BaltACDYou keep harping on 'vetting'. What is your proper level of vetting?
"Harping"? No just pointing out one of the reasons for the recent human error tragedies.
Proper level of vetting is to have experienced operations personnel for an oversight committee made up of seasoned T&E veterans which can also screen prospective candidates, advise instructors, conduct field testing and evaluate trainees. Seasoned operations veterans can better assess the acumen for train operations a candidate possesses than a non experienced in operations Human Resources employee.
charlie hebdoSomewhere in the info on this accident is mention that many railroaders prefer to walk on ties than on the ballast (where they should be) when they must inspect.
What does that have to do with walking on a live track when there was a safe alternative?
charlie hebdoThe benefits and hazards of this practice are obvious to anyone even possessing an IQ in the low average range (80 to 89).
That could be said of the two individuals walking on a live track.
charlie hebdoI don't think this has much to do with training or experience and very little with "vetting."
This shows what little knowledge you have of railroad operations and that you have not read the whole thread.
charlie hebdoI can't find the information now, but I think I once read that NTSB investigation teams for rail accidents do include persons very familiar with railroads and/or the equipment used.
That's cute, but this particular investigation team shows an almost dismaying ignorance of practical railroading. As well as a certain predisposition not to bother acquiring it, as we might deduce from the very long time this mountain has labored to produce the collateral involved, let alone the very sad little molehill that is the published report.
I'm sure there are some people at NTSB who have a deep knowledge of railroad issues. I don't see evidence of their distinctive competence in this investigation, though.
Somewhere in the info on this accident is mention that many railroaders prefer to walk on ties than on the ballast (where they should be) when they must inspect. The benefits and hazards of this practice are obvious to anyone even possessing an IQ in the low average range (80 to 89).
The problem comes, as it often does, when for some reason a railroader's desire to take the easy course (on the ties or in the gauge) outweighs their informed common sense about taking the safe course always. That is not something that I think maps well to a Bayesian framework assuming railroaders are always alert and thinking when in 'dangerous' situations. While I don't have access to any 'intelligence test' data for the two conductors, I suspect they were of at least average intelligence for the job they were filling, which might make them a bit above average compared to the general population. As I noted before, I think this is a case where sloppy discipline, rather than conscious risk-taking or 'poor choices' made rationally, is the principal cause, and no amount of drilling or weed-weasel constant oversight or more frequent little safety meetings and ad hoc job briefings is likely to address that cause in a way that would be -- note I say 'would' because I don't expect this crew of NTSB folks to recognize it -- significant in improving the actual conditions that produced this accident.
I don't think this has much to do with training or experience and very little with "vetting."
Let me be a bit clearer in that the 'vetting' I consider would have helped is in the assessment of character and general traits, not in 'coachability' or the ability to remember complex rules or corporate-culture conventions. What is needed, in a sense, is 'prequalification' of conductor applicants, to assess if they have (for example) the ability to 'live' safety discipline even when tired, or upset, or even forgetting that a mere ten car lengths to the engine can be an eternity in a few seconds if you neglect where you are or what may come upon you.
OvermodThe problem comes, as it often does, when for some reason a railroader's desire to take the easy course (on the ties or in the gauge) outweighs their informed common sense about taking the safe course always. That is not something that I think maps well to a Bayesian framework assuming railroaders are always alert and thinking when in 'dangerous' situations. While I don't have access to any 'intelligence test' data for the two conductors, I suspect they were of at least average intelligence for the job they were filling, which might make them a bit above average compared to the general population. As I noted before, I think this is a case where sloppy discipline, rather than conscious risk-taking or 'poor choices' made rationally, is the principal cause, and no amount of drilling or weed-weasel constant oversight or more frequent little safety meetings and ad hoc job briefings is likely to address that cause in a way that would be -- note I say 'would' because I don't expect this crew of NTSB folks to recognize it -- significant in improving the actual conditions that produced this accident.
I was quite serious. I do not think the jobs require an IQ much above 80.
OvermodLet me be a bit clearer in that the 'vetting' I consider would have helped is in the assessment of character and general traits, not in 'coachability' or the ability to remember complex rules or corporate-culture conventions. What is needed, in a sense, is 'prequalification' of conductor applicants, to assess if they have (for example) the ability to 'live' safety discipline even when tired, or upset, or even forgetting that a mere ten car lengths to the engine can be an eternity in a few seconds if you neglect where you are or what may come upon you.
Character "vetting" (this term is repugnant, reminiscent of other lines of work) is tricky business, especially for traits such as dependability, cautiousness and conscientiousness, although the NEO-PI-R works pretty well, as does the MMPI-2-RF. I also think individuals might be more cautious on their own than when in a group, where they are more likely to feel it's safer to take greater risks.
243129This shows what little knowledge you have of railroad operations and that you have not read the whole thread.
I would like some clarification 243129 as to what you are seemingly asserting. I take it that you are suggesting that the engineer on 175 was:
1) Deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event, or
2) Did not provide true recolection of a very disturbing event where she was involved in the death of two men.
I have some suspicion that her testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced.
Electroliner 1935 243129 This shows what little knowledge you have of railroad operations and that you have not read the whole thread. I would like some clarification 243129 as to what you are seemingly asserting. I take it that you are suggesting that the engineer on 175 was: 1) Deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event, or 2) Did not provide true recolection of a very disturbing event where she was involved in the death of two men. I have some suspicion that her testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced.
243129 This shows what little knowledge you have of railroad operations and that you have not read the whole thread.
Of course, but Joe is obsessed with vetting, training and supervision as the universal factor because he believes he was a perfect engineer.
charlie hebdoOf course, but Joe is obsessed with vetting, training and supervision as the universal factor because he believes he was a perfect engineer.
charlie your immaturity is showing, please stop embarrassing yourself.
Electroliner 1935 I shall answer your question(s) this evening, I have some important tasks to tend to in the meanwhile.
Electroliner 1935I have some suspicion that her [engineer of # 175] testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced.
From the event recorder, it appears that Engineer Reese of #175 began sounding a continuous horn blast lasting 5-7 seconds up to the point of striking the two conductors. It is unclear when Mr. Reese first saw the two conductors. After striking them, she made an emergency application of brakes.
Ms. Reese recalled in her testimony that she first saw the two conductors when her train was 15-20 seconds away from them, and that she immediately laid on the horn. It seems that she did not recall that timing accurately because the horn began 5-7 seconds prior to impact according to the event recorder; and because at 20 seconds, she would have been approximately 2,000 feet from the victims. It seems unlikely that she would have seen them from that distance.
At the train speed of 74 mph, the distance traveled in 7 seconds was 542 feet.
243129 charlie hebdo Of course, but Joe is obsessed with vetting, training and supervision as the universal factor because he believes he was a perfect engineer. charlie your immaturity is showing, please stop embarrassing yourself.
charlie hebdo Of course, but Joe is obsessed with vetting, training and supervision as the universal factor because he believes he was a perfect engineer.
"[Joe] doth protest too much, methinks!"
243129 BaltACD You keep harping on 'vetting'. What is your proper level of vetting? "Harping"? No just pointing out one of the reasons for the recent human error tragedies. Proper level of vetting is to have experienced operations personnel for an oversight committee made up of seasoned T&E veterans which can also screen prospective candidates, advise instructors, conduct field testing and evaluate trainees. Seasoned operations veterans can better assess the acumen for train operations a candidate possesses than a non experienced in operations Human Resources employee.
BaltACD You keep harping on 'vetting'. What is your proper level of vetting?
OK, let's get serious.
You seem to be giving far too much power to a group of veteran/senior operating employees. That sounds like a prescription for problems due to a lack of objectivity.
"Vetting" properly refers to screening new candidates, not hiring. Initial vetting should be limited to screening out applicants, whether in-house or external, on a variety of factors. This is customarily carried out by HR staff for good reasons. While the input of the veterans in establishing some of the criteria could be very useful, railroaders would have little insight or knowledge for determining or measuring some other essential criteria, such as cognitive abilities and personality/emotional factors. Additionally, the veterans would lack the requisite objectivity to be actually part of the hiring process which includes interviews, which must remain in the domain of management. Preventing nepotism and corruption is also essential.
Perhaps you could share with us what some of the criteria and assessment methodologies should include, from a retired veteran's perspective?
Army Vetting at the present time
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/05/14/military-service-most-young-people-dont-qualify-careers/3665840002/
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Euclid Electroliner 1935 I have some suspicion that her [engineer of # 175] testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced. From the event recorder, it appears that Engineer Reese of #175 began sounding a continuous horn blast lasting 5-7 seconds up to the point of striking the two conductors. It is unclear when Mr. Reese first saw the two conductors. After striking them, she made an emergency application of brakes. Ms. Reese recalled in her testimony that she first saw the two conductors when her train was 15-20 seconds away from them, and that she immediately laid on the horn. It seems that she did not recall that timing accurately because the horn began 5-7 seconds prior to impact according to the event recorder; and because at 20 seconds, she would have been approximately 2,000 feet from the victims. It seems unlikely that she would have seen them from that distance. At the train speed of 74 mph, the distance traveled in 7 seconds was 542 feet.
Electroliner 1935 I have some suspicion that her [engineer of # 175] testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced.
The mind is not an accurate recorder of events. This has been proven in many court trials. Also reaction times are not being considered here. How quick can you see something you are not expecting and how quickly can you comprehend and react to it. I am thinking of the parlor game where one holds a dolar bill between someones fingers, drops it and the other person has to catch it. Very few can react in time to catch it knowing it is going to be dropped. The mind has finite reaction times. The engineer had to comprehend that the train was on the path to impact, and then initiate the horn. She also might not have good vision of them because the headlight bright area may have been off the center line of the track because of the curve. There was no way she could prevent the accident. At 75 mph, the men did not have time to move and she could not stop the train in time.
Railroaders work in an unforgiving environment and they pay with their lives for mistakes. Fatalities beget rules. I wish all good health and safe travels.
charlie hebdoYou seem to be giving far too much power to a group of veteran/senior operating employees. That sounds like a prescription for problems due to a lack of objectivity.
This pertains to railroad operations,
"The only source of knowledge is experience"- Chairman Mao.
charlie hebdo"Vetting" properly refers to screening new candidates, not hiring. Initial vetting should be limited to screening out applicants, whether in-house or external, on a variety of factors. This is customarily carried out by HR staff for good reasons.
What are the reasons? What knowledge of daily 'life in the trenches' would an HR person possess? Not having first hand knowledge of the job how can they assess a candidate's acumen? So what are the "good reasons"?
charlie hebdoPerhaps you could share with us what some of the criteria and assessment methodologies should include, from a retired veteran's perspective?
I have shared "some of the criteria and assessment methodologies", did you miss them?
Electroliner 1935 Euclid Electroliner 1935 I have some suspicion that her [engineer of # 175] testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced. From the event recorder, it appears that Engineer Reese of #175 began sounding a continuous horn blast lasting 5-7 seconds up to the point of striking the two conductors. It is unclear when Mr. Reese first saw the two conductors. After striking them, she made an emergency application of brakes. Ms. Reese recalled in her testimony that she first saw the two conductors when her train was 15-20 seconds away from them, and that she immediately laid on the horn. It seems that she did not recall that timing accurately because the horn began 5-7 seconds prior to impact according to the event recorder; and because at 20 seconds, she would have been approximately 2,000 feet from the victims. It seems unlikely that she would have seen them from that distance. At the train speed of 74 mph, the distance traveled in 7 seconds was 542 feet. The mind is not an accurate recorder of events. This has been proven in many court trials. Also reaction times are not being considered here. How quick can you see something you are not expecting and how quickly can you comprehend and react to it. I am thinking of the parlor game where one holds a dolar bill between someones fingers, drops it and the other person has to catch it. Very few can react in time to catch it knowing it is going to be dropped. The mind has finite reaction times. The engineer had to comprehend that the train was on the path to impact, and then initiate the horn. She also might not have good vision of them because the headlight bright area may have been off the center line of the track because of the curve. There was no way she could prevent the accident. At 75 mph, the men did not have time to move and she could not stop the train in time. Railroaders work in an unforgiving environment and they pay with their lives for mistakes. Fatalities beget rules. I wish all good health and safe travels.
I am not saying that she should have reacted quicker. I was just responding to your comment in which you suspect that what the engineer remembers was not totally correct in that it appears by the event recorder to not match what actually occurred in regard to timing of recognition of the two conductors and initiating the horn warning. I do not think that she did anything wrong in her recognition and horn initiation. It is just that it does not quite match her testimony, which is what you said you expected. I agree that she could have easily made a small error in estimating that timing, going by memory after the fact.
I don't know to what extent she can be faulted for waiting until impact before making the emergency application. That is always a critical point, and investigators did bear down on that point in her interview. I agree that 5 seconds [if that is the time she had] would not have made a significant difference by providing a longer interval for the conductors to spontaneously come to a realization of their immediate peril. Every second does count, but something like 1/10 second for instance, does not count much.
Nevertheless, the issue is significant because some engineers say thay they would not make an emergency application until impact (if impact occurs). In the case of stalled motor vehicles for instance, this withholding of the emergency application could result in a death. This is entirely beside the point of whether or not the emergency application could actually stop the train before impact. Usually, it cannot do that. But that excuse is a red herring in my opinion.
The point is that even if there is not time to stop the train, there can be benefit in lessening the damage or injury by slowing down.
Electroliner 1935 I would like some clarification 243129 as to what you are seemingly asserting. I take it that you are suggesting that the engineer on 175 was: 1) Deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event,
1) Deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event,
Yes the 175 engineer was "deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event."
The tracks on both sides of her lane of travel were blocked. 66 was coming north, she was southbound and the freight was on the adjacent track. Her testimony is quite confusing and unintelligible but let us go with sounding the horn for 5 to 7 seconds. The scenario described should have indicated to her that hitting the two employees was imminent. By not immediately applying the brakes to emergency she robbed the two victims of any chance of escape. Perhaps a millisecond could have saved a life. We will never know but the fact remains that they were not granted that chance.
Part of her testimony stated that she saw trespassers everyday but they "normally move". Hopefully that was not her mindset in this situation but it is quite possibly the reason she did not apply the brake to emergency until after she struck the two employees.
Electroliner 19352) Did not provide true recolection of a very disturbing event where she was involved in the death of two men.
No she did not. Her testimony was convoluted and quite confusing.
I consider this engineer a 'victim' also. She is a victim of Amtrak's poor vetting and training regimens. From what I have gleaned from her testimony I find it incredulous that she was accepted into engine service. Is supervision so clueless as to think she is qualified to operate a train? From what I saw in my last years there the answer is YES. Amtrak is an accident waiting to happen....again. Just look back at the human error accidents i.e. Chatsworth CA, Frankford Jct., Chester PA, Dupont WA etc. etc.
Only 243129 has the vetting, training, supervision and experience to have prevented the incident.
BaltACD Only 243129 has the vetting, training, supervision and experience to have prevented the incident.
Experience 'in the trenches', something you do not have.
243129charlie hebdo Perhaps you could share with us what some of the criteria and assessment methodologies should include, from a retired veteran's perspective? 243129: I have shared "some of the criteria and assessment methodologies", did you miss them?
243129: I have shared "some of the criteria and assessment methodologies", did you miss them?
It seems to me, if you were familaiar with your own schemes, you could easily share them. Repeatedly insisting that people have to pore back through numerous threads and look for something more developed than your mantra or slogans is an indication that for all your time in the trenches, you have nothing with a reasonable degree of specificity. And your return to citing Mao is ludicrous. His distrust and imprisonment and liquidation of thousands of experts caused millions of Chinese to die of starvation and disease. If that is any indication of your plan for the use of experience, I doubt if anyone will regard your plans as much more than a dangerous joke or more likely, an opening for cronyism and graft.
Furthermore, your dismissal of BaltACD as a desk jockey is laughable and another indication that you are not open to any criticism (you are always right, in your mind) and are incapable of entering into a serious discussion using facts, not slogans.
charlie hebdoIt seems to me, if you were familaiar with your own schemes, you could easily share them
I wonder if 1019x saw this.
charlie hebdoRepeatedly insisting that people have to pore back through numerous threads and look for something more developed than your mantra or slogans is an indication that for all your time in the trenches, you have nothing with a reasonable degree of specificity.
How can you participate in an intelligent discourse if you have not read the entire thread? You are asking me to repost information to save you the effort.
O.K. I will.
charlie hebdoAnd your return to citing Mao is ludicrous. His distrust and imprisonment and liquidation of thousands of experts caused millions of Chinese to die of starvation and disease. If that is any indication of your plan for the use of experience, I doubt if anyone will regard your plans as much more than a dangerous joke or more likely, an opening for cronyism and graft.
The quote from Mao "All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience" is wise and quite appropriate when applied to acquiring a skill. You seem to be appalled that I would refer to the wisdom of a 'despot'. Did we not use the 'wisdom' obtained from Hitler and the Nazis? How about the autobahn that our interstate highway system is patterned after? Does the name Wernher von Braun ring a bell?
charlie hebdoFurthermore, your dismissal of BaltACD as a desk jockey is laughable and another indication that you are not open to any criticism (you are always right, in your mind) and are incapable of entering into a serious discussion using facts, not slogans.
BaltACD has no experience in the 'trenches', his imperious attitude and snarky asides begat him the retort 'desk jockey'.
So back to you. What is your background in railroad operations? Now that I have displayed the information that you did not read or wish to look for what say you?
You're up Chuck.
..
There is little point in wasting time in a thread with a guy who when asked about criteria, can only repeat his own comment which was questioned in the first place. Avoidance at best. Citing Mao and Hitler as positive sources about anything reveals your ignorance (the Long Island and Merritt Parkways and the Penn Turnpike precede or were initiated at the same time as the Autobahn system, which actually started during the Weimar Republic) and your ideological models.
Perhaps all this nonsense is simply your effort to dodge the issue of nepotism and corruption resulting from the adoption of your scheme.
charlie hebdo There is little point in wasting time in a thread with a guy who when asked about criteria, can only repeat his own comment which was questioned in the first place. Avoidance at best. Citing Mao and Hitler as positive sources about anything reveals your ignorance (the Long Island and Merritt Parkways and the Penn Turnpike precede or were initiated at the same time as the Autobahn system, which actually started during the Weimar Republic) and your ideological models. Perhaps all this nonsense is simply your effort to dodge the issue of nepotism and corruption resulting from the adoption of your scheme.
I have avoided nothing, you on the other hand have 'avoided' posting anything useful or on topic. Your rant is reminiscent of a prepubescent child. I have confronted you on your statements and railroad background and you conveniently ignore responding.
This tragedy was avoidable. The events leading up to these fatalities created a 'perfect storm' for disaster.
The two CSX employees exercised extremely poor judgement by inspecting their train from a live track with no form of protection when a safer environment was available. This indicates poor training, poor vetting, poor(or lack of) supervision and inexperience.
The engineer on train#175 exercised extremely poor judgement by not applying the brakes to emergency immediately upon seeing the two individuals no matter the distance. Her inability to assess the situation, trains to left and right of her lane of travel would indicate imminent disaster, leads one to believe that she did not possess the acumen for the position of locomotive engineer.
Again poor vetting, poor training, poor (or lack of) supervision and inexperience.
So there are your 'answers'. Dispute them. you're up Chuck.
Oh and chuck, just days after the 1933 Nazi takeover, Adolf Hitler enthusiastically embraced an ambitious autobahn construction project, appointing Fritz Todt, the Inspector General of German Road Construction, to lead it. By 1936, 130,000 workers were directly employed in construction, as well as an additional 270,000 in the supply chain for construction equipment, steel, concrete, signage, maintenance equipment, etc. In rural areas, new camps to house the workers were built near construction sites.
Our Interstate highway system is named after Eisenhower is it not? I wonder where he got the idea?
Oh and one other thing Chuck, I noticed you did not dispute my mention of Wernher von Braun pioneer of rocket technology and space science.Following the war, he was secretly moved to the United States, along with about 1,600 other German scientists, engineers, and technicians, and you castigate me for applying a quote from Chairman Mao?
You've said this slogan so many times as the universal explanation that we all know you have zilch.
Altogether now! "Poor training, poor vetting, poor supervision and inexperience"
2nd verse, same as the first.
"Poor training, poor vetting, poor supervision and inexperience"
charlie hebdo You've said this slogan so many times as the universal explanation that we all know you have zilch. Altogether now! "Poor training, poor vetting, poor supervision and inexperience" 2nd verse, same as the first. "Poor training, poor vetting, poor supervision and inexperience"
I see that your only rebuttal is a juvenile one.
The reasons listed, in my opinion with the evidence at hand, are the primary causes of this tragedy.
What's to dispute? The reasons you list are those of the NTSB. Your expansion to underlying causes is merely your mantra, which are the juvenile rants of an embittered crank, repeated over and over again.
How many accidents did you have before you were retired? Fatal?
Your knowledge on topics outside railroading is superficial at best. One wonders if the same is true with regard to Amtrak? You denounce BaltACD as a desk jocky. Really? I believe dispatchers might disagree with that absurd label. Perhaps you resent them because you had some run-ins with dispatchers while you were still allowed to work?
charlie hebdoWhat's to dispute? The reasons you list are those of the NTSB. Your expansion to underlying causes is merely your mantra, which are the juvenile rants of an embittered crank, repeated over and over again.
The NTSB cited poor training, poor supervision and poor vetting?
The causes I state are primary .
charlie hebdoHow many accidents did you have before you were retired? Fatal?
Five fatalities.
charlie hebdoYour knowledge on topics outside railroading is superficial at best.
I posted validity of my statements on the autobahn and Wernher von Braun which you chose to ignore.
I am still waiting for you to dispute my reasons for this tragedy with your own opinion on what you think were the cause or causes.
I will ignore your insults and name-calling and permit you to continue to embarrass yourself.
243129 Electroliner 1935 I would like some clarification 243129 as to what you are seemingly asserting. I take it that you are suggesting that the engineer on 175 was: 1) Deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event, Yes the 175 engineer was "deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event." The tracks on both sides of her lane of travel were blocked. 66 was coming north, she was southbound and the freight was on the adjacent track. Her testimony is quite confusing and unintelligible but let us go with sounding the horn for 5 to 7 seconds. The scenario described should have indicated to her that hitting the two employees was imminent. By not immediately applying the brakes to emergency she robbed the two victims of any chance of escape. Perhaps a millisecond could have saved a life. We will never know but the fact remains that they were not granted that chance. Part of her testimony stated that she saw trespassers everyday but they "normally move". Hopefully that was not her mindset in this situation but it is quite possibly the reason she did not apply the brake to emergency until after she struck the two employees.
She said she saw trespassers every day, but normally they move. I do interpret that to mean that she intends to not apply brakes prior to impact because she expects them to move. You really don't know if they are going to move until the last half second or so. The assumption is that they will move out of the way, and that there is not enough time to stop the train before striking them if they do not move; so why apply brakes when they will probably move out of the way in time?
But the job is not that easy. An engineer must assess each fouling trespasser or vehicle individually and not act according to one root assumption such as an assumption that most people will move. In assessing the situation on approach to the two conductors, an attentive engineer would realize the sound of the two trains might be perceived as the sound of just one train instead of two. That should tell the engineer of #175 that there may be a stronger than usual chance that the two conductors would not move out of the way. Then the fact that they did not turn and look at #175 or acknowledge the horn signal in any way, should have told the engineer that the conductors were not aware of the train and there was a very good chance they they would not move in time.
If an engineer of #175 realized that the two conductors were aware of #66 but not aware of #175, the engineer might realize that a broken up, more urgent sounding horn signal might be better than just "laying" on the horn. No matter what type of horn signal was being sounded by the engineer of #66, a broken up, urgent series of strong toots from #175 would have had a chance of sounding different than what #66 was blowing. Even if #66 was blowing the same sort of broken up horn signal, there would have been a good chance that at times, part of the horn warning would have been sounded by one train while no horn sound was coming from the other train.
If just for 1-3 seconds, #66 was not blowing and #175 was blowing, I think there would have been a good chance that the two conductors would have realized horn sounding was coming from behind them. That would have saved their lives.
On the contrary, if both engineers "laid" on the horn, that would have been the worst kind of signal to send, because it was the most likely signal to be wrongly believed to have been coming from just one train instead of two.
Engineers should be trained in recognizing this type of two-train distraction, and watching out for the possibility of it distracting people fouling the track. And they should also be trained how to carefully handle the horn signals in this type of emergency. Maybe some of the theory behind police car audio signals could be applied to passenger train locomotives. What is needed is some signal that can bust through the sound of a train horn and be distinctly heard.
EuclidEngineers should be trained in recognizing this type of two-train distraction, and watching out for the possibility of it distracting people fouling the track. And they should also be trained how to carefully handle the horn signals in this type of emergency. Maybe some of the theory behind police car audio signals could be applied to passenger train locomotives. What is needed is some signal that can bust through the sound of a train horn and be distinctly heard.
I am wondering what you say about the training. What would you have done if you were the engineer of Amtrak 175? How should the training be changed? And would the result be different?
Electroliner 1935I am wondering what you say about the training. What would you have done if you were the engineer of Amtrak 175?
I would have instantly applied the brakes in emergency .
Electroliner 1935How should the training be changed? And would the result be different?
Training should be monitored and advised by an oversight committee of experienced operations veterans.
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