It is being reported that a BNSF coal train on the Creston Subdivision in SW Iowa has rear-ended a Work Train near Emerson, IA. The cab of the coal train's lead locomotive was sheared off and the two crewmen were killed. Please keep them and their families in your prayers today.
Found this Link to the story:on FOX news:http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/04/17/iowa-freight-train-collision-kills-2-workers/?test=latestnews
Published April 17, 2011
| Associated Press
FTA: "...Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway spokesman Gus Melonas said both trains were headed east when the accident happened about 7 a.m. in McPherson, about 55 miles southwest of Des Moines. The coal train had been going from the Powder River Basin in Wyoming to Chicago with 130 loads of coal. The fuel was to be transferred to another line in Chicago to be sent to an Eastern utility, he said.
The other train was hauling 34 cars of maintenance equipment belonging to the railroad from Bridgeport, Neb., to Creston, Iowa, Melonas said. Both trains had two-person crews.
The conductor and engineer on the coal train were killed, Melonas said. The crew on the other train was not injured..."
The coal train was reported to be running on a Restricting Indication so they knew there was something ahead. Speed was reported to be ~15 mph. With the sight lines at the accident location it likely should have been much less.
Another report on this wreck with photos.
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20110418/NEWS/104180310/Coal-train-rear-ends-another-train-killing-two?Frontpage
Prayers for the deceased crew members, and sympathies for their families.
From the photo with the linked article, it appears that one of the flats carrying the comparatively lightweight MOW equipment rode up and over the frame of the lead locomotive of the coal train. Can't tell if the 'anti-collision posts' in the short nose worked or not, or if the impact and damage crushed the cab, etc.
At the risk of appearing to be callous and cold-hearted, I gotta ask, since no one else has yet (instead of just assuming or stating):
Would Positive Train Control (PTC) have prevented this collision from happening ?
- Paul North.
Paull, asked a valid question. But in light of the Reportage of this Forum in a couple of recent incidents ( Drudge, for one, and the Spartanburg Zoo, for another).
It might be best if we just acknowledge the grief for the two deceased BNSF employees and let the Rail;road and the Federal Inspectors complie their reports.
. I would hate to be in a Court of Law and have comments from a Forum used by attorneys to either defend or make a case based on speculation from an Internet Site..
What kind of track authority, rules, and signals (if any) were governing these two trains?
Which is one reason I asked the question - only.
Not admissible into evidence anyway, on any basis I can think of - even if my identity seems obvious. Let's start with my total lack of first-hand observation of the events and knowledge of the facts, so anything I post is legally not 'relevant' - and based on the 'hearsay' of the newspaper report and other posts, at that - then we'll go from there, if need to.
Bucky Russ:
That area out there is double main track CTC with speeds for freight trains nominally anywhere between 30 and sixty MPH dependent on geometry.
McPherson is the end of double track, east of Ellison. McPherson to Red Oak is single main track because of the Nishnabota River bridge. Photos don't tell you much right now.
PTC has yet to prove itself, has no long term track record and is still a work in progress. (IMHO)
Paul_D_North_Jr Would Positive Train Control (PTC) have prevented this collision from happening ? - Paul North.
No. PTC cannot prevent mistakes.
Mechanical Department "No no that's fine shove that 20 pound set all around the yard... those shoes aren't hell and a half to change..."
The Missabe Road: Safety First
coborn35 Paul_D_North_Jr: Would Positive Train Control (PTC) have prevented this collision from happening ? - Paul North. No. PTC cannot prevent mistakes.
Paul_D_North_Jr: Would Positive Train Control (PTC) have prevented this collision from happening ? - Paul North.
It can't prevent ALL mistakes, but I bet it sure can prevent some.... or at least I hope so.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Such a tragic event. My heart goes out to their families.
What was the weather conditions? Foggy or reduced visability?If running at RS, they should have seen the train or flasher. Not going to speculate. It will be determined later.
Ed
coborn35 No. PTC cannot prevent mistakes.
So the question still stands: Would Positive Train Control (PTC) have prevented this collision from happening ?
mudchicken Bucky Russ: That area out there is double main track CTC with speeds for freight trains nominally anywhere between 30 and sixty MPH dependent on geometry. McPherson is the end of double track, east of Ellison. McPherson to Red Oak is single main track because of the Nishnabota River bridge. Photos don't tell you much right now. PTC has yet to prove itself, has no long term track record and is still a work in progress. (IMHO)
My concern is not about the potential effect of PTC. I was just wondering; between the two trains, whose responsibility was it to avoid the collision? Would it be correct to assume that the coal train should have had a stop signal in advance of the work train? Or do we just not know the details of the two train movements at this time?
And T&E crews wonder why the 'Weed Weasels' do Banner Testing of Restricted Speed rules.
Condolences to the families of those involved.
Death is a hell of price to pay for not complying with the rules, but it is all too frequently the price that is paid in railroading.
Paul_D_North_Jr Prayers for the deceased crew members, and sympathies for their families. From the photo with the linked article, it appears that one of the flats carrying the comparatively lightweight MOW equipment rode up and over the frame of the lead locomotive of the coal train. Can't tell if the 'anti-collision posts' in the short nose worked or not, or if the impact and damage crushed the cab, etc. At the risk of appearing to be callous and cold-hearted, I gotta ask, since no one else has yet (instead of just assuming or stating): Would Positive Train Control (PTC) have prevented this collision from happening ? - Paul North.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
This is the second wreck I've heard about within a year where the cab of an SD70ACe was breeched. Is the SD70ACe inherently unsafe?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- K.P.’s absolute “theorem” from early, early childhood that he has seen over and over and over again: Those that CAUSE a problem in the first place will act the most violently if questioned or exposed.
If you study some of the Photos I,ve seen, the nose and frame post are bent,but intact .The problem with the 2 trains are train tonnage and car weight. The colliding Coal train with 10000 or more tons hit flat cars with mechanical equipment, explaining the flat cars stacking up one on top of the other. At impact, it appears that the eastbound coal train hit the rear of the worktrain and pushed the cars foward until their car weight eventually started the telescoping of the lighter flatcars. This is still a tragedy involving the loss of 2 railroad men and is very unfortunate.
Whatever man builds....the forces developed in nature under some set of specific circumstances can defeat man's creation.
Look no further than the Japanese Nuke plant....all it took was natures 48 foot Tsunami to defeat all the safe guards that man had built into the plant.
The Iowa incident, regrettable though it is, was nothing more than a man failure incident. The train the fatalities occurred on was moving faster than the allowed 'Restricted Speed' and paid the ultimate price for the rules failure.
Without more extensive pictures than I have seen, I would conjecture that the car that rode up and through the locomotive cab was not the car that was struck by the locomotive but was the 2nd or 3rd car and it was launched over the originally impacted car, that was held down by the anti-climbers on the locomotive, and used the impacted car as a ramp to take aim at the locomotive cab. While the nose section of locomotives is designed to withstand impacts, the cab section itself has little more than glass standing between the occupants and a on coming car body.
BaltACD And T&E crews wonder why the 'Weed Weasels' do Banner Testing of Restricted Speed rules. Condolences to the families of those involved. Death is a hell of price to pay for not complying with the rules, but it is all too frequently the price that is paid in railroading.
And I could say that even with all this banner testing, we still have crews violating restricted speed. Are the tests working? Restricted speed is a method of operation - yet many get that stupid 15 or 20mph speed stuck in their mind.
See Al Krug's essay on "Mind-set is dangerous" at: http://www.alkrug.vcn.com/rrfacts/mindset.htm
"I’m intrigued by "mind-set." In the transportation business, mind-set is a killer. It’s ruthless. Nasty. And very, very sneaky. It’s the phenomenon of seeing or hearing what you "want" or "expect" to see. From the Airlines & Railroad Accidents newsgroup."
See also his recounting of the BNSF policy "flip-flop" on where helper crews have to ride under the heading "Helper Crash" for his "Tales From The Krug" for January 31, 2003 at:
http://krugtales.50megs.com/rrpictale/p030131/p030131.htm
Bucyrus What kind of track authority, rules, and signals (if any) were governing these two trains?
What I'd like to know is where was the communication? Didn't the dispatcher notify the crew of the coal train to be looking out for another train ahead and vice versa? This was CTC territory, so the dispatcher center had to have known they had two trains running the same route. Why didn't they know about each other?
I don't want to speculate, but by the looks of it, the coal train's crew didn't even know they were following another train which would really make the situation that much sadder. Perhaps if BNSF crews would call signals and announce periodic stopped conditions like CSX does over the road channel, this tragedy could've been averted. Thoughts and prayers...
Ted M.
got trains?™
See my photos at: http://tedmarshall.rrpicturearchives.net/
Ted Marshall Bucyrus: What kind of track authority, rules, and signals (if any) were governing these two trains? What I'd like to know is where was the communication? Didn't the dispatcher notify the crew of the coal train to be looking out for another train ahead and vice versa? This was CTC territory, so the dispatcher center had to have known they had two trains running the same route. Why didn't they know about each other? I don't want to speculate, but by the looks of it, the coal train's crew didn't even know they were following another train which would really make the situation that much sadder. Perhaps if BNSF crews would call signals and announce periodic stopped conditions like CSX does over the road channel, this tragedy could've been averted. Thoughts and prayers...
Bucyrus: What kind of track authority, rules, and signals (if any) were governing these two trains?
I know up here at least the BN calls out other than clear signals, goes like "BNSF 9177 West, Approach in Advance of Central Ave on Main Track 2, 15 mph, out" or "BNSF 7707 East, Approach in advance of Kimberly on Main Track 1, 35 mph, out"
In signaled territory it is NOT the Dispatchers responsibility to notify trains that they are following or will be coming upon another train....it is the trains responsibility to follow the signal indications displayed and to comply with the speeds and actions that the signal indications convey. The Train Dispatcher has NO IDEA of what indication a signal in the field is actually displaying to a crew....it is the crews responsibility to view the signal and comply with the indication it displays. Not to trivialize this incident, but, it was a man failure incident....nothing more and nothing less.
Even if the train ahead calls signals, that doesn't mean a following train will always here it. Sometimes our dispatchers will tell you if you're going to be second or third out behind other trains. It's not required, but helps to keep trains from blocking crossings. (Telling a train that there is one ahead of it between control points isn' the same as telling it what the signal indications are. Either (s)he sees a track occupancy or (s)he doesn't on their board/screen)
For all we know, the following train may have known there was a train ahead of it. Sometimes that information can be interpreted wrong. For example, if the block beyond the last red signal is a long one, the following train may assume the train ahead is at the far end, not the near end.
From appearances, it looks like this incident is due to human error. Some are already saying this, I guess they know something no one else does. I'll wait for the findings to be released. Sadly, there are two who won't be able to give their side of the story.
Jeff
My guess, and only a guess is that the crew fell asleep.
Lots of that happening these days with the transportation industry (Air Traffic Controllers).
Saw some more picture today, the cab is sheared clean off. There are about 5 flat cars stacked on top of each other right through where the cab should have been. No wonder cab would have prevented this.
coborn35 Saw some more picture today, the cab is sheared clean off. There are about 5 flat cars stacked on top of each other right through where the cab should have been. No wonder cab would have prevented this.
A stronger cab could have easily prevented it. It is just a matter of cost / benefit.
Or everything above the frame = the flat cars sheared took off the 2 vertical "collision posts", too ?
Saying anything about the cause of this collision is mere speculation at this time. We don't know which train was where it wasn't supposed to be if, in fact, that is a factor. Nor do we know speeds, track and weather conditions, singal or lack of signal indications, speeds, appliance application and effects of either train, what happened after the second train passed the last signal, condition or operating condition of the locomotive, and about a million other things not being a BNSF manager or supervisor of that track, trains, and crews that we can discern or know. The discussion of the posts in the locomotive is OK as speculative as it is as long as it pertains to the resulting condition and not as part of the cause. And that's about as far as we can go.
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