tree68 VOLKER LANDWEHR I don't know, but isn't that a situation were one should consider to slow down. In hindsight, you won't find anyone who disagrees. As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware. Had that spike level been the product of a gradual rise, I would imagine warnings would have been posted.
VOLKER LANDWEHR I don't know, but isn't that a situation were one should consider to slow down.
In hindsight, you won't find anyone who disagrees.
As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware. Had that spike level been the product of a gradual rise, I would imagine warnings would have been posted.
EuclidIt seems to me that even with perfect hindsight, there is plenty of disagreement here with the premise that there was a need to slow down.
I don't think so. I thing most everyone here agrees that the railroad was keeping an eye on things and determined that normal operation was appropriate.
The water in the fields may have been there for several days without causing undue alarm. There was ongoing high water in the area.
I'll go with the railroad's judgment.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware. Had that spike level been the product of a gradual rise, I would imagine warnings would have been posted.
The first spike at the gage 10 miles upriver from the accident site was 16 hours before the accident. You can get alerts from the Iowa Flood Center.
If BNSF got surprised by the water level or the flood itself they should reconsider their warning system. Alone http://ifis.iowafloodcenter.org/ifis/app/?c=Doon_(Rock_River)gives warning enough if you click through the offerings. The table at the right hand top states that upriver watershed area is 910 sq mi and the travel time 2 days. And they send alerts if you ask for.
Others say correctly that we don't know if the high water level was a cause or contributing factor to the accident. I think if the train had slowed down the accident aftermath would have been much more less severe.
And if I consider this discussion, is Rule 6.21 realy needed? Common sense might suffice.Regards, Volker
tree68I don't think so. I thing most everyone here agrees that the railroad was keeping an eye on things and determined that normal operation was appropriate.
In your response to my post you said BNSF was perhaps surprised? How can it be both at the same time.
tree68The water in the fields may have been there for several days without causing undue alarm. There was ongoing high water in the area.
We learned in Germany that not the water height destroys a river levee (as long as it is below the rim) but the exposure duration.
I'm not in possession of the information to challenge the railroads judgement but I have doubts.
I hope that public interest is large enough (oil spill, drinking water) that BNSF is forced to publish their investigation results.Regards, Volker
Edit: Interesting to see that the software blocks a technical term because it has colloquially an additional meaning. Are users deemed too dumb here to understand the meaning from the context?
VOLKER LANDWEHRIf BNSF got surprised by the water level or the flood itself they should reconsider their warning system.
I agree! I mentioned that a while back.
It should be noted, however, that there are no level gauges on the Little Rock River, although reported rainfall in a town upriver on the Little Rock indicated a significant rainfall (4") before the derailment (if I have the timeline right) which would not have been reported via the gauges on the Rock River.
VOLKER LANDWEHRIn your response to my post you said BNSF was perhaps surprised? How can it be both at the same time.
I would submit that it was this surge on the Little Rock River that caused the problem for the railroad, not the overall flood conditions. This was hardly the first time the area had flooded, with no untoward results. The surge was the straw that broke the camel's back.
The surge on the Rock River also deserves attention - the rapid rise (less than 12 hours) of some four feet is the issue.
VOLKER LANDWEHRAnd if I consider this discussion, is Rule 6.21 really needed? Common sense might suffice.
There are many rules in railroad rulebooks that are there because common sense isn't all that common.
tree68 Euclid It seems to me that even with perfect hindsight, there is plenty of disagreement here with the premise that there was a need to slow down. I don't think so. I thing most everyone here agrees that the railroad was keeping an eye on things and determined that normal operation was appropriate. The water in the fields may have been there for several days without causing undue alarm. There was ongoing high water in the area. I'll go with the railroad's judgment.
Euclid It seems to me that even with perfect hindsight, there is plenty of disagreement here with the premise that there was a need to slow down.
Volker essential suggested he believes there was a need to slow down.
You seemed to agree, but said that would have required hindsight; and since we don’t have such hindsight, you seem to be saying that the water was higher than the company anticipated because there was a high water spike that caught them off guard. So, only in hindsight do we know about that spike and its corresponding need to slow down.
So overall, you agreed that there was a need to slow down, and you said, “In hindsight, you won't find anyone who disagrees” [with the point that there was a need to slow down].
What I am saying is that some people here do NOT think there was any need to slow down. They say the water was not high enough to warrant slowing down.
Then you reply that you don’t agree with my point that others disagree with your first point (that there was a need to slow down). You say that the railroad was keeping an eye on things and determined that normal operation (not slowing down) was appropriate.
Well if that is your belief, what do you mean when you say, “As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware.”
Was the railroad keeping an eye on things –or- were they caught unaware?
tree68I would submit that it was this surge on the Little Rock River that caused the problem for the railroad, not the overall flood conditions. This was hardly the first time the area had flooded, with no untoward results. The surge was the straw that broke the camel's back. The surge on the Rock River also deserves attention - the rapid rise (less than 12 hours) of some four feet is the issue.
You are right, there is no gage on Little Rock River. You say yourself that the Rock River surge deserved attention. And its gage gave ample warning.
I found gage readings for Rock Valley, Iowa less than 10 miles downriver: http://floodlist.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/rock-river-rock-valley-iowa.png
The max. reading was 21.2 ft on Friday 22nd at 1:00 am. Record level is given with 22.7 ft, 3.5 hours before the accident. I think this high water qualified as unusual high. And in my opinion it was foreseeable. And a high water on Rock River means that waters from tributary Little Rock River cannot dischargeas easily as under normal conditions.
tree68There are many rules in railroad rulebooks that are there because common sense isn't all that common.
Has the rule bettered the situation?Regards, Volker
Unless the crew was provided with information indicating a need to reduce speed, I don't think they needed to do so, either. The high waters had been going on for several days with no apparent ill effects for the railroad.
If the crew was provided with information indicating a need to reduce speed (likely via a bulletin or similar method) and chose to ignore it, the incident is on their shoulders.
Otherwise, it was business as usual.
The railroad was undoubtedly patrolling the track in question, and the powers that be apparently saw no reason to slow traffic down. Flooded fields alone apparently did not constitute actionable water levels.
I mention the spike only because it is an anomoly to the usual slow rise and fall of floodwaters and, yes, may have caught the railroad by surprise.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Unfortunately, the world operates in real time.
Volker points out some significant things about the spike. I fully agree that it should have been recognized and appropriate action taken - by the railroad. If they did not recognize the hazard and relay that concern to the crew of the train, it's on their shoulders.
Barring the possibility that they ignored such warnings, they were acting on the information they were given when they went on duty and while enroute. If that information did not indicate those extraordinarily high water levels, they were justified in maintaining track speed.
Rule 6.21 worked as designed. The problem is the "aware" part - the crew apparently wasn't aware of the need to reduce speed, so apparently they didn't, except:
Actually, since we haven't seen a report or gotten other information, we don't know that the crew wasn't reducing speed even as the pile-up occurred. I'm guessing they were on high, dry ground a half mile before they reached the bridge. If that's the case, then 6.21 did work as designed.
I don't know what information BNSF Weather Services provide to BNSF. When I was working at CSX, the CSX Weather Services DID NOT provide any 'flood stage' information, at least not to Operating Department personnel - MofW 'may' have been provided such information but I have no factual information that they recieved any different weather alerts than were provided to Operating Department personnel.
We have no knowledge of what actions BNSF MofW employees took in regard to inspecting the area involved in the derailment. We also don't know what kind of restrictions, if any, BNSF MofW placed on the tracks where the derailment happened. We don't know what BNSF MofW employees observed when they made their inspection of the derailment area and what they thought of then current and future conditions of the area would be and how those observations would affect the safe operation of train.
As I have stated previously, trains are not line of sight vehicles. Train are operated in accordance with timetable specified speeds, unless those speeds are otherwise restricted by appropriate personnel for cause.
Since there were no fatalities or mass evacuations caused by this derailment it is highly unlikely there will be a through NTSB investigation of the incident and it is equally unlikely that BNSF will publish to the public therir internal investigation of the incident.
Foresight is worse than 20/400 and hindsight is right at 20/20.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
tree68Unless the crew was provided with information indicating a need to reduce speed, I don't think they needed to do so, either.
I don't blame the crew. BNSF should have known what to expect with all available warning.
tree68I mention the spike only because it is an anomoly to the usual slow rise and fall of floodwaters and, yes, may have caught the railroad by surprise.
Here I disagree. Yes there was a fast rise. On the other hand there was ample time to react. Upriver gage 16 hours before accident, Rock Valley about 3.5 hours before. And this was a crude oil unit train not some manifest. Reading your post further you seem to agree with me on this.
tree68Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Unfortunately, the world operates in real time.
Hindsight allows to find out what could/should have been known by the railroad. Even then mistakes are possible.
tree68Barring the possibility that they ignored such warnings, they were acting on the information they were given when they went on duty and while enroute. If that information did not indicate those extraordinarily high water levels, they were justified in maintaining track speed.
As I said before I don't blame the crew. Without warning from the office they had no chance to judge the water level and possible dangers in the dark.
Looking at the pile-up I don't believe that they had slowed to restricted speed and they had crossed the river already.
It will be interesting to see what really happened.Regards, Volker
BaltACD, I agree with most what you said. But there are some differences.
My web searches showed how much information about flooding are available to the public in that area. If BNSF didn't get them they should reconsider their warning sources.
Unusal high waters can lead to weak points or damages in dam that can't easily be detected by MofW employees. I think in these situations Rules 6.21 comes into play.
Again: In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement.
It takes into consideration that MofW might not find any defects because they are likely there but still hidden.
I think a check by MofW showing no defects doesn't relieve the RR from executing Rule 6.21.
But that is just my interpretation and I'm not a railroader.Regards
VOLKER LANDWEHR BaltACD, I agree with most what you said. But there are some differences. My web searches showed how much information about flooding are available to the public in that area. If BNSF didn't get them they should reconsider their warning sources. Unusal high waters can lead to weak points or damages in dam that can't easily be detected by MofW employees. I think in these situations Rules 6.21 comes into play. Again: In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement. It takes into consideration that MofW might not find any defects because they are likely there but still hidden. I think a check by MofW showing no defects doesn't relieve the RR from executing Rule 6.21. But that is just my interpretation and I'm not a railroader.Regards
If MofW doesn't issue restricted speed after hi-railing, at the very least, the incident territory why should a train crew operate at a speed different from those whose job it is to 'KNOW' the particular territory and whatever idocyncracies that pertain to the territory.
The world is built on trust - trust that those who have 'extradorinary' knowledge of situations - can be trusted to provide appropriate warnings when necessary. The absence of those warnings is defacto permission to operate in the normal manner.
MofW personnel are those that have been charged with the responsibility of knowing local conditions in times of extreme weather and issuing specific warnings consistent with the local knowledge and the results of the inspections they have undertaken.
VOLKER LANDWEHR Unusal high waters can lead to weak points or damages in dam that can't easily be detected by MofW employees. I think in these situations Rules 6.21 comes into play. Again: In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement. It takes into consideration that MofW might not find any defects because they are likely there but still hidden. I think a check by MofW showing no defects doesn't relieve the RR from executing Rule 6.21. But that is just my interpretation and I'm not a railroader.Regards
I think that is an excellent interpretation. MOW will find a bridge or culvert that is washed out, but they won't find defects such as water erosion inside of the fill bank or internal saturation that will cause liquefaction. It takes a train to find those defects. That is why when all outward appearances indicate no defects, the train must still be slowed down in case there are hidden defects that will derail the train. By slowing down, you minimize the damage of the derailment.
Then why have patrols? Whenever it's more than partly cloudy, just run all trains at restricted speed.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
BaltACDIf MofW doesn't issue restricted speed after hi-railing, at the very least, the incident territory why should a train crew operate at a speed different from those whose job it is to 'KNOW' the particular territory and whatever idocyncracies that pertain to the territory.
It is not about the crew.
Example: You have a very high water level. The bridge piers start to loose their footings. MofW make a control drive but doesn't find anything. It is still to early. MofW has done everything possible and should be trusted. OK, but you can't trust nature in special circumstances. And MofW should know it and go the safe way.
The Rule 6.21 doesn't say in unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop, except the route is cleared by MofW.
I think rule 6.21 aims at those defects that cannot be detected by MofW because of circumstances.
BaltACDThe world is built on trust - trust that those who have 'extradorinary' knowledge of situations - can be trusted to provide appropriate warnings when necessary. The absence of those warnings is defacto permission to operate in the normal manner.
Agreed, but MofW must realize or know that their judgement can be unsafe. Then the rule should apply to MofW. If not, there seems to be a gap and you end up relying on common sense.Regards, Volker
If you can't trust your 'experts' you can't trust yourself as you don't posess their knowledge or experience.
BaltACD If MofW doesn't issue restricted speed after hi-railing, at the very least, the incident territory why should a train crew operate at a speed different from those whose job it is to 'KNOW' the particular territory and whatever idocyncracies that pertain to the territory. The world is built on trust - trust that those who have 'extradorinary' knowledge of situations - can be trusted to provide appropriate warnings when necessary. The absence of those warnings is defacto permission to operate in the normal manner. MofW personnel are those that have been charged with the responsibility of knowing local conditions in times of extreme weather and issuing specific warnings consistent with the local knowledge and the results of the inspections they have undertaken.
MOW is not going to test the soil for saturation, so they will have no way to confirm whether liquefaction will occur. Even if soil is believed to be saturated, liquefaction cannot be determined without vibration. A train will provide the vibration to trigger liquefaction failure is the soil is sufficiently saturated.
So it takes a train to provide the ultimate proof that trains can pass safely.
EuclidSo it takes a train as the ultimate proof that trains can pass safely.
So we need a train to prove whether the track is safe for a train to pass, yet we want the train to be prepared to stop before the track that may not be safe for the train to pass, even though the only way we know the track is safe for a train to pass is by having a train pass the track that we don't know is safe to pass?
zugmann Euclid So it takes a train as the ultimate proof that trains can pass safely. So we need a train to prove whether the track is safe for a train to pass, yet we want the train to be prepared to stop before the track that may not be safe for the train to pass, even though the only way we know the track is safe for a train to pass is by having a train pass the track that we don't know is safe to pass?
Euclid So it takes a train as the ultimate proof that trains can pass safely.
Well when you test with the train, you go really slow a few times. It is unlikely that internal erosion or saturation sufficient to cause liquefaction will be developing, but those are the defects that can fail to be detected by observation.
Part of predicting either of these defects would be to conduct soil boring and testing for type of soil and degree of compaction. Then you would know the bearing capacity of the soil, how readily it absorbs water, and how water absorption affects its bearing capacity. This could be done any time since it the testing does not require a flood to be occurring.
BaltACDIf you can't trust your 'experts' you can't trust yourself as you don't posess their knowledge or experience.
The crews need to trust the MofW, OK. But can MofW trust its own results in the case of unusual high water levels? GCOR 1.1.1 comes to mind: Maintaining a Safe Course: In case of doubt or uncertainty, take the safe course. A good 'expert' has to be able to question his own findings and to learn when.
On the other hand why do crews need Rule 6.21 when they only have to slow down when required by MofW as said by some here? Regards, Volker
zugmannSo we need a train to prove whether the track is safe for a train to pass, yet we want the train to be prepared to stop before the track that may not be safe for the train to pass, even though the only way we know the track is safe for a train to pass is by having a train pass the track that we don't know is safe to pass?
No, the railroad could follow Rule 6.21.Regards, Volker
Under the circumstance - why inspect at at all - Restricted speed for all trains. Save the MofW Overtime.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
BaltACDUnder the circumstance - why inspect at at all - Restricted speed for all trains. Save the MofW Overtime.
You are smarter than that.
Take the situation at Doon. 95% of the time the MofW's inspections are sufficient to find defects. And then there are situations like on June 22, 2018 when not all possible defects can be found with visual inspections alone.
That is the time the doubts should set in. At least it is the way I handled similar situations in my 35 year carreer in civil engineering.
And that 100 times nothing happened doesn't mean the 101 time will go well too.Regards, Volker
EuclidPart of predicting either of these defects would be to conduct soil boring and testing for type of soil and degree of compaction. Then you would know the bearing capacity of the soil, how readily it absorbs water, and how water absorption affects its bearing capacity. This could be done any time since it the testing does not require a flood to be occurring.
So, running trains over this ROW for what, 100+ years, through all sorts of conditions carries no value? If high water was known to be a problem at this location, restrictions would have been put on immediately.
Inasmuch as we're assuming no such restrictions were issued, that would seem to indicate that the railroad felt confident the ROW would do just fine under the circumstances.
We don't know that compaction tests haven't been done. Or any other such testing, for that matter.
Someone mentioned "perfect storm" earlier - perhaps this was just that.
tree68So, running trains over this ROW for what, 100+ years, through all sorts of conditions carries no value? If high water was known to be a problem at this location, restrictions would have been put on immediately.
It is not a guarantee that nothing will happen.
tree68Inasmuch as we're assuming no such restrictions were issued, that would seem to indicate that the railroad felt confident the ROW would do just fine under the circumstances.
That might have been BNSF's take but looking at all evindence it might not be correct?
tree68Someone mentioned "perfect storm" earlier - perhaps this was just that.
There was a lot of advance warning available. A perfect storm would not be the explanation/excuse for operations as usual, I think.
I have heard here repeated times that railroad are aiming for the safe route. In this thread I have more the impression that efficiency comes first.
We had a number of heavy storms since October 2017. IIRC Deutsche Bahn stopped all movements in large areas three times. I admit that most trains are passenger trains.
Perhaps the high water had nothing to do with the accident, but following Rule 6.21 would have reduced the aftermath. I know, hindsight.....Regards, Volker
VOLKER LANDWEHR BaltACD Under the circumstance - why inspect at at all - Restricted speed for all trains. Save the MofW Overtime. You are smarter than that. Take the situation at Doon. 95% of the time the MofW's inspections are sufficient to find defects. And then there are situations like on June 22, 2018 when not all possible defects can be found with visual inspections alone. That is the time the doubts should set in. At least it is the way I handled similar situations in my 35 year carrer in civil engineering. And that 100 times nothing happened doesn't mean the 101 time will go well too.Regards, Volker
BaltACD Under the circumstance - why inspect at at all - Restricted speed for all trains. Save the MofW Overtime.
That is the time the doubts should set in. At least it is the way I handled similar situations in my 35 year carrer in civil engineering.
Forgot [/sarcasm]
As I said railroad operations rely on the trust of all the departments involved in doing their particular special tasks to the best of their ability, education and experience. Without abilities, education and experience of all the crafts involved what would be the sense in even hanging out the shingle that you are a railroad and open for business.
tree68 Euclid Part of predicting either of these defects would be to conduct soil boring and testing for type of soil and degree of compaction. Then you would know the bearing capacity of the soil, how readily it absorbs water, and how water absorption affects its bearing capacity. This could be done any time since it the testing does not require a flood to be occurring. So, running trains over this ROW for what, 100+ years, through all sorts of conditions carries no value? If high water was known to be a problem at this location, restrictions would have been put on immediately. Inasmuch as we're assuming no such restrictions were issued, that would seem to indicate that the railroad felt confident the ROW would do just fine under the circumstances. We don't know that compaction tests haven't been done. Or any other such testing, for that matter. Someone mentioned "perfect storm" earlier - perhaps this was just that.
Euclid Part of predicting either of these defects would be to conduct soil boring and testing for type of soil and degree of compaction. Then you would know the bearing capacity of the soil, how readily it absorbs water, and how water absorption affects its bearing capacity. This could be done any time since it the testing does not require a flood to be occurring.
As I mentioned recently, I assume that the railroad made numerous inspections during the high water and found no visual problem. The railroad may indeed have felt confident that the ROW fill would hold up, as you say. As I indicated earlier, I am not 100% confident that the roadbed did hold up. Interestingly, I noticed that a couple of news reports say it is felt that the roadbed gave out under the train. No source is given for that information. It may just be scuttlebut. But a lot of times, that sort or scuttlebut reflects what knowledgable people at the site are saying.
Liquefaction depends on an agitating force to shake the ground while it is saturated and bearing a load. Maybe this was the first time the ground became adequately saturated with a heavy enough and long enough train to reach the point of liquefaction failure of the roadbed.
I only mention the testing of soils to indicate that this is not something that would likely be done in a flood emergency situation. They would do it when more convenient and keep the information on file. However, I would not be surprised if has never been done there.
So, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water.
EuclidSo, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water.
Which basically means Rule 2.61 would have no bearing here, right?
tree68 Euclid So, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water. Which basically means Rule 2.61 would have no bearing here, right?
Euclid So, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water.
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