243129 n012944 It is a safety system overlay. Operations do not depend on it. Had you read the entire thread you would have seen that that has been discussed.
n012944 It is a safety system overlay. Operations do not depend on it.
Had you read the entire thread you would have seen that that has been discussed.
Great. Your statement is still incorrect, and mine is correct.
An "expensive model collector"
243129 n012944 243129 Track #3 should have been removed from service not speed restricted. So you have expertise as a track inspector now? Had the track been removed from service the derailment and injuries would not have happened.
n012944 243129 Track #3 should have been removed from service not speed restricted. So you have expertise as a track inspector now?
243129 Track #3 should have been removed from service not speed restricted.
Track #3 should have been removed from service not speed restricted.
So you have expertise as a track inspector now?
Had the track been removed from service the derailment and injuries would not have happened.
Had the train complied with the slow order, the derailment and injuries would not have happened. I guess you knew back then that your craft could not be trusted to operate withen the rules.
No I have expertise as a railroad engineer and when I see an unsafe condition that could be injurious to personnel and passengers I advocate the safe course should be taken. Had the track been removed from service the derailment and injuries would not have happened. Did you happen to look at the pictures?
n012944It is a safety system overlay. Operations do not depend on it.
243129 charlie hebdo You'd have to show that a properly designed PTC-type system has a higher fail rate than the current human system that's out-of-date by your own admission due to inadequate personnel. You are in the field and the system you depend on goes kaput, now what?
charlie hebdo You'd have to show that a properly designed PTC-type system has a higher fail rate than the current human system that's out-of-date by your own admission due to inadequate personnel.
You are in the field and the system you depend on goes kaput, now what?
It is a safety system overlay. Operations do not depend on it.
Deggesty Would she have the strength to deal with such a situation if the proper tools and replacement were available?
The tools and replacements are available onboard but how to use them is a different story. This is not exclusive to women. In the last 20 or so years of my career I experienced it all too frequently. Amtrak relied on their veteran resource to bail them out, that resource has dwindled and it shows. A burst air hose is now cause for a major delay.
Quoting 243129 "I once asked a conductor with about 5 years of service what she would do if her train suffered a burst air hose. Answer: "Oh we would just call somebody" and the sad part is they (the company) would send somebody!"I hope she knew what an air hose is.ANd, I hope she never has to deal with one. Would she have the strength to deal with such a situation if the proper tools and replacement were available? Grantd, I have yet to see such a situation.
Johnny
Overmod 243129 This particular case is the result of procedures indicated in the title of this thread. Well, there is that, and I don't think anyone can argue that the things indicated in the thread title 'as amended' are not, in in important sense, "kaput" if they produce and then 'enable' someone with the personal and professional characteristics described. (Or his largely undocumented and unsung counterpart on 1371). It's one job of properly-implemented PTC to save these people, and the railroads that helped create them, from some of the fruits of their lack of 'right stuff'. And I think it could be done 'reasonably well' as indicated, with the slow orders being de facto implemented in the signal indications, and in any automatic-train-control enforcement either through speed regulation or penalty braking short of the 'hazard' identified.
243129 This particular case is the result of procedures indicated in the title of this thread.
Well, there is that, and I don't think anyone can argue that the things indicated in the thread title 'as amended' are not, in in important sense, "kaput" if they produce and then 'enable' someone with the personal and professional characteristics described. (Or his largely undocumented and unsung counterpart on 1371).
It's one job of properly-implemented PTC to save these people, and the railroads that helped create them, from some of the fruits of their lack of 'right stuff'. And I think it could be done 'reasonably well' as indicated, with the slow orders being de facto implemented in the signal indications, and in any automatic-train-control enforcement either through speed regulation or penalty braking short of the 'hazard' identified.
Electronic help is fine, I have no problem with that assistance. The problem I have is that the 'basics' are not paid enough attention.
I once asked a conductor with about 5 years of service what she would do if her train suffered a burst air hose. Answer: "Oh we would just call somebody" and the sad part is they (the company) would send somebody!
243129This particular case is the result of procedures indicated in the title of this thread.
OvermodIn this particular case, you do have to be more specific about what 'kaput' means
This particular case is the result of procedures indicated in the title of this thread. Again PTC and whatever other high tech systems to govern train movements fail most engineers, and I speak of Amtrak and Metro-North of which I have had personal experience witnessing some of their 'performances', become lost resulting in massive delays and on occassion catstrophic accidents.
About 20 years or so ago - the CSX Main Frame computers got infected from some form of virus or other computer malady. The virus affected communication lines with various remote computers that depended upon the Main Frame system to provide data to the remote systems and to distribute data that the remote systems generate to the users of the Main Frame system
One of the remote systems attached to the Main Frame was the Computer Aided Dispatching System. CADS runs the Train Dispatching system for the entire CSX System - lining signals, throwing switches, granting and annuling track occupancy authorities for both trains and MofW personnel.
The virus busied up the Communications Lines between the Main Frame and CADS. The busied them to the extend that CADS would crash to inoperatability after about 10 minutes after rebooting from the previous crash. With the continual rebooting, the Dispatcher's ability to properly keep track of the trains and personnel on their territory became tenuous. After several hours of such operation the decision was made to STOP all trains and have them report their locations. The repeated rebooting of the system would not permit Dispatchers to be able to move train ID's to keep up with their actual locations - and thus know where their trains actually were.
Approximately 12 hours from the start of the computer attack, the 'Computer Detectives' discovered what the problem was, that being said, at that time the had no idea of what the FIX would be. The stop gap band aid that was put in place was to sever the communication lines between the Main Frame and CADS. Once the communications lines were severd, CADS could be rebooted and run as a stand alone system.
With CADS running in stand alone - Main Frame originated data such as Crew Names, train loading and a number of other data (high-wide and a number of other train restrictions) elements would have to be manually input by the Train Dispatcher - rather than have the Main Frame supply the data automatically. CADS depended upon the communications system of the Main Frame to distribute Train Messages to the 'Train Messges Only' printers in each crew on duty location, so train messages could not be sent to the printers. CSX has in place a means for CADS to Fax train messages to the crew locations - however, that Fax system operates by going through the Main Frame and the CSX Rules require faxed messages to have 'Transmitted by CSX Technofax' printed on the bottom of messages faxed through that system - that system could not be used.
The back stop band aid was to print out train messages on local printers attached to CADS and then 'hand fax' the messages to the proper crew location. Another element of CSX Rules requires Train Messages recieved at the crew location by means OTHER than the dedicated Train Message Printer or by fax with the CSX Technofax legend on them to be REPEATED to the Dispatcher to insure that everything that was sent was actually received.
To facilitate the handling of train messages in accordance with the rules - virtually ever Extra Train Dispatcher that was not actually working a Dispatching Desk was called in to handle sending the train messages via normal fax machines and then handling the read back after the Train Messages were received by the crews
The 'alternate means of operations' continued for about two days before 'The Masters of Bits and Bytes' discovered how to defeat the virus and then return the communications lines to remote computers to normal operations.
If the normal means of control for a operation fail - bring the operation to a stop until effective control can be reestablished. PTC on today's railroads is a overlay on the Automatic Block Signals that are in effect - those signals are operated by track occupancy circuits, with PTC merely relaying the 'signaled block indications' with the PTC logic 'enforcing' less than full track speed conditions - the automatic block signals would still be operating if only PTC fails - if the automatic block signals and PTC fail - then trains will have to get Dispatcher's permission to pass absolute signals and proceed at restricted speed - the same as is done in signaled territory without PTC.
Take the SAFE course of action.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
243129You are in the field and the system you depend on goes kaput, now what?
In this particular case, you do have to be more specific about what 'kaput' means.
Of course, the 'fail-safe' alternative is to have the system go to a safe speed, or restricted speed if necessary, should any component that goes into the cab-signal display go bad (or if input to it is corrupted). You then have the problem at Cayce, where your methods of dealing with 'inadvertent dark territory' may turn out to have enforcement or technical holes. Even then, a proper implementation of PTC would be reading switch positions with physical wireless transponders that the locomotive would detect 'early enough' to allow a stop if the switch were facing, or avoid a split if trailing.
But the present case is interesting, because a "failure" would be a failure to get the lower speed restriction to 'register' in the system by the time the engineer would need to respond to it. And that might be true whether or not the engineer had received and acknowledged a Form D update regarding any previous version of the slow order.
In a computerized system, the whole process of 'issuing and confirming' an updated order with the train personnel and coding it into the cab signals should be treated as a 'transaction', not fully complete in the same way that changes in interlocking are not deemed 'done' until everything is fully locked and right.
And under that scheme, you have the desirable redundancy that both the engineer's expectation and his observation of signals involve the latest information; if the situation changes after the last Form D an engineer didn't 'zone out on', the signal will catch it; if for some reason there's a glitch or failure in the cab signals, the Form D would have alerted personnel to it. You'd need either two separate failures or a common-mode problem to cause that ... and the most likely constellation of complex failure would produce a stop or delay rather than a runthrough or runover.
Of course, chronic failures or known-bad information is in itself a kind of failure, and the only real defense against that is to fix the underlying problems or points of failure...
charlie hebdoYou'd have to show that a properly designed PTC-type system has a higher fail rate than the current human system that's out-of-date by your own admission due to inadequate personnel.
243129 n012944 charlie hebdo And what about PTC? Wouldn't a properly designed system prevent this? Yes, it does. What happens when the "properly designed system" fails?
n012944 charlie hebdo And what about PTC? Wouldn't a properly designed system prevent this? Yes, it does.
charlie hebdo And what about PTC? Wouldn't a properly designed system prevent this?
And what about PTC? Wouldn't a properly designed system prevent this?
What happens when the "properly designed system" fails?
You'd have to show that a properly designed PTC-type system has a higher fail rate than the current human system that's out-of-date by your own admission due to inadequate personnel.
Deggestyduring WWII--Oak Ridge was added as a stop duirng the war because of the improtant work done there.
As in nuclear development?
Back when orders were issued at a place where the engineer and conductor could meet, they would compare their orders so each would know what the other understood. This could not be done when orders were hooped up along the way, and each had to have confidence that the other understood the order--and if the baggageman (who was often the headend brakeman) also received the orders there had to be a three way confidence.
Now, with radio communication, everyone concerned can make certain that all understand the orders, no matter what the circumstances of the receipt of orders are
I am trying to remember the circumstances .of why a flagstop was not made at Oak Ridge (above Knoxville) during WWII--Oak Ridge was added as a stop duirng the war because of the improtant work done there.
BaltACDIf Metro-North considered it a big deal - neither of the trains would have exceeded the 10 MPH. It is only a big deal because it was such a small deal to the engineers that they seriously violated the Slow Order because 'they forgot'. If it is ingrained to be a Big Deal - you don't forget!
It would seem that Metro North is also afflicted with poor vetting, hiring, training and supervision procedures also.
243129 BaltACD Consecutive trains operating through a 10 MPH slow order at speeds well above that speed. That would represent a big deal to me.
BaltACD Consecutive trains operating through a 10 MPH slow order at speeds well above that speed.
That would represent a big deal to me.
If Metro-North considered it a big deal - neither of the trains would have exceeded the 10 MPH. It is only a big deal because it was such a small deal to the engineers that they seriously violated the Slow Order because 'they forgot'. If it is ingrained to be a Big Deal - you don't forget!
BaltACDConsecutive trains operating through a 10 MPH slow order at speeds well above that speed.
243129 BaltACD So on Metro-North Slow Orders were a little deal. Got it. Says who?
BaltACD So on Metro-North Slow Orders were a little deal. Got it.
Says who?
Consecutive trains operating through a 10 MPH slow order at speeds well above that speed.
DeggestyI do not have any of my old rulebooks here, but I do not remember any signal telling the engineer to slow down.
It would have involved a more complex code than simple whistle or cord signals would convey, and its purpose would be worth less than the operating benefits. Even a code that meant 'check your Form D information right now' was never thought necessary -- although I certainly think that some form of 'heads up' code, even as a request for alerter-like response by the engineer, would be a useful thing in many situations.
In the Metro-North case, an important thing that was happening was a need to transmit (and to receive formal acknowledgement for) several specific reductions to progressively lower speeds over a comparatively short time interval. A non-radio signal would need the specific code for 'change to a slow order', then the information about the limits for the order, then the specific speed CHANGE for the order, including unambiguously both the current speed and the new speed. All this information would then have to be sent back via the channel (as in NORAC 165 and 166) to confirm that the conductor had received and understood it. (That all this would have to occur with the train not moving is implicit in the rules, but is an added concern if trying to get a train over the road!)
Radio greatly shortens this by permitting voice operation (which is one of the NORAC things rolled into the current Form D procedure, if you look at NORAC history) but I don't think even now it's possible to assume that one radio transmission to both employees gets the formal job done: you still have the engineer running the train being responsible for receiving and then acknowledging each change in detail, and then communicating and receiving acknowledgement, also in detail, from the conductor.
Not incidentally, the great physical separation between engineer and conductor on one of these MU trains is an important difference from a Form D confirmation done between two people in the same cab.
BTW, I can't help but agree with Joe that the correct response would have been to take the deflicted portion of Track 3 between crossovers entirely out of service instead of putting a "10mph" slow order on it. That would involve more careful setting and use of crossover switching ... which may be why that wasn't done.
I do not have any of my old rulebooks here, ut I do not remember any signal telling the engineer to slow down. Besides the signal to release brakes and to stop (the same signal--if standing it meant to release the brrakes and if running it meant to stop. There were the signals to stop at the next station (applicable to flag stops?), back up, increase train heat, cut train heat off (that was quite useful if cars were to be cut or added at the next station stop), and a few others.
243129Metro North does not participate in NORAC.
But Metro-North was one of the 'founding' six railroads in the organization that went on to create NORAC, their current rules are heavily based on NORAC, and their current deputy director of operating rules is involved in the revision process for NORAC. So I thought it might be appropriate, in the absence of the actual Metro-North rules, to provide the NORAC equivalent as the 'next best thing' to look at ... until such time as someone provides the correct actual rules and procedures.
charlie hebdoThe procedure of having a crucial speed restriction passed on to the conductor by the engineer so that the conductor can act as a fail-safe on the engineer is comical in its absurd circularity.
That system worked for years before and while I was still working. We worked together cohesively and watched each other's butt. That form of operation has been eroded by what the title of this thread denotes.
Given the acumen of today's 'railroaders' I agree.
However PTC is not the be all to end all. Such systems can, do and will fail and most of today's 'railroaders' would become lost as has been in evidence with Amtrak's recent disasters. Automated addiction.
OvermodI can't find anything regarding issuance or acceptance of emergency slow orders anywhere in the 18th edition of NORAC.
Metro North does not participate in NORAC.
Overmod And how is receipt of such an order supposed to be acknowledged, including the 'issuer's' reasonable assurance that the order has been communicated and received properly?
In this case and in compliance with Metro North rules an addition was made to the DTOBO via radio and should have been repeated to the dispatcher and shared with the conductor. This was not done.
oltmanndNot a Form D?
Clearly the form D is supposed to be used for the purpose - the specific problem here being that while it's good for initial listing of slow orders or other concerns when starting a trip, or adding new issues that come up during a trip, it's not nearly as well suited to new issues that then steadily change, perhaps in a timeframe of minutes, while the train is moving at high speed.
I can't find a copy of Metro-North Operating Rules, but I'd assume that the "Line C" is supposed to refer to something like NORAC 165 (C) which concerns receipt of 'electronically transmitted' material en route. The actual provision there says:
Employees receiving a Form D by electronic transmission must examine each copy for completeness and legibility. They must communicate with the Dispatcher to verify the number and date of each Form D received.
What the procedures really don't cover is a situation in which multiple updates of a quickly worsening concern are being sequentially sent, each overriding the previous in importance. The requirements of the other provisions in 165, and in 166 following, would be difficult to observe in a moving commuter train on an assumedly tight schedule -- not that that's an excuse, but that may explain somewhat how an excessively rigorous procedure might come to be treated with less rigorous observance. To the point that actual forgetfulness intervenes...
As of this time, the report is again available in PDF at the link that rdamon provided:
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1905.pdf
BaltACDSo on Metro-North Slow Orders were a little deal. Got it.
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