Paul of Covington Euclid However, I think it is quite possible that the trial will determine that Bostian had a duty to consciously monitor what was going through his mind at all times while on duty. Who is going to monitor whether an engineer is consciously monitoring what is in his own mind?
Euclid However, I think it is quite possible that the trial will determine that Bostian had a duty to consciously monitor what was going through his mind at all times while on duty.
Who is going to monitor whether an engineer is consciously monitoring what is in his own mind?
Bostain, I fear, will continue to be pawn in the Pennsylvania prosecutors game of 'charge before an election' and withdraw the charges after the election. PA political theater. At least until a Judge attaches jeapordy and/or predjudice to the withdrawal of the charges.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Paul of Covington Who is going to monitor whether an engineer is consciously monitoring what is in his own mind?
I don't know if you want to tread there. Esp. mine. Yeesh.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
The point-and-call safety system would have quite likely prevented this disaster with #188 over-speeding into the curve. The system does not rely on an authority figure monitoring the thoughts in an employee’s head. Instead, it helps the employee better monitor their own thoughts. It is used in Japan and China, but not in North America. However, interestingly, the system was born as a practice of calling signals to other crewmembers, which is a North American practice.
But point and call is a practice in which an employee calls safety-sensitive moves to themselves. Rather than a supervisor monitoring what is in an employee’s mind, point and call method requires an employee to monitor their own mind in a process of reaffirmation using both thought and physical gestures to reinforce thought. It is a very natural way of creating confident assurance that a move is correctly made. For example, it is like throwing a mainline switch and then looking at the points and consciously confirming by saying “switch lined for mainline.”
The fact that the physical gestures of point and calling are required, and can thus be enforced, is what ensures compliance. And with that compliance, the correct mental activity is automatically assured. So there is no need for a supervisor to get inside the head of an employee to learn what they are thinking.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/10/21/reference/jr-gestures/#.XteYV1VKiJA
I've seen the Japan engineers doing this on You Tube. They wear gloves and the point is distinctly seen as the engineer always lifts his/her hand above their head. It seems to me that this combined with a camera on the engineers to make sure they are doing the pointing would provide a good way of keeping the Amtrak engineers focused on their duty and a realiable record in case an incident occurs.
alphasIt seems to me that this combined with a camera on the engineers to make sure they are doing the pointing would provide a good way of keeping the Amtrak engineers focused on their duty and a realiable record in case an incident occurs.
Even a moment's actual thought will reveal that point and call would likely have done vanishingly little to the course of the 188 wreck. He would do whatever little ballet routine means 'resuming speed' and then proceed to open his throttle... surely you aren't proposing he does a little safety dance every 10mph he opens or closes the throttle, with perhaps a special little hand sign whenever he goes for the brake that indicates what mode he intends to use and whether he's going to pull up the ring for bail off.
I think that a great many people would make this a 'rote' behavior and concentrate on the pointing and calling to the clear detriment either of actual outside-situation awareness or actual critical thinking. Those of you who have tried driving through multiple intersections when the cops are watching for 'California rolls' know how easily concerns with stopping in the 'right' few feet and remembering to 'notch the baro' with a little jerk of the brakes can cause you to miss pedestrians, cyclists, or approaching traffic more easily. There's enough wacky over complication of 'train driving' already without adding more feel-good pseudoscience to it.
And you do speak frfom expoerience. Overmod, I can always rely on you for a very sensible critique.
My computer decided to swich the sentence order. Has a mind of its own!
OvermodEven a moment's actual thought will reveal that point and call would likely have done vanishingly little to the course of the 188 wreck.
Except it might have prevented the wreck. The system is more than just a habitual routine. It is a mental discipline intended to eliminate habitual routine. I don't know what items in the approach to the curve would have been triggers for a point and call, but they probably would have been tied to landmarks approaching the restricted curve. Bostian claims he had no memory of the last few minutes leading to the curve. I assume that loss of memory was caused the by the trauma of the accident, and had nothing to do with forgetting where the curve was. So what likely caused the failure to slow down was being preoccupied with thought unrelated to the curve ahead. This is exactly what point and call intends to prevent.
One thing people tend to overlook it how responsive the ACS Sprinters are with a train
[qoute user="Wikipedia"] The locomotives are designed to be capable of accelerating 18 Amfleet cars to maximum speeds as high as 125 mph (201 km/h) on the Northeast Corridor in a little over eight minutes, with trains of eight Amfleets taking two and a half minutes to reach the same speed. [/quote]
It didn't take a very long period of lost situational awareness for the train to be accelerated from legal speed to the final derailment speed. Most likely, less than One Minute.
zugmann Paul of Covington Who is going to monitor whether an engineer is consciously monitoring what is in his own mind? I don't know if you want to tread there. Esp. mine. Yeesh.
Yeah, that might be a dark and scary region.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Euclid The system is more than just a habitual routine. It is a mental discipline intended to eliminate habitual routine.
Used as proposed, with inward-facing cameras watching for every detail and perhaps Winston-Smith-telescreen style reminders, it is a habitual routine intended to eliminate habitual routine. Even more of a confusion of foreground attention than the 'alerters' that turn into habitual routine.
Find a better answer, one that actually works. (It will probably involve interactive dialog with 'something' that also monitors position and speed with knowledge of hazards... and distracted driving; such systems are known.
A cheap, low-tech, and immediately applicable solution would be a second crewman in the cab. Assistant engineer, co-engineer, lookout, "back-up eyeballs," call him or her whatever you will.
"Uh, hey man, aren't you supposed to slow down right about here?"
"OH ***! Thanks for reminding me, dude!"
Flintlock76 A cheap, low-tech, and immediately applicable solution would be a second crewman in the cab. Assistant engineer, co-engineer, lookout, "back-up eyeballs," call him or her whatever you will. "Uh, hey man, aren't you supposed to slow down right about here?" "OH ***! Thanks for reminding me, dude!"
Again I ask, What good did the fireman do in preventing the September 15, 1958 10 am Newark Bay rail accident where the engineer ignored three signals and operated his train into the river. Three crewmen and forty five passengers died.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newark_Bay_rail_accident
It was a lift bridge and it was partway up, sufficient to let the train pass under the part way up bridge deck and the part way down counterweight. So he passed two distant approach signals and the bridges home signal without stopping and we will never know why. He was going too fast for the derail to prevent him from going into the water. No black boxes, no cameras in the fifties. I would like to think that a second set of eyes in the cab would prevent all accidents but they won't. Some perhaps but all, NO. At least 48 people died in the wreck
Electroliner 1935Again I ask, What good did the fireman do in preventing the September 15, 1958 10 am Newark Bay rail accident where the engineer ran the signal and operated his train into the river. They both died.
Well honestly, and I know about the wreck you're speaking of, I'm a Jersey Central fan, it didn't do any good. But, do you know the old saying "One swallow does not a summer make?"
Who know how many wrecks were prevented and not reported as prevented because nothing happened due to that second crewman?
No-one reports accidents that don't happen.
And no-one squeals on a fellow-employee unless the irresponsible behavior of that employee repeats itself over and over until it's obvious the offender is a danger to himself and others.
Flintlock76 Electroliner 1935 Again I ask, What good did the fireman do in preventing the September 15, 1958 10 am Newark Bay rail accident where the engineer ran the signal and operated his train into the river. They both died. Well honestly, and I know about the wreck you're speaking of, I'm a Jersey Central fan, it didn't do any good. But, do you know the old saying "One swallow does not a summer make?" Who know how many wrecks were prevented and not reported as prevented because nothing happened due to that second crewman? No-one reports accidents that don't happen. And no-one squeals on a fellow-employee unless the irresponsible behavior of that employee repeats itself over and over until it's obvious the offender is a danger to himself and others.
Electroliner 1935 Again I ask, What good did the fireman do in preventing the September 15, 1958 10 am Newark Bay rail accident where the engineer ran the signal and operated his train into the river. They both died.
Not all drawbridge incidents are because of Train and Engine crew issues
https://dotlibrary.specialcollection.net/Document?db=DOT-RAILROAD&query=(select+3994)
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Flintlock76No-one reports accidents that don't happen.
True, But I can clain that I have powers to repell Elephants because they never come around me.
But seriously, how many accidents can you identify that were "prevented" by the second individual in the cab?
Also, I have been in DOT's website before but I couldn't get it to recognize me or allow me to get in tonight.
Electroliner 1935True, But I can clain that I have powers to repell Elephants because they never come around me.
You are correct: Correleation does not imply causation.
Electroliner 1935Again I ask, What good did the fireman do in preventing the September 15, 1958 10 am Newark Bay rail accident where the engineer ignored three signals and operated his train into the river. Three crewmen and forty five passengers died.
But that is "inappropriate generalization". Both logical fallacies.
I can't offer any real proof - just anecdotal evidence, but I've seen cases of where having 2 people in the cab kept something bad from happening. If that's not good enough for you, then so be it. But I don't understand why some people are so insistent against 1-man crews when it isn't their butt as the crumple zone?
Electroliner 1935True, But I can claim that I have powers to repel Elephants because they never come around me.
Add to what Jeff says that demanding to prove a negative is a somewhat irritating "logical" practice.
I can think offhand of at least one wreck, on PC in the late 60s if I remember correctly, with three in the cab (all incapacitated or asleep). Mere numbers are no sure guarantee, and in some cases (Cayce being one for sure) any number of people would have just become more casualties.
Zug's point is correct: vigilance is the answer, and it's the call of the people at the throttle, not armchair cognitive scientists or busybodies, as to what is needed and what is effective.
Perhaps Zug can take time out of his campaign prep to detail exactly what training and vigilance procedures and equipment 'ought' to be used for single-man crews in place of what is essentially a buddy system. That would at least get us talking sense again.
OvermodPerhaps Zug can take time out of his campaign prep to detail exactly what training and vigilance procedures and equipment 'ought' to be used for single-man crews in place of what is essentially a buddy system. That would at least get us talking sense again.
I charge $300 an hour.
But I ain't campaigning - I know whatever happens will happen. Will I still be working out here? Who knows. I just don't get why so many are so damned opposed to 2-man operations.
Electroliner 1935But seriously, how many accidents can you identify that were "prevented" by the second individual in the cab?
None. They were "prevented".
zugmannI charge $300 an hour. But I ain't campaigning...
I meant 'campaigning for President'. Never have the chances for a common-sense 'outsider' been better than they are this year...
I do think much of the 'objection' has actually been to one-man rather than two-man crews, with the semantics only turning to question a two-man safety 'advantage' for the sake of argument.
OvermodI meant 'campaigning for President'. Never have the chances for a common-sense 'outsider' been better than they are this year...
In that case: $600 an hour.
Overmod Euclid The system is more than just a habitual routine. It is a mental discipline intended to eliminate habitual routine. Used as proposed, with inward-facing cameras watching for every detail and perhaps Winston-Smith-telescreen style reminders, it is a habitual routine intended to eliminate habitual routine. Even more of a confusion of foreground attention than the 'alerters' that turn into habitual routine. Find a better answer, one that actually works. (It will probably involve interactive dialog with 'something' that also monitors position and speed with knowledge of hazards... and distracted driving; such systems are known.
Well there are things that would “actually work” as you put it. This calls into question the role of Amtrak in causing this disaster. Even something as simple as a warning sign may have prevented the crash. If a company instituted point and call, they surely would have done so in conjunction wayside markers to be acknowledged. Certainly, speed controls would have prevented speeding in the curve. By placing as speed control for one direction entering the curve, the company acknowledged that the curve was too dangerous to rely on simple human perception of the curve. Yet by dim reasoning, they concluded that the speed control was only needed for one direction, and that was not the direction of 188.
Performing point and call does appear to be a habitual routine to casual observers. And it does have a component of habitual routine in assimilating the cues that require the point and call application. But at its core, it is not intended to be a habitual routine, should not be allowed to become habitual routine, and can be done without becoming habitual routine. However if it is done in bad faith by employees who resent management, point and call will accomplish nothing.
It only works for people who honestly admit that they can sometimes have a lapse of attention, and are also people who comprehend the conscious focusing technique. And those people have to welcome the technique as a tool to make their actions safer. Watching point and call being used in Japan gives me the impression that the practitioners do understand and welcome the purpose.
And after all, what happened to 188 was only a mental act of incorrect thought over a very short timeframe. A simple cue to focus attention would likely have ended the daydream and saved the day.
EuclidBut at its core, it is not intended to be a habitual routine, should not be allowed to become habitual routine, and can be done without becoming habitual routine. However if it is done in bad faith by employees who resent management, point and call will accomplish nothing.
And how does it not become habitual routine when you do it over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over?
I'm sure even many of the Japense are doing it out of habit.
zugmann Euclid But at its core, it is not intended to be a habitual routine, should not be allowed to become habitual routine, and can be done without becoming habitual routine. However if it is done in bad faith by employees who resent management, point and call will accomplish nothing. And how does it not become habitual routine when you do it over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over? I'm sure even many of the Japense are doing it out of habit.
Euclid But at its core, it is not intended to be a habitual routine, should not be allowed to become habitual routine, and can be done without becoming habitual routine. However if it is done in bad faith by employees who resent management, point and call will accomplish nothing.
Because the habit is only to recognize the cues that call for the application of the mental technique. The application of the mental technique imposes mindfulness, and that dispells the lack of mindfuless that results from habitual routine.
EuclidAnd after all, what happened to 188 was only a mental act of incorrect thought over a very short timeframe. A simple cue to focus attention would likely have ended the daydream and saved the day.
Which is the real take-home message. Point-and-call adds nothing to proper reflectorized or approach-lit speed advisory signs; you could argue the point-and-call procedure would have helped in the 501 accident (where there technically was a reflectorized sign to be pointed to and called) with as much validity, but it wouldn't substitute for something as simple and sensible as a fixed 'home and distant' signal even without a speed-based ATS enablement.
Part of this is that a system relying on rote performance of haptic actions is comparatively brittle, and very substantially subject to many of the same kinds of subconscious or nonconscious distraction that Bostian was supposed to have suffered.
I have no objection to a railroad 'employee' adopting point-and-call if it enhances their own sense of professional discipline. I do wonder, though, if it truly suits very many North American railroaders, let alone will be recognized as uniformly beneficial if added on top of all the existing adversarial rigmarole Asia an additional mandate and excuse for paper statutory violations...
EuclidBecause the habit is only to recognize the cues that call for the application of the mental technique. The application of the mental technique imposes mindfulness, and that dispells the lack of mindfuless that results from habitual routine.
You strung a lot of words together - but you're still doing the same thing over and over.
I'd be more interested to know how Japanese RRer schedules work.
Overmod an additional mandate and excuse for paper statutory violations...
That's it. If the RR's management can't find a way to fire you over it - they don't want it.
The world runs on routine actions presented to people who make routine reactions to those actions. When a person has to think about their response to an action, their efficiency goes down - it takes more time to think about a reaction and make it than it does for a reflex reaction.
Humans when dealing with repetitve stimuli develop reflexive, unthinking, reactions to those repetitive stimuli. You may have to THINK about a response to a stimuli the first time it happens, the 2nd time less thought is required as you now have experience, on the 150th time within a 2 hour span - there is no thinking allocated to the response.
Overmod Euclid And after all, what happened to 188 was only a mental act of incorrect thought over a very short timeframe. A simple cue to focus attention would likely have ended the daydream and saved the day. Which is the real take-home message. Point-and-call adds nothing to proper reflectorized or approach-lit speed advisory signs; you could argue the point-and-call procedure would have helped in the 501 accident (where there technically was a reflectorized sign to be pointed to and called) with as much validity, but it wouldn't substitute for something as simple and sensible as a fixed 'home and distant' signal even without a speed-based ATS enablement.
Euclid And after all, what happened to 188 was only a mental act of incorrect thought over a very short timeframe. A simple cue to focus attention would likely have ended the daydream and saved the day.
Point and call may have prevented both the 501 wreck and the Cayce disaster. Point and call was needed for that final operation of the fateful switch at Cayce. But instead, you have a conductor throwing that switch over and over with a lot of other things on his mind. In the end, both switch positions seemed the same to him. He never actually looked at it the final time to consciously determine it was correctly aligned. He just thought he knew it was.
You mention the missed reflectorized sign in the 501 wreck. The engineer had a duty to look at that sign which is so easy to do as is passes by. Maybe the engineer took the sign too much for granted. Maybe he did not look for it because he already knew what it required. And in not looking for it, he missed it. But he did not know he missed it. If he were required to perform point and call, he would have been required to know the territory in order to recognize the point and call cues. Then, assuming the sign would be a cue, the engineer would know where it was, look for it, point and call it, and assimilate its meaning to begin slowing down.
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