why new signals on old line?

[steemtrayn]

gregc

this morning i noticed a new signal bridge on I believe the old Lehigh Valley line in Manville, NJ heading west toward Phillipsburg.  They've done without signals on this line for probably close a century.   

 

 

This line has been signalled for as long as I've known it, going back to pre-Conrail days.

[BRAKIE]

dehusman

A PTC penalty application does NOT meet the thresholds for a Federally mandated toxi test. I have no information whether a penalty application will trigger toxi tests under the railroad's authority.

Well,this I do know..Make a mistake on today's railroad and you get to whiz in a jar and then stand before the man to explain why that mistake happen.

More then likely you will end up with street time or handed your walking papers even if you past the whiz test..

A lot of railroads has ARF hiding in bushes and peeking around corners trying to catch a crew in violation.

[nbrodar]

As to the cost of PTC...my company plans to spend $1.5 to $2 BILLION (thats billion with a B) to impliment PTC.  I believe the total cost across the industry is somewhere between 10 and 15 BILLION. The entire cost of PTC is borne by the rail industry.  That's a lot of dollars that could have went to track improvements, new rolling stock, and more train crews. Those billions in cost will get passed on to the shippers, and ultimately you and I.

I saw an analysis a while ago (I can't remember if it was the FRA or the AAR) that said over the last decade PTC would have saved 12 lives.  Not 1,200, not 120, 12.  That's roughly $1 billion per life.

[dehusman]

JOHN BRUCE III

So basically what you had prior to the 2008 Chatsworth head-on that essentially mandated eventual PTC was Metrolink operating crews who were party animals or their enablers, as well as managers who were looking the other way. Thr political situation was that this had to be fixed, but the unions kept insisting that it was nobody's fault. Now it looks like the resolution will be that, after great expense, you can still have party animals, enablers, and AWOL supervisors running the show (and getting paid for it), but PTC will protect their jobs, since it will keep anyone from screwing up bad enough even to fail a drug test. At least, that's how it looks to me. Unless a hostler or whatever is so loaded he makes an extra hard joint at the mechanical faciliy!

 

Nobody really knows what the penalty application frequency will be since there is no history on this type of system.  You are assuming that every time a penalty application occurs its because some catastrophic event is about to occur.  That's jumping to conclusions.  You aren't considering that there might be a penalty application for reasons other than an impending catastrophic incident.

 

A train is traveling down the railroad at 2am on a Novemeber morning.  A cold front is moving through and the temperature is dropping quickly.  It is operating on clear signals.  A rail breaks in the next block dropping the signal to stop.  Since the bock dropped to stop but the engineer hasn't seen the signal yet, the train has a penalty application to try and get the train stopped before it passes the stop signal.  Nobody is drunk, nobody is being derelict in their duty.  Nobody needs to be drug tested.

 

A train is traveling down the railroad with 85 loads, 22 empties.  Its stops at an intermediate point and sets out a block of 75 loads.  The train departs before the tonnage is updated.  The train thinks its 85/22 but its actually 10/22.  The engineer handles the train based on it being 10/22 but PTC calculates stopping distances based on 85/22 so it is expecting longer stopping distances.  PTC thinks the speed should decrease sooner than the engineer takes action and activates a penalty application.  Nobody is drunk, nobody is being derelict in their duty. Nobody needs to be drug tested.

 

Calm down.

[dehusman]

BRAKIE

 Dave,Just don't bet the farm you just might lose it..I suspect drug testing will continue-gotta put the blame somewhere.

 

 

There are two type of post accident toxi testing.  Federally mandated (the type you were talking about) is only done when the incident meets the federally set thresholds.  The railroad generally does not have the discretion on whether to test in those events.

 

There is also testing permitted on the railroads authority under reasonable suspicion.  That is probably the testing you meant to discuss.  It is NOT federally mandated and is done based on the judgement and policy of the railroad.

 

A PTC penalty application does NOT meet the thresholds for a Federally mandated toxi test.  I have no information whether a penalty application will trigger toxi tests under the railroad's authority.

[BRAKIE]

dehusman

 

BRAKIE

 

JOHN BRUCE III

So would it even result in a drug test, then?

 

 

Yes..IIRC its mandated by the FRA after any incident.

 

 

 

 

FRA mandates drug tests after serious incidents resulting fatalities, hazmat releases and extensive property damage.  Since PTC prevents those things from happening there is no Federal requirement to do toxi testing following a penalty application.

 

Dave,Just don't bet the farm you just might lose it..I suspect drug testing will continue-gotta put the blame somewhere.

[big daydreamer]

This thread has become full of random speculation.

JOHN BRUCE III

Thr political situation was that this had to be fixed, but the unions kept insisting that it was nobody's fault. Now it looks like the resolution will be that, after great expense, you can still have party animals, enablers, and AWOL supervisors running the show (and getting paid for it), but PTC will protect their jobs, since it will keep anyone from screwing up bad enough even to fail a drug test.

• The union protects its members; there is nothing surprising about that.  
• Where does it say that PTC will provent workers from failing a drug test?  
• Where does it say that PTC is designed to eliminate bad management?  

gregc

I don't believe the technology is terribly complicated compared to other systems.    If it were available today, it would be in use, so of course it needs to be developed, but I doubt entirely from scratch. 

...

One simple way of evaluating cost is to compare it to the potential savings.   How many accidents will it prevent, damage to equipment and material being shipped, cost of repairing trackage to restore service, as well as harm to people?

• What other systems are you comparing it to?  Often the biggest challenge is in making all the components work together well within the system.
• "from scratch" is a relative term.  There is always pre-existing technology going into a design, but that doesn't gaurantee easy work.  There is lots of radio and GPS equipment comercially available, but what about the software on the back office servers?  What about the PTC software in the locomotive? Would industry switches on mainline track need their own radios too? These are all questions that should be answered before the system gets put together.

Any cost/benefit evaluation will have to involve educated guesses and scope limits.  Those guesses will involve the probability of an accident and its cost (financial, environmental, or social).  I don't know how the companies do their accounting but I assume the benefit of PTC will be reducing one time accident expenses rather than reducing recurring expenses.  Then they would compare that financial benefit to the financial cost of PTC.  The environmental and social cost/benefit would work similarily.  

It is also possible to combine the different kinds of costs, but that would be too complicated to discuss here. 

[JOHN BRUCE III]

So basically what you had prior to the 2008 Chatsworth head-on that essentially mandated eventual PTC was Metrolink operating crews who were party animals or their enablers, as well as managers who were looking the other way. Thr political situation was that this had to be fixed, but the unions kept insisting that it was nobody's fault. Now it looks like the resolution will be that, after great expense, you can still have party animals, enablers, and AWOL supervisors running the show (and getting paid for it), but PTC will protect their jobs, since it will keep anyone from screwing up bad enough even to fail a drug test. At least, that's how it looks to me. Unless a hostler or whatever is so loaded he makes an extra hard joint at the mechanical faciliy!

[dehusman]

BRAKIE

 

JOHN BRUCE III

So would it even result in a drug test, then?

 

 

Yes..IIRC its mandated by the FRA after any incident.

 

 

FRA mandates drug tests after serious incidents resulting fatalities, hazmat releases and extensive property damage.  Since PTC prevents those things from happening there is no Federal requirement to do toxi testing following a penalty application.

[BRAKIE]

JOHN BRUCE III

So would it even result in a drug test, then?

 

Yes..IIRC its mandated by the FRA after any incident.

[JOHN BRUCE III]

So would it even result in a drug test, then?

[dehusman]

JOHN BRUCE III

  The fatal accidents that PTC could have prevented resulted, let's face it, from intoxicated crews, crews violating existing rules against personal cell phone use, conductors and supervisors refusing to enforce existing rules, etc. I would guess that a PTC-forced stop would decertify an individual engineer --

An engineer is decertified for violating the rule.  PTC prevents violating the rule.  A PTC penalty application isn't necessarily a decertifiable event since the rule wasn't violated.

[JOHN BRUCE III]

dehusman

 

It will prevent a whole bunch of. . . crew decertifications.  It will prevent a lot of opportunities for failure (the vast majority of which do not result in a collision, fatality, derailment or hazmat release now).  That is a good thing.  Is it worth the cost?  Time will tell.

 

 

I think Mr Husman is getting to the heart of things here.  Human error involving main track authority and signal compliance, as he puts it, is covered by rules well over 100 years old. The fatal accidents that PTC could have prevented resulted, let's face it, from intoxicated crews, crews violating existing rules against personal cell phone use, conductors and supervisors refusing to enforce existing rules, etc. I would guess that a PTC-forced stop would decertify an individual engineer -- but it would probably save the job of the official who hadn't been supervising the engineer in the first place. In effect, one view of the project is that it will save the jobs of incompetent mid level officials. What's that worth?

[BRAKIE]

dehusman

PTC is alson NOT being installed on all routes, maybe a third of the main track mileage, only the track that carries passenger trains or a certain amount of the really serious hazmat (which does not include crude oil).

Well,like I said NS is going full blast installing PTC on the Sandusky lines and lines South of Columbus.

The FRA mandate for PTC was Dec 31, 2015 now its Dec 31,2020.

Here's a interesting read on the subject.

http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/ptc/fra-says-ptc-deadline-wont-be-met.html

 

 

[dehusman]

BRAKIE

 If a train carrying hazmat can be stopped before ramming another train that will save millions in property and environmental damages and maybe lives of the crew and civilians which if killed in the wreck and the aftermath will result in more millions in wrongful death lawsuit settlements. 

First off, despite all the hype on the news and in these forums, collisions at speed, major derailments and hazardous material releases that are a major risk are actually pretty few and far between.  PTC will help eliminate the major risks caused primarily by human error involving main track authority and signal compliance.  It probably wouldn't have prevented Lac Megantic (the engines were shut down), or the BNSF derailment in ND (another train derailed into the path of the oil train) or the derailment and fire in Kentucky (track/weather caused) or the derailment on the bridge in Phillie (track caused).   I am having a hard time coming up with a recent oil train derailment that PTC would have prevented.

PTC is alson NOT being installed on all routes, maybe a third of the main track mileage, only the track that carries passenger trains or a certain amount of the really serious hazmat (which does not include crude oil).

It will prevent a whole bunch of potential catastrophes and crew decertifications.  It will prevent a lot of opportunities for failure (the vast majority of which do not result in a collision, fatality, derailment or hazmat release now).  That is a good thing.  Is it worth the cost?  Time will tell.

[BRAKIE]

JOHN BRUCE III

How much of other people's money do you want to spend to solve problems that might have far less expensive solutions?

What price life?

If a train carrying hazmat can be stopped before ramming another train that will save millions in property and environmental damages and maybe lives of the crew and civilians which if killed in the wreck and the aftermath will result in more millions in wrongful death lawsuit settlements.

[gregc]

JOHN BRUCE III

I think there are two questions. One is whether it's technologically feasible

I don't believe the technology is terribly complicated compared to other systems.    If it were available today, it would be in use, so of course it needs to be developed, but I doubt entirely from scratch.

I think it's less complicated than the air traffic control system and automated systems within aircraft.    Consider the number of fast moving aircraft in a crowded area like New York with three major airports and safely doing it in all types of weather.

It looks like it is mostly communications technology that railroads have plenty of experience with and data management.    However, they have a lot of track miles to potentially upgrade.

JOHN BRUCE III

The second question is how much money do you want to spend to completely eliminate risk?

 

I doubt PTC expected to completely eliminate risk/accidents?   And despite the mandate, what is a reasonable amount of time to develop and how many track miles are covered in what timeframe?     Like all technology, it will be replaced with better and less expensive technology  over time.

 

One simple way of evaluating cost is to compare it to the potential savings.   How many accidents will it prevent, damage to equipment and material being shipped, cost of repairing trackage to restore service, as well as harm to people?

 

how much has the current signaling system cost since its genesis in the early 1830s(?) ?   How many accidents has it prevented and money saved, as well as safely increasing capacity?

 

PTC seems inevitable and doable.

[mlehman]

JOHN BRUCE III

The second question is how much money do you want to spend to completely eliminate risk?

I don't think anyone is asserting that PTC will "completely eliminate risk."  So the cost of THAT system is pretty irrelevant, although I'm certain it's high.

The price of PTC is relevant. Got a number? I suspect it's pretty big, but not something that prevents the RRs from moving forward. It's mgmt's priorities.

2015 isn't too far off, but I'm certain that if it's not ready for primetime, the government's not going to insist on anyone wusing a life-safety ssystem before it's viable. In the meantime, companies should be working toward the deadline as best possible, so if there is a delay, it will be minimal. Areas of track where PTC is in operation should be put to use verifying system compliance.

Stalling on safety is just a bad idea. Besides, money and labor are likely as cheap as they'll ever be. Most RRs are doing fine and most commercial lenders see them as good risks if borrowing is needed. Why put this off, any longer.

[JOHN BRUCE III]

I hink there are two questions. One is whether it's technologically feasible: the AAR's official position is "PTC is an unprecedented challenge from both a technical and operational perspective. A properly functioning PTC system must be able to determine the precise location, direction and speed of trains; warn train operators of potential problems; and take immediate action if the operator does not respond to the warning provided by the PTC system. A fully functioning PTC system must also allow for communication between all passenger, commuter and freight rail systems traveling on PTC-equipped track. There is currently no commercially available system that meets these requirements therefore much of the required technology and engineering applications are being developed from scratch. . . .

"However, far too many technological and regulatory barriers exist today, and despite the railroad industry’s best efforts, the 2015 deadline for full implementation of PTC mandated by Congress will not be met."

 

In other words, it will not be done on time, and there is still some question about its feasibility.

 

The second question is how much money do you want to spend to completely eliminate risk? We agree that PTC will not stop grade crossing incidents, nor low speed collisions, nor vaious stuff-happens conditions. You may say that you can never pay enough to eliminate risk -- but you can't eliminate all risk. The 2008 head-on at LA Metrolink that was the impetus for PTC was caused by management not applying existing policies -- the engineer wasn't calling signals to the conductor; the conductor was part of a get-along attitude among crews. Management tolerated this. If people had been doing their jobs according to existing policy, it wouldn't have happened.

 

How much of other people's money do you want to spend to solve problems that might have far less expensive solutions?

[mlehman]

No system is completely failsafe. That's why there are not only signals, but a rule book to govern interpretation of the signals and a human to apply the rules to what they see. I also don't see the logic in blaming the signal system for track defects and failure of a human to comply. It's not designed to deal with those issues.

There are long stretches of unsignaled track where PTC would improve safety without question. On signaled track, it provides redundancy. Presuming the bugs get worked out, it will be an important factor in once again significantly improving RR safety. It's unfortunate, but true that some of the most important safety initiatives in RRing were forced on management by law. Such a system is technically feasible.

And the cost of human life is incalcuable. You can never pay enough to account for someone's life, even though the courts make such determinations regularly.

[JOHN BRUCE III]

Regarding the 1996 accident at Drawbridge, NJ, I found this:

 

"

In a dramatic news conference at the Gateway Hilton in Newark, officials of the National Transportation Safety Board indicated they had found crucial evidence on the second day of their investigation that appeared to explain not only the cause of the derailment, but also why there had been no red signals that might have halted the train and prevented the wreck.

"They said that while the displaced rails resembled a small upward ramp, with the end of one five inches above the other, the rails were still touching so that electrical contact was not broken and a red signal that would have halted the oncoming train was never posted."

[dehusman]

BRAKIE

As you mention PTC will stop the train if the engineer disobeys a signal.

 

 

It goes beyond that.  PTC stops a train if it thinks the engineer ins't going to be able to comply with it.  A train has passed an approach signal, it the engineer doesn't reduce speed to 30 mph/40 passenger (or appropriate speed) the system will have a penalty application.  If the train is approaching a stop signal and the PTC system, knowing the speed of the train, the weight of the train, the location of the train, the location of the signal, will calculate the point at which action has to be taken to stop the train prior to passing the stop signal, if the engineer is operating a train at a speed which will not permit the train to stop prior to passing the signal, the system will initiate a penalty application.

 

A train is going down the railroad, and passes the approach signal, slows to 28 mph and holds that.  PTC figures that it takes 2500 ft to stop that particular train from 28 mph.  If the engineer hasn't started slowing the train prior to 2500 ft before the signal, PTC will apply a penalty application, even though the train hasn't passed a stop signal.

 

PTC also will not stop low speed collisions and exceeding authority.

[BRAKIE]

dehusman

The wayside signals are still needed to inform and give authority to the engineer so he can operate the train without hitting a penalty brake application. Plus PTC is all about stop, there is nothing in PTC about go. So the signals are need to tell the engineer when he can start or speed up.

Absolutely! As I already mention NS is spending millions of dollars upgrading signals to PTC standards..

As you mention PTC will stop the train if the engineer disobeys a signal.

[JOHN BRUCE III]

There are numerous situations PTC doesn't cover. Los Angeles Metrolink had two major accidents that led to the requirement for PTC: a head-on where an engineer was texting instead of watching signals, and a rear-end where the BNSF engineer may have fallen asleep. However, LA Metrolink has had just as many horrific accidents where a driver went around lowered crossing gates and derailed a cab car, which in one case was quickly hit by an oncoming train on the track where it had been deflected in the derailment. PTC would not have prevented either the driver running around the gates or the train hitting the derailed cab car, since that happened before any signal could have stopped the train.

So there are still numerous cases, illustrated by fairly recent fatal accidents, where PTC would not help. I believe the accident at Drawbridge, NJ, where a slightly misaligned drawbridge derailed an Amtrak train, would not have been prevented by PTC, since signals were apparently not affected. The massively fatal accident to a German ICE train caused by a WHEEL that broke under the train would not have been prevented by PTC. Any mudslide, rockslide, errant vehicle or debris on the track, broken rail, misalignmnent,washout, etc that either does not activate signals, or takes place too soon for the train to stop, will not be prevented by PTC.

Thi leads to the puzzling situation that, even though LA Metrolink will be an early adopter of PTC, and has replaced its cab cars with new ones that have elevated cabs and crash-resistant noses, those cab cars now also have most of their forward seats removed, since PTC still won't keep the passengers in those cab cars safe enough to ride in them!

 

[jeffhergert]

In dark territory, PTC would enforce the end of authority, such as a track warrant, the same as a signal indication.  In dark territory, the "signal" to go is the issuance of more authority.  I think the Alaska Railroad is installing PTC on dark portions, as well as the signalled portions of their line.  

Eventually, some predict with future versions of PTC wayside signals will be removes.  All authority and routing, such as taking a siding at a meeting point, will be displayed on the onboard screen.  I think there are valid reasons to keep wayside signalling even then, but I'm not a bean-counter.

Jeff

 

[dehusman]

gregc

It seems the PTC is a automatic and remotely operated system forcing a train to stop, or at least slow down, and is hardly surprising with the technology today.    Which seems to make adding optical signals even more puzzling.

Are optical signals only necessary on passenger lines?

 

PTC applies a penalty STOP on the train, it doesn't slow it down, it stops the train if the train does not or cannot comply with a restrictive condition.  It stops the train before it exceeds the authority.  Conventional cab signal and automatic train stop systems stop the train if it exceeds the authority, PTC stops the train before it exceeds the authority. 

 

The wayside signals are still needed to inform and give authority to the engineer so he can operate the train without hitting a penalty brake application.  Plus PTC is all about stop, there is nothing in PTC about go.  So the signals are need to tell the engineer when he can start or speed up.

[nbrodar]

gregc

 I assume  that it would have access to the same communication channel that remotely control light signals as well as any block detection that may indicate a train in front of it.

i think you much more complicated technology in your pocket (i.e. phone).

 

 

Is it failsafe? Does it work 100% of the time, in 100% of the places?  Does it survive getting the crap beat out of it? Is the GPS recognition fine enough to translate not only what milepost you are at, but also what track you are on?

 

PTC is a tool for train management (and a pretty bad one in my opinion). Not an end all be all. 

 

PTC (as currently structured) cannot confir authority for a train to occupy a section of controlled track.  Only a dispatcher controlled signal or track warrant can.   PTC is an adjunct to these providing for the seperation of trains, not the actual authority for the movement of trains.

[BRAKIE]

I know NS is going full bore on upgrading their signals for PTC  on the sandusky line and the majority of the old PRR signals has been removed from the Ft.Waye Line between Crestline and in Bucyrus,Ohio.

[gregc]

big daydreamer

Google's driverless car technology replaces the driver, not the road.  The car still has to look for and read traffic lights. http://youtube.com/YXylqtEQ0tk?t=6m36s

i didn't think PTC was replacing the train.

I assume  that it would have access to the same communication channel that remotely control light signals as well as any block detection that may indicate a train in front of it.

i think you much more complicated technology in your pocket (i.e. phone).