VOLKER LANDWEHRYou think everything was handled OK,
Never said that. I have no idea whether they handled everything ok because, as many of us have said many times before, we have no actual knowledge about what the BNSF did or didn't do. They could have done everything right or they could have done nothing right. I don't know, you don't know, nobody on this list knows and chances are, nobody on this list will ever know. This entire discussion has been about hypotheticals, what ifs and what processes are (except Euclid, where the discussion always goes to semantics).
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Regarding the excuse that there was only water standing in a farmer’s field:
The rule says this:
“In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
The rule is only generally stating where slow approach is required. It does not limit these locations to ONLY bridges and culverts. Notice that it also includes, “and other potentially hazardous points.”
Now we are told by Tree68 that there is some definition for “High water” that is independent of the Rule 6.21, and because the train did not slow down, that proves that the water alongside the derailment site did not meet the independent definition of “High water.”
If the term “High water” in Rule 6.21 must meet an independent definition outside of the Rule in order for the rule to apply, let’s see that independent definition. It certainly must be readily accessible because it is said to be the point that governs whether the Rule applies or not.
dehusmanObviously the people responsible for the bridge didn't think there was a problem. Its their bridge, what they think trumps what you think.
Obviously, but were they right? Did they have all information? Was there an accident?
dehusmanWas the bridge damaged by the flood? Did it collapse under the train?
That is the same hindsight you accuse us of. And it is not even correct. Did something happen beneath the surface at the pier foundations? Was there the danger of flotsam? We don't know.
Your argument sounds like lets wait and see if something gets damaged if yes we can react.
I think we can agree that we disagree. You think everything was handled OK, I still have my doubts.Regards, Volker
This drawn out discussion is a prime example of why you cannot write rules for every possible occurance. Rules that get down to these details, will never cover every detail. That is why the rule book's first rule is "take the safe path". Tell the train crew to be aware of the surrounding situation and slow down or whatever. Once the rule book portends to cover all conditions, one more exemption will occur. In the case of this derailment, the rules say all sorts of things, but none covered this particular case. Rules are a two edged sword: one to cover operation of the train and two to protect the crew if they followed the rule yet something happened.
This was clearly an unanticipated event. It is really no one's fault and should go down as an accident. But, I bet there will be a new rule that if you see water within 3.5 feet of the rail you should go 7.5 mph -- or something like that.
The responses of the defenders of the BNSF about Doon are reminiscent of Sgt. Schultz on the old "Hogan's Heroes" TV show:https://youtu.be/rwcBaG-S7UA
VOLKER LANDWEHRThat aside there is still the bridge. The train didn't derail on the bridge but at the time of the accident it was on the bridge. The situation there, with almost record level and according fast currents, let me think that a restricted speed might have been appropriate.
Obviously the people responsible for the bridge didn't think there was a problem. Its their bridge, what they think trumps what you think.
Was the bridge damaged by the flood? Did it collapse under the train?
EuclidNow, above, you say that if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule. Really? What if the rule does not apply? what happened to the requirement to meet the definition of high water? You sound like you have switched over to what I have been saying.
No, its just that you have no idea what you are talking about and can't understand what people tell you (which shouldn't be a surprise to anybody).
The intended audience of rule 6.21 is the train crew. It explicitly gives them authority to slow down or stop if they feel there is a danger. If they think there is a danger then the rule applies. If they don't see a danger and there has not been a warning of a problem, then they won't take action.
Murphy Siding dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident. "Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is. If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about. In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over. Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest. If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation? Where the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks.
dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident. "Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is. If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about. In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over. Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest. If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation?
VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident.
"Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is.
If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about.
In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over.
Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest.
If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation?
Where the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks.
I find it interesting that both of you pic one facette. One the Major Flood Stage, the other the water in the fields.
I agree that even a Major Flood Stage doesn't represent a danger when the track is high enough above this level.
On the other hand this is not an insurance that nothing can happen. It is only the obvious. Even lower water levels can weaken a dam over time of application or multiple recurrence.
That aside there is still the bridge. The train didn't derail on the bridge but at the time of the accident it was on the bridge. The situation there, with almost record level and according fast currents, let me think that a restricted speed might have been appropriate.
All answers we got were about the water in the fields but the Rule 6.21 mentions bridges explicitly.
It is not one facette, it is the whole situation.Regards, Volker
n012944 VOLKER LANDWEHR I'm not a railroader and I don't believe that decisions by railroaders are automatically right. You really should......
VOLKER LANDWEHR I'm not a railroader and I don't believe that decisions by railroaders are automatically right.
I'm not a railroader and I don't believe that decisions by railroaders are automatically right.
You really should......
First thanks for correcting.
If decisions of railroader could automatically be trusted there should be far less accidents.
On the other hand this rule and the high water situation in general leaves so much room for interpretation. And especially in the high water situation at Doon with an heavy accident and following oil spill I find trust a bit difficult.
When others rely on your decisions the last you should do is automatically trust your own decision. I needed to question myself constantly as mistakes could have had deadly consequences in my job as structural design engineer. Think of e.g. the FIU bridge collapse in Miami. Living in Germany I'm not part of that accident.
That translates to other fields especially if something has gone wrong.Regards, Volker
tree68 Euclid Maybe you can post a reference that says that Rule 6.21 is default moot and must be invoked when the threshold definition of the rule term, “High water” is met. Maybe you can also post that threshold definition of “High water.” Actually, I've already asked you to provide that information, since you're so certain that the water levels at the Little Rock River crossing met that threshold. OTOH, if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule.
Euclid Maybe you can post a reference that says that Rule 6.21 is default moot and must be invoked when the threshold definition of the rule term, “High water” is met. Maybe you can also post that threshold definition of “High water.”
Actually, I've already asked you to provide that information, since you're so certain that the water levels at the Little Rock River crossing met that threshold.
OTOH, if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule.
I never said I was certain that the water level met the threshold. I said that I don't agree that there is a threshold. The specific definition, specification, or threshold that precisely defines what is "high water" is your idea, not mine. Frankly, I don't think it exists. What I have said all along is that "high water" is subjective and defined by common sense.
Now, above, you say that if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule. Really? What if the rule does not apply? what happened to the requirement to meet the definition of high water? You sound like you have switched over to what I have been saying.
Murphy SidingWhere the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks.
That arguement won't fly because we've been saying that throughout the entire thread and it hasn't seemed to have any effect. Its so obvious that its hard to believe people can't understand it.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
dehusman Euclid Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ? There is no specific definition of high water. Just like the term "dangerous defects" is used with no specific definition and "conditions that restrict visibility" are not defined. Trying to define every possibility specifically is pretty well impossible.
Euclid Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ?
There is no specific definition of high water. Just like the term "dangerous defects" is used with no specific definition and "conditions that restrict visibility" are not defined.
Trying to define every possibility specifically is pretty well impossible.
Okay, in CSX rules, flash flood warning is issued and that invokes Rule 301.7 which automatically imposes a speed limit of 40 mph within the limits of the flood warning. Then IF the train encounters unusually heavy rain or high water within the limits, that added condition imposes an additional requirement for restricted speed when approaching bridges, culverts, and other points like to be affected.
Therefore, it is possible to have a flash flood warning and not have any requirement for restricted speed. Restricted speed is a separate condition within the broader framework of the flash flood warning. Restricted speed is not automatically imposed by the flash flood warning.
Now I have been told that under BNSF rules, that the requirement to slow down for high water can only be invoked if the specific definition of high water is met. And since the train did not slow down, that proves that the water alongside of the derailment site did not qualify as “high water” under the BNSF definition of high water. Is there a similar definition of “high water” for the purpose of imposing restricted speed under CSX Rule 301.7?
EuclidOr does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ?
Perhaps off-topic, but here is a washout and derailment where the water is obviously up to the track. Happened yesterday morning:
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/tsb-releases-image-of-via-rail-derailment-that-injured-2-1.4737680
This one seems to be small enough that there is no way the crew could have seen it coming, and much of that area runs through swamps, so should Rule 6.21 or whatever it is be in effect all the time...?
Bear-poking completed.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
VOLKER LANDWEHRWe know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident.
EuclidSo the decision to extinguish Rule 6.21...
OK, there's another term to delete from your vocabulary - at no time is a rule "extinguished." It either applies or it doesn't.
Another concept you can delete from your collection is "gave permission to ignore a rule." It's highly unlikely any supervisor is going to do so under normal circumstances. Maybe another railroader can give an example of when it has happened.
When I say "invoke" I mean this: The dispatcher will send a message in one form or another to the effect of "high water between MP x and MP y. Proceed through that area IAW rule 6.21."
Or the DS may simply issue a slow order that reflects Rule 6.21 by ordering the crew to operate at restricted speed between MP x and MP y account high water.
This is the same thing I mentioned re: crossings and NORAC Rule 138.
EuclidMaybe you can post a reference that says that Rule 6.21 is default moot and must be invoked when the threshold definition of the rule term, “High water” is met. Maybe you can also post that threshold definition of “High water.”
And rule 6.21 isn't moot - it the railroad feels water levels don't meet their threshold for "high", the rule simply doesn't apply. It's not extinguished, no one has to be given permission to ignore it - it just doesn't apply.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
BaltACDIs a Flash Flood Warning in effect?
And for the non-railroaders, that doesn't mean a NWS flash flood warning, that means a Flash Flood Warning issued by the railroad, through their processes and policies.
Euclid n012944 Euclid n012944 CSX rules. 301.7 When a Flash Flood Warning is issued: 2. Trains must operate through the limits not exceeding 40 MPH until the leading end reaches the far limits; If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and Promptly notify the train dispatcher of conditions that affect the safe movement of trains or on-track equipment. 624.2 When an authorized employee provides notification that he or she is ready to perform heat inspections or flash flood warning inspections, the train dispatcher must promptly issue an authority. FYI, rule 301.7 lasts until the flash flood warning is over, per the weather service. Even if the tracks have been inspected, crews must still observe the rule until told not to by the dispatcher. I have a question about this part: 2. If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and… Does this rule apply whenever there is high water? Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ? If it is the latter, what is that specific definition of high water which when met, will invoke the rule to require approaching at restricted speed? The answer is in the begining of the rule. "When a flash flood warning is issued". So the first condition is "When a flash flood warning is issued." But following that first condition, there is a second condition stated as item #2. It is a second condition because it says, "If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered..." Only if that second condition exists is there a requirement to slow to restricted speed. So in order to know if that second condtion exists, you have to have a definition or specification for "unusually heavy rain or high water." What is that definition?
n012944 Euclid n012944 CSX rules. 301.7 When a Flash Flood Warning is issued: 2. Trains must operate through the limits not exceeding 40 MPH until the leading end reaches the far limits; If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and Promptly notify the train dispatcher of conditions that affect the safe movement of trains or on-track equipment. 624.2 When an authorized employee provides notification that he or she is ready to perform heat inspections or flash flood warning inspections, the train dispatcher must promptly issue an authority. FYI, rule 301.7 lasts until the flash flood warning is over, per the weather service. Even if the tracks have been inspected, crews must still observe the rule until told not to by the dispatcher. I have a question about this part: 2. If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and… Does this rule apply whenever there is high water? Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ? If it is the latter, what is that specific definition of high water which when met, will invoke the rule to require approaching at restricted speed? The answer is in the begining of the rule. "When a flash flood warning is issued".
Euclid n012944 CSX rules. 301.7 When a Flash Flood Warning is issued: 2. Trains must operate through the limits not exceeding 40 MPH until the leading end reaches the far limits; If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and Promptly notify the train dispatcher of conditions that affect the safe movement of trains or on-track equipment. 624.2 When an authorized employee provides notification that he or she is ready to perform heat inspections or flash flood warning inspections, the train dispatcher must promptly issue an authority. FYI, rule 301.7 lasts until the flash flood warning is over, per the weather service. Even if the tracks have been inspected, crews must still observe the rule until told not to by the dispatcher. I have a question about this part: 2. If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and… Does this rule apply whenever there is high water? Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ? If it is the latter, what is that specific definition of high water which when met, will invoke the rule to require approaching at restricted speed?
n012944 CSX rules. 301.7 When a Flash Flood Warning is issued: 2. Trains must operate through the limits not exceeding 40 MPH until the leading end reaches the far limits; If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and Promptly notify the train dispatcher of conditions that affect the safe movement of trains or on-track equipment. 624.2 When an authorized employee provides notification that he or she is ready to perform heat inspections or flash flood warning inspections, the train dispatcher must promptly issue an authority. FYI, rule 301.7 lasts until the flash flood warning is over, per the weather service. Even if the tracks have been inspected, crews must still observe the rule until told not to by the dispatcher.
301.7 When a Flash Flood Warning is issued:
2. Trains must operate through the limits not exceeding 40 MPH until the leading end reaches
the far limits;
If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and
Promptly notify the train dispatcher of conditions that affect the safe movement of trains or on-track equipment.
624.2 When an authorized employee provides notification that he or she is ready to perform heat inspections or flash flood warning inspections, the train dispatcher must promptly issue an authority.
FYI, rule 301.7 lasts until the flash flood warning is over, per the weather service. Even if the tracks have been inspected, crews must still observe the rule until told not to by the dispatcher.
I have a question about this part:
2. If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and…
Does this rule apply whenever there is high water? Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ? If it is the latter, what is that specific definition of high water which when met, will invoke the rule to require approaching at restricted speed?
The answer is in the begining of the rule. "When a flash flood warning is issued".
So the first condition is "When a flash flood warning is issued." But following that first condition, there is a second condition stated as item #2. It is a second condition because it says, "If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered..."
Only if that second condition exists is there a requirement to slow to restricted speed.
So in order to know if that second condtion exists, you have to have a definition or specification for "unusually heavy rain or high water." What is that definition?
Is a Flash Flood Warning in effect?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
jeffhergert I thought about posting about how we follow procedure FF (flash flood) when issued, usually after civil authorities issue flood warnings. I figure the Yes-But Choir (it used to be more of a solo act) would pick it apart and I'm not in the mood for music. Besides, who cares how things are handled in the real world. Jeff
I thought about posting about how we follow procedure FF (flash flood) when issued, usually after civil authorities issue flood warnings. I figure the Yes-But Choir (it used to be more of a solo act) would pick it apart and I'm not in the mood for music.
Besides, who cares how things are handled in the real world.
Jeff
yes, but.....
What is the definition of "the real world"?
An "expensive model collector"
Johnny
The rule interpretation is probably (I am not a rules specialist) UNUSUALLY high water, just like the rule says. I would expect in that area a flooded field was not unusual. Local knowledge will guide operations, and the field staff and train crews will be familiar with "points likely to be affected".
Euclid n012944 CSX rules. 301.7 When a Flash Flood Warning is issued: Trains must operate through the limits not exceeding 40 MPH until the leading end reaches the far limits; If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and Promptly notify the train dispatcher of conditions that affect the safe movement of trains or on-track equipment. 624.2 When an authorized employee provides notification that he or she is ready to perform heat inspections or flash flood warning inspections, the train dispatcher must promptly issue an authority. FYI, rule 301.7 lasts until the flash flood warning is over, per the weather service. Even if the tracks have been inspected, crews must still observe the rule until told not to by the dispatcher. I have a question about this part: If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and… Does this rule apply whenever there is high water? Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ? If it is the latter, what is that specific definition of high water which when met, will invoke the rule to require approaching at restricted speed?
n012944 CSX rules. 301.7 When a Flash Flood Warning is issued: Trains must operate through the limits not exceeding 40 MPH until the leading end reaches the far limits; If unusually heavy rain or high water is encountered within the limits, approach bridges, culverts, and other points likely to be affected at restricted speed; and Promptly notify the train dispatcher of conditions that affect the safe movement of trains or on-track equipment. 624.2 When an authorized employee provides notification that he or she is ready to perform heat inspections or flash flood warning inspections, the train dispatcher must promptly issue an authority. FYI, rule 301.7 lasts until the flash flood warning is over, per the weather service. Even if the tracks have been inspected, crews must still observe the rule until told not to by the dispatcher.
Trains must operate through the limits not exceeding 40 MPH until the leading end reaches
VOLKER LANDWEHR In quick search of NORAC, CSX rules, and NS rules I didn't find a similar rule only a rule regarding Reporting of unusual occurences. But I may have overlooked something.
In quick search of NORAC, CSX rules, and NS rules I didn't find a similar rule only a rule regarding Reporting of unusual occurences. But I may have overlooked something.
CSX rules.
tree68Let's say you have a nicely finished basement - carpet, hardwood floor, electronics, furniture - a comfortable family room. Four inches of water in that basement is going to be something of a catastrophe - the carpet and wood flooring will be ruined, and other items may suffer damage as well. My basement is unfinished. The furnace and water heater are up on pedestals, and any storage is on shelves. If I get four inches of water, it'll be damp down there for a bit, until the water drains, but that'll be all. Both examples involve four inches of water. One basement is ruined, while it's just another day for the other.
tree68Does it really matter if a railroader has experience with Rule 6.21? The crux of the matter is whether the railroad or the railroaders actually involved considered the water "high." If they did not, the rule simply did not apply.
For the course of this discussion it would be nice to get an insight from a railroader who is confronted with these situations more often to understand when and why or why not a railroad deems a flooding dangerous.
I looked for information that could have been available to BNSF if they looked for. I drew my conclusions from what I found and my knowledge and experience as civil engineer. These conclusions might be wrong. But nothing has convinced me yet, neither way.
tree68I don't have time at the moment to research chapter and verse in NORAC, but there is a similar rule there.
tree68Those local railroaders are the ones who run the line on a daily basis. If they didn't consider the waters at the time to meet the criteria of Rule 6.21, why should we?
Perhaps because there was an accident (caused by whatever) and some evidence that can lead to the conclusion that there might have been a misjudgement?
I'm not a railroader and I don't believe that decisions by railroaders are automatically right. I would like to understand the criteria a railroad uses in such situations.
tree68I've posited that high water was normally no big deal at Doon. I still hold that opinion.
OK, I differ. Is a high water above the Major Flood Stage level and at Rock Valley just 1.5 ft below record levels unusual or not? It looks like BNSF operated as usual but in the light of the accident with the resulting oil spill it must be allowed to question this.
The information about UP's procedures might help a lot.Regards, Volker
tree68 Euclid What is the difference between giving permission to not adhere to the rule and not invoking the rule? That's simple. Giving permission to not adhere to a rule implies that there is a reason to adhere to the rule in the first place. Not invoking the rule means there is no reason to do so. In this case, you seem to remain convinced that the railroad (and the crew) knew the water was high enough to be a threat (although we still haven't established what level that is) and chose to ignore that information. As to your second question(s) - every spring we deal with rusty rail conditions and the possibility that crossing protection may not operate as it should. So every spring our bulletin orders reflect that and invoke NORAC rule 138 - provide flag protection - should the protection not operate. The rule is always in effect, but only applies if the crossing protection does not work. Once the rails are polished and the crossing protection works as it should, every time, that item disappears from the bulletin order. Again, the rule is still there. If we get a report of malfunctioning crossing protection, we'll be told to be prepared to stop and flag that crossing - per rule 138. That might be in a bulletin order, or could be right in the comments of the Form D if the need is immediate. I can't make it any more simple than that.
Euclid What is the difference between giving permission to not adhere to the rule and not invoking the rule?
That's simple.
Giving permission to not adhere to a rule implies that there is a reason to adhere to the rule in the first place.
Not invoking the rule means there is no reason to do so.
In this case, you seem to remain convinced that the railroad (and the crew) knew the water was high enough to be a threat (although we still haven't established what level that is) and chose to ignore that information.
As to your second question(s) - every spring we deal with rusty rail conditions and the possibility that crossing protection may not operate as it should. So every spring our bulletin orders reflect that and invoke NORAC rule 138 - provide flag protection - should the protection not operate. The rule is always in effect, but only applies if the crossing protection does not work.
Once the rails are polished and the crossing protection works as it should, every time, that item disappears from the bulletin order. Again, the rule is still there.
If we get a report of malfunctioning crossing protection, we'll be told to be prepared to stop and flag that crossing - per rule 138. That might be in a bulletin order, or could be right in the comments of the Form D if the need is immediate.
I can't make it any more simple than that.
Okay, I see what you are saying. They did not invoke the rule because it hinges on there being high water, and that term is defined in such a way that the conditions of flooding at the derailment site were not high water. Therefore, the rule was moot or un-invoked.
In my opinion, the rule stands based on a common sense definition of high water. There is plenty of common sense subjectivity in rules. They are not moot-unless-invoked. Why have rules that are default moot unless they are invoked? Even in your example of crossing signals not activating, the flag protection rule is always there. If you want to apply the term “invoked,” I would say that rule is self-invoking. But it seems like an argument over semantics. Is a highway speed limit sign un-invoked if there is nobody there to read it?
Maybe you can post a reference that says that Rule 6.21 is default moot and must be invoked when the threshold definition of the rule term, “High water” is met. Maybe you can also post that threshold definition of “High water.”
In any case, my larger point is that I don’t believe the crew violated the rule. I believe the rule stood on its own at the time, and the crew was given permission to ignore it. Maybe you disagree with the terms I use to convey that, but if a rule can be invoked, it can also be extinguished.
The reason the rule was extinguished is that the procedure it calls for was not needed because MOW had been continuously inspecting the track, so there was no reason for the train to slow down to look for track flaws. And also, the Rule does not require a train to slow down to lessen derailment damage if a track flaw derails it. So there was no reason for the rule under those conditions.
So the decision to extinguish Rule 6.21 was made by a higher authority than the crew, under the premise that the track had been inspected and found to be safe for normal train operation. That determination was obviously wrong if the derailment was somehow caused by the flood. The determination was right if the derailment cause was not related to the flood.
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