East Palestine wreck

[ns145]

Man, in hindsight it sure would have been a good idea to have stopped 32N east of Salem and checked out that 23rd car.  Question is what is the normal range of operating temperatures for a properly operating roller bearing?  I suspect NS' data analytics predicted that if it were developing into a problem that the next detector would catch it in time.  Close, but no cigar.

[tree68]

Here's info from the preliminary report from Trains:

https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/hot-box-warning-came-too-late-for-norfolk-southern-train-that-derailed-in-ohio/?fbclid=IwAR2n5L9N0SZdWNWSgFTRCtpaFOGSIz6VNSE3cPffDixv48Ks17s9BX7bEeA

Many of your points are addressed in this report.

Euclid

[If they had looked back when the view was not blocked, it would have been impossible for them not to see the problem 25 cars back] 

Key point:  when the view was not blocked.  Please point out where that might be.  As has been noted, even on a curve, 25 cars back may not be visible.

Euclid

[I am referring to watching the 25 cars from the locomotive.  The only relevance of the video is that it shows us the failing bearing that caused the wreck]

Again, what indicates that the hot bearing was ever visible from the locomotive 25 cars away?  

 

 

[Euclid]

tree68

 

 

Euclid

Both the detector and the crew had a responsibility to react for the purpose of preventing it.  Either one alone could have prevented it. 

 

 

The crew can only react to what they are aware of.  As has been noted, twenty-five cars back may be far enough back that they couldn't see the issue in that section.  Remember, too, that the doorbell videos are taken from alongside the train, not down its length.

And the crew has enough to do without spending all their time looking back along the train.  Automobile drivers look out the windshield - they don't spend all their time looking in the rear view mirrors.

The East Palestine detector, mere car lengths from the point of derailment, was too little, too late. Even if it immediately broadcast the issue, it was too late.  And it has been discussed here that applying the brakes may have even exacerbated the issue.

That leaves the Salem detector.  Since we don't know what its sensor specifications are, we don't know if it actually failed.  Apparently it did sense something, as there is plenty of talk of an over-warm report.  It's been discussed here what the appropriate reaction is to such a report - I don't recall the specifics.  I'm sure NTSB and the FRA are looking at it.  

The final report will be interesting.  

 

Your comments quoted from above are shown in black text.  My responses are shown in blue text:

 

The crew can only react to what they are aware of.  [Of course.  The point is a duty to be aware] As has been noted, twenty-five cars back may be far enough back that they couldn't see the issue in that section. [If they had looked back when the view was not blocked, it would have been impossible for them not to see the problem 25 cars back]  Remember, too, that the doorbell videos are taken from alongside the train, not down its length. [I am referring to watching the 25 cars from the locomotive.  The only relevance of the video is that it shows us the failing bearing that caused the wreck]

 

And the crew has enough to do without spending all their time looking back along the train.  Automobile drivers look out the windshield - they don't spend all their time looking in the rear view mirrors. [Who on earth is suggesting that trainmen or motorists spend ALL THEIR TIME LOOKING BACK?  I have watched crews stick their heads out the open window to look back along the inside of every curve.  They take it as seriously as looking ahead.  They do both without compromising each other.  To look back, they turn sideways, lean out and direct their line of sight right down the train.  They are not just occasionally glancing at a rearview mirror]

 

The East Palestine detector, mere car lengths from the point of derailment, was too little, too late. Even if it immediately broadcast the issue, it was too late.  And it has been discussed here that applying the brakes may have even exacerbated the issue. [Yes it was too late for any benefit from the East Palestine detector.  I agree that applying brakes may have influenced the failing bearing, but what was the alternative?  

 

That leaves the Salem detector.  Since we don't know what its sensor specifications are, we don't know if it actually failed.  [My point is that it failed its purpose to prevent a failing bearing to derail a train] Apparently it did sense something, as there is plenty of talk of an over-warm report.  It's been discussed here what the appropriate reaction is to such a report - I don't recall the specifics.  I'm sure NTSB and the FRA are looking at it. [Yes I read news of that, but I could not understand it.  It sounded like they got something from the detector and then had meetings to discuss and decide what action to take.  I think what is needed is a detector that makes the decision]    

 

The final report will be interesting. [Yes, I am looking forward to it.  I’m sure they will be thorough, but will take at least 2 years to complete.  I understand there will soon be a preliminary report issued, any day now.]

[Ulrich]

Maybe we should wait to hear what the crew has to say. Likely they've been told not to speak to anyone other than to investigators for now. 

[ns145]

charlie hebdo

 

 

BigJim

Yet again foliage is a big hinderence as to what can and cannot be seen!

 

 

Shorter trains?

What good are the extra set of eyes?

Foliage in the Midwest in February?

 

The shear mass of closely spaced tree trunks, branches, and undergrowth even in Winter is surprisingly dense.  I took this photo on Monday.  You can only see 11 car lengths back and this is a fairly broad curve.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/ns145/52705640639

With railroads no longer using lineside code line poles and wires for signalling and communications, the trees and brush are growing right up to the sides of the track.  The resulting "tree canyons" are making the railfanning hobby more and more difficult as once great locations are no longer usable for photography.

 

[Euclid]

7j43k

 

 

Euclid

Do we know how far back the defective car was?  I have seen several differing references.  The least distance stated was 12 car lengths.  I think that would have been within easy eye sight even on straight track, where there was little to no other ambient light.  

 

 

 

From a list of the loads of the cars involved, which included such things as reporting marks, car numbers, etc., it was the 25th car back.

It was GPLX 75465.  It was loaded with polyethylene, as was the car behind it. Then there was an empty that formerly contained lube oil.  And then 4 cars of vinyl chloride.  And so on.

You can see the two polyethylene cars on their sides in photos.

Ed

 

Okay, thanks for that clarification.  Assuming the car was in the condition shown at Salem, it would have been easy to see for much, if not the majority of its trip from Salem to West Palestine. If the crew had been informed of an overheating danger found by the detector, I would expect them to have been looking back extensively during the trip to monitor the visual condition of the car.  They would have taken the opportunity of every curve to look back on the inside of the curve.

 

I do not know if the response from the detector was ever conveyed to the crew.  I assume it may not have been deemed necessary.  However, it they had observed the car with the sparks and flames shown by the camera at Salem, I cannot imagine that they would not have immediately stopped to investigate and inform others in the system. 

 

However if the crew had been told about the detector response, and told not to worry about it while traveling on to East Palestine, I can imagine them ignoring it during that 20 miles.  But that would depend on the crew. 

 

But still, a car deemed okay to continue for 20 more miles, might derail and drag with the trainline staying together and not dumping the air.  It could drag for miles.  So you would want to keep an eye on it.  If it was dragging, it will be causing extensive damage to track and crossings, so there would be great benefit in watching it.  Also, spotting a dragging car offers time to react in time to prevent a likely pileup. 

[tree68]

Euclid

Both the detector and the crew had a responsibility to react for the purpose of preventing it.  Either one alone could have prevented it. 

The crew can only react to what they are aware of.  As has been noted, twenty-five cars back may be far enough back that they couldn't see the issue in that section.  Remember, too, that the doorbell videos are taken from alongside the train, not down its length.

And the crew has enough to do without spending all their time looking back along the train.  Automobile drivers look out the windshield - they don't spend all their time looking in the rear view mirrors.

The East Palestine detector, mere car lengths from the point of derailment, was too little, too late. Even if it immediately broadcast the issue, it was too late.  And it has been discussed here that applying the brakes may have even exacerbated the issue.

That leaves the Salem detector.  Since we don't know what its sensor specifications are, we don't know if it actually failed.  Apparently it did sense something, as there is plenty of talk of an over-warm report.  It's been discussed here what the appropriate reaction is to such a report - I don't recall the specifics.  I'm sure NTSB and the FRA are looking at it.  

The final report will be interesting.  

[charlie hebdo]

BigJim

Yet again foliage is a big hinderence as to what can and cannot be seen!

Shorter trains?

What good is the extra set of eyes to look for problems if they can only see a short distance?  I don't blame operating crews.  The fault is with the system.

Foliage in the Midwest in February?

[BigJim]

7j43k

How far back can you see?  Six?  Twelve?  Eighteen?  My thought is that 25 cars back frequently CAN be seen.  Especially if there's something very bright on a dark night.

That depends on the curvature and topography. Sometimes you can't see ten cars back, other times, very much of the train. Yet again foliage is a big hinderence as to what can and cannot be seen!
Guess what!
You've probably seen those pictures/videos of locomotive spinning their all of their wheels. Well, that cannot be seen or extremely hard to see if you are on a straight line, even at night and although it is right underneath you!

[7j43k]

Euclid

Do we know how far back the defective car was?  I have seen several differing references.  The least distance stated was 12 car lengths.  I think that would have been within easy eye sight even on straight track, where there was little to no other ambient light.  

 

 

From a list of the loads of the cars involved, which included such things as reporting marks, car numbers, etc., it was the 25th car back.

It was GPLX 75465.  It was loaded with polyethylene, as was the car behind it.  Then there was an empty that formerly contained lube oil.  And then 4 cars of vinyl chloride.  And so on.

You can see the two polyethylene cars on their sides in photos.

 

 

Ed

[charlie hebdo]

BaltACD

Let me spend all the money I want from YOUR BUSINESS the ways I WANT TO as opposed to the way YOU with your expertise and experience feature it should be spent and invested.  It will be fun!

You are obviously losing it with your shouting (the meaning of all caps). You are all over the railroads  with criticism of PSR and Wall Street and beancounters, but if anyone says the operating end of a railroad is screwed up, you are a raging bull. Can't you realize PSR, etc. and screwed up operations and deferred maintenance are directly related?  Perhaps not.

With all their expertise, those rail execs and managers are the ones with the disasters occuring. The public has a stake in safe operations.

[charlie hebdo]

duplicate

[Euclid]

7j43k

 

 

BigJim

 

 

charlie hebdo

Neithet the hotbox detector nor the crew noticed a fiery journal for 20 miles. Unacceptable.

 

 

What is unacceptable is you dragging the crew into something that is out of their control, namely, the car being too far back to be seen!

 

 

 

 

 

 

How far back can you see?  Six?  Twelve?  Eighteen?  My thought is that 25 cars back frequently CAN be seen.  Especially if there's something very bright on a dark night.

 

Ed

 

I think your general assumption of at least 25 car lengths of sight distance is entirely reasonable.  We saw the failure developing in its early stage 20 miles before it failed.  So the visibility distance probably increased as the illumination source grew larger over time.  I think up to at least 50 car lengths may have ultimately been possible.

 

It also depends on whether anyone looked back, and how often they looked back because the sight distance would constantly be changing from curves, obscurations, and other light sources along the way.  With a long enough curve and no obstruction, it might have been seen at 75 car lengths or more. 

 

Do we know how far back the defective car was?  I have seen several differing references.  The least distance stated was 12 car lengths.  I think that would have been within easy eye sight even on straight track, where there was little to no other ambient light.  

 

Also, do we actually know what the crew had learned of the defect from the wayside detector?  I have not heard any clear, definitive answer to that question.  

 

Have we heard what the detector would have offered to the crew as warning information in such case that we saw developing at Salem?  All we know is that there was a detector that was intended to prevent this derailment.  Both the detector and the crew had a responsibility to react for the purpose of preventing it.  Either one alone could have prevented it. 

[tree68]

7j43k

I am not familiar with the topography of the area, and I appreciate your exploration of same.

I based my conclusions on what can be seen from the satellite images.  I did not look at topography, which would also be a potential factor.  You can't see through dirt, if you will.  Cuts, fills, etc.

Yes, you are supposed to look back from time to time when the situation allows.  But you still have to be looking forward.  Things like crossings, signals, etc.

[7j43k]

Thank you, Larry,

for your examination of my idea.  I am not familiar with the topography of the area, and I appreciate your exploration of same.

 

It does bother me when workers are expected to monitor an event that rarely happens (as is the case here).  I have been employed thusly, and it is not a pleasant feeling to be told to watch for "something" unlikely to happen, while doing other tasks.

 

I do think that railroad operation should be revised in these United States.

 

Ed

[BaltACD]

charlie hebdo

 

tree68 

charlie hebdo

Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable.  Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads.  

It's not trivializing rail safety.  Many of us here live that every day.  Believe me when I say that having 500+ people riding in the cars on my coupler is no laughing matter.

What's being trivialized is the knee-jerk, unrealistic solutions being presented.  Or should I say that there's a shot of reality being injected into said solutions.  

By people who are in the business. 

I appreciate your voice of sanity. But apparently my deliberate use of hyperbole went undetected in the rush to defend the rails at all costs.  It is apparent that many of the people in the business" are a part the problem and not part of the solution, else these issues would have been dealt with by these companies long ago. But corporate greed, manifested by PSR, is the problem.  And rail history shows that the companies have always had to be forced into adopting sensible safety measures, usually by the government looking out for the public and worker safety. The same is true now.  PTC was opposed by most insiders.  It has flaws but it has doubtless prevented collisions. The rails need to get over their arrogant stance and try to be good neighbors with the communities they traverse.  Bu on here it is the stale refrain of anti-NIMBYism.

Let me spend all the money I want from YOUR BUSINESS the ways I WANT TO as opposed to the way YOU with your expertise and experience feature it should be spent and invested.  It will be fun!

[charlie hebdo]

tree68

 

 

charlie hebdo

Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable.  Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. 

 

 

It's not trivializing rail safety.  Many of us here live that every day.  Believe me when I say that having 500+ people riding in the cars on my coupler is no laughing matter.

What's being trivialized is the knee-jerk, unrealistic solutions being presented.  Or should I say that there's a shot of reality being injected into said solutions.  

By people who are in the business.

 

I appreciate your voice of sanity. But apparently my deliberate use of hyperbole went undetected in the rush to defend the rails at all costs.  It is apparent that many of the people in the business" are a part the problem and not part of the solution, else these issues would have been dealt with by these companies long ago. But corporate greed, manifested by PSR, is the problem.  And rail history shows that the companies have always had to be forced into adopting sensible safety measures, usually by the government looking out for the public and worker safety. The same is true now.  PTC was opposed by most insiders.  It has flaws but it has doubtless prevented collisions. The rails need to get over their arrogant stance and try to be good neighbors with the communities they traverse.  Bu on here it is the stale refrain of anti-NIMBYism.

[Euclid]

dehusman

From what I have read, it went by two detectors, both functioned as intended.  The first detector detects hot journals and the bearing had not heated up enough to generate an automatic warning to the crew.  It did note the journal was warmer than normal. The second detector detected dragging equipment and it did broadcast a warning but the journal had failed by then and was most likely dragging because it was already derailed. 

How far was the first detector from the surveillance video at Salem, Ohio?  Did the train pass the first detector prior to passing the surveillance video?

If the car seen sparking in the video passed the detector in that condition, what would the detector likely do in response?

You say that the bearing had not heated up enough to generate an automatic warning to the crew.  How do you know that?

[tree68]

7j43k

How far back can you see?  Six?  Twelve?  Eighteen?  My thought is that 25 cars back frequently CAN be seen.  Especially if there's something very bright on a dark night.  

Twenty-five cars is around a quarter mile, depending on the cars.

There is, conveniently, a train in the image from Acme Mapper, so one can get a feel for how far 25 cars is.

Following the line from Salem to East Palestine via satellite images, there aren't a lot of places where one would be able to see well very far along the train.  Just looking at the trees next to the ROW shows that they could well block the view to the rear.

Coming in to East Palestine a train passes under the Main Street bridge, whose abutments would mask the rest of the train, even though it's on a right hand (eastbound) curve.  Never mind the engineer focusing on upcoming crossings.

As for the defect detectors - if they report immediately on spotting something, that's one thing.  OTOH, if they wait until the last car passes, the East Palestine defect detector would never pipe up with a report until well after the head end has cleared the village, which in this case was after the derailment.  I'll defer to the experts on HBD/DED functioning in those cases.

I know from personal experience that there are times I can't see the end of our 12 car Polar Express trains.

[Shadow the Cats owner]

Jim the car was throwing enough fire for a ring doorbell 2 blocks away from the tracks at night to activate on a darkened porch.  If the crew had bothered to look behind them in a curve they would have seen the fire coming off the freaking car itself moving with the train.  

[7j43k]

BigJim

 

 

charlie hebdo

Neithet the hotbox detector nor the crew noticed a fiery journal for 20 miles. Unacceptable.

 

 

What is unacceptable is you dragging the crew into something that is out of their control, namely, the car being too far back to be seen!

 

 

 

How far back can you see?  Six?  Twelve?  Eighteen?  My thought is that 25 cars back frequently CAN be seen.  Especially if there's something very bright on a dark night.

 

Ed

[tree68]

charlie hebdo

Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable.  Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. 

It's not trivializing rail safety.  Many of us here live that every day.  Believe me when I say that having 500+ people riding in the cars on my coupler is no laughing matter.

What's being trivialized is the knee-jerk, unrealistic solutions being presented.  Or should I say that there's a shot of reality being injected into said solutions.  

By people who are in the business.

[BigJim]

charlie hebdo

Neithet the hotbox detector nor the crew noticed a fiery journal for 20 miles. Unacceptable.

What is unacceptable is you dragging the crew into something that is out of their control, namely, the car being too far back to be seen!

[charlie hebdo]

Ulrich

 

 

charlie hebdo

 

 

Euclid

I'm starting to detect a pattern here.  Mice and men...  stuff happens ... best laid plans.  Oh those darn laws of physics again....

 

 

 

 

Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable.  Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. 

 

 

 

 

No investigation yet to determine what happened and mistakes made. No one would argue that safety is paramount, but suggesting that railroads are irresponsible is a bit harsh and premature. Quite possibly something was overlooked..somebody didn't do his/her job properly, and here we are. At this point we don't know. Sometimes mechanical failures are hard to predict..I got a flat on a brand new tire a couple of weeks ago. Tire was properly inflated..I was driving carefully on a dry road when it happened. Whose fault? I could have lost control and swerved  into a crowded bus stop...whose fault would that have been? We live in a dangerous world, and our comfy lifestyles require the transport of hazardous materials at speed.. it may have been directly  due to someone's negligence..or..as likely, it was due to an unpredictable failure of a component somewhere along the line. They're called accidents for a reason..no one meant for this to happen.

 

Nice story but itrelevant to what happened on the NS.  Neithet the hotbox detector nor the crew noticed a fiery journal for 20 miles. Unacceptable.

[BaltACD]

Ulrich

 

charlie hebdo 

Euclid

I'm starting to detect a pattern here.  Mice and men...  stuff happens ... best laid plans.  Oh those darn laws of physics again.... 

Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable.  Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads.  

No investigation yet to determine what happened and mistakes made. No one would argue that safety is paramount, but suggesting that railroads are irresponsible is a bit harsh and premature. Quite possibly something was overlooked..somebody didn't do his/her job properly, and here we are. At this point we don't know. Sometimes mechanical failures are hard to predict..I got a flat on a brand new tire a couple of weeks ago. Tire was properly inflated..I was driving carefully on a dry road when it happened. Whose fault? I could have lost control and swerved  into a crowded bus stop...whose fault would that have been? We live in a dangerous world, and our comfy lifestyles require the transport of hazardous materials at speed.. it may have been directly  due to someone's negligence..or..as likely, it was due to an unpredictable failure of a component somewhere along the line. They're called accidents for a reason..no one meant for this to happen.

Investigation has been taking place ever since people were allowed on to the wreck scene.  They just aren't wearing clothing identifying them as a part of some Agency you think should be investigating.  On wreck scenes, I have never seen anyone wearing clothing BRAZENLY identifying them as NTSB or some other agency - they are there, they don't advertise.

[Ulrich]

charlie hebdo

 

 

Euclid

I'm starting to detect a pattern here.  Mice and men...  stuff happens ... best laid plans.  Oh those darn laws of physics again....

 

 

 

 

Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable.  Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. 

 

No investigation yet to determine what happened and mistakes made. No one would argue that safety is paramount, but suggesting that railroads are irresponsible is a bit harsh and premature. Quite possibly something was overlooked..somebody didn't do his/her job properly, and here we are. At this point we don't know. Sometimes mechanical failures are hard to predict..I got a flat on a brand new tire a couple of weeks ago. Tire was properly inflated..I was driving carefully on a dry road when it happened. Whose fault? I could have lost control and swerved  into a crowded bus stop...whose fault would that have been? We live in a dangerous world, and our comfy lifestyles require the transport of hazardous materials at speed.. it may have been directly  due to someone's negligence..or..as likely, it was due to an unpredictable failure of a component somewhere along the line. They're called accidents for a reason..no one meant for this to happen.

[charlie hebdo]

Euclid

I'm starting to detect a pattern here.  Mice and men...  stuff happens ... best laid plans.  Oh those darn laws of physics again....

 

Platitudes and cliches abound with those who choose to trivialize rail safety. Predictable.  Fortunately many others (especially those with power) see a real need to force safety measures on the irresponsible railroads. 

[BaltACD]

Murphy Siding

 

Euclid

I'm starting to detect a pattern here.  Mice and men...  stuff happens ... best laid plans.  Oh those darn laws of physics again.... 

... money can't buy happiness but it can buy a congressman...

It can also buy a political party (party hats are extra)

[tree68]

Euclid

Money can also buy the correct tool for the job.

A hammer is the correct tool for driving a nail, but people still manage to find their thumb from time to time...

[Euclid]

Murphy Siding

 

 

Euclid

I'm starting to detect a pattern here.  Mice and men...  stuff happens ... best laid plans.  Oh those darn laws of physics again....

 

 

 

 

... money can't buy happiness but it can buy a congressman...

 

 

I will have to add that to the list.  Money can also buy the correct tool for the job.