BaltACDTraining only goes so far - at some point the employee has to think and act upon the situation that is presenting itself in accordance with HIS best judgement applying the principles that he has been presented and had 'forced' into him by his training,
This is why vetting is important in the hiring process.
BaltACD Nothing 175's engineer could have done beyond NOT BEING AT THAT LOCATION AT THAT TIME would have prevented the outcome that happened.
You do not know that. We will never know for sure but any chance of affording those two individuals seconds to escape by retarding the speed was negated by the failure of the engineer to apply the brakes in emergency UNTIL AFTER IMPACT!
BaltACDLiving people make decisions - sometimes they make the wrong one.
In this case three people made bad decisions.
Just wait until the lawyers for the deceased receive the information that emergency braking was not enacted until after impact.
Training only goes so far - at some point the employee has to think and act upon the situation that is presenting itself in accordance with HIS best judgement applying the principles that he has been presented and had 'forced' into him by his training,
No matter how good the training - the employee has to THINK AND ACT on their own. The best training in the world does not guarantee 100% compliance and application of the principles that were taught. Human beings do not react to situations like robots.
In this incident, despite the training that had been done, the employees made multiple bad decisions that ended up costing them their lives. Nothing 175's engineer could have done beyond NOT BEING AT THAT LOCATION AT THAT TIME would have prevented the outcome that happened.
Until we can develop technology that can download the final thouyghts of humans as they die and make those thoughts understandable to the living survivors we will never know what the CSX crew were thinking about in their final seconds alive.
Living people make decisions - sometimes they make the wrong one.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
EuclidWhat I have suggested is a matter of training going forward.
Going forward? They should have been trained properly in the first place.
EuclidI also don't blame the two conductors.
Their poor judgement coupled with poor training and inexperience cost them their lives.
EuclidBut I do blame CSX for sending them out there without protection.
Not enough info to support that.
Electroliner 1935This fatality could not have been avoided by any action that an engineer could have taken.
We will never know because she took no action until after the fact.
Electroliner 1935the two men made a fatal mistake and forgot the rule to expect a train on ony track at any time and paid dearly for it.
Agreed. However proper training and lack of common sense might also be a factor.
YOU DO NOT INSPECT YOUR TRAIN FROM A LIVE TRACK WHEN THERE IS A SAFE ALTERNATIVE !
Electroliner 1935Amtrak's 175 engineer has to live with what happened and she was powerless to prevent it. I think it might be painful for her to think that she might have been able to do something and don't want to add to any pain she has.
There were actions she could have taken that she did not.
Electroliner 1935 HindSight is 20/20. This fatality could not have been avoided by any action that an engineer could have taken. You can yap as much as you want but the two men made a fatal mistake and forgot the rule to expect a train on ony track at any time and paid dearly for it. Amtrak's 175 engineer has to live with what happened and she was powerless to prevent it. I think it might be painful for her to think that she might have been able to do something and don't want to add to any pain she has.
HindSight is 20/20. This fatality could not have been avoided by any action that an engineer could have taken. You can yap as much as you want but the two men made a fatal mistake and forgot the rule to expect a train on ony track at any time and paid dearly for it. Amtrak's 175 engineer has to live with what happened and she was powerless to prevent it. I think it might be painful for her to think that she might have been able to do something and don't want to add to any pain she has.
Electroliner 1935 Euclid Engineers should be trained in recognizing this type of two-train distraction, and watching out for the possibility of it distracting people fouling the track. And they should also be trained how to carefully handle the horn signals in this type of emergency. Maybe some of the theory behind police car audio signals could be applied to passenger train locomotives. What is needed is some signal that can bust through the sound of a train horn and be distinctly heard. I am wondering what you say about the training. What would you have done if you were the engineer of Amtrak 175? How should the training be changed? And would the result be different?
Euclid Engineers should be trained in recognizing this type of two-train distraction, and watching out for the possibility of it distracting people fouling the track. And they should also be trained how to carefully handle the horn signals in this type of emergency. Maybe some of the theory behind police car audio signals could be applied to passenger train locomotives. What is needed is some signal that can bust through the sound of a train horn and be distinctly heard.
I am wondering what you say about the training. What would you have done if you were the engineer of Amtrak 175? How should the training be changed? And would the result be different?
To answer your question as to what I would have done if I were the engineer of #175, I would have sounded the standard horn signal as follows: Succession of short sounds = An attempt to attract attention to the train. It is used when persons of livestock are on the track at other-than-road crossings at grade.
If I were the engineer of #66, I would not have sounded the horn if I was sure that the two conductors saw my train. If I was not sure, I would have made two short toots. The overall point would be for #66 to make as little horn sound as possible.
The following analysis includes my rationale for better training to address this unique distraction hazard:
In this case, both engineers saw the two conductors about the same time. Both engineers saw that the two conductors were fouling the track for #175. Both of them saw that the conductors were facing #66 and had their backs to #175. Both engineers had air horns that can be heard a mile away. Both engineers blew horn warnings at about the same time. If either or both conductors had heard any air horn that they perceived to be behind them, that would have saved their lives and prevented any injury as well.
The two conductors saw one train (#66) approaching them and they knew they were in the clear of it. There was no chance that they would have been hit by that train, and they knew that. The two conductors also heard a horn sound, which they perceived to be coming only from #66, but it was also coming from #175; a train that they had not looked back to recognize. So because the horn signal from #175 sounded like the horn signal of the train they were watching approach from the front, they failed to realize that #175 too was participating in the horn warning. Clearly, the two conductors had to hear the horn warning from #175, but they mistook it for being only a warning from #66.
Therefore, the key to better training would be to prevent or at least limit the horn warning from the train (#66), which was not on course to strike the two conductors. In fact, if #66 had not shown up at that precise moment, the two conductors would have heard #175 blowing behind them and they would have jumped out of the way in time to avoid injury or death.
So the better training would be to instruct the engineer of #66 to limit horn warning to just the smallest amount of toot, if any at all. At the same time, training should instruct the engineer of #175 to blow a very energized pattern of honks, perhaps in a prescribed and practiced pattern of rhythm and duration of each note. In any case, it should generally fit the standard succession of short sounds that the rules call for in this type of emergency.
Engineers should be trained to recognize the development of this unique danger. Whenever two trains are converging on each other at high speed; if there are also a one or more people present near that point of convergence; this is the time for both engineers to recognize the great danger.
If the people are merely close to the tracks, both trains should sound moderately urgent horn signal patterns with plenty of open space between the honks.
If the people are fouling one of the tracks, engineers should note whether they appear to recognize both trains approaching, just one train approaching, or no trains approaching.
If they seem likely to be recognizing one train but not the other, then the track they are fouling must be considered in regard to with which train they recognize.
If they are fouling the track with the train they recognize, then horn signals from that train have little importance, because they see that train approaching. But horn signals from the train they don’t recognize are quite important because they might jump into the clear of the train they recognize and into the path of the train they don’t recognize.
But the most critical situation is when people are fouling a track, and don’t recognize a train approaching on that track, while they do recognize a train approaching on the track they are not fouling. This is the most critical scenario of this basic danger and this was what occurred at the Ivy City, D.C. accident. In this case, a horn warning from the recognized train was almost irrelevant, but far more importantly, it distracted from the horn warning from #175 which was profoundly important and essential to saving the two conductors.
Therefore, given that both trains gave horn warnings, it would have been best to use a specially prescribed warning that would leave spaces of silence for the other train’s horn warning to be heard and have its source direction perceived by the people on the track. With that type of warning, it would have at least clarified the danger by limiting the mistaken perception that the two warnings were coming from just one train.
When I refer to a specially prescribed warning, I am referring to developing a new warning signal that might improve on the standard warning for such emergencies which is the succession of short sounds mentioned above. In any case, the horn signal used by the engineer of #175 (laying on the horn) is not the best signal to use, and is not correct according to the rules. The point of this signal requirement, in the case of two trains converging on persons by the track, is to leave quiet space between horn sounds to leave room for horn sounds of the other train horn. The quiet spaces also accentuate the intervening horn sounds, perhaps making them more noticeable than a long, continuous horn blow. Laying on the horn might be effectively okay for some emergencies, but for this unique two-train distraction, it was a horn signal that could have done more harm as well as being of the benefit intended
So that is the training that I would recommend. In over a century of railroading, I doubt that this problem has ever been recognized as something that can be addressed. Railroads have worked hard to develop loud whistles and horns that seem to match the level of danger trains can present. But that loud warning poses a special, hidden danger if two trains sound it at the same time. Maybe instead of just equipping every locomotive with a loud horn, there should be a secondary audible warning device that can cut through the warning of a loud locomotive horn, and eliminate the confusion of two loud horns sounding simultaneously.
EuclidShe said she saw trespassers every day, but normally they move. I do interpret that to mean that she intends to not apply brakes prior to impact because she expects them to move. You really don't know if they are going to move until the last half second or so.
Expects? Really? That in itself says volumes about lack of acumen for the position of locomotive engineer.
EuclidBut the job is not that easy. An engineer must assess each fouling trespasser or vehicle individually and not act according to one root assumption such as an assumption that most people will move.
Absolutely.
EuclidThen the fact that they did not turn and look at #175 or acknowledge the horn signal in any way, should have told the engineer that the conductors were not aware of the train and there was a very good chance they they would not move in time.
Still she did not react.
EuclidEngineers should be trained in recognizing this type of two-train distraction, and watching out for the possibility of it distracting people fouling the track.
Agreed. Testing for acumen would also enter in to it. 'What if' situations should be part of the testing.
Electroliner 1935I am wondering what you say about the training. What would you have done if you were the engineer of Amtrak 175?
I would have instantly applied the brakes in emergency .
Electroliner 1935How should the training be changed? And would the result be different?
This tragedy was avoidable. The events leading up to these fatalities created a 'perfect storm' for disaster.
The two CSX employees exercised extremely poor judgement by inspecting their train from a live track with no form of protection when a safer environment was available. This indicates poor training, poor vetting, poor(or lack of) supervision and inexperience.
The engineer on train#175 exercised extremely poor judgement by not applying the brakes to emergency immediately upon seeing the two individuals no matter the distance. Her inability to assess the situation, trains to left and right of her lane of travel would indicate imminent disaster, leads one to believe that she did not possess the acumen for the position of locomotive engineer.
Again poor vetting, poor training, poor (or lack of) supervision and inexperience.
Training should be monitored and advised by an oversight committee of experienced operations veterans.
EuclidEngineers should be trained in recognizing this type of two-train distraction, and watching out for the possibility of it distracting people fouling the track. And they should also be trained how to carefully handle the horn signals in this type of emergency. Maybe some of the theory behind police car audio signals could be applied to passenger train locomotives. What is needed is some signal that can bust through the sound of a train horn and be distinctly heard.
243129 Electroliner 1935 I would like some clarification 243129 as to what you are seemingly asserting. I take it that you are suggesting that the engineer on 175 was: 1) Deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event, Yes the 175 engineer was "deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event." The tracks on both sides of her lane of travel were blocked. 66 was coming north, she was southbound and the freight was on the adjacent track. Her testimony is quite confusing and unintelligible but let us go with sounding the horn for 5 to 7 seconds. The scenario described should have indicated to her that hitting the two employees was imminent. By not immediately applying the brakes to emergency she robbed the two victims of any chance of escape. Perhaps a millisecond could have saved a life. We will never know but the fact remains that they were not granted that chance. Part of her testimony stated that she saw trespassers everyday but they "normally move". Hopefully that was not her mindset in this situation but it is quite possibly the reason she did not apply the brake to emergency until after she struck the two employees.
Electroliner 1935 I would like some clarification 243129 as to what you are seemingly asserting. I take it that you are suggesting that the engineer on 175 was: 1) Deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event,
I would like some clarification 243129 as to what you are seemingly asserting. I take it that you are suggesting that the engineer on 175 was:
1) Deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event,
Yes the 175 engineer was "deficient in her perfomance and might have been able to take some action to mitigate the event."
The tracks on both sides of her lane of travel were blocked. 66 was coming north, she was southbound and the freight was on the adjacent track. Her testimony is quite confusing and unintelligible but let us go with sounding the horn for 5 to 7 seconds. The scenario described should have indicated to her that hitting the two employees was imminent. By not immediately applying the brakes to emergency she robbed the two victims of any chance of escape. Perhaps a millisecond could have saved a life. We will never know but the fact remains that they were not granted that chance.
Part of her testimony stated that she saw trespassers everyday but they "normally move". Hopefully that was not her mindset in this situation but it is quite possibly the reason she did not apply the brake to emergency until after she struck the two employees.
She said she saw trespassers every day, but normally they move. I do interpret that to mean that she intends to not apply brakes prior to impact because she expects them to move. You really don't know if they are going to move until the last half second or so. The assumption is that they will move out of the way, and that there is not enough time to stop the train before striking them if they do not move; so why apply brakes when they will probably move out of the way in time?
But the job is not that easy. An engineer must assess each fouling trespasser or vehicle individually and not act according to one root assumption such as an assumption that most people will move. In assessing the situation on approach to the two conductors, an attentive engineer would realize the sound of the two trains might be perceived as the sound of just one train instead of two. That should tell the engineer of #175 that there may be a stronger than usual chance that the two conductors would not move out of the way. Then the fact that they did not turn and look at #175 or acknowledge the horn signal in any way, should have told the engineer that the conductors were not aware of the train and there was a very good chance they they would not move in time.
If an engineer of #175 realized that the two conductors were aware of #66 but not aware of #175, the engineer might realize that a broken up, more urgent sounding horn signal might be better than just "laying" on the horn. No matter what type of horn signal was being sounded by the engineer of #66, a broken up, urgent series of strong toots from #175 would have had a chance of sounding different than what #66 was blowing. Even if #66 was blowing the same sort of broken up horn signal, there would have been a good chance that at times, part of the horn warning would have been sounded by one train while no horn sound was coming from the other train.
If just for 1-3 seconds, #66 was not blowing and #175 was blowing, I think there would have been a good chance that the two conductors would have realized horn sounding was coming from behind them. That would have saved their lives.
On the contrary, if both engineers "laid" on the horn, that would have been the worst kind of signal to send, because it was the most likely signal to be wrongly believed to have been coming from just one train instead of two.
Engineers should be trained in recognizing this type of two-train distraction, and watching out for the possibility of it distracting people fouling the track. And they should also be trained how to carefully handle the horn signals in this type of emergency. Maybe some of the theory behind police car audio signals could be applied to passenger train locomotives. What is needed is some signal that can bust through the sound of a train horn and be distinctly heard.
charlie hebdoWhat's to dispute? The reasons you list are those of the NTSB. Your expansion to underlying causes is merely your mantra, which are the juvenile rants of an embittered crank, repeated over and over again.
The NTSB cited poor training, poor supervision and poor vetting?
The causes I state are primary .
charlie hebdoHow many accidents did you have before you were retired? Fatal?
Five fatalities.
charlie hebdoYour knowledge on topics outside railroading is superficial at best.
I posted validity of my statements on the autobahn and Wernher von Braun which you chose to ignore.
I am still waiting for you to dispute my reasons for this tragedy with your own opinion on what you think were the cause or causes.
I will ignore your insults and name-calling and permit you to continue to embarrass yourself.
What's to dispute? The reasons you list are those of the NTSB. Your expansion to underlying causes is merely your mantra, which are the juvenile rants of an embittered crank, repeated over and over again.
How many accidents did you have before you were retired? Fatal?
Your knowledge on topics outside railroading is superficial at best. One wonders if the same is true with regard to Amtrak? You denounce BaltACD as a desk jocky. Really? I believe dispatchers might disagree with that absurd label. Perhaps you resent them because you had some run-ins with dispatchers while you were still allowed to work?
charlie hebdo You've said this slogan so many times as the universal explanation that we all know you have zilch. Altogether now! "Poor training, poor vetting, poor supervision and inexperience" 2nd verse, same as the first. "Poor training, poor vetting, poor supervision and inexperience"
You've said this slogan so many times as the universal explanation that we all know you have zilch.
Altogether now! "Poor training, poor vetting, poor supervision and inexperience"
2nd verse, same as the first.
"Poor training, poor vetting, poor supervision and inexperience"
I see that your only rebuttal is a juvenile one.
The reasons listed, in my opinion with the evidence at hand, are the primary causes of this tragedy.
charlie hebdo There is little point in wasting time in a thread with a guy who when asked about criteria, can only repeat his own comment which was questioned in the first place. Avoidance at best. Citing Mao and Hitler as positive sources about anything reveals your ignorance (the Long Island and Merritt Parkways and the Penn Turnpike precede or were initiated at the same time as the Autobahn system, which actually started during the Weimar Republic) and your ideological models. Perhaps all this nonsense is simply your effort to dodge the issue of nepotism and corruption resulting from the adoption of your scheme.
There is little point in wasting time in a thread with a guy who when asked about criteria, can only repeat his own comment which was questioned in the first place. Avoidance at best. Citing Mao and Hitler as positive sources about anything reveals your ignorance (the Long Island and Merritt Parkways and the Penn Turnpike precede or were initiated at the same time as the Autobahn system, which actually started during the Weimar Republic) and your ideological models.
Perhaps all this nonsense is simply your effort to dodge the issue of nepotism and corruption resulting from the adoption of your scheme.
I have avoided nothing, you on the other hand have 'avoided' posting anything useful or on topic. Your rant is reminiscent of a prepubescent child. I have confronted you on your statements and railroad background and you conveniently ignore responding.
So there are your 'answers'. Dispute them. you're up Chuck.
Oh and chuck, just days after the 1933 Nazi takeover, Adolf Hitler enthusiastically embraced an ambitious autobahn construction project, appointing Fritz Todt, the Inspector General of German Road Construction, to lead it. By 1936, 130,000 workers were directly employed in construction, as well as an additional 270,000 in the supply chain for construction equipment, steel, concrete, signage, maintenance equipment, etc. In rural areas, new camps to house the workers were built near construction sites.
Our Interstate highway system is named after Eisenhower is it not? I wonder where he got the idea?
Oh and one other thing Chuck, I noticed you did not dispute my mention of Wernher von Braun pioneer of rocket technology and space science.Following the war, he was secretly moved to the United States, along with about 1,600 other German scientists, engineers, and technicians, and you castigate me for applying a quote from Chairman Mao?
..
charlie hebdoIt seems to me, if you were familaiar with your own schemes, you could easily share them
I wonder if 1019x saw this.
charlie hebdoRepeatedly insisting that people have to pore back through numerous threads and look for something more developed than your mantra or slogans is an indication that for all your time in the trenches, you have nothing with a reasonable degree of specificity.
How can you participate in an intelligent discourse if you have not read the entire thread? You are asking me to repost information to save you the effort.
O.K. I will.
Proper level of vetting is to have experienced operations personnel for an oversight committee made up of seasoned T&E veterans which can also screen prospective candidates, advise instructors, conduct field testing and evaluate trainees. Seasoned operations veterans can better assess the acumen for train operations a candidate possesses than a non experienced in operations Human Resources employee.
charlie hebdoAnd your return to citing Mao is ludicrous. His distrust and imprisonment and liquidation of thousands of experts caused millions of Chinese to die of starvation and disease. If that is any indication of your plan for the use of experience, I doubt if anyone will regard your plans as much more than a dangerous joke or more likely, an opening for cronyism and graft.
The quote from Mao "All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience" is wise and quite appropriate when applied to acquiring a skill. You seem to be appalled that I would refer to the wisdom of a 'despot'. Did we not use the 'wisdom' obtained from Hitler and the Nazis? How about the autobahn that our interstate highway system is patterned after? Does the name Wernher von Braun ring a bell?
charlie hebdoFurthermore, your dismissal of BaltACD as a desk jockey is laughable and another indication that you are not open to any criticism (you are always right, in your mind) and are incapable of entering into a serious discussion using facts, not slogans.
BaltACD has no experience in the 'trenches', his imperious attitude and snarky asides begat him the retort 'desk jockey'.
So back to you. What is your background in railroad operations? Now that I have displayed the information that you did not read or wish to look for what say you?
You're up Chuck.
243129charlie hebdo Perhaps you could share with us what some of the criteria and assessment methodologies should include, from a retired veteran's perspective? 243129: I have shared "some of the criteria and assessment methodologies", did you miss them?
243129: I have shared "some of the criteria and assessment methodologies", did you miss them?
It seems to me, if you were familaiar with your own schemes, you could easily share them. Repeatedly insisting that people have to pore back through numerous threads and look for something more developed than your mantra or slogans is an indication that for all your time in the trenches, you have nothing with a reasonable degree of specificity. And your return to citing Mao is ludicrous. His distrust and imprisonment and liquidation of thousands of experts caused millions of Chinese to die of starvation and disease. If that is any indication of your plan for the use of experience, I doubt if anyone will regard your plans as much more than a dangerous joke or more likely, an opening for cronyism and graft.
Furthermore, your dismissal of BaltACD as a desk jockey is laughable and another indication that you are not open to any criticism (you are always right, in your mind) and are incapable of entering into a serious discussion using facts, not slogans.
BaltACD Only 243129 has the vetting, training, supervision and experience to have prevented the incident.
Only 243129 has the vetting, training, supervision and experience to have prevented the incident.
Experience 'in the trenches', something you do not have.
Electroliner 19352) Did not provide true recolection of a very disturbing event where she was involved in the death of two men.
No she did not. Her testimony was convoluted and quite confusing.
I consider this engineer a 'victim' also. She is a victim of Amtrak's poor vetting and training regimens. From what I have gleaned from her testimony I find it incredulous that she was accepted into engine service. Is supervision so clueless as to think she is qualified to operate a train? From what I saw in my last years there the answer is YES. Amtrak is an accident waiting to happen....again. Just look back at the human error accidents i.e. Chatsworth CA, Frankford Jct., Chester PA, Dupont WA etc. etc.
Electroliner 1935 Euclid Electroliner 1935 I have some suspicion that her [engineer of # 175] testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced. From the event recorder, it appears that Engineer Reese of #175 began sounding a continuous horn blast lasting 5-7 seconds up to the point of striking the two conductors. It is unclear when Mr. Reese first saw the two conductors. After striking them, she made an emergency application of brakes. Ms. Reese recalled in her testimony that she first saw the two conductors when her train was 15-20 seconds away from them, and that she immediately laid on the horn. It seems that she did not recall that timing accurately because the horn began 5-7 seconds prior to impact according to the event recorder; and because at 20 seconds, she would have been approximately 2,000 feet from the victims. It seems unlikely that she would have seen them from that distance. At the train speed of 74 mph, the distance traveled in 7 seconds was 542 feet. The mind is not an accurate recorder of events. This has been proven in many court trials. Also reaction times are not being considered here. How quick can you see something you are not expecting and how quickly can you comprehend and react to it. I am thinking of the parlor game where one holds a dolar bill between someones fingers, drops it and the other person has to catch it. Very few can react in time to catch it knowing it is going to be dropped. The mind has finite reaction times. The engineer had to comprehend that the train was on the path to impact, and then initiate the horn. She also might not have good vision of them because the headlight bright area may have been off the center line of the track because of the curve. There was no way she could prevent the accident. At 75 mph, the men did not have time to move and she could not stop the train in time. Railroaders work in an unforgiving environment and they pay with their lives for mistakes. Fatalities beget rules. I wish all good health and safe travels.
Euclid Electroliner 1935 I have some suspicion that her [engineer of # 175] testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced. From the event recorder, it appears that Engineer Reese of #175 began sounding a continuous horn blast lasting 5-7 seconds up to the point of striking the two conductors. It is unclear when Mr. Reese first saw the two conductors. After striking them, she made an emergency application of brakes. Ms. Reese recalled in her testimony that she first saw the two conductors when her train was 15-20 seconds away from them, and that she immediately laid on the horn. It seems that she did not recall that timing accurately because the horn began 5-7 seconds prior to impact according to the event recorder; and because at 20 seconds, she would have been approximately 2,000 feet from the victims. It seems unlikely that she would have seen them from that distance. At the train speed of 74 mph, the distance traveled in 7 seconds was 542 feet.
Electroliner 1935 I have some suspicion that her [engineer of # 175] testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced.
From the event recorder, it appears that Engineer Reese of #175 began sounding a continuous horn blast lasting 5-7 seconds up to the point of striking the two conductors. It is unclear when Mr. Reese first saw the two conductors. After striking them, she made an emergency application of brakes.
Ms. Reese recalled in her testimony that she first saw the two conductors when her train was 15-20 seconds away from them, and that she immediately laid on the horn. It seems that she did not recall that timing accurately because the horn began 5-7 seconds prior to impact according to the event recorder; and because at 20 seconds, she would have been approximately 2,000 feet from the victims. It seems unlikely that she would have seen them from that distance.
At the train speed of 74 mph, the distance traveled in 7 seconds was 542 feet.
The mind is not an accurate recorder of events. This has been proven in many court trials. Also reaction times are not being considered here. How quick can you see something you are not expecting and how quickly can you comprehend and react to it. I am thinking of the parlor game where one holds a dolar bill between someones fingers, drops it and the other person has to catch it. Very few can react in time to catch it knowing it is going to be dropped. The mind has finite reaction times. The engineer had to comprehend that the train was on the path to impact, and then initiate the horn. She also might not have good vision of them because the headlight bright area may have been off the center line of the track because of the curve. There was no way she could prevent the accident. At 75 mph, the men did not have time to move and she could not stop the train in time.
Railroaders work in an unforgiving environment and they pay with their lives for mistakes. Fatalities beget rules. I wish all good health and safe travels.
I am not saying that she should have reacted quicker. I was just responding to your comment in which you suspect that what the engineer remembers was not totally correct in that it appears by the event recorder to not match what actually occurred in regard to timing of recognition of the two conductors and initiating the horn warning. I do not think that she did anything wrong in her recognition and horn initiation. It is just that it does not quite match her testimony, which is what you said you expected. I agree that she could have easily made a small error in estimating that timing, going by memory after the fact.
I don't know to what extent she can be faulted for waiting until impact before making the emergency application. That is always a critical point, and investigators did bear down on that point in her interview. I agree that 5 seconds [if that is the time she had] would not have made a significant difference by providing a longer interval for the conductors to spontaneously come to a realization of their immediate peril. Every second does count, but something like 1/10 second for instance, does not count much.
Nevertheless, the issue is significant because some engineers say thay they would not make an emergency application until impact (if impact occurs). In the case of stalled motor vehicles for instance, this withholding of the emergency application could result in a death. This is entirely beside the point of whether or not the emergency application could actually stop the train before impact. Usually, it cannot do that. But that excuse is a red herring in my opinion.
The point is that even if there is not time to stop the train, there can be benefit in lessening the damage or injury by slowing down.
charlie hebdoYou seem to be giving far too much power to a group of veteran/senior operating employees. That sounds like a prescription for problems due to a lack of objectivity.
This pertains to railroad operations,
"The only source of knowledge is experience"- Chairman Mao.
charlie hebdo"Vetting" properly refers to screening new candidates, not hiring. Initial vetting should be limited to screening out applicants, whether in-house or external, on a variety of factors. This is customarily carried out by HR staff for good reasons.
What are the reasons? What knowledge of daily 'life in the trenches' would an HR person possess? Not having first hand knowledge of the job how can they assess a candidate's acumen? So what are the "good reasons"?
charlie hebdoPerhaps you could share with us what some of the criteria and assessment methodologies should include, from a retired veteran's perspective?
I have shared "some of the criteria and assessment methodologies", did you miss them?
Army Vetting at the present time
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/05/14/military-service-most-young-people-dont-qualify-careers/3665840002/
243129 BaltACD You keep harping on 'vetting'. What is your proper level of vetting? "Harping"? No just pointing out one of the reasons for the recent human error tragedies. Proper level of vetting is to have experienced operations personnel for an oversight committee made up of seasoned T&E veterans which can also screen prospective candidates, advise instructors, conduct field testing and evaluate trainees. Seasoned operations veterans can better assess the acumen for train operations a candidate possesses than a non experienced in operations Human Resources employee.
BaltACD You keep harping on 'vetting'. What is your proper level of vetting?
"Harping"? No just pointing out one of the reasons for the recent human error tragedies.
OK, let's get serious.
You seem to be giving far too much power to a group of veteran/senior operating employees. That sounds like a prescription for problems due to a lack of objectivity.
"Vetting" properly refers to screening new candidates, not hiring. Initial vetting should be limited to screening out applicants, whether in-house or external, on a variety of factors. This is customarily carried out by HR staff for good reasons. While the input of the veterans in establishing some of the criteria could be very useful, railroaders would have little insight or knowledge for determining or measuring some other essential criteria, such as cognitive abilities and personality/emotional factors. Additionally, the veterans would lack the requisite objectivity to be actually part of the hiring process which includes interviews, which must remain in the domain of management. Preventing nepotism and corruption is also essential.
Perhaps you could share with us what some of the criteria and assessment methodologies should include, from a retired veteran's perspective?
243129 charlie hebdo Of course, but Joe is obsessed with vetting, training and supervision as the universal factor because he believes he was a perfect engineer. charlie your immaturity is showing, please stop embarrassing yourself.
charlie hebdo Of course, but Joe is obsessed with vetting, training and supervision as the universal factor because he believes he was a perfect engineer.
charlie your immaturity is showing, please stop embarrassing yourself.
"[Joe] doth protest too much, methinks!"
Electroliner 1935I have some suspicion that her [engineer of # 175] testimony to the STB is not totally correct but is what she remembers. Time is altered in events like she experienced.
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