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RIO Tinto unmanned train collides with stopped train.

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Posted by jeffhergert on Saturday, May 18, 2024 12:48 PM

Pure speculation, but it's so fun to speculate.

We seem to focus that the moving train somehow lost communication in some manner.  What if it was the disabled train that got lost?

I don't know if Rio Tinto's lines are signaled, or if any signal system has been discontinued.  There's a lot of proponents out their who propose to eliminate signals entirely and go to a CBTC (Communications Based Train Control) system.  (Some have said that the signal departments only want signals to keep their jobs.  Sems that also could apply to those proponents so they then have work.)

In CBTC, the main computer at the control center will receive inputs from everything affecting movement: trains, MOW, switch positions, etc.  The main computer will transmit to each train's onboard computer how far it can go until it has to stop.  A specific train won't necessarily know the location of other trains, just that it has to stop at milepost X.  What if the disabled train stopped communicating to the main office?  Then the main computer no longer knows there is an obstruction (disabled train), so then gives instruction to the moving train to continue to a point beyond where the disabled train is.  The human dispatcher (Probably not the correct term they use, but is what most of us would be familiar with.), for whatever reason, doesn't realize in time that a train is missing.  The realization is made with only enough time to warn those working on or around the disabled train.

Just some (junk) food for thought.

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Posted by Euclid on Saturday, May 18, 2024 2:31 PM

Overmod

I've been boycotting this thread (and will probably go back to boycotting this thread) to help keep my blood pressure in a sensible range.

For the last time: the empty train hit the loaded one, not the other way around.  Is that a clear enough statement for Ron to finally, finally get it?  THE EMPTY TRAIN IS THE ONE THAT WAS DISPATCHED.  THE LOADED TRAIN WAS THE ONE THAT STALLED AND NEEDED HELP.  THE EMPTY TRAIN HIT IT.

It seems that multiple people have told him this, and he keeps bouncing back 'confirming' what they said by repeating the same inanity about the loaded train hitting an empty one.   

 
It has been reported both ways. 
 
Here is what Rio Tinto says:
 
“Rio Tinto (ASX, LON: RIO) said on Monday that one of its fully-loaded autonomous iron ore trains had crashed with a set of stationary wagons in Western Australia’s Pilbara region.
 
It was the fully loaded train that approached at speed and collided with the stationary train that needed to be recovered.”
 
 
Here is another news report:
 
“A laden Rio Tinto train has come off the tracks in the Pilbara after smashing into stationary wagons, the mining giant’s third driverless train to derail in the Pilbara within the space of a year.”
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Posted by Euclid on Monday, May 20, 2024 8:20 AM

Euclid

 

 
Overmod

I've been boycotting this thread (and will probably go back to boycotting this thread) to help keep my blood pressure in a sensible range.

For the last time: the empty train hit the loaded one, not the other way around.  Is that a clear enough statement for Ron to finally, finally get it?  THE EMPTY TRAIN IS THE ONE THAT WAS DISPATCHED.  THE LOADED TRAIN WAS THE ONE THAT STALLED AND NEEDED HELP.  THE EMPTY TRAIN HIT IT.

It seems that multiple people have told him this, and he keeps bouncing back 'confirming' what they said by repeating the same inanity about the loaded train hitting an empty one.   

 

 

 
It has been reported both ways. 
 
Here is what Rio Tinto says:
 
“Rio Tinto (ASX, LON: RIO) said on Monday that one of its fully-loaded autonomous iron ore trains had crashed with a set of stationary wagons in Western Australia’s Pilbara region.
 
It was the fully loaded train that approached at speed and collided with the stationary train that needed to be recovered.”
 
 
Here is another news report:
 
“A laden Rio Tinto train has come off the tracks in the Pilbara after smashing into stationary wagons, the mining giant’s third driverless train to derail in the Pilbara within the space of a year.”
 

 

The plot thickens:
 
Earlier here, I speculated that stop signal/command sent to the loaded train that was approaching the site of the stopped, empty train, was not sent in time by a human operator from the remote location of control origination.  
 
Now apparently we learn that the stop signal/command was sent in time to stop the approaching loaded train, but the stop signal/command was sent to the wrong train.
 
That raises this question:  Did the stop signal go to the wrong train because it was mistakenly sent there by a human operator?  Or did the signal go to the wrong train due to some technical glitch in the control system? 
 
 
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Posted by Euclid on Tuesday, May 21, 2024 9:26 AM
New information from yesterday, 5/20/24
 
In my previous post, I asked if the failure to send the command to stop the loaded ore train that was approaching the site of the stalled train was due to a technical malfunction of the automatic train control system, or was the result of a human operator sending the stop command to the wrong train by mistake. 
 
I may be mistaken, but it is my understanding from news reports that there was a train that had been stopped on the mainline due to some type of malfunction, and it was being approached by a loaded ore train running by autonomous operation, apparently at normal track speed.
 
The intention was to use the approaching train to move the stopped train into the clear because it was not able to move on its own.  So there was an intention to stop the approaching train once it was near the stopped train.  Then the operable train would move the inoperable train.
 
The intention to stop the approaching train was to be executed by using the autonomous operating system to send a stop signal/command to the approaching train by using a manual control actuated by a human operator, to send the stop signal to the approaching train, to be executed by the autonomous system that operated the train. 
 
This plan failed and the approaching train thus maintained normal clear track speed rather than slowing to stop short of the stopped train that was to be assisted to move.  So the approaching train then collided with the stopped train.
 
So why did the plan to stop the train fail? Was it because the human operator failed to manually operate some type of manual switch/control to select and execute the stop command?  ---Or was it because the operator made the proper manual execution, but the automatic/electronic/digital system itself malfunctioned, and thus failed to execute the operator’s proper execution?
 
This above news report seems to answer that question, but I will leave it to others to decide what that answer is.
 
The latest report from yesterday:
 
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Posted by Overmod on Tuesday, May 21, 2024 10:58 AM

Don't say "the plan failed" -- say WHY it failed.

According to the mining union, a command to transfer control of the loaded train from the autonomous system to local control was sent to "the wrong train" despite that command having to be checked by supervisory personnel before transmission.

This does not explain why the automated system on the loaded train (which would not have received an order for local control) did not stop properly short of the standing train.  Nor does it explain who the 'six workers' presumably attempting to get the stopped train to move, which the union hinted had to scramble to get away from the impending wreck in time to save themselves, were, and how they got where they were.

This is not going to make sense until an impartial agency reviews and reports on it.  It may not make sense even then.

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Posted by BaltACD on Tuesday, May 21, 2024 1:41 PM

Overmod
Don't say "the plan failed" -- say WHY it failed.

According to the mining union, a command to transfer control of the loaded train from the autonomous system to local control was sent to "the wrong train" despite that command having to be checked by supervisory personnel before transmission.

This does not explain why the automated system on the loaded train (which would not have received an order for local control) did not stop properly short of the standing train.  Nor does it explain who the 'six workers' presumably attempting to get the stopped train to move, which the union hinted had to scramble to get away from the impending wreck in time to save themselves, were, and how they got where they were.

This is not going to make sense until an impartial agency reviews and reports on it.  It may not make sense even then.

So far the 'pronouncements' of the local authorities have paralleled those about the MV Dali destroying the FSK Bridge in Baltimore.

Bad things happened and the wreck then happened.  No further info as to WHY the bad things happened, which are the heart of the causes.  In the case of the MV Dali we have been told circuit breakers tripped - we have not been told what it was the CAUSED the circuit breakers to trip.

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Posted by Euclid on Tuesday, May 21, 2024 2:27 PM

Overmod

Don't say "the plan failed" -- say WHY it failed.

According to the mining union, a command to transfer control of the loaded train from the autonomous system to local control was sent to "the wrong train" despite that command having to be checked by supervisory personnel before transmission.

This does not explain why the automated system on the loaded train (which would not have received an order for local control) did not stop properly short of the standing train.  Nor does it explain who the 'six workers' presumably attempting to get the stopped train to move, which the union hinted had to scramble to get away from the impending wreck in time to save themselves, were, and how they got where they were.

This is not going to make sense until an impartial agency reviews and reports on it.  It may not make sense even then.

 

When I said the plan failed I was referring to the plan to stop the approaching autonomous train.  I am comfortable in asserting that the plan failed because it is obvious.  In previous post on this page, I had already mentioned that the news reports the operators sent the stop signal/command to the wrong train. 
 
As to an explanation as to why the message was sent to the wrong train, or other details as to why the plan failed, I see no certain conclusion yet.  I agree that it does not prove what caused the collision.  But the article I posted does seem to conclude what it considers to be a definite cause for the wreck
 
That conclusion seems to be disputed between the Company and the Union.  In that dispute the Union seems to conclude that because this error was developed by more than one person, it cannot be called “human error.”
 
They say that the collision was not the result of the error of a single train controller.  Instead they say it was a systematic failure of Rio Tinto’s implementation of safety procedures surrounding automation.
 
In this sense, I think it boils down to whether the cause of the wreck is the fault of human failure or the fault of automation failure.
 
This is why I said in my previous post, “I will leave it to others to decide what that answer is.” 
 
Was the wreck caused by an employee or was it caused by management?
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Posted by jeffhergert on Tuesday, May 21, 2024 3:46 PM

First, I would think a train would be stopped  before changing from autonomous mode to some kind of local/remote control. Stopping being done automatically in autonomous mode.  Then people on the scene making the change

Second, if the change command was done while the train was moving, but sent to the wrong train, the train still moving in autonomous mode should have still stopped itself.  The system should have still recognized that there was an obstruction, the disabled train, and the automation stopped the train short of the obstruction.  That the command was sent to the wrong train seems like trying to focus blame on humans rather then a possible flaw in their automation.

Jeff

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Posted by Euclid on Wednesday, May 22, 2024 10:56 AM
I was wondering about that.  I would think there would be some type of full-time system that would have all trains being able to detect another train that is fouling their route. 
 
I have read that they do have sensors on the locomotives that will detect any fouling at grade crossings.  But even with that, I don’t see how that alone could prevent crossing collisions since the sensor would be only line of sight, and that would not account for whether the train could stop in time to avoid a crossing collision.  And this problem would also have that limitation, and more so, if it was expected to stop a train short of another fouling train. 
 
I think doing that would require a track activated block system rather than just a sensor on the locomotive.  But if they do have such a block system, why not just rely on that to stop the loaded train before it reached the site of the stalled train?
 
They say the stop signal was sent to the wrong train.  If so, it would have stopped that wrong train.  If so, wouldn’t that sudden, un-programed stopping of that train have gotten a lot of attention from probably several people?  How long would it take to realize that correct train did not receive its intended stop signal?
 

One would think there would have been plenty of time to discover the error and stop the correct train.

 

But in thinking more about it, I suspect that although it was immediately clear that a stop signal had been sent to a train unintentionally.  It may be that nobody realized that another train had been intended to receive that stop signal, and did not receive it. 

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Posted by tree68 on Wednesday, May 22, 2024 4:10 PM

Euclid
They say the stop signal was sent to the wrong train.  If so, it would have stopped that wrong train.  If so, wouldn’t that sudden, un-programed stopping of that train have gotten a lot of attention from probably several people? 

If it was sent to a stopped train, who's to tell?

Euclid
...full-time system that would have all trains being able to detect another train that is fouling their route. 

I wonder if the rear end marker talks to the system (with GPS information) or if they just work with the known length of a given train.

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Posted by jeffhergert on Thursday, May 23, 2024 4:15 AM

Positive Train Control, the Energy Management Systems used in the US use GPS as well as inputs from legacy signal systems.  An enhanced version ofNYAB/Knorr's LEADER system is part of Rio Tinto's automation package.  It would follow that Rio Tinto's trains use GPS, with or without inputs from signals or other wired in hardware. 

Unless they only run, and intend to run, one train at a time on a track, any autonomous system is going to need to know the locations of obstructions/occupancies and be able to react to them.  That is, if trains ahead are slowing down, a following train would also need to slow down.  If trains started to stop ahead, a following train would also need to stop.  If a train needs a command from a central office to stop because of traffic, or a command from local personnel, I wouldn't call it autonomous.

Jeff 

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Posted by blue streak 1 on Saturday, May 25, 2024 9:57 AM

One item about ACSES is that a mobile inductor can be placed on a track to stop any train.

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Posted by Euclid on Saturday, May 25, 2024 12:28 PM
The problem was not an inability to stop an Autonomous Train.  The problem was a mistake in sending the stop command to the wrong train.  Presumably, the wrong train dutifully stopped (if it was moving).  But the sender of the command failed to realize his/her mistake in sending the vital command to the wrong train.
 
What the news report refers to as the “wrong train” was not the disabled train.  The news article says that it was this train:
 
“Rio Tinto train controllers initiated the ‘on-site’ feature [the stop command], [by] transmitting it to the autonomous train to the south of the 222 car disabled train.”
 
So that train was the “wrong train;” and it was not the disabled train. 
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Posted by BaltACD on Saturday, May 25, 2024 2:08 PM

Euclid
The problem was not an inability to stop an Autonomous Train.  The problem was a mistake in sending the stop command to the wrong train.  Presumably, the wrong train dutifully stopped (if it was moving).  But the sender of the command failed to realize his/her mistake in sending the vital command to the wrong train.
 
What the news report refers to as the “wrong train” was not the disabled train.  The news article says that it was this train:
 
“Rio Tinto train controllers initiated the ‘on-site’ feature [the stop command], [by] transmitting it to the autonomous train to the south of the 222 car disabled train.”
 
So that train was the “wrong train;” and it was not the disabled train. 

Simple!

What we have here is a failure to communicate!

I might state that the Cardinal Rule of Train Dispatching is KNOW WHO YOU ARE COMMUNICATING WITH!

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Posted by jeffhergert on Saturday, May 25, 2024 11:15 PM

AN AUTONOMOUS TRAIN SHOULD NOT REQUIRE A COMMAND FROM ANY PERSON TO STOP SHORT OF ANY OBSTRUCTION. 

Jeff

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Posted by Euclid on Sunday, May 26, 2024 10:50 AM
Several news sources say this: 
 
"At this stage these [investigation questions] are focused on the operation of and adherence to signaling systems in the area."
 
Does anyone here know what that means?
 
There seems to be hardly anything in any of the news reporting on this wreck that conveys a clear picture of the points it intends to make. 
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Posted by BaltACD on Sunday, May 26, 2024 7:22 PM

Euclid
Several news sources say this: 
 
"At this stage these [investigation questions] are focused on the operation of and adherence to signaling systems in the area."
 
Does anyone here know what that means?
 
There seems to be hardly anything in any of the news reporting on this wreck that conveys a clear picture of the points it intends to make. 

If you can't convince them of your brilliance - baffle them with bull and double talk.

I haven't been impressed with anything that has been posted to date.

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