Amtrak 501 Derail in Washington State

[BaltACD]

A listing of the Permanent Speed Restrictions on the Lakewood Sub

Sounder Commuter Rail TT #2

1(B). Speed—Permanent Restrictions

Southward

                            Talgo Psgr Frt

MP 0.7 to MP 1.1 30 30 20

MP 1.1 to MP 2.0 35 35 20

MP 2.0 to MP 3.4 35 35 20

MP 3.4 to MP 3.8 45 45 35

MP 4.1 to MP 4.4 75 60 40

MP 6.9 to MP 7.3, MT2 60 60 40

MP 8.8 to MP 9.6, MT2 79 60 25

MP 9.6 to MP 9.9, MT2 60 55 25

MP 9.9 to MP 10.7, MT2 79 60 25

MP 14.4 to MP 14.7 79 70 40

MP 16.3 to MP 17.2 79 68 40

MP 17.2 to MP 18.5 79 75 40

MP 18.9 to MP 19.8 79 79 10

MP 19.8 to MP 19.9 30 30 10

MP 19.9 to MP 21.3 42 35 10

 

Northward

MP 21.3 to MP 19.9 42 35 35

MP 19.9 to MP 19.8 30 30 25

MP 18.5 to MP 17.2 79 75 40

MP 17.2 to MP 16.3 79 68 40

MP 14.7 to MP 14.4 79 70 40

MP 10.7 to MP 9.9, MT2 79 60 25

MP 9.9 to MP 9.6, MT2 60 55 25

MP 9.6 to MP 8.8, MT2 79 60 25

MP 8.8 to MP 8.2, MT2 79 60 25

MP 8.2 to MP 6.9, MT179 60 30

MP 8.2 to MP 7.3, MT2 79 60 30

MP 7.3 to MP 6.9, MT2 60 60 30

MP 4.4 to MP 4.1 75 60 40

MP 3.8 to MP 3.4 45 45 35

MP 3.4 to MP 2.0 35 35 10

MP 2.0 to MP 1.1 35 35 20

MP 1.1 to MP 0.7 30 30 20

I find it interesting that at some locations conventional Passenger and Talgo have the same restrictions, at other locations they are different.  What is more interesting is the the I-5 bridge restriction is 30 MPH for all.  From 19.9 to 21.3 Talgo's get 42 MPH and Conventional equipment is 35 MPH.  Of additional interest the speed for freight from 19.8 to 21.3 is 10 MPH.

 

 

 

[Anonymous]

BaltACD

 

I find it interesting that at some locations conventional Passenger and Talgo have the same restrictions, at other locations they are different.  What is more interesting is the the I-5 bridge restriction is 30 MPH for all.  From 19.9 to 21.3 Talgo's get 42 MPH and Conventional equipment is 35 MPH.  Of additional interest the speed for freight from 19.8 to 21.3 is 10 MPH.

The speed of a Talgo train compared to a conventional train is not a fixed amount. The speed increase depends on the radius of the curve. The larger the radius the larger the speed increase.

At small radii the increase gets so small that it is not practical to post different speeds.

The Cascade Talgo trains are conventional locomotives with tilting Talgo cars. So at some point the allowed lateral acceleration for the locomotive crews might become the limiting factor.
Regards, Volker

[BaltACD]

After accident interview of Amtrak''s Road Foreman OJT - a number of interesting observations.

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61332/616784.pdf

[Deggesty]

I found the interview quite interesting.

[243129]

What I gleaned from the testimony reinforces the fact that we have the unknowing teaching the unknowing.

Beatson talks in circles and is repetitive a la Donald Trump. His math is terrible, he cites 20 years British Railways, when in actuality he had nineteen, and held three positions of ten years each??? His qualifications are questionable as he is as ill qualified as his students. His testimony is fraught with contradictions. He cites distractions from a single qualifying conductor yet there was allowed up to eight qualifiying personnel in the cab at one time.  Unless it has been changed  the maximum is four people in the cab of a locomotive.

He throws RFE Bradasich under the bus.

Signs cannot be depended on as they can be removed by vandals. Permanent landmarks are your best source of reference.

Engineers must know where they are at all times and not rely on reminders from in train personnel who can be easily distracted.

 

 

 

[Electroliner 1935]

243129

What I gleaned from the testimony reinforces the fact that we have the unknowing teaching the unknowing.

Beatson talks in circles and is repetitive a la Donald Trump. His math is terrible, he cites 20 years British Railways, when in actuality he had nineteen, and held three positions of ten years each??? His qualifications are questionable as he is as ill qualified as his students. His testimony is fraught with contradictions. He cites distractions from a single qualifying conductor yet there was allowed up to eight qualifiying personnel in the cab at one time.  Unless it has been changed  the maximum is four people in the cab of a locomotive.

He throws RFE Bradasich under the bus.

Signs cannot be depended on as they can be removed by vandals. Permanent landmarks are your best source of reference.

Engineers must know where they are at all times and not rely on reminders from in train personnel who can be easily distracted. 

The following are excerpts from the INTERVIEW OF CHARLES BEATSON [I have highlighted (Bold) some items]

 https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61332/616784.pdf

 

Upon reading this interview I think that 243129 may be correct as to saying that Amtrak doesn’t know what it doesn’t know. Charles Beatson has a large territory and may have more area than he can handle.  

 

The following

P5 L7.  Yes. I'm Charles Beatson. Last name is spelled B-e-a-t-s-o- n. My job title is road foreman on-the-job training, and I work for Amtrak in Portland.

 

P6 L24..I typically do all the evaluation rides. I can't always do them all. Geographically, it's hard for me to do. But I typically do most of them, and I also do almost all the check rides on them. And where I'm qualified on the territory, I do that. And then I do all the paperwork and administration for that

Q. Okay. Now, when you say all engineers, are we talking a specific region?

A.. Yes. Zone 10. That encompasses Seattle Crew Base, Spokane Crew Base, Shelby Crew Base, and Portland Crew Base

Q. And you know, roughly, how many engineers would that cover at a given time?

A. Well, student engineers or engineers-in-training, it can be up to eight at a time or it can be as little as one, depending on who's currently in training and where they are at any time during their training. It has been as high as eight. It doesn't seem many, but geographically, that's spread between the west coast here in Portland and Seattle and go as far east to Minot, North Dakota. So that's a good 1400-mile spread of area.

 

Q. Okay. Very good. Now, you know, we're here on -- just outside Dupont, and you know, we got a little history of this recent line that opened up. Are you involved in training people for operating over this territory, this new 20-mile section?

A. I was involved insofar as I was helping Road Foreman Chris Bradasich and Road Foreman Josh Thompson in Seattle, who were taking the lead on this. I was helping in making sure that the Portland engineers got sent up there for training, and I was up there myself to get certified and qualified myself, as well. But I didn't participate in the actual day-to-day qualifying up there other than the night I was there myself. But I made sure  that every engineer in Portland got up there and was able to get time up there -- they were available to them. And the Seattle end of the route, those engineers were managed by the road foreman up in Seattle.

 

The following seems to show that he thinks he can memorize a new territory very easily. And therefore thinks all engineers can do the same. .

 

P10 L 13 “Okay. So I ran the very first trip because it seemed the best thing to do, get me done. So I ran the first trip under guidance and instruction piloting from Chris Bradasich. Then -- so that was my operating trip. And then I observed four subsequent roundtrips myself, so  five in total that I saw. And at the end of that night, having run the territory and having observed the territory five times, I said to Chris, I'm very happy with this, and I feel qualified. And he said, okay, that's fine, I'm qualified.”

 

The following indicates he thinks that seeing the territory at night is adequate to learn it. I strongly disagree.

 

 P13 L 22 Q. Okay. What we learned here is that most of the qualifying runs took place during the night because track work was being done  during the day, so they had to squeeze in the qualifying runs during the nighttime only. What's your thoughts about that?

A. I'm not sure if that's the reason we were doing on nights, ou know, what was going on during the day. I can't comment. But my thoughts on night running: Typically, I don't like that. I don't like training on nights. Well, put it this way. I don't like having to do a territory I've never seen before on nights to learn on. Sometimes we do in the winter here in our territory, that's what we do, but over the course of a long period of time, engineers get familiar with the territory at night. I mean, we have a crew based in Spokane that does work nights all the time. However, on this territory, I was rather surprised. It's actually very well-lit at night because it follows the freeway all the way from Lakewood, anyway, to Dupont, to Nisqually. I was surprised at how visible everything was to me. So, in a way, my concern about running -- learning on night, I had no concern by the time I was done with it. By contrast, because I could see all the signals very clearly at night, I knew from my half-trip during the day earlier that month that those signals would not be as easy visible during the day because obviously it's daylight. There was infrastructure, grade crossing equipment, station paraphernalia, those things would be hard to see during the day. So, in many respects, at night, on a clear night -- and we had a clear night when we were there -- it was absolutely fine. And not every night they had was a clear night. That I can tell you.

 

When questioned about the amount of time allowed to get the training done he admits that he would have liked more but didn’t have the fortitude to tell any higher authority that more time was needed because I conclude he was not willing to challenge a higher up or because he didn’t realize that the qualifying was insufficient.

 

 P14 L2. Q. Okay. That's good insight. I appreciate that. Your overall impression of -- so this program to get this track up and running, what we're learning, is almost a year in the  making?

A. Um-hum.

Q. Now, you know, I'd appreciate your opinion about how things  overall went. That's sort of an open-ended question. You know, what's your impression of how things developed until the day of the inaugural trip?

A. I felt that we were waiting and waiting and waiting for a time where we can go up there and train and learn the territory, but we couldn't because it wasn't ready. And I was just, you know, aching it for it be ready for us to be able to train on. And then it wasn't ready and it wasn't ready. And then, finally, WSDOT -- I presume it was WSDOT -- set a date for implementation of service on December 18th. And you know, October rolls around, and I'm thinking, come on, we need to get going on this. And then we got word that we weren't going to get the territory to train on until November, which gave us about  a month in which to do any training at all. So that was a huge frustration for me, not ideal in my world. I'd like more time. And then, there was a couple of test trains. There were  three test trains done, I believe, two on the weekend and one on a weeknight, with two different types of trains in early November. But I'll have to research the dates exactly. And I know during those two testing runs, that was going to be part of someone's qualifying training, as well. But that was the first chance we had to see the whole route in its entirety as locomotive engineers and conductors. And then, finally, the date was set that we could start our training, but only on nights, starting for 2 weeks on the 27th of  November, which gave us less than a month to train.

 

Here, I think if he was as good an leader as he should have been, he should have said STOP! We need more training time.

 

And I was  hoping we would be training the whole time up until the 18th, but that was -- we didn't get that. I should also say, and I forgot to mention this earlier, prior to implementation of the night training, I did send, and Seattle also sent, a number of engineers -- not all of them because we just couldn't do it because of manpower -- we actually sent a number of engineers on Sounder commuter trains on the head- ends from Seattle to Lakewood and back to at least get some insight and observation of that first part of the territory. So they had a bit of a head start on the first part of that territory until they actually went in on their own training trips at night

Q. Okay. Thank you. I think we heard -- I think we had heard something along those lines. One thing you said that stood out for me just now, you would like more time. What would you like more time for? A. I feel that -- excuse me -- I felt that, you know, in any 1 training environment with a new territory -- and I hadn't seen it. Remember, at this point, I hadn't seen it. So I really was working on the basis of the -- I would like more time to be able to train people or have people trained on it. Once I saw it, I realized it wasn't as challenging as I thought it might be. But even so, I felt that a month of training would be better than 2 weeks. I mean, we had 2 weeks of intensive  training, but I think a nice month of training, where we could have perhaps sent people up there with less -- with more time to be able to take it in, that would have been better. Having said that, the time that engineers were up there, I  think they did a pretty good job of learning it and taking it in.

Q. Well, what level of confidence, given that there was a 10 to 12-day period and they were training at night, which you commented on, what level of confidence, you know, did you have for the crews coming out of the training and starting operations? How confident were you?

A. You know, my confidence was based on them. There were some that were quite confident. And there's some that were less confident. And so -- but they all achieved what was required in terms of getting qualified. But there were some that were feeling less comfortable with it than others.

 

Again as 243129  suggests, Amtraak doesn’t know what it doesn’t know. 

 

 P38 L9. 9 Q. Okay. Do you think that the methods of the training for the crew resource management, the situational awareness, do you think that it's adequate enough for the crews?

 A. Yes, yes.

[Anonymous]

Looks like Amtrak's RFEs took the new Point Defiance Bypass very lightly and underestimated possible problems braking to 30 mph with an unfamiliar locomotive.
Regards, Volker

[243129]

Electroliner 1935

I agree with your assessments especially the one quoted below.

"Here, I think if he was as good an leader as he should have been, he should have said STOP! We need more training time."

Mr. Beatson seems to fit the adage 'jack of all trades and master of none'.

He initially states that the training is adequate and later states that it is not ergo my Trump comparison.

How many more disasters will it take to convince all that Amtrak has the unknowing teaching the unknowing?

[243129]

VOLKER LANDWEHR

Looks like Amtrak's RFEs took the new Point Defiance Bypass very lightly and underestimated possible problems braking to 30 mph with an unfamiliar locomotive.
Regards, Volker

 

They certainly did. Now we will have to wait and see if the NTSB discovers that.

[BaltACD]

Seattle RFE's interview

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61332/616785.pdf

[243129]

BaltACD

Seattle RFE's interview

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61332/616785.pdf

 

The RFE after three trips is putting together a physical characteristics test??!! GMAFB.

I am almost embarrassed for RFE Bradasich. His testimony reveals how much he does not know and makes blatantly obvious that Amtrak has the unknowing teaching the unknowing.

Jonathan Hines is incompetent and should be removed as head of the training and compliance programs.

[243129]

After the Amtrak 91 incident this was sent to Op-Ed:

New Haven Register

Malibu Times

Seattle Times

L.A. Times

Denver Post

Chicago Tribune

Chicago Sun Times

San Francisco Chronicle

Miami Herald

Senators Murphy and Blumenthal, the Federal Railroad Administration and the Surface Transportation Board.

Amtrak portrays a clear and present danger to the traveling public with their inadequate vetting and training procedures and nowhere is it more evident than in the recent rash of operator error disasters.
How many more lives will be lost due to the arrogance of Amtrak management who historically have ignored input from their now dwindling veteran operations workforce?  If one were to quiz today’s operations employees one would be astounded at what they don’t know.
The warning signs have been there and Amtrak has paid no heed despite repeated pleas from their veteran workforce to examine and revamp their training regimen.
Here are some of the warning signs Amtrak ignored:

June 3, 2011 Amtrak train collides with Chicago Metra train 12 hurt.

October 13, 2011 Amtrak San Joaquin collides with Coast Starlight 17 injured.

November, 2013 Amtrak had a New York to Washington Regional train accept the wrong route and wander six miles in the wrong direction to the end of the line on a foreign railroad.

May 12, 2015 Amtrak train 188 derails due to excessive speed 8 killed, 200 injured.

April 3, 2016 Amtrak train hits company backhoe killing 2 and injuring 39

July 6, 2016 Amtrak train arrives Charlottesville 1 hour and 45 minutes late after accepting wrong route towards Richmond.

December 12, 2017 Amtrak Cascades train 501 derails killing 3 and injuring 77.

February 4, 2018 Amtrak train #91 crashes in to standing CSX freight train killing 2 and injuring 116.

All of the above are attributed to human error yet Amtrak still made no changes to it’s vetting and training procedures.
The public outcry for Positive Train Control is not the be all to end all. It creates dependency and erodes what skills the engineer (operator) might possess. Positive Train Control can and will fail and a good percentage of engineers will become ‘lost’. Couple that with Amtrak’s inadequate vetting and training procedures and you have a prescription for disaster, a ‘perfect storm’ if you will.
Nothing precludes proper training and Amtrak seems incapable of providing it.
What will it take for Amtrak to review and assess it’s hiring and training procedures? More death and injuries?
Amtrak is in dire need of oversight from experienced operations personnel. Something must be done soon or there will be more disasters.

 

[charlie hebdo]

243129

Signs cannot be depended on as they can be removed by vandals. Permanent landmarks are your best source of reference.

That sounds like a level of technology we had 100+ years ago.  Relying on landmarks or signposts should not be the navigation/orientation tool for operating trains moving at 79 mph.

[BaltACD]

charlie hebdo

 

243129

Signs cannot be depended on as they can be removed by vandals. Permanent landmarks are your best source of reference. 

That sounds like a level of technology we had 100+ years ago.  Relying on landmarks or signposts should not be the navigation/orientation tool for operating trains moving at 79 mph.

So in the 21st Century world of fake news - what would be a better system?  Knowing that technology fails from time to time - without prior notice.

[charlie hebdo]

BaltACD

 

 

charlie hebdo

 

243129

Signs cannot be depended on as they can be removed by vandals. Permanent landmarks are your best source of reference. 

That sounds like a level of technology we had 100+ years ago.  Relying on landmarks or signposts should not be the navigation/orientation tool for operating trains moving at 79 mph.

 

 

So in the 21st Century world of fake news - what would be a better system?  Knowing that technology fails from time to time - without prior notice.

 

An objection easily remedied if you think about it.

My point was that navigating by landmarks "service brake application to 40 mph at the red barn" is quite imprecise and subject to total failure in the dark or with fog and other times of poor visibility. The Conrail engineer mentiontioned that mileposts might be removed by vandals. Surely there are ways to prevent this 99% of the time and to make them more legible?   

But with HSR and even conventional fast trains, even good signs and landmarks are easily overlooked.  Volker Landwehr should be able to tell us what method is used on Deutsche Bahn.

[243129]

charlie hebdo

 

 

 

243129

Signs cannot be depended on as they can be removed by vandals. Permanent landmarks are your best source of reference.

 

 

That sounds like a level of technology we had 100+ years ago.  Relying on landmarks or signposts should not be the navigation/orientation tool for operating trains moving at 79 mph.

 

Do you have a better level of technology? A properly qualified engineer, which Stephen Brown was not, would use permanent landmarks as reference points. What part of it's all in the proper training don't you get?

[243129]

charlie hebdo

 

 

BaltACD

 

 

charlie hebdo

 

243129

Signs cannot be depended on as they can be removed by vandals. Permanent landmarks are your best source of reference. 

That sounds like a level of technology we had 100+ years ago.  Relying on landmarks or signposts should not be the navigation/orientation tool for operating trains moving at 79 mph.

 

 

So in the 21st Century world of fake news - what would be a better system?  Knowing that technology fails from time to time - without prior notice.

 

 

 

 

An objection easily remedied if you think about it.

My point was that navigating by landmarks "service brake application to 40 mph at the red barn" is quite imprecise and subject to total failure in the dark or with fog and other times of poor visibility. The Conrail engineer mentiontioned that mileposts might be removed by vandals. Surely there are ways to prevent this 99% of the time and to make them more legible?   

But with HSR and even conventional fast trains, even good signs and landmarks are easily overlooked.  Volker Landwehr should be able to tell us what method is used on Deutsche Bahn.

 

How is this, in your opinion "easily remedied"?

Once again I will say to you, it's all in the proper training.

 "service brake application to 40 mph at the red barn" is quite imprecise and subject to total failure in the dark or with fog and other times of poor visibility."

How do you determine that the "red barn" example is "imprecise"? A properly trained engineer would have more than one reference point for a restriction.

In times of restricted visibility a properly trained engineer can use his ears. You can hear yourself going under or over a bridge, a siding switch, an interlocking, a tunnel, grade crossing etc.

You are supposed to know where you are and that is attained by proper training something which is virtually nonexistent on Amtrak. The unknowing are teaching the unknowing.

"But with HSR and even conventional fast trains, even good signs and landmarks are easily overlooked."

How would you know this?

 

[Anonymous]

charlie hebdo

But with HSR and even conventional fast trains, even good signs and landmarks are easily overlooked. Volker Landwehr should be able to tell us what method is used on Deutsche Bahn.

I'll try but I'm not too familiar with the German signaling system. What I can say is: Distance between main signals is between 2,300 ft and 4,300 ft depending on speed. An approach signal is located between two main signals in the braking distance, mostly 3,300 ft, to the following main signal and shows its aspect and when necessary a speed restriction sign. That works up to 100 mph.

For faster trains LZB was developed as the distance between approach and main signal was shorter than the braking distance: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linienzugbeeinflussung

This allows the engineer to "see" signals up to 8 miles ahead.

LZB is a kind of PTC with a bit different capability.
Regards, Volker

[BaltACD]

charlie hebdo

My point was that navigating by landmarks "service brake application to 40 mph at the red barn" is quite imprecise and subject to total failure in the dark or with fog and other times of poor visibility. The Conrail engineer mentiontioned that mileposts might be removed by vandals. Surely there are ways to prevent this 99% of the time and to make them more legible?   

But with HSR and even conventional fast trains, even good signs and landmarks are easily overlooked.  Volker Landwehr should be able to tell us what method is used on Deutsche Bahn.

How do you think racing drivers get around the track - AT SPEED.

Ever heard a NASCAR Crew Chief tell a driver 'Just hit your marks and we'll win this race"?

Drivers, during their practice time on track work out a number of 'marks' (landmarks of one variety or another) of where to start braking, where to start their turn in to the curve, where they want to apex the curve, where they want to track out too coming off the curve.  This is done for each and every trun on the track - both road coursed and oval tracks.

Drivers might have the same marks, or because of their driving technique they might have different marks.  One thing drivers have insure is that their 'marks' won't move.  If it is on a road course, where racing takes place in the rain and other forms of less than ideal weather - the marks selected must be visible in that weather.

One race track I competed on, painted braking markers on the left edge of the track - which was OK until it rained and the water and glare made the marks invisible - so you use multiple 'marks' to identify the points that mean something to your operation of whatever kind of vehicle you are operating.

[243129]

VOLKER LANDWEHR

 

 

charlie hebdo

But with HSR and even conventional fast trains, even good signs and landmarks are easily overlooked. Volker Landwehr should be able to tell us what method is used on Deutsche Bahn.

 

 

I'll try but I'm not too familiar with the German signaling system. What I can say is: Distance between main signals is between 2,300 ft and 4,300 ft depending on speed. An approach signal is located between two main signals in the braking distance, mostly 3,300 ft, to the following main signal and shows its aspect and when necessary a speed restriction sign. That works up to 100 mph.

For faster trains LZB was developed as the distance between approach and main signal was shorter than the braking distance: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linienzugbeeinflussung

This allows the engineer to "see" signals up to 8 miles ahead.

LZB is a kind of PTC with a bit different capability.
Regards, Volker

 

LZB and PTC are 'aids'. They are there to assist you not 'run' the train. They can and will fail. That is where proper training comes in.

[Anonymous]

243129

LZB and PTC are 'aids'. They are there to assist you not 'run' the train. They can and will fail. That is where proper training comes in.

I've heard you, repeating it again and again doesn't make it more right.

I was asked how DB handles such situations and I tried to answer.

The problem is that there were so many human errors by American railroad personell that the PTC system ws deemed necessary. On the other hand the best training doesn't prevent human error completely.

DB needed a new system because of higher speeds. For slower speeds they have PZB. To harmonize the different European systems ETCS is developed.
Regards, Volker

[BaltACD]

VOLKER LANDWEHR

 

243129

LZB and PTC are 'aids'. They are there to assist you not 'run' the train. They can and will fail. That is where proper training comes in. 

I've heard you, repeating it again and again doesn't make it more right.

I was asked how DB handles such situations and I tried to answer.

The problem is that there were so many human errors by American railroad personell that the PTC system ws deemed necessary. On the other hand the best training doesn't prevent human error completely.

DB needed a new system because of higher speeds. For slower speeds they have PZB. To harmonize the different European systems ETCS is developed.
Regards, Volker

Europeans have done so well in recent years

[243129]

VOLKER LANDWEHR

 

 

243129

LZB and PTC are 'aids'. They are there to assist you not 'run' the train. They can and will fail. That is where proper training comes in.

 

 

I've heard you, repeating it again and again doesn't make it more right.

I was asked how DB handles such situations and I tried to answer.

The problem is that there were so many human errors by American railroad personell that the PTC system ws deemed necessary. On the other hand the best training doesn't prevent human error completely.

DB needed a new system because of higher speeds. For slower speeds they have PZB. To harmonize the different European systems ETCS is developed.
Regards, Volker

 

And you will hear it again and again because that is the reason that these disasters occur.

Nothing prevents human error completely but proper training minimizes those situations.

[243129]

BaltACD

 

 

VOLKER LANDWEHR

 

243129

LZB and PTC are 'aids'. They are there to assist you not 'run' the train. They can and will fail. That is where proper training comes in. 

I've heard you, repeating it again and again doesn't make it more right.

I was asked how DB handles such situations and I tried to answer.

The problem is that there were so many human errors by American railroad personell that the PTC system ws deemed necessary. On the other hand the best training doesn't prevent human error completely.

DB needed a new system because of higher speeds. For slower speeds they have PZB. To harmonize the different European systems ETCS is developed.
Regards, Volker

 

 

Europeans have done so well in recent years

 

The 'driver' was talking on the phone prior to the crash.

[charlie hebdo]

I wasn't asking your opinion 243129  because we know it already.  We've all heard it about 185 times already.  Your stock answer is like "one size fits all."   You've ridden your hobby horse to death.

[243129]

charlie hebdo

I wasn't asking your opinion 243129  because we know it already.  We've all heard it about 185 times already.  You stock answer is like "one size fits all."   You've ridden your hobby horse to death.

 

Show me where I am wrong.

You have avoided responding to my queries. You have made statements and when called on them you do not answer.

For the 186th time. Proper training!

[BaltACD]

243129

 

charlie hebdo

I wasn't asking your opinion 243129  because we know it already.  We've all heard it about 185 times already.  You stock answer is like "one size fits all."   You've ridden your hobby horse to death. 

Show me where I am wrong.

You have avoided responding to my queries. You have made statements and when called on them you do not answer.

For the 186th time. Proper training!

There is no subsititute for a QUALIFIED engineer on any train.

While qualifying as a Train Dispatcher, rode with a crew from Warwick, Ohio to Holloway, OH.  Trip commenced at dusk and very shortly thereafter a pea soup thick fog setteled on the area.  Territory was Dark operated with Timetable and Train Orders.  We held Train Order authority to Holloway.  We proceeded at track speed (30 MPH) with the Engineer keeping his head looking out and down from the side cab window (F7 locomotive).  The locomotive headlight just shown into the fog and it returned a solid white sheet of blindness.  The engineer with his vigil and route knowledge and what he was able to view with the light from the truck light - all road crossing were properly sounded, both those with automatic protection and those without.  Train was slowed to a speed so that it could be stopped,  IF the railroad crossings at grade with the NKP and PRR has signals displayed had required stopping, when the signals were viewable they authorized our train to proceed.

You can't perform this kind of operation UNLESS you KNOW your territory inside, outside, forward and backward.  That is being qualified.  That kind of territorial knowledge does not come from a couple of training runs - runs where it is acknowledged that the 501 engineer only Operated 2 trips North and 1 trip South at the controls of a train, that DID NOT have a Charger as the lead locomotive.

243129 is correct - Training until the trained actually know what they are doing and what they are expected to do.  You know the territory by touch and feel as much or more than you know it by sight.

Passing a 12 question Physical Characteristics test does not constitute being qualified.

[Anonymous]

243129

The 'driver' was talking on the phone prior to the crash.

Not much better but different: He talked with his conductor on the train.
Regards, Volker

[Anonymous]

243129

And you will hear it again and again because that is the reason that these disasters occur. Nothing prevents human error completely but proper training minimizes those situations.

Nobody says that proper training is not needed. But the best training will not prevent human errors. There are other factors.

In the early 20th century American railroads new that and developed the first ATS safety systems. While German railways continued development to the present and are developing for the future. American railroads forgot about it with the demise of passenger trains, until PTC hit.
Regards, Volker

[243129]

VOLKER LANDWEHR

 

 

243129

The 'driver' was talking on the phone prior to the crash.

 

 

Not much better but different: He talked with his conductor on the train.
Regards, Volker

 

Court investigators said that the driver was speaking on the telephone to staff at Renfe about the route to Ferrol, and consulting a map or document, shortly before the brakes were activated and that he did apply the brakes, but not in time to achieve the safe speed limit for the curve.

This person evidentally is not capable of multi-tasking.

Also gleaned from the transcript is that he was a bit of a 'hot dog' who regaled his Facebook followers with tales of his journeys.

Not a good combination.