VOLKER LANDWEHR 7j43k The only facts I'm aware of that WE (the public) don't have is the identity and work history of the engineer, and the data from the cameras. The locomotive crew's work history is in the same report. Quote: The 55-year-old engineer had been working for Amtrak since May 2004 and had been promoted to engineer in August 2013. The other crewmember in the cab of the locomotive was a 48-year-old “qualifying” conductor who was being familiarized with the territory. This conductor had been working for Amtrak since June 2010 and had been promoted to conductor in November 2011.Regards, Volker
7j43k The only facts I'm aware of that WE (the public) don't have is the identity and work history of the engineer, and the data from the cameras.
The locomotive crew's work history is in the same report.
Quote: The 55-year-old engineer had been working for Amtrak since May 2004 and had been promoted to engineer in August 2013. The other crewmember in the cab of the locomotive was a 48-year-old “qualifying” conductor who was being familiarized with the territory. This conductor had been working for Amtrak since June 2010 and had been promoted to conductor in November 2011.Regards, Volker
That is an inadequate and incomplete work history.
Ed
We seem to be attracting more and more lawyers on this forum.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
7j43k VOLKER LANDWEHR 7j43k The only facts I'm aware of that WE (the public) don't have is the identity and work history of the engineer, and the data from the cameras. The locomotive crew's work history is in the same report. Quote: The 55-year-old engineer had been working for Amtrak since May 2004 and had been promoted to engineer in August 2013. The other crewmember in the cab of the locomotive was a 48-year-old “qualifying” conductor who was being familiarized with the territory. This conductor had been working for Amtrak since June 2010 and had been promoted to conductor in November 2011.Regards, Volker That is an inadequate and incomplete work history. Ed
That is all you are getting at this point in time.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The Seattle Times reported at 9:30 this morning that in essence the engineer was lost. https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/transportation/ntsb-report-amtrak-engineer-missed-speed-limit-sign-before-the-train-crashed-on-a-curve-south-of-tacoma/
Activate link ..
www.seattlepi.com/seattlenews/article/NTSB-Amtrak-engineer-missed-signs-before-deadly-12524827.php
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/transportation/ntsb-report-amtrak-engineer-missed-speed-limit-sign-before-the-train-crashed-on-a-curve-south-of-tacoma/
"The 55-year-old engineer, who is not named in the NTSB report, took seven to 10 observational trips and operated three trips on the Sound Transit-owned Point Defiance Bypass before Dec. 18, when Amtrak Cascades 501 derailed on its inaugural passenger voyage down the new section of track."
Just before the derailment, the conductor said he heard the engineer mumble something, then looked up and sensed the train going "airborne."
Was it something like "OH S--T"?
This reinforces the need for PTC. I have thought about how all the trains I have been on have had engineers that "knew" their territory and operated their trains properly. I did have one BNSF (Metra) commuter train forget a stop one night but otherwise all trains I have been on were operated properly. But the consequences of errors in my opinion justify the case for PTC. It woud still not prevent low speed accidents like Hoboken. PTC will let you run at restricting speed which is what normally occurs in terminals. In Hoboken, the operator seemingly had his train under control but still managed to accellerate as he approached the end of track.
Similar to the CTA crash at Lake and Wabash where the operator went past a stop signal at under 15 mph and hit the end of another stopped train, He failed to remove power and the train pushed itself off the tracks and it fell to the ground.
Electroliner 1935 Just before the derailment, the conductor said he heard the engineer mumble something, then looked up and sensed the train going "airborne." Was it something like "OH S--T"? This reinforces the need for PTC. I have thought about how all the trains I have been on have had engineers that "knew" their territory and operated their trains properly. I did have one BNSF (Metra) commuter train forget a stop one night but otherwise all trains I have been on were operated properly. But the consequences of errors in my opinion justify the case for PTC. It woud still not prevent low speed accidents like Hoboken. PTC will let you run at restricting speed which is what normally occurs in terminals. In Hoboken, the operator seemingly had his train under control but still managed to accellerate as he approached the end of track. Similar to the CTA crash at Lake and Wabash where the operator went past a stop signal at under 15 mph and hit the end of another stopped train, He failed to remove power and the train pushed itself off the tracks and it fell to the ground.
Once again PTC is not the be all to end all. Nothing precludes proper training which includes on the job training. Accidents at restricted speed can also cause significant damage and loss of life.
243129 Electroliner 1935 Just before the derailment, the conductor said he heard the engineer mumble something, then looked up and sensed the train going "airborne." Was it something like "OH S--T"? This reinforces the need for PTC. I have thought about how all the trains I have been on have had engineers that "knew" their territory and operated their trains properly. I did have one BNSF (Metra) commuter train forget a stop one night but otherwise all trains I have been on were operated properly. But the consequences of errors in my opinion justify the case for PTC. It woud still not prevent low speed accidents like Hoboken. PTC will let you run at restricting speed which is what normally occurs in terminals. In Hoboken, the operator seemingly had his train under control but still managed to accellerate as he approached the end of track. Similar to the CTA crash at Lake and Wabash where the operator went past a stop signal at under 15 mph and hit the end of another stopped train, He failed to remove power and the train pushed itself off the tracks and it fell to the ground. Once again PTC is not the be all to end all. Nothing precludes proper training which includes on the job training. Accidents at restricted speed can also cause significant damage and loss of life.
Being QUALIFIED as a engineer means more of than just knowing where the speed signs and whistle posts and signal locations. To be QUALIFIED the engineer needs to sufficiently comfortable to operate his train safely over his territory in the ABSENCE of the normal landmarks.
ie. Train has departed the station and in 4 minutes there is a 30 MPH slow order for a tenth of a mile, 8 minutes after the 30 MPH slow there will be a road crossing etc. etc. etc.
Remember, if the Engineer feels lost - he STILL HAS the ability to slow his train to Restricted Speed to get his bearing. Losing time on the run is a much better option than putting the train on I-5.
So apparently the brake application was for realizing the train was speeding into the curve and not for an automatic system warning for an "overspeed condition" that would have required the engineer to slow to 79 mph.
Therefore, when the engineer made a comment about an "overspeed condition," and applied the brake, he was referring to his exceeding the 30 mph curve speed limit by 50 mph.
I recall thinking that the 6 second time line seemed too short to contain two different reasons to slow to two different speeds. Now I understand that there never was two issues of exceeding the speed limit.
So the only question left is this: Why did the engineer make an application of the independent brake instead of an emergency application?
BaltACDRemember, if the Engineer feels lost - he STILL HAS the ability to slow his train to Restricted Speed to get his bearing. Losing time on the run is a much better option than putting the train on I-5.
This is the engineer's final failure and why the NTSB will pin it on him despite any training inadequacy issues, which I believe there are.
Say you are driving 65 in a 55 zone. Then a cop pulls you over and says, “Sir, the reason I stopped you is that you are in an over-speed condition.”
This is about the way the NTSB told us that the engineer entered a 30 mph curve at 80 mph. He was just having one of those pesky “over-speed conditions.”
EuclidThis is about the way the NTSB told us that the engineer entered a 30 mph curve at 80 mph. He was just having one of those pesky “over-speed conditions.”
That's the common term used in the industry. Keep tilting windmills, Don.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
A common term for what exactly?
Stop playing stupid. It's beneath us both.
EuclidA common term for what exactly?
Slam the door on this nitwittery.
On the basis of one poster's jocular and uninformed supposition that the engineer's 'mumble' was 'oh s--t', you came to a hard conclusion that the overspeed announcement and independent application concerned realization of the impending curve. That is wrong, and that is stupid. There is way too much established evidence for the 'overspeed' being an internal alerter notification, responded to in an appropriate manner with a 'trim' via the independent. To throw all that out on such a nonsensical basis is ... well, Zug said it more diplomatically than I would.
Overmod Euclid A common term for what exactly? Slam the door on this nitwittery. On the basis of one poster's jocular and uninformed supposition that the engineer's 'mumble' was 'oh s--t', you came to a hard conclusion that the overspeed announcement and independent application concerned realization of the impending curve. That is wrong, and that is stupid. There is way too much established evidence for the 'overspeed' being an internal skeeter notification, responded to in an appropriate manner with a 'trim' via the independent. To throw all that out on such a nonsensical basis is ... well, Zug said it more diplomatically than I would.
Euclid A common term for what exactly?
On the basis of one poster's jocular and uninformed supposition that the engineer's 'mumble' was 'oh s--t', you came to a hard conclusion that the overspeed announcement and independent application concerned realization of the impending curve. That is wrong, and that is stupid. There is way too much established evidence for the 'overspeed' being an internal skeeter notification, responded to in an appropriate manner with a 'trim' via the independent. To throw all that out on such a nonsensical basis is ... well, Zug said it more diplomatically than I would.
There is no need for you to slam the door on anything. Please show me the evidence for your statement as follows:
“There is way too much established evidence for the 'overspeed' being an internal skeeter notification, responded to in an appropriate manner with a 'trim' via the independent.”
Regarding your point:
“…you came to a hard conclusion that the overspeed announcement … concerned realization of the impending curve.”
Yes I did come to that conclusion based on the NTSB saying this:
“He [the engineer] said that as soon as he saw the 30 mph sign at the start of the curve, he applied brakes. Seconds later, the train derailed as it entered the curve.”
The latest report from the NTSB says nothing about the following:
An over-speed condition.
An automatic, system-generated over-speed warning or announcement.
Any reason why the engineer wanted to reduce speed to 79 mph.
An application of the independent brake with the intention to reduce speed to 79 mph.
Any application of the independent brake for any reason.
Any reason why the engineer applied brakes other than seeing the 30 mph curve ahead.
Maybe Zugmann can help you explain this diplomatically.
I don't need assistance in diplomacy, where it is warranted.
i understand you may have forgotten all the circumstantial and reported details, including the NTSB reports prior to now, but Occam's Razor alone points to the alerted interpretation of the overspeed timeline as reported. It is not up to me to produce detailed preponderance of established evidence to counter a wild-hair allegation based on a speculative comment by someone not there.
All this will be recapitulated in the actual report(s) that come out of the investigation, whether or not there is some kind of political whitewashing of evidence going on. (And while I personally suspect some of that, I don't propose it as fact, let alone defend it, without far more evidence than I have -- let alone that no one particularly cares what my suppositions would be at this point.)
I believe it has been established that there was no application of the train brake, either from the cab handle or the EOT dump switch, before the UDE during the derailment dropped the pressure enough to mask it. If the independent application were in some alternate-universe explanation of air-brake practice intended to set up hard braking six seconds later... why not use the 'real' train brakes right then, or at least keep the independent on?
That you think your point #4 is a subject of mystery is particularly sad, as is the corresponding assumption that if the NTSB doesn't call it out as a potential accident cause there must be no reason for it. Hint: why is 79mph a significant number for operations on this line, and why might exceeding this by several mph running downgrade 'cause' an engineer to realize he was in overspeed and need to do something other than cycle the alerter in response?
I don't understand the obsession with the overspeed alert and what the engineer was thinking at that time, and that he applied the brake simply to reduce speed by a couple of MPH. This had little if anything to do with the derailment. The train was lost because he failed to slow down long before this.
EuclidMaybe Zugmann can help you explain this diplomatically.
Only if I get the same immunity that you enjoy on here.
Overmod, thanks for bringing Occam's Razor into the discussion. Is there some way it can be used to cut the useless chatter out?
Johnny
The engineer is said to have been lost. However, he knew the milepost location of the 30 mph curve at milepost 19.8, and he remembers passing mileposts 15.5, 16, and 17. So if he was lost, it was only in the last 2.8 miles. And in that last 2.8 miles, the engineer missed two chances of becoming unlost.
One chance was milepost 18, and the other chance was the 2-mile advance warning sign for the curve. Those two markers were only .2 miles apart, so one lapse of attention could have quite easily caused both of them to be missed.
Assuming nobody stole those two markers, the engineer must not have been paying attention to the track ahead as he passed them. He also must not have had enough familiarity of the road to look for those missed markers. The report does not say anything about the engineer seeing any milepost between milepost 18 and the curve at milepost 19.8.
The following is from the most recent NTSB report on the Amtrak #501 crash:
The concern with the overspeed business is this: it's a bit like the Titanic bearing down on the iceberg in the dark at 25 knots, only a few seconds from collision, and the helmsman gets a signal from the engine room that his engines are making too many turns so he orders a slight trim of the valve gear (with the effect of bleeding off a knot or so of way). If he'd realized about the iceberg he would have taken FAR greater action to get way off the ship.
I have to wonder if he somehow confused his response to the overspeed alert with watching for the point of initial braking for the curve. It is strange otherwise that he claims to be observing milepost by milepost and then takes no telemetrically detectable train brake action at all in what is less than 2 minutes' running from the last one he remembers.
Meanwhile, if the NTSB report is as you indicate, and I see no reason it is not, there are major problems with that last 'explanation'. He claims to have seen that tiny speed-limit sign as his first warning identifying the signal... but the sign is so small that by the time he could read it he'd be (at nearly 120 feet per second) no more than a second or so away, yet he claims that net of all reaction time he had the brake applied by the point of derailment. Despite the tech reports indicating the only measurable air application came when the train parted mechanically, presumably a couple of seconds later (we will get the precise timeline later in the investigation). To me something about this does not smell quite right.
It DOES seem the video might answer many questions.
When do we citizens get to see it?
EuclidSo the only question left is this: Why did the engineer make an application of the independent brake instead of an emergency application?
Because he was planning to start slowing down a mile before the curve. So, his next planned braking was for the curve. He just automatically started going through those motions when he realized he needed to brake for the curve. The problem was, it was already too late.
Remember, he was still looking for MP18 and the curve speed restriction sign (that he had missed)
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
oltmannd Euclid So the only question left is this: Why did the engineer make an application of the independent brake instead of an emergency application? Because he was planning to start slowing down a mile before the curve. So, his next planned braking was for the curve. He just automatically started going through those motions when he realized he needed to brake for the curve. The problem was, it was already too late. Remember, he was still looking for MP18 and the curve speed restriction sign (that he had missed)
Euclid So the only question left is this: Why did the engineer make an application of the independent brake instead of an emergency application?
If that is true, then the engineer made two brake applications in approach to the curve instead of one application as the NTSB said in their first report.
If the engineer wanted to slow from 80 to 30 over one mile, why would he use the indepent brake rather than dynamic braking?
If there was just one brake application, and it was at the curve, that was past the point where the engineer was lost.
The report says: "He [engineer] said that as soon as he saw the 30 mph sign at the start of the curve, he applied brakes. Seconds later, the train derailed as it entered the curve."
It does not say what type of brake application it was, but an independent brake application does not make sense at this point where the engineer has become aware of the fact that he is at the curve after misjudging his location for the previous couple miles.
The big issue is that the engineer was lost.
He claims he got three training trips at the controls. Where these three round trips, or three one way trips. If one way, in what direction? Did all trips cover the entire route from the depot in Tacoma to the stopping point short of the two main track at Nisqually? **Edit - A new AP story says the wreck trip was his second southbound trip at the controlls.** How many trips at track speed, or did they just poke along at 30 MPH or so?
While there has been a lot of chatter here about the advance speed warning sign two miles out, no one has thought about the other landmarks available to the engineer. This route has lots of adjacent civil landmarks, road crossings and the three miles above the curve is alongside the I-5 freeway.
In the good old days there was the station of Dupont a bit less than two miles above the curve. In addition, the grade breaks from flat to downgrade in about the same area. Finally, since the Dupont dynamite factory was shut down the ground has been developed into the suburban community of Dupont. Modern Dupont has a freeway interchange with a square overhead bridge about 1.5 miles above the curve. The interchange has curving overhead bridges at 1.7 and 1.3 miles above the curve. This is a huge reference point it would be impossible to miss even in the dark, and fog, and rain, and it is very conveniently located in relation to the curve. Any competent RFE training people on this route would be a fool not to point this out as a reference point.
I am having a hard time figuring out how the engineer could have been lost. I believe he was lost. Inadequate qualification trips, distraction by the trainee, and lack of RFE in cab of every train for the first few days rank high on my private list.
7j43kIt DOES seem the video might answer many questions. When do we citizens get to see it?
If I understand theThe Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 correctly the answer is: most likely never:
§1114 Disclosure, availability, and use of information
(d) Surface vehicle recordings and transcripts
(1) Confidentiality of recordings.--The Board may not disclose publicly any part of a surface vehicle voice or video recorder recording or transcript of oral communications by or among drivers, train employees, or other operating employees responsible for the movement and direction of the vehicle or vessel, or between such operating employees and company communication centers, related to an accident investigated by the Board. However, the Board shall make public any part of a transcript or any written depiction of visual information that the Board decides is relevant to the accident--
Regards, Volker
EuclidThe report says: "He [engineer] said that as soon as he saw the 30 mph sign at the start of the curve, he applied brakes. Seconds later, the train derailed as it entered the curve."
Trains operating at track speed - ARE NOT LINE OF SIGHT VEHICLES. The Engineer has to take the necessary actions to set up for slow orders well ahead of seeing the the slow order sign.
BaltACD Euclid The report says: "He [engineer] said that as soon as he saw the 30 mph sign at the start of the curve, he applied brakes. Seconds later, the train derailed as it entered the curve." Trains operating at track speed - ARE NOT LINE OF SIGHT VEHICLES. The Engineer has to take the necessary actions to set up for slow orders well ahead of seeing the the slow order sign.
Euclid The report says: "He [engineer] said that as soon as he saw the 30 mph sign at the start of the curve, he applied brakes. Seconds later, the train derailed as it entered the curve."
I don't understand your point. I realize they have to plan ahead for speed restrictions. My point is that in this case, the engineer did not plan ahead. The engineer did not make an independent application thinking he was a mile away from the curve and wanting to slow down over that mile. The engineer applied the brakes as soon as he saw the 30 mph sign at the start of the cuve. So he could not have believed he was still a mile away from the curve.
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