dehusman Euclid Dave, I did not say they suspended Rule 6.21. I said they suspended the requirements of rule 6.21. In other words, they informed the crew that they were not to slow down as required by the rule because the site had already been thoroughly inspected for track defects and none were found. Fine. The requirements of rule 6.21 were not suspended. Rule 6.21 remains in effect. The rule tells the crew if there is bad weather to watch out, if they see something they think is hazardous to slow down or to stop. Doesn't matter who inspected it, or if they put on a slow order or not. Nobody suspends the rule or its requirements.
Euclid Dave, I did not say they suspended Rule 6.21. I said they suspended the requirements of rule 6.21. In other words, they informed the crew that they were not to slow down as required by the rule because the site had already been thoroughly inspected for track defects and none were found.
Fine. The requirements of rule 6.21 were not suspended. Rule 6.21 remains in effect. The rule tells the crew if there is bad weather to watch out, if they see something they think is hazardous to slow down or to stop. Doesn't matter who inspected it, or if they put on a slow order or not. Nobody suspends the rule or its requirements.
The rule (Rule 6.21) most definitely does not say: “If there is bad weather, watch out, if you see something that you think is hazardous, slow down or to stop.”
The Rule says this: “In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
Approaching a “hazardous point prepared to stop” means be prepared to stop if the “hazardous point” is found to contain a hazard that is unsafe to pass. So in that circumstance, “prepared to stop” means slowing down enough that it is possible to stop short of any discovered hazard that is unsafe to pass. In this case the condition that began the requirement of Rule 6.21 was the high water.
In your interpretation of what the Rule says or means, you have the engineer required to slow down only if he sees something he thinks is unsafe to pass. But the actual rule requires the engineer to slow down before seeing something he thinks is hazardous to the extent of being unsafe to pass. He is supposed to slow down in anticipation of seeing a hazard that is unsafe to pass, so he will be able to get stopped before reaching that hazard.
Euclid I think it has been a fine discussion. .......................
I think it has been a fine discussion. .......................
Since this thread has degenerated, as others have mentioned, into a, “yes, but” circular conversation.
I will venture into yet another comparison. While not train related, my comparison to the Abbott and Costello comic routine was in my mind an apt description of what the thread has degenerated into.
As the partial quote was posted, SEE ABOVE.........
I thought, now who is doing to disagree. Interesting to whom? Yes very very interesting to one who enjoys and invites “verbal sword fighting”. I have always thought a good exercise to combat this “without end dialogue” was to practice, extinction. There is NO end to this.
As Abbott and Costello was used before to describe the Doon/BNSF derailment (I need to keep this rail specific), I wondered if any young folks would wonder who Abbott and Costello is. Now this next one is ACTUALLY………….THE...... FIRST THOUGHT, that came to mind, when this back and forth began. My thought was of a religious song sung by a quartet. Without the lyrics it deals with not becoming a Christian, thus the repeating line is ………I shuhd, cuda, wooda. Exactly what this discussion is like in DETAILING the cause of the derailment.
Remember "WHO", the catcher?, he and his dad know exactly what happened. I doubt that we will ever know. But this is a free county, as today memorializes and endless arguments are allowed here.
By the way I do realize that I can unsubscribe the specific thread if I am so so so offended. And on that note the Adios Coal thread has recently posted some very interesting information that is informative and pertinent to the REAL discussion
God Bless America ya’ll mike endmrw0704181139
EuclidDave, I did not say they suspended Rule 6.21. I said they suspended the requirements of rule 6.21. In other words, they informed the crew that they were not to slow down as required by the rule because the site had already been thoroughly inspected for track defects and none were found.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
dehusman Euclid Given all of this due diligence, I suspect they suspended the requirements of Rule 6.21 and felt it was safe to let the train pass at its full speed limit. Nobody "suspended" any rules. All the rules are all in effect. Its that it wasn't applicable.
Euclid Given all of this due diligence, I suspect they suspended the requirements of Rule 6.21 and felt it was safe to let the train pass at its full speed limit.
Nobody "suspended" any rules. All the rules are all in effect. Its that it wasn't applicable.
Dave, I did not say they suspended Rule 6.21. I said they suspended the requirements of rule 6.21. In other words, they informed the crew that they were not to slow down as required by the rule because the site had already been thoroughly inspected for track defects and none were found.
So basically, the derailment could not have been caused by the flood unless it was caused by flood-induced liquefaction of the roadbed; a condition that is not readily detectable by track inspections.
dehusmanNobody "suspended" any rules. All the rules are all in effect. Its that it wasn't applicable.
+1
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
EuclidGiven all of this due diligence, I suspect they suspended the requirements of Rule 6.21 and felt it was safe to let the train pass at its full speed limit.
I imagine BNSF quickly determined the cause, and passed that information on to an NTSB representative. Presumably the NTSB decided there was nothing of real broad value for future prevention to be learned from a full investigation. In other words, the derailment cause was likely nothing unique or unusual, and continued routine train operation in that area that night was not considered problematic.
I think it has been a fine discussion. A lot of things have been considered in the process. I have been thinking about some of the points brought up about railroad company preparedness, versus the theory that nobody told the crew about the flood, and that they were thus blindsided by it as they suddenly came upon it.
Embedded in that theory about the crew being uninformed, is the sub-theory that they never even saw the water at all because it was dark. Another sub-theory is that they recognized the water and the need to reduce speed the instant the water was in their presence, but there was not enough time to reduce speed to what was required, and so the derailment occurred at a relatively high speed.
In considering all this, I speculate that everybody in the company including the crew, was 100% informed about every single detail and specification of the flood conditions, including rain amounts, forecasts for rain, water levels, currents, locations of conditions, and changing patterns over time. I believe they ran several track patrols prior to the oil train and concluded that the track was in perfectly good condition. For various reasons, I don’t believe the water ever rose above the tops of the rails. I don’t think there was much, if any, current there, and thus there was no erosion observed. Given all of this due diligence, I suspect they suspended the requirements of Rule 6.21 and felt it was safe to let the train pass at its full speed limit.
They basically felt that they had performed all the requirements of Rule 6.21 in the course of their monitoring and patrolling of the track. Since they found no track defects, they saw no reason to slow the train down so he could look for defects.
So all of this leads me to conclude that one of two things happened:
1) The train derailed due to liquefaction of the fill as it was agitated by the passing train.
2) The train derailed due to some cause that was not related to the flood.
SD70DudeThis thread has degenerated into the circular "yes, but" pattern.
Per usual.
Good one CB!
This thread has degenerated into the circular "yes, but" pattern.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
BaltACD Euclid BaltACD The thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles. Oh, I think I picked that up fairly early in life. What does not being line of sight vehicles have to do with the topic here? It seems like there are already a hundred good excuses, and now let's add that trains are not line of sight vehicles. Yet how many times in this thread alone have you asserted 'they saw the water and should have slowed down'. Seeing water is a function of 'line of sight'.
Euclid BaltACD The thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles. Oh, I think I picked that up fairly early in life. What does not being line of sight vehicles have to do with the topic here? It seems like there are already a hundred good excuses, and now let's add that trains are not line of sight vehicles.
BaltACD The thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles.
Oh, I think I picked that up fairly early in life. What does not being line of sight vehicles have to do with the topic here? It seems like there are already a hundred good excuses, and now let's add that trains are not line of sight vehicles.
Yet how many times in this thread alone have you asserted 'they saw the water and should have slowed down'. Seeing water is a function of 'line of sight'.
To me, the seriousness and debate on the cause of the Doon, IA. derailment has degenerated into the Abbott and Costello bit about baseball.
“Who” is on first and he was on his cell paying too much attention to the river gauge at Little Rock River. He stepped off base and was tagged out. "What", was on second and was googling the rules about mandated slow movement of trains in severe weather. He wandered off base and was tagged out also. Now,"Where," was on third and saw a chance to steal home plate. He did but the run did not count since the third base coach did not give him authority to proceed and steal. Therefore, the run does not count. Now there is a catcher at home plate named, "Who". Who is talking on his cell phone to his dad. His dad happened to be the engineer on the ill-fated derailment train.
All this talk about what happened, how, why, etcetera, is all a waste of time, like the above story is about as good a contribution to the thread as all I have read lately. However, since it was not a fatal, NTSB, won’t have an investigation. And probably BNSF will not have a detailed account of the incident for public consumption. HOWEVER, Who, the catcher will know all about it since his dad was there. mike endmrw0703181354
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
tree68I gave what was, based on the gauges. Pure hindsight, which we all know is generally 20-20. There was a very definitive spike in river levels. That may not have been properly anticipated. In fact, I'd bet it wasn't. Had BNSF been aware of that spike, I'd opine they probably would have taken action.
Sure, your gauge readings were hindsight, but the level graphs show that there would have been ample forewarning available if BNSF had used IFIS.
If they did or not we don't know, but I would deem it negligent if they didn't. This or a comparable service.
tree68The levels of the Rock River (and thus the Little Rock River, as it flows into the Rock a short distance beyond the derailment site) were already high, above "Action" stage as I recall, but not necessarily at "Flood" stage, and they had been at that level for several days.
The levels on June 21 and 22 were above Major Flood Stage of 19ft. That was the reason to post the above definition of Major Flood Stage.
From one of my earlier posts:The water level Tree68 gave for up-river from Doon is defined as Major Flood Stage: http://ifis.iowafloodcenter.org/ifis/app/?c=Doon_(Rock_River)Klick on the Attention mark for more information.
And than on more info in new small window.
As I said I don't know if the rule 6.21 was applicable. On the other hand this was a crude oil unit train not an intermodal.
The problem with dams is, you get have the train across a location and than vibration have summed up enough to get the soil moving.Regards, Volker
BaltACDThe thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles.
tree68I gave what was, based on the gauges. Pure hindsight, which we all know is generally 20-20. There was a very definitive spike in river levels. That may not have been properly anticipated. In fact, I'd bet it wasn't. Had BNSF been aware of that spike, I'd opine they probably would have taken action. The levels of the Rock River (and thus the Little Rock River, as it flows into the Rock a short distance beyond the derailment site) were already high, above "Action" stage as I recall, but not necessarily at "Flood" stage, and they had been at that level for several days. Apparently BNSF didn't find those levels actionable or they would have issued the appropriate guidance. And this is the question at hand - at what level of the Little Rock River would BNSF determine the need to slow, or stop trains? Apparently it hadn't reached that level the last time BNSF folks had checked. Bucky apparently feels that the threshold should have been lower. How much?
There was a very definitive spike in river levels. That may not have been properly anticipated. In fact, I'd bet it wasn't. Had BNSF been aware of that spike, I'd opine they probably would have taken action.
The levels of the Rock River (and thus the Little Rock River, as it flows into the Rock a short distance beyond the derailment site) were already high, above "Action" stage as I recall, but not necessarily at "Flood" stage, and they had been at that level for several days. Apparently BNSF didn't find those levels actionable or they would have issued the appropriate guidance.
And this is the question at hand - at what level of the Little Rock River would BNSF determine the need to slow, or stop trains? Apparently it hadn't reached that level the last time BNSF folks had checked. Bucky apparently feels that the threshold should have been lower. How much?
The severe weather alerts CSX was recieving from their Weather Service when I was working never mentioned directly or in passing flood stages for any of the bodies of water that they were mentioning in their flood alerts. The degree of specificity that these warnings gave was Subdivision and Mileposts between which the Flood Warning was effective.
Never having worked for BNSF I have no idea who their Weather Service is or what kind of reports they issue and to whom those reports are issued.
The thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles.
VOLKER LANDWEHR tree68 Please define high water as it applies to the Little Rock River crossing by BNSF just south of Doon, Iowa. Specifics are required (ie, river levels). I think you gave the specifics yourself when you posted the water levels from 10 miles upstream. They were above the Major Flood Stage: From Wiki "Flood Stage": Major Flood Stage Rivers: significant to catastrophic, life-threatening flooding is usually expected at this stage. Extensive flooding with some low-lying areas completely inundated is likely. Structures may be completely submerged. Large-scale evacuations may be necessary. Whatever this means for BNSF's operation of a crude oil train.Regards, Volker
tree68 Please define high water as it applies to the Little Rock River crossing by BNSF just south of Doon, Iowa. Specifics are required (ie, river levels).
I think you gave the specifics yourself when you posted the water levels from 10 miles upstream. They were above the Major Flood Stage: From Wiki "Flood Stage":
Whatever this means for BNSF's operation of a crude oil train.Regards, Volker
I gave what was, based on the gauges. Pure hindsight, which we all know is generally 20-20.
tree68Please define high water as it applies to the Little Rock River crossing by BNSF just south of Doon, Iowa. Specifics are required (ie, river levels). Otherwise, it's your opinion vs the knowledge and experience of BNSF.
I already did that in a very recent post here. How do you know that specifics are required? The rule calls for action without a precise defintion of high water.
tree68BNSF (or any railroad, for that matter) doesn't want to dump a train, especially one that could have such significant impact.
Who is saying that the crew should have dumped the train? The rule only calls for slowing down. It does not say you should put the train into emergency.
tree68Clearly, this caught them by surprise, for whatever reason. Some of the possibilities have been discussed here.
Why is it clear to you that this caught them by surprise? You go to the ends of the earth insisting that they had no duty to slow down because we don’t have a definition of “high water.” And now you say the water caught them by surprise. Which is it?
tree68Please define high water as it applies to the Little Rock River crossing by BNSF just south of Doon, Iowa. Specifics are required (ie, river levels).
VOLKER LANDWEHR cx500 And should the flood have been the cause, if the fill had remained stable for over a century through numerous flood events there was no logical reason to think this time might be different. The age of a dam doesn't make it safe in high water situations. It might have got weakened by recurring high water levels over the years. I would monitor an old dam closer than a newer one. We know from our river dikes in Germany that they will break some day if they are not cared for and not necessarily at the highest possible water levels. But for sure the oldest are in highest danger.Regards, Volker
cx500 And should the flood have been the cause, if the fill had remained stable for over a century through numerous flood events there was no logical reason to think this time might be different.
The age of a dam doesn't make it safe in high water situations. It might have got weakened by recurring high water levels over the years. I would monitor an old dam closer than a newer one.
We know from our river dikes in Germany that they will break some day if they are not cared for and not necessarily at the highest possible water levels. But for sure the oldest are in highest danger.Regards, Volker
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
EuclidThe issue is only about slowing down in areas of high water as required by rule 6.21.
Please define high water as it applies to the Little Rock River crossing by BNSF just south of Doon, Iowa. Specifics are required (ie, river levels).
Otherwise, it's your opinion vs the knowledge and experience of BNSF.
If I had one, I could show you a picture of water trackside along our line this past weekend. You'd probably say that the water level looks fine - it's a good six to eight feet below track level in a marshy area.
We know it's an indication of a possible plugged culvert (beavers) and requires urgent attention. It was reported to our MOW folks.
BNSF (or any railroad, for that matter) doesn't want to dump a train, especially one that could have such significant impact. They are going to take whatever measures (which have been described here previously) to ensure that such an incident doesn't take place.
Clearly, this caught them by surprise, for whatever reason. Some of the possibilities have been discussed here. You can bet that they will be doing what's necessary to ensure it doesn't happen again - perhaps some active monitoring of the river levels at that bridge.
dehusmanEuclid seems to think that the crew was clairvoyant and a mile or 2 before the location somehow knew there woud be high water there and should have slowed down before they got there.
As I said before, if the railroad didn't know of the danger something has gone wrong. There are gauges upstream and down stream of Doon in about 50 miles distance. The first peak upstream was about 16 hours before the accident, downstream 2 days after the upstream peak. Doon is about 10 miles from the upstream gauge.
So from experience it was possible to predict a higher water level at the derailment site.Upstream gauge: https://natwebcaww01.wr.usgs.gov/nwisweb/data/img/USGS.06483290.44424.00060..20180620.20180626.log.0.p50.gif
Downstream gauge: https://natwebcaww01.wr.usgs.gov/nwisweb/data/img/USGS.06485500.233364.00065..20180620.20180626..0..gif
Regards, Volker
Euclid cx500 Euclid I am told that there was no need to slow down for the flood because we don’t know what caused the derailment. It is that childlike reasoning that I am arguing against. If the cause had nothing to do with the flood, the argument that there was no need to slow down is perfectly valid. And should the flood have been the cause, if the fill had remained stable for over a century through numerous flood events there was no logical reason to think this time might be different. No matter what caused the derailment, the existence of the flood alone requires the slow-down according to rule 6.21. There was a flood with high water, right? There is rule 6.21, right? The answer to both questions is yes. Therefore the arugment that there was no need to slow down is 100% bogus. The rule does not say you have to slow down only if you know that the flood will derail your train. The rule calls for slowing down as a precautionary measure just in case the flood poses the danger of a derailment. The rule also does not allow you to ignore the requiement to slow down in a flood just because there were no derailments caused by previous floods in the same location. The issue here has absolutely nothing to do with what caused the derailment. The issue would be exactly the same even had there been no derailment. The issue is only about slowing down in areas of high water as required by rule 6.21.
cx500 Euclid I am told that there was no need to slow down for the flood because we don’t know what caused the derailment. It is that childlike reasoning that I am arguing against. If the cause had nothing to do with the flood, the argument that there was no need to slow down is perfectly valid. And should the flood have been the cause, if the fill had remained stable for over a century through numerous flood events there was no logical reason to think this time might be different.
Euclid I am told that there was no need to slow down for the flood because we don’t know what caused the derailment. It is that childlike reasoning that I am arguing against.
If the cause had nothing to do with the flood, the argument that there was no need to slow down is perfectly valid.
And should the flood have been the cause, if the fill had remained stable for over a century through numerous flood events there was no logical reason to think this time might be different.
No matter what caused the derailment, the existence of the flood alone requires the slow-down according to rule 6.21. There was a flood with high water, right? There is rule 6.21, right? The answer to both questions is yes. Therefore the arugment that there was no need to slow down is 100% bogus.
The rule does not say you have to slow down only if you know that the flood will derail your train. The rule calls for slowing down as a precautionary measure just in case the flood poses the danger of a derailment.
The rule also does not allow you to ignore the requiement to slow down in a flood just because there were no derailments caused by previous floods in the same location.
The issue here has absolutely nothing to do with what caused the derailment. The issue would be exactly the same even had there been no derailment. The issue is only about slowing down in areas of high water as required by rule 6.21.
Non-railroaders trying to apply railroad rules - ROFLOL
cx500And should the flood have been the cause, if the fill had remained stable for over a century through numerous flood events there was no logical reason to think this time might be different.
charlie hebdoStraw man argument. Nobody said that. What some of us are saying is that some of the RRers on here don't think the BNSF was at all remiss in its exercising caution.
I don't think anybody is saying that.
What we are saying is that there are different levels of caution and there are different levels of risk. It is really easy to figure out there was a problem after the pile up. No brainer. It is waaaaaaaaayyyyyy harder to figure out there is a problem, especially one that cannot be detected by the naked eye, before things happen.
The railroad could have done everything they were supposed to and the subgrade still could have failed. they could have had a patrol immediately infront of the train, inspecting the track, may not have found any defects and still there could have been a subgrade failure. They could have patrolled an hour before the incident and between the time the patrol went by and the time the train got there the water rose 2 or 3 or 4 feet. We don't know.
People on these list seem to view these things as isolated incidents. They are not. This was a multi-day, multi-state event that covered HUNDREDS of miles of railroad tracks from several railroads. There were probably a hundred miles of tracks where the water was a some point or another up to the ballast line. We have had several of these weather events over the last moth or so. This was not high water at just one spot, it was high water at many locations at many different times over a several day period. Having water next to the tracks in the midwest where the railroad runs along streams and through flood plains is NOT UNUSUAL.
Euclid seems to think that the crew was clairvoyant and a mile or 2 before the location somehow knew there woud be high water there and should have slowed down before they got there.
Fact is nobody on this list knows what happened in any detail and we will probably never know unless a government agency investigates and releases a report.
Murphy Siding charlie hebdo Murphy Siding There is a vocal minority on this thread who hold to the claim that since there was a derailment, the railroad must have done everything wrong. Straw man argument. Nobody said that. What some of us are saying is that some of the RRers on here don't think the BNSF was at all remiss in its exercising caution. We have no information that tells us if they were or weren't. We also have no real information that tells us if it was or wasn't warranted.
charlie hebdo Murphy Siding There is a vocal minority on this thread who hold to the claim that since there was a derailment, the railroad must have done everything wrong. Straw man argument. Nobody said that. What some of us are saying is that some of the RRers on here don't think the BNSF was at all remiss in its exercising caution.
Murphy Siding There is a vocal minority on this thread who hold to the claim that since there was a derailment, the railroad must have done everything wrong.
Straw man argument. Nobody said that. What some of us are saying is that some of the RRers on here don't think the BNSF was at all remiss in its exercising caution.
We have no information that tells us if they were or weren't. We also have no real information that tells us if it was or wasn't warranted.
And likely we never will know with much certitude because it won't be investigated by an objective 3rd party (NTSB) since fortunately there were no deaths. Heck, maybe an elephant caused the derailment? And those new improved tank cars, they really did their job, right? Of course, there could be a civil suit brought by those pesky dimestore lawyers. But we all know they are crooks.
EuclidI am told that there was no need to slow down for the flood because we don’t know what caused the derailment. It is that childlike reasoning that I am arguing against.
mudchicken (1) Bucky and a few others on here have forgotten who "owns" the track. (The train and the dispatcher are mere tenants) (2) BNSF and the other big outfits have their own weather / meteorlogical teams staffed directly with the centrallized dispatchers micro-managing weatherforecasts and warnings inside the railroad's corridors. (3) Investigators will be looking at how much and how often bad weather patrols were out in front of the trains and were patrols warranted here given the conditions prior to the incident. Perfect storm or exactly what? IMHO some of the views expressed are just plain warped logic from folks not versed in the real world and certainly not qualified as railroaders in any way, shape or form. Cool it.
(1) Bucky and a few others on here have forgotten who "owns" the track. (The train and the dispatcher are mere tenants)
(2) BNSF and the other big outfits have their own weather / meteorlogical teams staffed directly with the centrallized dispatchers micro-managing weatherforecasts and warnings inside the railroad's corridors.
(3) Investigators will be looking at how much and how often bad weather patrols were out in front of the trains and were patrols warranted here given the conditions prior to the incident. Perfect storm or exactly what?
IMHO some of the views expressed are just plain warped logic from folks not versed in the real world and certainly not qualified as railroaders in any way, shape or form. Cool it.
What does the track ownership have to do with the price of tea in China?
I don’t see why you seem to conclude that I fail to realize that the railroads take flood prediction and monitoring seriously. My position is on the side of safety. Yet, I am accused of overreacting merely by asking whether the BNSF crew followed the rules in slowing down the oil train in order to make passing through the flood safer. It is an obvious question, considering that the oil train derailed on a largely submerged fill. I am told that there was no need to slow down for the flood because we don’t know what caused the derailment. It is that childlike reasoning that I am arguing against.
Murphy SidingThere is a vocal minority on this thread who hold to the claim that since there was a derailment, the railroad must have done everything wrong.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.