VOLKER LANDWEHRThe problem in this discussion seems to be that the participating railroaders don't have experience with Rule 6.21 or don't reveal it.
Does it really matter if a railroader has experience with Rule 6.21? The crux of the matter is whether the railroad or the railroaders actually involved considered the water "high." If they did not, the rule simply did not apply.
I don't have time at the moment to research chapter and verse in NORAC, but there is a similar rule there.
Those local railroaders are the ones who run the line on a daily basis. If they didn't consider the waters at the time to meet the criteria of Rule 6.21, why should we?
Clearly something failed. By all appearances, water played a part, but it could just as well have been a broken axle that revealed itself at a particularly inopportune time.
But..But...But... There was water ALL AROUND!
Let's say you have a nicely finished basement - carpet, hardwood floor, electronics, furniture - a comfortable family room.
Four inches of water in that basement is going to be something of a catastrophe - the carpet and wood flooring will be ruined, and other items may suffer damage as well.
My basement is unfinished. The furnace and water heater are up on pedestals, and any storage is on shelves. If I get four inches of water, it'll be damp down there for a bit, until the water drains, but that'll be all.
Both examples involve four inches of water. One basement is ruined, while it's just another day for the other.
I've posited that high water was normally no big deal at Doon. I still hold that opinion.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
EuclidFine, you lose the bet.
So you went through railroad training?
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Sorry, if I/we held you of from posting.
I'd really appreciate your first hand knowledge.
The problem in this discussion seems to be that the participating railroaders don't have experience with Rule 6.21 or don't reveal it.
I hope your post could put the discussion on a foundation.
It is not like dehusman said, that we know nothing.
We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident.
We have the video from the Sheriff Department with video sequences of tank cars on the river bridge. We have the pile-up that for me doesn't look it happend at a reduced speed.
And we have Rule 6.21 that for me as a civil engineer seems to take into consideration that with unusual high waters hidden track defects that cannot get detected by visual inspection only are more likely than in different situations.
But I might get it wrong here. So first hand experience is needed.Regards, Volker
EuclidWhat is the difference between giving permission to not adhere to the rule and not invoking the rule?
That's simple.
Giving permission to not adhere to a rule implies that there is a reason to adhere to the rule in the first place.
Not invoking the rule means there is no reason to do so.
In this case, you seem to remain convinced that the railroad (and the crew) knew the water was high enough to be a threat (although we still haven't established what level that is) and chose to ignore that information.
As to your second question(s) - every spring we deal with rusty rail conditions and the possibility that crossing protection may not operate as it should. So every spring our bulletin orders reflect that and invoke NORAC rule 138 - provide flag protection - should the protection not operate. The rule is always in effect, but only applies if the crossing protection does not work.
Once the rails are polished and the crossing protection works as it should, every time, that item disappears from the bulletin order. Again, the rule is still there.
If we get a report of malfunctioning crossing protection, we'll be told to be prepared to stop and flag that crossing - per rule 138. That might be in a bulletin order, or could be right in the comments of the Form D if the need is immediate.
I can't make it any more simple than that.
Euclid BaltACD Euclid tree68 Euclid I would say that Rule 6.21 should have been adhered to by the crew because of the high water; unless they were given permission to not adhere to the rule. The crew would not be given permission not to adhere to the rule, to ignore it, or anything of the sort. Please erase from your library the misconception that a rule can be summarily ignored, or that a crew can be instructed to ignore a rule. If it occurs at all, it will be an extremely rare event, or will earn some folks some unpaid time off. If the railroad was not concerned with the high water, they simply would not invoke the rule. What is the difference between giving permission to not adhere to the rule and not invoking the rule? If a rule must always stand, if it always is, if it cannot be officially decided to be ignored, then how can it be invoked? If a rule cannot be extinguished, how can it be invoked? Terex - time for you to go to work on a railroad. You might actually learn something about rules application. The betting is you would not make it through the probationary period before you were told not to return. Fine, you lose the bet.
BaltACD Euclid tree68 Euclid I would say that Rule 6.21 should have been adhered to by the crew because of the high water; unless they were given permission to not adhere to the rule. The crew would not be given permission not to adhere to the rule, to ignore it, or anything of the sort. Please erase from your library the misconception that a rule can be summarily ignored, or that a crew can be instructed to ignore a rule. If it occurs at all, it will be an extremely rare event, or will earn some folks some unpaid time off. If the railroad was not concerned with the high water, they simply would not invoke the rule. What is the difference between giving permission to not adhere to the rule and not invoking the rule? If a rule must always stand, if it always is, if it cannot be officially decided to be ignored, then how can it be invoked? If a rule cannot be extinguished, how can it be invoked? Terex - time for you to go to work on a railroad. You might actually learn something about rules application. The betting is you would not make it through the probationary period before you were told not to return.
Euclid tree68 Euclid I would say that Rule 6.21 should have been adhered to by the crew because of the high water; unless they were given permission to not adhere to the rule. The crew would not be given permission not to adhere to the rule, to ignore it, or anything of the sort. Please erase from your library the misconception that a rule can be summarily ignored, or that a crew can be instructed to ignore a rule. If it occurs at all, it will be an extremely rare event, or will earn some folks some unpaid time off. If the railroad was not concerned with the high water, they simply would not invoke the rule. What is the difference between giving permission to not adhere to the rule and not invoking the rule? If a rule must always stand, if it always is, if it cannot be officially decided to be ignored, then how can it be invoked? If a rule cannot be extinguished, how can it be invoked?
tree68 Euclid I would say that Rule 6.21 should have been adhered to by the crew because of the high water; unless they were given permission to not adhere to the rule. The crew would not be given permission not to adhere to the rule, to ignore it, or anything of the sort. Please erase from your library the misconception that a rule can be summarily ignored, or that a crew can be instructed to ignore a rule. If it occurs at all, it will be an extremely rare event, or will earn some folks some unpaid time off. If the railroad was not concerned with the high water, they simply would not invoke the rule.
Euclid I would say that Rule 6.21 should have been adhered to by the crew because of the high water; unless they were given permission to not adhere to the rule.
The crew would not be given permission not to adhere to the rule, to ignore it, or anything of the sort.
Please erase from your library the misconception that a rule can be summarily ignored, or that a crew can be instructed to ignore a rule. If it occurs at all, it will be an extremely rare event, or will earn some folks some unpaid time off.
If the railroad was not concerned with the high water, they simply would not invoke the rule.
What is the difference between giving permission to not adhere to the rule and not invoking the rule?
If a rule must always stand, if it always is, if it cannot be officially decided to be ignored, then how can it be invoked? If a rule cannot be extinguished, how can it be invoked?
Terex - time for you to go to work on a railroad. You might actually learn something about rules application. The betting is you would not make it through the probationary period before you were told not to return.
Fine, you lose the bet.
No way - you won't make it through preliminary training and be allowed to set hands or feet on live rail equipment.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
EuclidI would say that Rule 6.21 should have been adhered to by the crew because of the high water; unless they were given permission to not adhere to the rule.
If the railroad was not concerned with the high water, they simply would not invoke the rule. If they were concerned with water levels, they would notify the train crew, either directly by radio if it was a short fuse event, or via a bulletin or other such means when they came on duty.
If the crew saw water that they felt was high enough to fit the high water rule, they would be within their rights to adhere to it.
As noted, water levels had been high for several days.
About a mile north of the derailment site, the railroad crosses the Rock River. Apparently there was no concern there, either, or the train would have been slowed for that crossing as well.
For that matter, in the Sheriff's video, there was no flooding visible from the railroad north of 260th Street.
But none of that is going to change your opinion, or likely your misconceptions.
I thought about posting about how we follow procedure FF (flash flood) when issued, usually after civil authorities issue flood warnings. I figure the Yes-But Choir (it used to be more of a solo act) would pick it apart and I'm not in the mood for music.
Besides, who cares how things are handled in the real world.
Jeff
charlie hebdoDo we actually know what date and time the BNSF MOW folks inspected the area of the flooding/high water derailment? That would seem to be a pretty critical factor
No we really don't have any information on anything (which of course hasn't stopped anybody) and yes, it, among a zillion other things we don't know, would be a critical factor.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Do we actually know what date and time the BNSF MOW folks inspected the area of the flooding/high water derailment? That would seem to be a pretty critical factor.
tree68 Euclid So, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water. Which basically means Rule 2.61 [6.21] would have no bearing here, right?
Euclid So, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water.
Which basically means Rule 2.61 [6.21] would have no bearing here, right?
I would say that Rule 6.21 should have been adhered to by the crew because of the high water; unless they were given permission to not adhere to the rule. Certainly it would have had bearing if the flood did cause the wreck by creating a track defect, even if the defect were liquefaction which the crew would not have been able to spot by visual observation.
But even so, the slowing down would have made the wreck less damaging and may not have spilled any oil. However, the rule says nothing about a side benefit of the slowing down lessening the derailment damage if a derailment occurs despite slowing down to check the track.
If the crew had not been given permission to ignore the rule, and if the derailment was not caused by anything related to the flood, I would say that the crew should have nevertheless slowed down because the rule calls for slowing down in cases of high water. Officials pull tests on train crews with mocked up circumstances to see if the crews follow the rules. They are expected to follow the rules in those tests even though the test conditions are staged. So when heading into high water, they are supposed to slow down even if no track defects exist and no derailment happens.
Murphy Siding Wait. I lost my scorecard..... Rule 2.61.?
Wait. I lost my scorecard..... Rule 2.61.?
GCOR
6.21 Precautions Against Unusual Conditions Protect trains and engines against any known condition that may interfere with their safety. When conditions restrict visibility, regulate speed to ensure that crew members can observe and comply with signal indications. In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement. Advise the train dispatcher of such conditions by the first available means of communication.
Murphy SidingWait. I lost my scorecard..... Rule 2.61.?
I think that's the number - slow down for bad weather, in essence.
tree68 Euclid So, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water. Which basically means Rule 2.61 would have no bearing here, right?
Which basically means Rule 2.61 would have no bearing here, right?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
EuclidSo, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water.
tree68 Euclid Part of predicting either of these defects would be to conduct soil boring and testing for type of soil and degree of compaction. Then you would know the bearing capacity of the soil, how readily it absorbs water, and how water absorption affects its bearing capacity. This could be done any time since it the testing does not require a flood to be occurring. So, running trains over this ROW for what, 100+ years, through all sorts of conditions carries no value? If high water was known to be a problem at this location, restrictions would have been put on immediately. Inasmuch as we're assuming no such restrictions were issued, that would seem to indicate that the railroad felt confident the ROW would do just fine under the circumstances. We don't know that compaction tests haven't been done. Or any other such testing, for that matter. Someone mentioned "perfect storm" earlier - perhaps this was just that.
Euclid Part of predicting either of these defects would be to conduct soil boring and testing for type of soil and degree of compaction. Then you would know the bearing capacity of the soil, how readily it absorbs water, and how water absorption affects its bearing capacity. This could be done any time since it the testing does not require a flood to be occurring.
So, running trains over this ROW for what, 100+ years, through all sorts of conditions carries no value? If high water was known to be a problem at this location, restrictions would have been put on immediately.
Inasmuch as we're assuming no such restrictions were issued, that would seem to indicate that the railroad felt confident the ROW would do just fine under the circumstances.
We don't know that compaction tests haven't been done. Or any other such testing, for that matter.
Someone mentioned "perfect storm" earlier - perhaps this was just that.
As I mentioned recently, I assume that the railroad made numerous inspections during the high water and found no visual problem. The railroad may indeed have felt confident that the ROW fill would hold up, as you say. As I indicated earlier, I am not 100% confident that the roadbed did hold up. Interestingly, I noticed that a couple of news reports say it is felt that the roadbed gave out under the train. No source is given for that information. It may just be scuttlebut. But a lot of times, that sort or scuttlebut reflects what knowledgable people at the site are saying.
Liquefaction depends on an agitating force to shake the ground while it is saturated and bearing a load. Maybe this was the first time the ground became adequately saturated with a heavy enough and long enough train to reach the point of liquefaction failure of the roadbed.
I only mention the testing of soils to indicate that this is not something that would likely be done in a flood emergency situation. They would do it when more convenient and keep the information on file. However, I would not be surprised if has never been done there.
So, as I said before, I think the derailment was either caused by roadbed liquefaction or by some other cause unrelated to the high water.
VOLKER LANDWEHR BaltACD Under the circumstance - why inspect at at all - Restricted speed for all trains. Save the MofW Overtime. You are smarter than that. Take the situation at Doon. 95% of the time the MofW's inspections are sufficient to find defects. And then there are situations like on June 22, 2018 when not all possible defects can be found with visual inspections alone. That is the time the doubts should set in. At least it is the way I handled similar situations in my 35 year carrer in civil engineering. And that 100 times nothing happened doesn't mean the 101 time will go well too.Regards, Volker
BaltACD Under the circumstance - why inspect at at all - Restricted speed for all trains. Save the MofW Overtime.
You are smarter than that.
Take the situation at Doon. 95% of the time the MofW's inspections are sufficient to find defects. And then there are situations like on June 22, 2018 when not all possible defects can be found with visual inspections alone.
That is the time the doubts should set in. At least it is the way I handled similar situations in my 35 year carrer in civil engineering.
And that 100 times nothing happened doesn't mean the 101 time will go well too.Regards, Volker
Forgot [/sarcasm]
As I said railroad operations rely on the trust of all the departments involved in doing their particular special tasks to the best of their ability, education and experience. Without abilities, education and experience of all the crafts involved what would be the sense in even hanging out the shingle that you are a railroad and open for business.
tree68So, running trains over this ROW for what, 100+ years, through all sorts of conditions carries no value? If high water was known to be a problem at this location, restrictions would have been put on immediately.
It is not a guarantee that nothing will happen.
tree68Inasmuch as we're assuming no such restrictions were issued, that would seem to indicate that the railroad felt confident the ROW would do just fine under the circumstances.
That might have been BNSF's take but looking at all evindence it might not be correct?
tree68Someone mentioned "perfect storm" earlier - perhaps this was just that.
There was a lot of advance warning available. A perfect storm would not be the explanation/excuse for operations as usual, I think.
I have heard here repeated times that railroad are aiming for the safe route. In this thread I have more the impression that efficiency comes first.
We had a number of heavy storms since October 2017. IIRC Deutsche Bahn stopped all movements in large areas three times. I admit that most trains are passenger trains.
Perhaps the high water had nothing to do with the accident, but following Rule 6.21 would have reduced the aftermath. I know, hindsight.....Regards, Volker
EuclidPart of predicting either of these defects would be to conduct soil boring and testing for type of soil and degree of compaction. Then you would know the bearing capacity of the soil, how readily it absorbs water, and how water absorption affects its bearing capacity. This could be done any time since it the testing does not require a flood to be occurring.
BaltACDUnder the circumstance - why inspect at at all - Restricted speed for all trains. Save the MofW Overtime.
That is the time the doubts should set in. At least it is the way I handled similar situations in my 35 year carreer in civil engineering.
zugmann Euclid So it takes a train as the ultimate proof that trains can pass safely. So we need a train to prove whether the track is safe for a train to pass, yet we want the train to be prepared to stop before the track that may not be safe for the train to pass, even though the only way we know the track is safe for a train to pass is by having a train pass the track that we don't know is safe to pass?
Euclid So it takes a train as the ultimate proof that trains can pass safely.
So we need a train to prove whether the track is safe for a train to pass, yet we want the train to be prepared to stop before the track that may not be safe for the train to pass, even though the only way we know the track is safe for a train to pass is by having a train pass the track that we don't know is safe to pass?
Under the circumstance - why inspect at at all - Restricted speed for all trains. Save the MofW Overtime.
zugmannSo we need a train to prove whether the track is safe for a train to pass, yet we want the train to be prepared to stop before the track that may not be safe for the train to pass, even though the only way we know the track is safe for a train to pass is by having a train pass the track that we don't know is safe to pass?
No, the railroad could follow Rule 6.21.Regards, Volker
BaltACDIf you can't trust your 'experts' you can't trust yourself as you don't posess their knowledge or experience.
The crews need to trust the MofW, OK. But can MofW trust its own results in the case of unusual high water levels? GCOR 1.1.1 comes to mind: Maintaining a Safe Course: In case of doubt or uncertainty, take the safe course. A good 'expert' has to be able to question his own findings and to learn when.
On the other hand why do crews need Rule 6.21 when they only have to slow down when required by MofW as said by some here? Regards, Volker
Well when you test with the train, you go really slow a few times. It is unlikely that internal erosion or saturation sufficient to cause liquefaction will be developing, but those are the defects that can fail to be detected by observation.
Part of predicting either of these defects would be to conduct soil boring and testing for type of soil and degree of compaction. Then you would know the bearing capacity of the soil, how readily it absorbs water, and how water absorption affects its bearing capacity. This could be done any time since it the testing does not require a flood to be occurring.
EuclidSo it takes a train as the ultimate proof that trains can pass safely.
BaltACD If MofW doesn't issue restricted speed after hi-railing, at the very least, the incident territory why should a train crew operate at a speed different from those whose job it is to 'KNOW' the particular territory and whatever idocyncracies that pertain to the territory. The world is built on trust - trust that those who have 'extradorinary' knowledge of situations - can be trusted to provide appropriate warnings when necessary. The absence of those warnings is defacto permission to operate in the normal manner. MofW personnel are those that have been charged with the responsibility of knowing local conditions in times of extreme weather and issuing specific warnings consistent with the local knowledge and the results of the inspections they have undertaken.
If MofW doesn't issue restricted speed after hi-railing, at the very least, the incident territory why should a train crew operate at a speed different from those whose job it is to 'KNOW' the particular territory and whatever idocyncracies that pertain to the territory.
The world is built on trust - trust that those who have 'extradorinary' knowledge of situations - can be trusted to provide appropriate warnings when necessary. The absence of those warnings is defacto permission to operate in the normal manner.
MofW personnel are those that have been charged with the responsibility of knowing local conditions in times of extreme weather and issuing specific warnings consistent with the local knowledge and the results of the inspections they have undertaken.
MOW is not going to test the soil for saturation, so they will have no way to confirm whether liquefaction will occur. Even if soil is believed to be saturated, liquefaction cannot be determined without vibration. A train will provide the vibration to trigger liquefaction failure is the soil is sufficiently saturated.
So it takes a train to provide the ultimate proof that trains can pass safely.
If you can't trust your 'experts' you can't trust yourself as you don't posess their knowledge or experience.
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