Phoebe Vet Any place where a passenger occupied train is approaching an impenetrable barrier, there should be a system in place to prevent the overrun regardless of the actions of the operator. A failure of that system does not, in any way, relieve the operator of liability for the collision.
Any place where a passenger occupied train is approaching an impenetrable barrier, there should be a system in place to prevent the overrun regardless of the actions of the operator.
A failure of that system does not, in any way, relieve the operator of liability for the collision.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Dave
Lackawanna Route of the Phoebe Snow
I agree Schlimm...this was either a poor design or application of the system....If the train were going 26mph at the control point, the system should have been designed to stop it at 26 mph. Evidently it is designed to stop the train only at track speed at that location. That don't work.
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I did not say that. perhaps I worded it poorly. Hardly "twisted logic." All I am saying is what the NTSB investigation has said. It was her fault to a large degree in this sense. By falling asleep, she put the train in danger. But the safety system failed to do its job, namely to stop a train in time when it was going too fast. What good is a safety system, which is supposed to be a correction for human error, if it was not designed to properly do its job?
schlimm Phoebe Vet Then it needs to be redesigned. Definitely. Goes to show that accidents are not always only the fault of operating employees.
Phoebe Vet Then it needs to be redesigned.
Then it needs to
be redesigned.
If the train was going 26 mph at the stopping mechanism, and the speed limit is less than 26 mph, then it seems to me that the fault's both the operating employee's and the stopping mechanism's, and which one's more at fault I'm sure people can debate.
Patrick Boylan
Free yacht rides, 27' sailboat, zip code 19114 Delaware River, get great Delair bridge photos from the river. Send me a private message
Then it needs to be redesigned.
Phoebe Vet I, on the other hand, would prefer an auto stop mechanism of some kind on the train.
The auto-stop triggering mechanism was set too close to the end of the line to stop the train in time if it exceeded 25 mph.
Polish Falcon Anti-Climber? just throwing that out there... OK OK Maybe because of the ant-climber the train did not telescope on itself.
Anti-Climber? just throwing that out there...
OK OK Maybe because of the ant-climber the train did not telescope on itself.
If there had been an anti climber on the train and the bumper there would have been fatalities on the train. The harm is done by the sudden stop. What was needed was an energy absorbing over run area at the end of the line. I, on the other hand, would prefer an auto stop mechanism of some kind on the train.
Like most things, the cause is not so simple as to be only the sleeping operator:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-preliminary-report-released-on-ohare-cta-crash-20140407,0,613865.story?track=rss
A preliminary report into the cause of a spectacular CTA Blue Line crash at O’Hare International Airport said today the distance between a device in the tracks designed to stop the train and a bumper post at the end of the line was “too short to stop the train” due to its speed. The report by the National Transportation Safety Board said that “seconds before the derailment last month the train was traveling about 26 mph as it crossed a fixed trip stop that activated the train emergency braking system.”
NorthWest Reports are that the CTA has fired the operator.
Reports are that the CTA has fired the operator.
Not a surprise.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-03-29/news/chi-blue-line-operator-worked-extra-hours-before-crash-20140328_1_cta-blue-line-cta-clash-operator
http://www.today.com/video/today/54781415#54781415
this may be the first time I've seen an accurate internet headline. http://www.msn.com/ said "Dramatic video of train crash"
NTSB preliminary verdict - sleeping
http://news.yahoo.com/ntsb-train-operator-asleep-chicago-crash-153008299.html
Since I know virtually nothing about the actual facts of this accident, and since ignorance is bliss, let me make a thoroughly uneducated guess as to the cause of this accident:
The train was not operating at "excessive speed". The speed was probably quite low (15 mph or less). What happened was that the train powered itself through the bumping post and up the escalator.
My reasons for this guess are as follows:
1. I don't believe that CTA uses manual brake trips at O' Hare (although it's been a long time since I've been there, so I could be wrong). Rather, I believe the signal system reduces train speed to 15 mph, and then depends on the operator to run "on sight ". In other words, subject to all the excuses and caveats previously stated, if the train was running under 15 mph, it could keep going without any "penalty" stop.
2. The contollers on this particular series of cars work by pushing the controller away from the operator toward the front of the car for acceleration, and pulling it back toward the operator for braking.
3. The train length reported in the press is 8 cars (I'll leave to others the question of why CTA would be running 8 car trains at 3 AM).
So, here's my scenario. The train approaches the bumping post at a speed under 15 mph (so the signal system doesn't stop the train). Because the operator has dozed off - possibly just moments before the impact - the train continues to move (it's entirely possible the operator dozed off with her hand on the controller in a way that the "dead man" wouldn't kick in). The train hits the bumping post. This throws the operator's body forward, pushing the controller to an acceleration position. Since the train never gets to 15 mph, the signal system doesn't stop the train. The front cars get severe damage. But the rear cars continue to power forward, pushing the front cars through the bumping post, and station platform and up the escalator, until the operator recovers and takes her hand off the controller (which trips the dead man).
Again, this is all speculation. But CTA had another serious accident over 30 years ago where a train powered itself off the 'L' structure in the Loop after rear-ending another train on a sharp curve. Once again, the "striking" train had a controller which operated just like the controller on the O'Hare train - pushing the handle away from the operator toward the front of the train caused acceleration. So, when the train hit the train ahead of it, the operator fell forward in a way that applied power to the train.
We'll see when the NTSB finishes its work if any of this speculation matches reality (probably not).
.
CTA has had such a system in place for a long time. However, even the best system has limitations when it comes to operations in a terminal such as O'Hare or Midway, where on-sight operation will be required at some point.
As anybody who has worked overnight shifts knows, it can be difficult to stay completely alert on the night shift even when you came on duty properly rested. You're always somewhat out of sync and a job with a fair amount of repetition doesn't help, either.
This is a rapid transit system...where is the automatic stop system? automatic speed control?
The obvious solution to a train operator is to implement two man crews. Its safer on a freight train why not a passenger train?
R
Randy Stahl How did this happen with all the technology CTA has ? Can we expect the same "glitches" with PTS?
How did this happen with all the technology CTA has ? Can we expect the same "glitches" with PTS?
Update: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-ohare-train-crash-20140324,0,1750012.story
I recently observed while arriving at the Midway terminal that there is a sign indicating to "begin operation on sight" just before reaching the terminal platforms. Presumably, this means that the train stop equipment does not operate beyond this point, although lower speeds have been enforced prior to reaching this point. There may be a similar arrangement at the O'Hare terminal.
OK, so first I am flashing back to "Silver Streak" and its climax.
Then I am thinking how lucky it was that was around three in the morning, when the trains are probably not arriving at eight-minute intervals and the up escalator was probably not occupied.
I suspect the bus-to-Rosemont detour will run for a couple of weeks while they get the trainset out and the escalator fixed. In the meantime, a few scary mental images will be running around my skull.
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