EuclidPoint and call may have prevented both the 501 wreck and the Cayce disaster. Point and call was needed for that final operation of the fateful switch at Cayce. But instead, you have a conductor throwing that switch over and over with a lot of other things on his mind. In the end, both switch positions seemed the same to him. He never actually looked at it the final time to consciously determine it was correctly aligned. He just thought he knew it was.
You lose all crediblity when you are so sure what happened when you weren't there.
You can have an opinion of what you think happened or what didn't happen. And there's times I'd be happy to debate those issues. But to speak as if everything you type is an absolute is rediculous.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Euclid: You are stating your opinions and conclusions as though you were there or that these were undeniable facts.
Firelock: Complaining about lawyers and juries and prosecutors is an easy game, but I would be very nervous to have a system without fhem.
zugmann Euclid Point and call may have prevented both the 501 wreck and the Cayce disaster. Point and call was needed for that final operation of the fateful switch at Cayce. But instead, you have a conductor throwing that switch over and over with a lot of other things on his mind. In the end, both switch positions seemed the same to him. He never actually looked at it the final time to consciously determine it was correctly aligned. He just thought he knew it was. You lose all crediblity when you are so sure what happened when you weren't there. You can have an opinion of what you think happened or what didn't happen. And there's times I'd be happy to debate those issues. But to speak as if everything you type is an absolute is rediculous.
Euclid Point and call may have prevented both the 501 wreck and the Cayce disaster. Point and call was needed for that final operation of the fateful switch at Cayce. But instead, you have a conductor throwing that switch over and over with a lot of other things on his mind. In the end, both switch positions seemed the same to him. He never actually looked at it the final time to consciously determine it was correctly aligned. He just thought he knew it was.
I am going by what is in the report.
Do any japan airline pilots use P & C in a cockpit? Or ship crewmen?
charlie hebdoFirelock: Complaining about lawyers and juries and prosecutors is an easy game, but I would be very nervous to have a system without fhem.
Charlie, respectfully, re-read what I said on May 28th. I'm not complaining about the whole system, just the ambitious few that pervert it to their own ends.
Electroliner 1935 Do any japan airline pilots use P & C in a cockpit? Or ship crewmen?
Here is an article about airlines considering using it:
http://code7700.com/pointing_and_calling.htm
Flintlock76 charlie hebdo Firelock: Complaining about lawyers and juries and prosecutors is an easy game, but I would be very nervous to have a system without fhem. Charlie, respectfully, re-read what I said on May 28th. I'm not complaining about the whole system, just the ambitious few that pervert it to their own ends.
charlie hebdo Firelock: Complaining about lawyers and juries and prosecutors is an easy game, but I would be very nervous to have a system without fhem.
Unlike some, I trust the truth -finding and fairness of a jury of peers over some quasi-star chamber proceedings.
What I mean is that the essence of the Point & Call system is what had to be lacking in the Cayce wreck. That essence is simply to look at that switch after you are done using it, see it lined correctly for the main line, and see that it is locked in that position. That is all that was required. If he had done that, the crash would have been impossible. So, obviously, the conductor never did that.
Yet he arrived at that conclusion that he had done that. How could that have happened? How could he have concluded that the switch was lined properly when it was not?
The only way he could have arrived at the wrong conclusion is that he did not make a direct, and concerted observation of the switch position when the work was done.
Instead, he reviewed the use of the switch during that work cycle, and he saw the act of final restoration of the switch and locking as an event that occurred in that work cycle. Yet, he only saw the memory of the familiar process of restoring the switch and not the actual act of doing so.
That event never did actually occur in that work cycle. So why was he convinced he did something that he never did? He was surely convinced as shown by the fact that that the engineer told him he did not see the conductor restore the switch, and that he (the engineer) was in a position where he would have seen it if it happened. Yet the conductor rejected the engineer’s question and doubt, and simply insisted that he had properly restored the switch. Seeing the memory of that act convinced him the switch was properly lined. But the engineer was not convinced, so he walked down the track to check the switch. What the engineer was intending to do amounts to Point & Call for that critical switch.
In the memory of every switchman, there is the act of throwing switches countless times. Yet there is very little memory that distinguishes one of those events from the others.
Therefore the routine of Point & Call would eliminate the possibility that the collective memory of routine switch throwing might also readily provided a false memory of restoring a specific switch when that had not actually occurred.
Secure, remote access to switch throwing would enable a person to check on whether or not they had done it correctly. Many people have this through their phones to turn off lights, AC, etc.
charlie hebdoSecure, remote access to switch throwing would enable a person to check on whether or not they had done it correctly.
There are two problems, though, and at least one further concern. First, the Cayce wreck was facilitated by the automatic signal system being down (ironically enough for installation and configuration of part of the mandated PTC enablement) and I don't think there is any guarantee that secure power to the switch sensor or data integrity from it to a wireless device would be working during such suppression ... the regular signal system of course working much better than recourse to knowingly consulting a device illegal to use while on duty without special permission. Second is the security issue in providing switch-position or train information remotely, although I think that reasonable safeguards could be provided.
The additional concern is precisely the same as with Euclid's clinging to point-and-shoot, which is that it's just as easy for distracted employees to forget as checking the switch twice in the first place. At Cayce, in particular, it might have saved a few seconds if the 'switchman' had been able to confirm the questioned switch position by turning on his phone and seeing its position... but neither an emergency call tried through the radio or a run to the location would have worked in time. Likewise the annals of railroading are full of 'I thought I'd done xxxx' stories -- at Cayce in fact there was an order in place mandating SPAFs to preclude precisely this sort of error -- where "it turned out" memory was faulty; why would miming and mouthing be necessarily any different in a world where children of railroad families walk in the gauge when distracted?
(I trust, of course, that you don't mean setting up apps on the phone that would physically enable throwing switches or lining routes. That would be too awful for words...)
Overmod charlie hebdo Secure, remote access to switch throwing would enable a person to check on whether or not they had done it correctly. This is an interesting thought, and it would be technically easy to integrate with functioning PTC. There are two problems, though, and at least one further concern. First, the Cayce wreck was facilitated by the automatic signal system being down (ironically enough for installation and configuration of part of the mandated PTC enablement) and I don't think there is any guarantee that secure power to the switch sensor or data integrity from it to a wireless device would be working during such suppression ... the regular signal system of course working much better than recourse to knowingly consulting a device illegal to use while on duty without special permission. Second is the security issue in providing switch-position or train information remotely, although I think that reasonable safeguards could be provided. The additional concern is precisely the same as with Euclid's clinging to point-and-shoot, which is that it's just as easy for distracted employees to forget as checking the switch twice in the first place. At Cayce, in particular, it might have saved a few seconds if the 'switchman' had been able to confirm the questioned switch position by turning on his phone and seeing its position... but neither an emergency call tried through the radio or a run to the location would have worked in time. Likewise the annals of railroading are full of 'I thought I'd done xxxx' stories -- at Cayce in fact there was an order in place mandating SPAFs to preclude precisely this sort of error -- where "it turned out" memory was faulty; why would miming and mouthing be necessarily any different in a world where children of railroad families walk in the gauge when distracted? (I trust, of course, that you don't mean setting up apps on the phone that would physically enable throwing switches or lining routes. That would be too awful for words...)
charlie hebdo Secure, remote access to switch throwing would enable a person to check on whether or not they had done it correctly.
This is an interesting thought, and it would be technically easy to integrate with functioning PTC.
Human beings! Get rid of them, they can't be trusted.
The human condition is based on trust - trust of other human beings. There will never be complete safety as long as human beings are involved - and remember, human beings construct and install everything that is not another human being.
Humans are doomed by their own being.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I'm talking about secure app-like things on phones or elsewhere. With proper encryption, why would that be so terrible?
I don't see any indication that the either employee in the Cayce disaster was distracted. And it did not have anything whatsoever to do with forgetting to check the switch. The conductor did not check the switch because he thought it would be unnecessary. Not only did he not forget, but he made a conscious decision to remember restoring the switch. But he remembered wrong. He apparently remembered a switch restoring that was a composite of past switch restoring events. So he reached into his memory of those events and retrieved an example of the act he was supposed to perform but did not perform. He did not properly examine his thought process.
And I agree that a sloppy attitude will not perform point & call with sufficient diligence. First, one has to look at the system with an open mind and see it as a useful tool, and then be willing to use it in good faith. I don't see a chance of that happening in U.S. railroad culture. They would despise it because it implies that they can't do their job on their own. They would despise it because management told them they must use it. If they were forced to use it, they would only do so when being observed by management, and then only begrudgingly with a sense bad faith. They would despise it because they would be embarrassed for appearing to be talking to themselves.
If you had a connection to allow a superior to double check the switch position, he might fail to do it because it is not his job. If you make it his job as well as the job of the field employee, then you have two people bearing responsibility. They already had two people bearing the responsibility and both of them failed to do that.
My only point in mentioning point & call is that it does work, but I do not recommend trying to apply it in U.S. operations. My point is that all it would have taken is the conductor looking at the switch to see how it was lined at the end of their work. It’s not complicated. While that is the simple essence of point & call, it would not require any call, but rather, just a conscious acknowledgement that the points are where they should be. But he did not do that. Instead, he got to the end of the shift and misremembered restoring the switch.
There was an excellent proven safety system in place up to one week before that accident. It was removed to make installation of PCS easier. It should not have been removed until PCS was operational period period period. If it absolutely had to be removed then some extra supervision should have been provided, or stop and proceed before every facing switch, or a speed restriction.
Extra supervision? Easy. Require both the conductor and engineer to verify that the points are right.
High railroad safety is based on redundancy, as well as observation of rules. Thus the three-point protection.
daveklepper There was an excellent proven safety system in place up to one week before that accident. It was removed to make installation of PCS easier. It should not have been removed until PCS was operational period period period. If it absolutely had to be removed then some extra supervision should have been provided, or stop and proceed before every facing switch, or a speed restriction. Extra supervision? Easy. Require both the conductor and engineer to verify that the points are right. High railroad safety is based on redundancy, as well as observation of rules. Thus the three-point protection.
One rule that would apply redundantly is: "When in doubt, take the safest course." The engineer agreed to release track authority while doubting that the switch was properly lined.
Euclid daveklepper There was an excellent proven safety system in place up to one week before that accident. It was removed to make installation of PCS easier. It should not have been removed until PCS was operational period period period. If it absolutely had to be removed then some extra supervision should have been provided, or stop and proceed before every facing switch, or a speed restriction. Extra supervision? Easy. Require both the conductor and engineer to verify that the points are right. High railroad safety is based on redundancy, as well as observation of rules. Thus the three-point protection. The engineer and conductor were already required to verify that the points were right. And they were required to confirm that by filling out a written form. Whatever they actually did to confirm the switch lined for the mainline, they did it after they released their track authority and the Amtrak train was barreling toward the switch and expecting it to be properly lined. They released their track authority while the engineed doubted that the switch was properly lined. Then as time was running out, the engineer reiterated his concern that the switch was wrong, but the conductor would not consider the possibility, so the engineer walked down the track to check for himself. One rule that would apply redundantly is: "When in doubt, take the safest course." The engineer agreed to release track authority while doubting that the switch was properly lined.
The engineer and conductor were already required to verify that the points were right. And they were required to confirm that by filling out a written form. Whatever they actually did to confirm the switch lined for the mainline, they did it after they released their track authority and the Amtrak train was barreling toward the switch and expecting it to be properly lined. They released their track authority while the engineed doubted that the switch was properly lined. Then as time was running out, the engineer reiterated his concern that the switch was wrong, but the conductor would not consider the possibility, so the engineer walked down the track to check for himself.
REMEMBER, when better systems are implemented - higher quality idiots will still defeat them. Thus has been the human experience since the begining of the human race. Nothing has ever been designed and created that some idiot didn't defeat.
I stand corrected. There was redundancy. And it took two to defeat it, not one.
Thanks. But it was dumb to remove the ABS a week before PTC installation.
daveklepperBut it was dumb to remove the ABS a week before PTC installation.
Euclid daveklepper But it was dumb to remove the ABS a week before PTC installation. I certainly agree. It is almost reckless to abruptly suspend a safety system that everyone has become dependent on.
daveklepper But it was dumb to remove the ABS a week before PTC installation.
I certainly agree. It is almost reckless to abruptly suspend a safety system that everyone has become dependent on.
How does one OPERATE two systems at the same time when one system is replacing (from the ground up) the existing system? Stopping operations IS NOT an option.
Inquiring minds want to know.
BaltACDHow does one OPERATE two systems at the same time when one system is replacing (from the ground up) the existing system? Stopping operations IS NOT an option.
Flip a coin to see which signal system you should comply with?
(meanwhile in the real world, sometimes signal systems are suspended....)
I am not saying that they should operate both systems at the same time. I am saying that when shutting down the ABS, they should have replaced it with restricted speed approaching mainline switches from the facing point direction.
What you said:
Euclid I certainly agree. It is almost reckless to abruptly suspend a safety system that everyone has become dependent on.
zugmann What you said: Euclid I certainly agree. It is almost reckless to abruptly suspend a safety system that everyone has become dependent on.
I should have made that more clear as I did in my post immediately prior to this one. Shutting down ABS is okay, but they should have compensated by mitigating the risk that ABS was intended to protect against. That would be common sense, but technically, it was not required.
It is not rocket science to replace one signal system with another in an hour or two, not one week! Sure it may mean miles of duplicate cables (temporarily), but the safety is worth it.
And now... "Gentlemen: round and round she goes, where it stops, nobody knows."
charlie hebdo And now... "Gentlemen: round and round she goes, where it stops, nobody knows."
When all you have is a hammer - every problem looks like a nail.
zugmann When all you have is a hammer - every problem looks like a nail.
Johnny
daveklepperIt is not rocket science to replace one signal system with another in an hour or two, not one week! Sure it may mean miles of duplicate cables (temporarily), but the safety is worth it.
The normal CSX Signal Suspension IS NOT a week long affair.
Normally, the suspension starts at 8 AM on a Friday morning. The Signal Department goes through the necessary 'game time' constructions (which are minimal) and destruction (removing the equipment, signal heads and masts of what is being replaced). The previously installed new signals have their heads turned to a operating position. The newly installed signal cabinets get hooked into the existing signal system of territories adjoining the location(s) involved in the suspension and then the testing commences. When the testing is done, trains cannot be in the affected territories so that the signal department can control the inputs and see that the system's response to those inputs are correct.
A signal suspension for a single control point will affect three control points. If B is the control point where the signals are being changed, the area of the signal suspension will be from A to C, which of necessity includes B. The signals at A toward B, by train message only indicate switch position at A and DO NOT covey movement authority. The same thing applies to signals at C working toward B. Authority for any movements between A and C are speific Track Warrants.
Bulletins announcing the Signal Suspension and how it will operate are issued on the affected territory three or four days prior to the effective date of the suspension. When I was working (I don't know of the PSR procedures after I retired) the Suspension bulletin would list a 'Job Briefing' telephone number to be used by ALL CREWS operating at or through the area affected by the suspension. The phone was manned by a Company Official and/or Employee mentor to explain and discuss the specific requirements necessary to operate through the territory in confomance with the rules put into effect in the suspension area.
Under normal circumsance, things would be changed out and tested satisfactorily by Sunday afternoon at the latest, sometime even by dark on Saturday afternoon. Signal Suspensions would rarely be in effect beyond 60 hours. Once everything is tested and operating properly, the bulletins authorizing the suspension are annulled and the territory returns to operation under the appropriate signal rules. When I was working Signal Suspension, at least from the Dispatcher's perspective were exceedingly serious undertakings.
With every form of human endeavor there comes a point in time when you have to trust in the procedures, training and integrity of the employees to perform the actions they are required to perform.
+1 and thank you for a voice of reason and facts amidst the speculators.
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