PTC: FRA issues FINAL rulemaking...

[samfp1943]

In TRAINSNewswire for this date; August 22,2014, there is the following article title: 

"Trains News Wire FLASH: FRA issues final rule on positive train control"

Published: August 22, 2014

A quick SEARCH of the TRAINS site shows a return of 189 items on the topic : PTC

[The whole PTC regulatory push seemed to get started in 2008 when at Chatsworth, Ca. A Metrolink train plowed into a parked UPRR work train.

 The wreck killed 25 and was eventually laid at the engineer who was found to have been 'Texting' and ran a RED signal...

   The costs to Metrolink were somewhere around $200/$220 million dollars,

( A mandated max on their liability). (The Train Dispatcher was eventually notified by the Metrolink, on-board Conductor of the accident).  It became a 'cause celebre' in Washington as the politicians wanted to be seen to "Do Something" ,   ( my emphasis) for the media.  

The outcome was the Federal Regulatory push for 'POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL' (PTC)  as the cure to prevent further train wrecks.  It was widely stated by the AAR and Chairman Boardman of AMTRAK that the Federally mandated date of Dec 31,2015 would not be met and would require a multi-billion dollar investment by the railroads. ]  

There is less than 17 months left to go in the mandated completion date.

In part, the article in the Newswire says: "... According to the FRA, the final rule revises the annual car limitation to remove cars containing only a residue of poison inhalation hazard materials; replaces the criterion “ruling grade of less than one percent” with the term “heavy grade” as defined in FRA's end-of-train device rule; limits to two per day the number of trains carrying any quantity of poison inhalation hazard materials; and replaces the temporal separation requirement with a requirement that a train carrying any quantity of PIH materials be operated with a vacant block ahead of and behind the train.

  A new exception for PTC-unequipped locomotives used in freight operations and PTC-unequipped freight trains has been added, which allows yard movements by these locomotives and trains to operate on PTC-equipped main track with speed restrictions and with operating rules in place to protect against conflicting movements. Further, the en route failure provision has also been revised to remove the requirement that an absolute block be placed in advance of train movements where the onboard PTC apparatus fails en route, as well as to add several temporary exceptions..."

 

The current Administration seems to be moving the goal posts, on the Rail Industry, as it seeks to write rule-making to solve more problems.

I just wonder how this will all shake out in the coming weeks and months, Head-on collisions seem to be a product of many factors, one of which is drowsy crew members missing signals, and occupying track they are not authorized to occupy...  If PTC warnings are able to be ignored, does a person not think they will be ignored? Will they'fine' the railroads ( as in the recent Bank of America case?)  

      Oil Trains  are already moving at mandated speeds, and thus reducing railroads infrastructure capacity.  

[Overmod]

Not having read the Newswire coverage itself, or seen the formal final rule yet:

I don't see a major issue with any of the items you cited EXCEPT the two-trains-per-day with PIH rule.  Don't most loose-car consists nowadays have at least one car with PIH material of some sort?  That would indicate to me there might be an adoption of longer loose-car consists in order to 'fit in' the same traffic ... which may not be the safest approach ... or the effective concentration of PIH and other hazmat material into the 'two' more dedicated consists, which I'd think increases the potential terrorist hazard as well as the consequences from a fairly wide variety of plausible incidents that might befall those trains.

[samfp1943]

Overmod

Not having read the Newswire coverage itself, or seen the formal final rule yet:

I don't see a major issue with any of the items you cited EXCEPT the two-trains-per-day with PIH rule.  Don't most loose-car consists nowadays have at least one car with PIH material of some sort?  That would indicate to me there might be an adoption of longer loose-car consists in order to 'fit in' the same traffic ... which may not be the safest approach ... or the effective concentration of PIH and other hazmat material into the 'two' more dedicated consists, which I'd think increases the potential terrorist hazard as well as the consequences from a fairly wide variety of plausible incidents that might befall those trains.

Overmod:  

     The rulemaking on PTC seems to be a given, I cannot speak to its implementation in other areas outside of the South Central Kansas area,. BNSF around here, over the last year has had a major push to install new comm and signal equipment ( they have laid Fiber Optic cables, and installed new equipment sheds ( complete with their microwave relay antennas).  Not sure if the OKT sub of the UP is heavily trafficed enough to qualify for PTC (?).  

     My guess is that the rule-making will not effect the traffic on the Wichita,Wellington, Amarillo , and west line (Southern Transcon)  , The line southeast from Wichita through Arkansas Cit (Ark City Sub)  towards Oklahoma City, and Texas seems to be more heavily involved with oil and chemical traffic, as the tank car content of those trains seems to be very high. Just as an observation.  

    My guess, again, is that if it effected their traffic, it would be on the BNSF T-con, where on busy days they seem to have very narrow headway between trains, already. The Capacity issue I spoke to in my OP.

 

[BaltACD]

This effort at 'Rule Making' is mostly about what lines must be covered by PTC.  Since the original PTC mandate was enacted, the carriers have changed routings of HAZMAT and other commodities that have been mandated to have PTC protection.  The changed routings have decreased the track mileage that the PTC requirements ACTUALLY apply to.  The original PTC mandate tried to lock in stone the traffic and routings that were in effect at the passing of the legislation in 2008.  Things change in 7+ years and this 'final rule making' is a attempt to account for the changes..

[zugmann]

Empty blocks ahead and behind trains with pih? 

Man... talk about a nightmare. 

[Overmod]

zugmann

Empty blocks ahead and behind trains with pih? 

Man... talk about a nightmare. 

Why, with only two trains a day subject to the block restrictions...   The limitation on PIH-containing cars HAS to be a bigger potential nightmare...

[BaltACD]

zugmann

Empty blocks ahead and behind trains with pih? 

Man... talk about a nightmare. 

I am wondering what the rules are defining as a block?

If it means a PIH train cannot move on any signal more restricting than Approach and a following train cannot accept a following signal less favorable than approach - it won't be that big of a problem.  If they define blocks as the distance between absolute signals - big problem.

[jeffhergert]

When our ATC/Cab signals fail, they like to issue us absolute blocks.  With an absolute block we can proceed on wayside signals up to 79mph.  Without an absolute block, restricted to 40mph on wayside signal indications. 

Before waysides were added to the former CNW, without an absolute block you could only move at restricted speed.

There were two types of absolute blocks issued.  When there were no waysides, and I think waysides have no been installed all the way along the exCNW, the absolute blocks were issued between control points:  "Absolute block established in advance of your train from CP (or present location) to CP.  No trains are or will be allowed to occupy this block in advance of your movement." 

With wayside signals, it's a little different.  They are still given CP to CP, but instead of the "no trains" part the instructions are GCOR 11.2 governs.  That rule says that within an absolute block, a train or engine can't pass a stop, restricted proceed, or restricting signal indication (except to clear the main track at a switch governed by the signal) without permission from the dispatcher.  If the cab signal is still operative, some failures are of other parts of the system, trains must come to a stop immediately if the cab signal goes to restricting. 

With wayside signals, it's not unusual for a train that has an en route failure to get an absolute block over the entire subdivision at once.

Jeff