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The Vision for the Future, U.S. Intercity Passenger Rail Network through 2050 is a useful document.  It contains a lot of food for thought and additional work.       The Passenger Rail Working Group's (PRWG) work product presents an intriguing vision for passenger rail in 2050.  It is better than the NARP offering.A fund similar to the Interstate Highway Trust Fund, issuing government bonds, raising the gasoline tax, etc. are mentioned as potential sources for funding the vision.  Unfortunately, the details are sketchy.  The probability of getting the federal or the state governments to implement a hefty increase in the gasoline tax, especially to build rail corridors, appears to be low.  Texas, for example, has not raised its gasoline tax since 1992.  Resistance to raising it has been fierce.  This is why proponents of public transit in Texas have looked to the sales tax to fund their projects.The PRWG does not mention the heavy debt burden being borne by U.S. taxpayers, nor does it mention the unfunded mandatory spending liabilities that are likely to acerbate it.  These are indicators of the country's ability to pay for the vision.  The PRWG estimates the cost of the vision at $357.2 billion, but it provides no way to independently verify the details.  Whether they are available for public scrutiny is problematic.  It claims that the cost estimates are conservative, that the actual costs will probably be less.  Many rail projects in the U.S., e. g. the Dallas light rail system, the Austin rail line, etc. have exceeded their original cost estimates by tens of millions of dollars.  These projects had a design to complete time of less than ten years.  The PRWG admits that it has no operating revenue and cost projections for the vision.  A planning model that fails to estimate these variables would be a non-starter in the business world, or at least it would have been in the Fortune 250 company where I worked, which was a capital intensive enterprise.The vision rightly recognizes the importance of enlisting the aid of the federal government to coordinate and help fund the efforts of state and local governments to further design and implement the vision.  The roles envisioned by the PRWG appear reasonable.    Sophisticated planners use scenarios for long term planning.  They know that they cannot predict the future beyond five years - sometimes ten - with a reasonable degree of probability.  So they develop three or four likely scenarios.  Then they identify, assess, and propose solutions for the opportunities and problems highlighted across the scenarios.  The PRWG does not appear to have used scenario planning, although it does admit that its maps of the future could change, which would have an impact on most of the assumptions and estimates used by the PRWG.The vision recognizes the potential for rapid rail in the country's burgeoning corridors.  It rightly notes the benefits that could accrue from better corridor rail capabilities.  Unfortunately, it still clings to the long distance train for "a select group of travelers", which means a tiny minority of the people who travel.  The assumptions and estimates used for the vision do not appear to have been audited.  Independent auditors can assess objectively the plan, especially the financial and benefit estimates, and provide independent assurance that they are reasonable.  Few work groups maintain an objective perspective of their product.The PRWG emphasizes the data that support its vision; it ignores the contrary data.  For example, it noted recent increases in train riders, including an observation that 2007 long distance trains revenues are up 21 per cent over 2005.  However, it failed to mention that long distance trains rack up a disproportionate amount of Amtrak's red ink before interest and depreciation.  It noted that driving is riskier than going by commercial carrier, but did not recognize that it is safer today per unit of measure than just ten years ago.  It mentioned that airplanes create more passenger seat mile pollution than trains, while failing to note that commercial airplanes contribute less than three per cent of the emissions thought to be responsible for global warming.  The train frequently beats the plane or car in downtown to downtown trips over relatively short distances, as the PRWG states.  But no train can cover 500 miles in the same time as a jet airplane.  Moreover, in many areas of the country, the action is not downtown.  It is in the suburbs.  In the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex, for example, more people live and work outside of downtown than in or near the city center.   This is changing, but it is not likely to be reversed significantly for a very long time if ever.  Thus, even if there was a rapid corridor train from Dallas to Houston, only travelers going from downtown to downtown, as well as areas south of Dallas and north of Houston, assuming suburban station stops were constructed there, would find it more convenient and, therefore, be potential customers.  The PRWG benchmarks passenger rail investment in a group of selected countries. While benchmarking can be helpful to fish for ideas, the PRWG comparisons are of limited value.  For example, it compares the per cent of GDP devoted to passenger rail infrastructure in the benchmarked countries.  The percentage of GDP invested by a country with a much smaller GDP than the U.S. is not a good comparison.  A smaller percentage of the U.S. GDP, which is the largest in the world, may translate into many more dollars than the higher percentage in a smaller country.  Moreover, it does not address the issue of where the other country is in relation to the U.S. in total infrastructure development.  The U.S. has a relatively mature air, highway, rail, river, and pipeline network.  While it is helpful to know what others are doing, at the end of the day investing in public infrastructure, including passenger rail, has to fit the needs of the United States and its ability to pay for them.  The PRWG acknowledges that technologies are likely to change by 2050.  But its vision focuses on existing rail technologies.  Moreover, it does not appear to have weighed the probability that competing transport technologies are likely to change dramatically by 2050.  This is probably wrong.  GE and Royals Royce, for example, are developing new jet engines that will be cleaner, quieter, and more efficient.  Boeing and Airbus are developing more efficient airplanes.  And car companies, amongst others, are racing to build alternative fuel vehicles that which will reduce fuel consumption and air pollution.  Thus, some or all of the justifications for an expanded passenger rail system could be reduced by technological changes in the alternatives.  The PRWG identified rail as the preferred solution for most of the country's large population centers and high density corridors.  This was the scope of its assignment.  But it should have acknowledged, at least obliquely, that while passenger rail may be the best option, albeit very expensive, in some areas, it may not be in others.  They appear to have overlooked other options that might be better, e.g. HOV lanes, rapid bus systems, smart highway guidance systems, telecommuting, etc.
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