BaltACDIf MofW doesn't issue restricted speed after hi-railing, at the very least, the incident territory why should a train crew operate at a speed different from those whose job it is to 'KNOW' the particular territory and whatever idocyncracies that pertain to the territory.
It is not about the crew.
Example: You have a very high water level. The bridge piers start to loose their footings. MofW make a control drive but doesn't find anything. It is still to early. MofW has done everything possible and should be trusted. OK, but you can't trust nature in special circumstances. And MofW should know it and go the safe way.
The Rule 6.21 doesn't say in unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop, except the route is cleared by MofW.
I think rule 6.21 aims at those defects that cannot be detected by MofW because of circumstances.
BaltACDThe world is built on trust - trust that those who have 'extradorinary' knowledge of situations - can be trusted to provide appropriate warnings when necessary. The absence of those warnings is defacto permission to operate in the normal manner.
Agreed, but MofW must realize or know that their judgement can be unsafe. Then the rule should apply to MofW. If not, there seems to be a gap and you end up relying on common sense.Regards, Volker
Then why have patrols? Whenever it's more than partly cloudy, just run all trains at restricted speed.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
VOLKER LANDWEHR Unusal high waters can lead to weak points or damages in dam that can't easily be detected by MofW employees. I think in these situations Rules 6.21 comes into play. Again: In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement. It takes into consideration that MofW might not find any defects because they are likely there but still hidden. I think a check by MofW showing no defects doesn't relieve the RR from executing Rule 6.21. But that is just my interpretation and I'm not a railroader.Regards
Unusal high waters can lead to weak points or damages in dam that can't easily be detected by MofW employees. I think in these situations Rules 6.21 comes into play.
Again: In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement.
It takes into consideration that MofW might not find any defects because they are likely there but still hidden.
I think a check by MofW showing no defects doesn't relieve the RR from executing Rule 6.21.
But that is just my interpretation and I'm not a railroader.Regards
I think that is an excellent interpretation. MOW will find a bridge or culvert that is washed out, but they won't find defects such as water erosion inside of the fill bank or internal saturation that will cause liquefaction. It takes a train to find those defects. That is why when all outward appearances indicate no defects, the train must still be slowed down in case there are hidden defects that will derail the train. By slowing down, you minimize the damage of the derailment.
VOLKER LANDWEHR BaltACD, I agree with most what you said. But there are some differences. My web searches showed how much information about flooding are available to the public in that area. If BNSF didn't get them they should reconsider their warning sources. Unusal high waters can lead to weak points or damages in dam that can't easily be detected by MofW employees. I think in these situations Rules 6.21 comes into play. Again: In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement. It takes into consideration that MofW might not find any defects because they are likely there but still hidden. I think a check by MofW showing no defects doesn't relieve the RR from executing Rule 6.21. But that is just my interpretation and I'm not a railroader.Regards
BaltACD, I agree with most what you said. But there are some differences.
My web searches showed how much information about flooding are available to the public in that area. If BNSF didn't get them they should reconsider their warning sources.
If MofW doesn't issue restricted speed after hi-railing, at the very least, the incident territory why should a train crew operate at a speed different from those whose job it is to 'KNOW' the particular territory and whatever idocyncracies that pertain to the territory.
The world is built on trust - trust that those who have 'extradorinary' knowledge of situations - can be trusted to provide appropriate warnings when necessary. The absence of those warnings is defacto permission to operate in the normal manner.
MofW personnel are those that have been charged with the responsibility of knowing local conditions in times of extreme weather and issuing specific warnings consistent with the local knowledge and the results of the inspections they have undertaken.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
tree68Unless the crew was provided with information indicating a need to reduce speed, I don't think they needed to do so, either.
I don't blame the crew. BNSF should have known what to expect with all available warning.
tree68I mention the spike only because it is an anomoly to the usual slow rise and fall of floodwaters and, yes, may have caught the railroad by surprise.
Here I disagree. Yes there was a fast rise. On the other hand there was ample time to react. Upriver gage 16 hours before accident, Rock Valley about 3.5 hours before. And this was a crude oil unit train not some manifest. Reading your post further you seem to agree with me on this.
tree68Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Unfortunately, the world operates in real time.
Hindsight allows to find out what could/should have been known by the railroad. Even then mistakes are possible.
tree68Barring the possibility that they ignored such warnings, they were acting on the information they were given when they went on duty and while enroute. If that information did not indicate those extraordinarily high water levels, they were justified in maintaining track speed.
As I said before I don't blame the crew. Without warning from the office they had no chance to judge the water level and possible dangers in the dark.
Looking at the pile-up I don't believe that they had slowed to restricted speed and they had crossed the river already.
It will be interesting to see what really happened.Regards, Volker
I don't know what information BNSF Weather Services provide to BNSF. When I was working at CSX, the CSX Weather Services DID NOT provide any 'flood stage' information, at least not to Operating Department personnel - MofW 'may' have been provided such information but I have no factual information that they recieved any different weather alerts than were provided to Operating Department personnel.
We have no knowledge of what actions BNSF MofW employees took in regard to inspecting the area involved in the derailment. We also don't know what kind of restrictions, if any, BNSF MofW placed on the tracks where the derailment happened. We don't know what BNSF MofW employees observed when they made their inspection of the derailment area and what they thought of then current and future conditions of the area would be and how those observations would affect the safe operation of train.
As I have stated previously, trains are not line of sight vehicles. Train are operated in accordance with timetable specified speeds, unless those speeds are otherwise restricted by appropriate personnel for cause.
Since there were no fatalities or mass evacuations caused by this derailment it is highly unlikely there will be a through NTSB investigation of the incident and it is equally unlikely that BNSF will publish to the public therir internal investigation of the incident.
Foresight is worse than 20/400 and hindsight is right at 20/20.
Unless the crew was provided with information indicating a need to reduce speed, I don't think they needed to do so, either. The high waters had been going on for several days with no apparent ill effects for the railroad.
If the crew was provided with information indicating a need to reduce speed (likely via a bulletin or similar method) and chose to ignore it, the incident is on their shoulders.
Otherwise, it was business as usual.
The railroad was undoubtedly patrolling the track in question, and the powers that be apparently saw no reason to slow traffic down. Flooded fields alone apparently did not constitute actionable water levels.
I mention the spike only because it is an anomoly to the usual slow rise and fall of floodwaters and, yes, may have caught the railroad by surprise.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Unfortunately, the world operates in real time.
Volker points out some significant things about the spike. I fully agree that it should have been recognized and appropriate action taken - by the railroad. If they did not recognize the hazard and relay that concern to the crew of the train, it's on their shoulders.
Barring the possibility that they ignored such warnings, they were acting on the information they were given when they went on duty and while enroute. If that information did not indicate those extraordinarily high water levels, they were justified in maintaining track speed.
Rule 6.21 worked as designed. The problem is the "aware" part - the crew apparently wasn't aware of the need to reduce speed, so apparently they didn't, except:
Actually, since we haven't seen a report or gotten other information, we don't know that the crew wasn't reducing speed even as the pile-up occurred. I'm guessing they were on high, dry ground a half mile before they reached the bridge. If that's the case, then 6.21 did work as designed.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68I would submit that it was this surge on the Little Rock River that caused the problem for the railroad, not the overall flood conditions. This was hardly the first time the area had flooded, with no untoward results. The surge was the straw that broke the camel's back. The surge on the Rock River also deserves attention - the rapid rise (less than 12 hours) of some four feet is the issue.
You are right, there is no gage on Little Rock River. You say yourself that the Rock River surge deserved attention. And its gage gave ample warning.
I found gage readings for Rock Valley, Iowa less than 10 miles downriver: http://floodlist.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/rock-river-rock-valley-iowa.png
The max. reading was 21.2 ft on Friday 22nd at 1:00 am. Record level is given with 22.7 ft, 3.5 hours before the accident. I think this high water qualified as unusual high. And in my opinion it was foreseeable. And a high water on Rock River means that waters from tributary Little Rock River cannot dischargeas easily as under normal conditions.
tree68There are many rules in railroad rulebooks that are there because common sense isn't all that common.
Has the rule bettered the situation?Regards, Volker
tree68 Euclid It seems to me that even with perfect hindsight, there is plenty of disagreement here with the premise that there was a need to slow down. I don't think so. I thing most everyone here agrees that the railroad was keeping an eye on things and determined that normal operation was appropriate. The water in the fields may have been there for several days without causing undue alarm. There was ongoing high water in the area. I'll go with the railroad's judgment.
Euclid It seems to me that even with perfect hindsight, there is plenty of disagreement here with the premise that there was a need to slow down.
I don't think so. I thing most everyone here agrees that the railroad was keeping an eye on things and determined that normal operation was appropriate.
The water in the fields may have been there for several days without causing undue alarm. There was ongoing high water in the area.
I'll go with the railroad's judgment.
Volker essential suggested he believes there was a need to slow down.
You seemed to agree, but said that would have required hindsight; and since we don’t have such hindsight, you seem to be saying that the water was higher than the company anticipated because there was a high water spike that caught them off guard. So, only in hindsight do we know about that spike and its corresponding need to slow down.
So overall, you agreed that there was a need to slow down, and you said, “In hindsight, you won't find anyone who disagrees” [with the point that there was a need to slow down].
What I am saying is that some people here do NOT think there was any need to slow down. They say the water was not high enough to warrant slowing down.
Then you reply that you don’t agree with my point that others disagree with your first point (that there was a need to slow down). You say that the railroad was keeping an eye on things and determined that normal operation (not slowing down) was appropriate.
Well if that is your belief, what do you mean when you say, “As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware.”
Was the railroad keeping an eye on things –or- were they caught unaware?
VOLKER LANDWEHRIf BNSF got surprised by the water level or the flood itself they should reconsider their warning system.
I agree! I mentioned that a while back.
It should be noted, however, that there are no level gauges on the Little Rock River, although reported rainfall in a town upriver on the Little Rock indicated a significant rainfall (4") before the derailment (if I have the timeline right) which would not have been reported via the gauges on the Rock River.
VOLKER LANDWEHRIn your response to my post you said BNSF was perhaps surprised? How can it be both at the same time.
I would submit that it was this surge on the Little Rock River that caused the problem for the railroad, not the overall flood conditions. This was hardly the first time the area had flooded, with no untoward results. The surge was the straw that broke the camel's back.
The surge on the Rock River also deserves attention - the rapid rise (less than 12 hours) of some four feet is the issue.
VOLKER LANDWEHRAnd if I consider this discussion, is Rule 6.21 really needed? Common sense might suffice.
There are many rules in railroad rulebooks that are there because common sense isn't all that common.
tree68I don't think so. I thing most everyone here agrees that the railroad was keeping an eye on things and determined that normal operation was appropriate.
In your response to my post you said BNSF was perhaps surprised? How can it be both at the same time.
tree68The water in the fields may have been there for several days without causing undue alarm. There was ongoing high water in the area.
We learned in Germany that not the water height destroys a river levee (as long as it is below the rim) but the exposure duration.
I'm not in possession of the information to challenge the railroads judgement but I have doubts.
I hope that public interest is large enough (oil spill, drinking water) that BNSF is forced to publish their investigation results.Regards, Volker
Edit: Interesting to see that the software blocks a technical term because it has colloquially an additional meaning. Are users deemed too dumb here to understand the meaning from the context?
tree68As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware. Had that spike level been the product of a gradual rise, I would imagine warnings would have been posted.
The first spike at the gage 10 miles upriver from the accident site was 16 hours before the accident. You can get alerts from the Iowa Flood Center.
If BNSF got surprised by the water level or the flood itself they should reconsider their warning system. Alone http://ifis.iowafloodcenter.org/ifis/app/?c=Doon_(Rock_River)gives warning enough if you click through the offerings. The table at the right hand top states that upriver watershed area is 910 sq mi and the travel time 2 days. And they send alerts if you ask for.
Others say correctly that we don't know if the high water level was a cause or contributing factor to the accident. I think if the train had slowed down the accident aftermath would have been much more less severe.
And if I consider this discussion, is Rule 6.21 realy needed? Common sense might suffice.Regards, Volker
EuclidIt seems to me that even with perfect hindsight, there is plenty of disagreement here with the premise that there was a need to slow down.
tree68 VOLKER LANDWEHR I don't know, but isn't that a situation were one should consider to slow down. In hindsight, you won't find anyone who disagrees. As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware. Had that spike level been the product of a gradual rise, I would imagine warnings would have been posted.
VOLKER LANDWEHR I don't know, but isn't that a situation were one should consider to slow down.
In hindsight, you won't find anyone who disagrees.
As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware. Had that spike level been the product of a gradual rise, I would imagine warnings would have been posted.
VOLKER LANDWEHRI don't know, but isn't that a situation were one should consider to slow down.
dehusmanThe flood stage is measured relative to a point somewhere along the stream. Based on the previous discussion the point was not AT the RR bridge. Just because the water is high there at the measuring station, doesn't necessarily mean it floods every bridge.
To your last sentence I agree. I try to understand the sense of a rule whose definition lies in the hand of the railroad.
Regarding the first two sentences: One gage is 10 miles upstream of the accident location, the next 40 miles downstream. So you can interpolate. See the links to these two gauges I provided earlier.
Here is the link to the Sheriff Office video: https://www.facebook.com/Sioux.County.Sheriff/videos/1782149598499719/
At 19:35 is a view of the river crossing. The video was posted at 7:34 am on June 22, 2018, only few hours after the accident.
A bridge doesn't need to be flooded to get damaged in high water situations.
I don't know, but isn't that a situation were one should consider to slow down.Regards, Volker
charlie hebdoYour argumentum ad absurdum is false as it usually is. The question here is probabilities. Obviously the probability of a derailment on track running through your "flooded fields are harmless" example is much greater than an airplane hitting the train. In fact, the train did derail, period, no matter how much you and some other posters try to twist and turn away from that. Methinks thou protesteth too much, sir.
charlie hebdo
Please tell me how you KNOW that the train did derail because of the high water. It is merely one of several plausible theories, and the cause is more likely to be the far more common one of broken rails, wheels or dragging equipment. I expect that may be why the NTSB chose not to investigate the circumstances despite the significant oil spill.
I agree that I carried the argument to absurd lengths, even more absurd than the one that certain other posters are using. We are just discussing how many "0"s are found to the right of the decimal point, and there will be lots of them in both cases. In the routine operation of a railroad on an elevated grade across an area that probably floods regularly, with presumably no history of ensuing subgrade weakness, the probabilities of either happening are remote.
And unlike many here, I worked most of my career with a railroad, mostly with the engineering department. Some frequent posters are very reluctant to share what qualifications they may have to justify their opinion.
dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR Question: Does a high water level exceeding the Major Flood Stage mark qualify as an unusually high water level in the sense of Rule 6.21? And wouldn't the train not need to slow down approaching the bridge? The flood stage is measured relative to a point somewhere along the stream. Based on the previous discussion the point was not AT the RR bridge. Just because the water is high there at the measuring station, doesn't necessarily mean it floods every bridge. The water could be up into the bridge at the measurement point but the RR bridge could still be high and dry above the water where it is located. The railroad isn't going to change its operation because the farmer's fields are flooded. Major flood stage means there is a high level of water, but doesn't necessarily mean that something near the river is automatically in danger. If "major flood stage" is 10 ft above normal water levels and the railroad is 20 ft above normal water levels, is the railroad flooded? No.
VOLKER LANDWEHR Question: Does a high water level exceeding the Major Flood Stage mark qualify as an unusually high water level in the sense of Rule 6.21? And wouldn't the train not need to slow down approaching the bridge?
The flood stage is measured relative to a point somewhere along the stream. Based on the previous discussion the point was not AT the RR bridge. Just because the water is high there at the measuring station, doesn't necessarily mean it floods every bridge. The water could be up into the bridge at the measurement point but the RR bridge could still be high and dry above the water where it is located. The railroad isn't going to change its operation because the farmer's fields are flooded. Major flood stage means there is a high level of water, but doesn't necessarily mean that something near the river is automatically in danger. If "major flood stage" is 10 ft above normal water levels and the railroad is 20 ft above normal water levels, is the railroad flooded? No.
Again the fallacious argument. The track was flooded.
VOLKER LANDWEHRQuestion: Does a high water level exceeding the Major Flood Stage mark qualify as an unusually high water level in the sense of Rule 6.21? And wouldn't the train not need to slow down approaching the bridge?
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
EuclidI do not believe they are guilty of violating Rule 6.21. And I do not believe there were unaware of the flood waters. I think the crew was told to proceed without slowing down per Rule 6.21 for the reason that the track had been fully inspected. So there was no reason for the train to slow down in anticipating of finding a dangerous flaw. Isn't that a fair conclusion on my part?
It's a nice story. May not reflect the truth, but hey.. it's something?
zugmann Euclid It is really the same concept as restricted speed. You need to review the restricted speed rule. We get it - in your mind you would be the god among engineers and would never make a mistake. If the crew did is found at fault - then BNSF may pursue discipline actions against them. But judging everything on hindsight and your (sometimes odd) interpretations of the rules is an exercise in futility. But carry on, like you always do.
Euclid It is really the same concept as restricted speed.
You need to review the restricted speed rule.
We get it - in your mind you would be the god among engineers and would never make a mistake. If the crew did is found at fault - then BNSF may pursue discipline actions against them. But judging everything on hindsight and your (sometimes odd) interpretations of the rules is an exercise in futility. But carry on, like you always do.
I do not believe they are guilty of violating Rule 6.21. And I do not believe there were unaware of the flood waters. I think the crew was told to proceed without slowing down per Rule 6.21 for the reason that the track had been fully inspected. So there was no reason for the train to slow down in anticipating of finding a dangerous flaw. Isn't that a fair conclusion on my part?
I would opine that the answer to that question is: "It Depends."
As in, it depends on the location.
The classifications for water levels weren't written with the railroads in mind. They were considered with your house in mind.
I know it's a bit of an absurd example, but do you really think the Erie (and all its successors) would be worried about a 14 foot flood at Lanesboro, PA? The D&H would have been concerned. The local residents would be concerned. The Erie probably wouldn't care. Starucca Viaduct is stone, over 100 feet high, and is probably built on bedrock.
So the answer is "it depends." That line has been there since at least 1938 (Historic Aerials image), so I'm sure there is plenty of experience with water levels, including Major Flood Stage, at that location. BNSF would have to tell us how high is too high for that location.
I've looked at the Sheriff Office video again. After the accident the train is parked across the river, standing on a bridge.
GCOR 6.21 says amon others: In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.
So the head end approached and crossed a bridge.
Question: Does a high water level exceeding the Major Flood Stage mark qualify as an unusually high water level in the sense of Rule 6.21? And wouldn't the train not need to slow down approaching the bridge?Regards, Volker
tree68 Euclid But the actual rule requires the engineer to slow down before seeing something he thinks is hazardous to the extent of being unsafe to pass. He is supposed to slow down in anticipation of seeing a hazard that is unsafe to pass, so he will be able to get stopped before reaching that hazard. I'll have to double check my job description for engineer. I didn't think clairvoyance was in there anywhere.
Euclid But the actual rule requires the engineer to slow down before seeing something he thinks is hazardous to the extent of being unsafe to pass. He is supposed to slow down in anticipation of seeing a hazard that is unsafe to pass, so he will be able to get stopped before reaching that hazard.
I'll have to double check my job description for engineer. I didn't think clairvoyance was in there anywhere.
Read the entire context of what I said rather than just a part needed to cleverly craft up the illusion of a contradiction.
Where does clairvoyance come in? You are slowing down in anticipation of spotting a reason to stop such as a washout or a broken rail. You are not slowing down by using psychic reading to see that such a dangerous defect lies ahead. You are slowing down only as a precaution in case there is a dangerous defect ahead. Indeed, there may prove to not be any such dangerous defects ahead, but you slow down just in case there is. It is stunning that this simple point is so hard to make here.
The way Dave describes it, you only slow down or slow to a stop if you see an actual dangerous defect ahead. The problem with that is that if you wait until seeing a hazard before beginning to slow down, there might not be enough distance left to get stopped. It is really the same concept as restricted speed.
cx500 Any point is potentially hazardous, all the time. But most of the time the probability is extremely low, like having an airplane crash just in front of the train. The train crew, track forces and other field personnel know their territory intimately through experience, and will be very aware of the actual hazardous POINTS that are the intent of Rule 6.21. Raging streams and rivers can erode embankments, undermine bridge piers, or even carry away a span. Flooded fields beside the track are not unusual and are generally harmless as long as the level is below the ties.
Any point is potentially hazardous, all the time. But most of the time the probability is extremely low, like having an airplane crash just in front of the train.
The train crew, track forces and other field personnel know their territory intimately through experience, and will be very aware of the actual hazardous POINTS that are the intent of Rule 6.21. Raging streams and rivers can erode embankments, undermine bridge piers, or even carry away a span. Flooded fields beside the track are not unusual and are generally harmless as long as the level is below the ties.
Rules have as many interpretations as the people enforcing them.
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