, since the line was cleared and services resumed within a week.
Four SD70ACe locomotives were destroyed in the derailment.
Peter
M636CLooking at the official curve and gradient diagram book that I was issued with in 1976, the location at 120km is called "Turner" after the nearby (112km) Turner River. This was a 2km long passing siding in 1976 but is now just a location on the double track line. The points may have given access to a short siding for track machines or damaged wagons or may have been a crossover between East and West tracks. The train consisted of four locomotives and 268 cars each loaded to 160 tonnes in two consists of two units and 134 cars coupled. It weighed more than 40 000 tonnes. The train had ECP brakes. The train was stopped at 211km on a falling 1 in 66 grade (1.5%, the steepest on the line) at an elevation of 450 metres. The line was almost continuously falling gradients to Turner, at an elevation of 210 metres. It is assumed that the brakes remained applied and that the locomotives remained in idle. The train used ECP brakes, so it is unlikely that any change in the brake setting occurred in the relatively short time the train was being inspected. It appears that while the brake application was enough to stop the train it was not enough to continue to hold it on the steep grade. Since the locomotives were in idle and the brakes were applied, the vigilance control (Alertor) system was probably not activated. An early statement suggested forty wagons were destroyed. It may be more than two hundred. Had the train stopped at 216 km, the train would have been on level track. I think it was a bad choice by the train driver to stop on the steepest grade on the line, but presumably he had been advised to stop (by a hot box detector?) and Control agreed to his stopping. Why the train ran away isn't clear but clearly neither the driver nor control (dispatcher) anticpated the runaway. Loaded trains are normally limited to 30mph but this train was doing 70 with no power applied when it derailed. The location seems well chosen, since the line was cleared and services resumed within a week. Four SD70ACe locomotives were destroyed in the derailment. Peter
Do these trains have hand brakes and if so were any applied when the operator began to make his inspection?
If the train 'ran away' with the brakes applied - did the wheel treads indicate the traditional blue of being overheated; or did the train slide down the grade with all wheels being flat spotted.
There are any number of things that are not adding up with my limited understanding of the incident.
M636C It appears that while the brake application was enough to stop the train it was not enough to continue to hold it on the steep grade.
I am curious about this point. I would conclude that if the braking is enough to stop the train, it would be enough to hold the train. But maybe there are exceptions that I am not aware of. What about the possibility that the brakes released while the train was stopped?
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