tree68 Nah - My opinions (as well as facts cited) have the same validity (or lack of same) as anyone elses. A point I would like you to acknowledge is that the conditions set forth in the oft-cited Rule 6.21 may not have been met just before the derailment. It may not have been raining heavily, or storming, and it's possible that neither the railroad nor the crew regarded the water as "high." If those conditions were not met, there was no reason for the crew to reduce speed. As has been pointed out - there was little or no standing water in the fields except those adjacent to the river. Even the Sheriff's drone video bears that out. Am I trying to prove you wrong? No. Just trying to get you to realize that it's not black and white. It's a concept you've had trouble with in the past.
Nah - My opinions (as well as facts cited) have the same validity (or lack of same) as anyone elses.
A point I would like you to acknowledge is that the conditions set forth in the oft-cited Rule 6.21 may not have been met just before the derailment. It may not have been raining heavily, or storming, and it's possible that neither the railroad nor the crew regarded the water as "high."
If those conditions were not met, there was no reason for the crew to reduce speed.
As has been pointed out - there was little or no standing water in the fields except those adjacent to the river. Even the Sheriff's drone video bears that out.
Am I trying to prove you wrong? No. Just trying to get you to realize that it's not black and white. It's a concept you've had trouble with in the past.
In what way do you think I believe anything about this is black and white? Sometimes ideas seem black and white, and sometimes they don't. How is that for an example of black and white?
I am perfectly willing to accept the premise that the crew and/or their supervisors, felt there was no need to slow down. I would say that is most probably the fact of the matter. And they may have been completely within their rights to reach that conclusion.
I will indeed acknowledge that the conditions set forth in the oft-cited Rule 6.21 may not have been met. I would like you to acknowledge that action called for in Rule 6.21 does not require all three of the conditions to have been met, as you seem to believe. The word, “or” in that list of three conditions means that any one of them is sufficient to call for the action of slow approach. If the word was “and,” it would mean that all three conditions are required to trigger the requirement for action.
So on that basis, the only condition that I am certain existed as the train approached was high water, and I assume that one condition is sufficient to call for action. Probably my strongest opinion is that the train derailed at around 40-50 mph. I have no opinion about what caused the derailment. But if it was caused by the flood, I suspect it was due to a liquefaction loss of support within the fill. I am quite certain the company would have known if here was any track erosion.
The rule says this:
“In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop."
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 Euclid What does that have to do with anything I said? It has everything to do with what you've been preaching. It has not yet been established that any of the conditions calling for the actions you cite existed, beyond your opinion that the water was high. So far as we know, the train was running under starry skies and the railroad had not yet determined that the water level was high enough to warrant any actions. That the pile-up occurred is an indication that something wasn't right - but that's hindsight, something the crew didn't have at that moment. And I agree - the crew may well have reduced their speed on their own if their own observation of the current conditions suggested they should. Given darkness and line-of-sight, they may have slowed down as much as possible after seeing the need and before the derailment occurred.
Euclid What does that have to do with anything I said?
It has everything to do with what you've been preaching. It has not yet been established that any of the conditions calling for the actions you cite existed, beyond your opinion that the water was high.
So far as we know, the train was running under starry skies and the railroad had not yet determined that the water level was high enough to warrant any actions.
That the pile-up occurred is an indication that something wasn't right - but that's hindsight, something the crew didn't have at that moment.
And I agree - the crew may well have reduced their speed on their own if their own observation of the current conditions suggested they should. Given darkness and line-of-sight, they may have slowed down as much as possible after seeing the need and before the derailment occurred.
The point I made about not slowing down was a reply to someone questioning that one single point. Your immediate response brought up a bunch of unrelated points. That is why I asked what it had to do with anything I said. I was referring what I said in the post I had made previously.
And, I have said that this issue about speed and everything else about the wreck IS my opinion. Everything you have said is also an opinion, but you don't qualify all of it that way. In many cases you make assertions as though they were solid facts in your effort to discredit my opinions which I have labeled as opinions. When I say something is my opinion, that means that I accept the fact that it may prove to be incorrect. But you seem to believe that your opinions have some kind of special validity that proves mine to be incorrect.
https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/news/world/2018/07/09/turkey-train-derailment-kills-24-injures-more-than-300/36731733/
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACDBeing pulled over to the side of the road in these condition is one of the most dangerous actions that can be taken. Cars on the side of the road can be obsucred by the wall of water and they often get hit by others that are trying to stop on the side of the road.
Been there - St Louis MO. Drove into a blinding rainstorm, in the dark, in the left lane of I-44. Could hardly see past the end of the hood, although I could see the Jersey barriers out the driver's window. Didn't dare slow down much, or change lanes, even, so I toughed it out until the shower broke. Fortunately there wan't much traffic at the time.
EuclidWhat does that have to do with anything I said?
BaltACD Being pulled over to the side of the road in these condition is one of the most dangerous actions that can be taken. Cars on the side of the road can be obsucred by the wall of water and they often get hit by others that are trying to stop on the side of the road.
Being pulled over to the side of the road in these condition is one of the most dangerous actions that can be taken. Cars on the side of the road can be obsucred by the wall of water and they often get hit by others that are trying to stop on the side of the road.
tree68 The Rule “In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.” Was the train running through heavy rain? Was it storming at the time? We've been discussing whether the water was high enough to cause concern ad nauseum. I think the consensus is "maybe." Hindsight tend to say yes, however nobody drives using hindsight.
The Rule “In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
Was the train running through heavy rain? Was it storming at the time? We've been discussing whether the water was high enough to cause concern ad nauseum.
I think the consensus is "maybe."
Hindsight tend to say yes, however nobody drives using hindsight.
What does that have to do with anything I said? I was responding to the comment made by n012944, beginning with his question, “Again, how do you know that speeds were not reduced?” I gave an answer as to why I believe the speed had not been reduced. Is that okay with you?
The reason I posted the rule again is because my opinion that the speed was not reduced is based on the Rule with these words: “must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
The evidence of the derailment damage looks like they were not traveling at a speed at which they would have been prepared to stop. They may have slowed down, but obviously not enough to satisfy the rule.
My point is about whether the train slowed down per the Rule, and it has nothing to do with who made the decision to not slow down. It also has nothing to do with whether the rule was invoked or not. It is just about the question of whether or not the train slowed down.
tree68Hindsight tend to say yes, however nobody drives using hindsight.
To a certain extent they do - Florida is well known for exceedingly heavy thunderstorms. For a variety of reasons I have driven I-95 on many occasions from Savannah to Miami.
If you are driving Northbound, you will tend to see a number of vehicles pulled off to the side of the Southbound lanes and none pulled over NB. When you are driving South you will observe that the cars pulled off all have 'out of the area' tags on their cars. Northerners have never had to contend with the routine Florida T'storm and don't know how deal with the high volume of water that is descending from the sky. Those accustomed to the area and conditions continue on motoring South at 30-40-50 MPH depending upon how much water is standing on the roadway.
tree68 however nobody drives using hindsight.
however nobody drives using hindsight.
Bucky does.
An "expensive model collector"
The Rule“In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
n012944 VOLKER LANDWEHR Was the high water level so unusual high that a reduced speed would have been appropriate. Again, how do you know that speeds were not reduced? We do not know if the train was running track speed or not. If you look at CSX's rule, a flash flood warning slaps a 40 MPH speed restriction regardless of water level. Is there something more in the BNSF rule book that does something similar? I don't know the BNSF rule book well enough to know, and I doubt those calling the BNSF's actions into question do either...
VOLKER LANDWEHR Was the high water level so unusual high that a reduced speed would have been appropriate.
Was the high water level so unusual high that a reduced speed would have been appropriate.
Again, how do you know that speeds were not reduced? We do not know if the train was running track speed or not. If you look at CSX's rule, a flash flood warning slaps a 40 MPH speed restriction regardless of water level. Is there something more in the BNSF rule book that does something similar? I don't know the BNSF rule book well enough to know, and I doubt those calling the BNSF's actions into question do either...
“In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
I assume that this means go slow enough that you can see a potential track defect or other flood hazard, and still have time to stop before reaching it. I also assume that some hazards that will cause a derailment might be so small that they cannot be seen from hardly any distance at all. So if the point of slowing down is to stop short of even the most obscure hazard, how slow is a reasonable speed? I doubt that slowing from 50 mph down to 35 mph would be slow enough, for instance. In my opinion, the reasonable speed has to be less than 10 mph.
If you spotted a defect, dumped the air, and got down to 8 mph before derailing, what is the chance that you would jackknife 32 loaded tank cars?
In my opinion, the number of cars jackknifed into a heap is very strong evidence that they did not slow down enough to look for defects capable of causing derailments as the Rule requires.
VOLKER LANDWEHRAnd again, though there is rule 6.21, I think it was the job of MofW and Engineering to impose speed restrictions if necessary not the crew's. Regards, Volker
This has been a central point of the discussion. It's the events leading up to, not the actual derailment that are important. It's been my position that it's possible that MOW and engineering did not see the water levels, though elevated, as an extraordinary problem.
Information revealed after the fact remains important in determining the actual cause of the incident, including that surge.
The high water had existed for several days prior to the incident.
Who said the bridge caused the derailment? No need to convey to "us", we know it.
It is a different question beside the cause of the accident. Was the high water level so unusual high that a reduced speed would have been appropriate. Depending on the accident's cause it might not have happened or the aftermath might have been less severe.
The question to answer was the high water unusual. I think yes others think otherwise. I had hoped Jeff Hergert might share his view of how UP handels such situation. He decided against it and is his right.
To put the flooding into perspective I look at the discharge at the Rock River gage near Rock Valley. Discharge at around 2:00 am on June 22, 2018 was about 35,000 cubic feet per second. https://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/uv?cb_00060=on&cb_00065=on&format=gif_default&site_no=06483500&period=&begin_date=2018-06-18&end_date=2018-06-25
In the time frame from 1947 to 2018 this discharge was only exceeded in 1969 (40,400) and 2014 (60,600). https://nwis.waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/peak?site_no=06483500&agency_cd=USGS&format=html
Everybody can draw his own conclusions.
And again, though there is rule 6.21, I think it was the job of MofW and Engineering to impose speed restrictions if necessary not the crew's.Regards, Volker
Murphy Siding cx500 VOLKER LANDWEHR We all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation. Unfortunately, those her discussing on a gut level know very little about this location, apart from the fact that the fields were flooded by heavy rain, and that there was a bridge in the area. We don't know if the rainfall and localized flooding was anything particularly unusual, past history, or the design of the bridge. If the piers had pile foundations rather than spread footings they would have almost certainly stayed secure. The railroad with a route in that area, that did know these details, was BNSF and as far as we know they handled the situation by operating as usual. The experts at the NTSB, by not undertaking further investigation despite a somewhat high profile derailment, seem to have implicitly agreed with that decision. None of the armchair critics on this forum have provided any evidence that the heavy rain had anything to do with the derailment. (I suppose it did make the spilled oil more mobile.) And yet we still can't seem to convey the fact that the bridge had absolutely nothing to do with the train derailing. The train derailed in a farmer's cornfield that was flooded.
cx500 VOLKER LANDWEHR We all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation. Unfortunately, those her discussing on a gut level know very little about this location, apart from the fact that the fields were flooded by heavy rain, and that there was a bridge in the area. We don't know if the rainfall and localized flooding was anything particularly unusual, past history, or the design of the bridge. If the piers had pile foundations rather than spread footings they would have almost certainly stayed secure. The railroad with a route in that area, that did know these details, was BNSF and as far as we know they handled the situation by operating as usual. The experts at the NTSB, by not undertaking further investigation despite a somewhat high profile derailment, seem to have implicitly agreed with that decision. None of the armchair critics on this forum have provided any evidence that the heavy rain had anything to do with the derailment. (I suppose it did make the spilled oil more mobile.)
VOLKER LANDWEHR We all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation.
Unfortunately, those her discussing on a gut level know very little about this location, apart from the fact that the fields were flooded by heavy rain, and that there was a bridge in the area. We don't know if the rainfall and localized flooding was anything particularly unusual, past history, or the design of the bridge. If the piers had pile foundations rather than spread footings they would have almost certainly stayed secure.
The railroad with a route in that area, that did know these details, was BNSF and as far as we know they handled the situation by operating as usual. The experts at the NTSB, by not undertaking further investigation despite a somewhat high profile derailment, seem to have implicitly agreed with that decision. None of the armchair critics on this forum have provided any evidence that the heavy rain had anything to do with the derailment. (I suppose it did make the spilled oil more mobile.)
And yet we still can't seem to convey the fact that the bridge had absolutely nothing to do with the train derailing. The train derailed in a farmer's cornfield that was flooded.
It seems to me that you must be imagining that some of you are having trouble conveying the fact that the bridge had absoultely nothing to do with the train derailing. Nobody has made that claim. So why invent it? I think the reason has become obvious.
At the same time, you dismiss the danger of the flood by saying that the train derailed in a farmer's field that was flooded. No, the train derailed on its own railroad corridor roadbed which was on a fill that was flooded up to the bottom of the ballast.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
tree68 BaltACD The yes but game.
BaltACD The yes but game.
The yes but game.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
VOLKER LANDWEHRWe all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation.
Euclid tree68 About 90% of this discussion has occurred because you have asserted that the conditions for following Rule 6.21 had been met and that someone was at fault for this incident because the rule had not been properly observed. But... There was WATER! Your definition of "high water" may well be different than anyone elses. You seem to have a problem with that. It's a common theme in threads that you adopt. If you read what I said, you will find that I believe the condition of "high water" as stated by rule 6.21 was met. I did assert that, as you say. And then I said that I believe that rule was complied with by MOW conducting inspection and monitoring. Apparently they found no problems with the track. I do not assume that the derailment was caused by the flood. If there is any question as to whether rule 6.21 was properly followed, I do not believe the crew bore that responsibility in this case.
tree68 About 90% of this discussion has occurred because you have asserted that the conditions for following Rule 6.21 had been met and that someone was at fault for this incident because the rule had not been properly observed. But... There was WATER! Your definition of "high water" may well be different than anyone elses. You seem to have a problem with that. It's a common theme in threads that you adopt.
If you read what I said, you will find that I believe the condition of "high water" as stated by rule 6.21 was met. I did assert that, as you say. And then I said that I believe that rule was complied with by MOW conducting inspection and monitoring. Apparently they found no problems with the track. I do not assume that the derailment was caused by the flood. If there is any question as to whether rule 6.21 was properly followed, I do not believe the crew bore that responsibility in this case.
tree68About 90% of this discussion has occurred because you have asserted that the conditions for following Rule 6.21 had been met and that someone was at fault for this incident because the rule had not been properly observed. But... There was WATER! Your definition of "high water" may well be different than anyone elses. You seem to have a problem with that. It's a common theme in threads that you adopt.
EuclidI never said I was certain that the water level met the threshold. I said that I don't agree that there is a threshold. The specific definition, specification, or threshold that precisely defines what is "high water" is your idea, not mine. Frankly, I don't think it exists. What I have said all along is that "high water" is subjective and defined by common sense. Now, above, you say that if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule. Really? What if the rule does not apply? what happened to the requirement to meet the definition of high water? You sound like you have switched over to what I have been saying.
What a bunch of gobbledygook.
About 90% of this discussion has occurred because you have asserted that the conditions for following Rule 6.21 had been met and that someone was at fault for this incident because the rule had not been properly observed.
But... There was WATER! Your definition of "high water" may well be different than anyone elses. You seem to have a problem with that. It's a common theme in threads that you adopt.
Throughout the discussion several of us have suggested that the conditions at that location did not necessarily meet the requirements in the eyes of the railroad.
No one is going to fault a crew whose observation of conditions make them feel that preventative action is necessary - in fact, that is the intention of the rule. If a crew reports to the DS that they feel conditions are such that they need to be extra careful, odds are the DS is going to notify the road foreman. If the road foreman finds that there was no reason for concern, so be it. The crew still abided by Rule #1 - take the safe course. They will not be penalized for observing Rule 6.21 although it turned out to be unnecessary.
Regarding this incident, it appears there were forces at work that the railroad did not consider - but we know that in hindsight, only.
All of my points about slowing the train have nothing to do with it needing special care because of being an oil train. To me, slowing the train is only related to the special risks of the flood as prescribed by the Rule.
But I hear that taking the safe way is not practical because you can't slow the trains to a crawl just because there is one molecule of water rumored to be in the area.
Murphy SidingIs the bigger issue here that a lot of people think oil trains in general should be slowed down?
Wasn't that already done?
I can't answer for others, I don't think so. I think special care should applied regarding oil trains in possibly dangerous conditions and the speed adjusted accordingly. Remember BNSF Rule 1.1.1 In doubt take the safe way.
But people have distinct differences in risk-awareness.Regards, Volker
VOLKER LANDWEHR Murphy Siding I think you have to take into consideration the lay of the land, local weathper patterns and the familiarity of those who operate in that area. Taking all that into consideration and adding the known rainfall, the flood levels as well as the situation at the bridge I came to my doubts that the decision to run an oil train at normal speed was correct. Murphy Siding This line has been in use for 125+ years and has no history of derailments. That is a statement that raises my hackles. In civil engineering we had a lot of advances in knowledge and technology over the years. So 125 years age is not necessarily a quality marker. To make this better understandable an example from Germany. In the 1990s we gained a lot of knowledge about the behavior of concrete and reinforcement steel under the influence of de-icing salt brought into parking garages from the streets. The standards needs changing. So we know that garages built before 1990 will have salt damage sometime. It is not a question of "if" but only of "when".Regards, Volker
Murphy Siding I think you have to take into consideration the lay of the land, local weathper patterns and the familiarity of those who operate in that area.
Taking all that into consideration and adding the known rainfall, the flood levels as well as the situation at the bridge I came to my doubts that the decision to run an oil train at normal speed was correct.
Murphy Siding This line has been in use for 125+ years and has no history of derailments.
That is a statement that raises my hackles. In civil engineering we had a lot of advances in knowledge and technology over the years. So 125 years age is not necessarily a quality marker.
To make this better understandable an example from Germany. In the 1990s we gained a lot of knowledge about the behavior of concrete and reinforcement steel under the influence of de-icing salt brought into parking garages from the streets. The standards needs changing. So we know that garages built before 1990 will have salt damage sometime. It is not a question of "if" but only of "when".Regards, Volker
Murphy SidingI think you have to take into consideration the lay of the land, local weathper patterns and the familiarity of those who operate in that area.
We all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation.
petitnjThis drawn out discussion is a prime example of why you cannot write rules for every possible occurance. Rules that get down to these details, will never cover every detail. That is why the rule book's first rule is "take the safe path".
I have my doubts how Rule 6.21 can be applied by a train crew.
I don't see them in the "line of fire" here. Any speed restrictions should have come from MofW or Engineering as described in the CSX rule.
At night the crew wasn't able to see if there were any dangers. But is it better in daylight? As BaltACD said a number of pages back railroading is not a line of sight operation. As I understand it Rule 6.21 needs the line of sight. So how does it work?
petitnjOnce the rule book portends to cover all conditions, one more exemption will occur. In the case of this derailment, the rules say all sorts of things, but none covered this particular case.
You need rules but you can overdo it. The risk begins when people believe that everything is in the rules. How do they react on unusual situations and will they recognize them?
In my occupation I had a number of occasions were rules have undermined common sense and discrete thinking leading to avoidable damages.
To be clear that wasn't minted on this accident. And I understand that many rules are needed as long as management and operation department aren't acting in concert on the same side.Regards; Volker
VOLKER LANDWEHR Murphy Siding dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident. "Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is. If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about. In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over. Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest. If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation? Where the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks. I find it interesting that both of you pic one facette. One the Major Flood Stage, the other the water in the fields. I agree that even a Major Flood Stage doesn't represent a danger when the track is high enough above this level. On the other hand this is not an insurance that nothing can happen. It is only the obvious. Even lower water levels can weaken a dam over time of application or multiple recurrence. That aside there is still the bridge. The train didn't derail on the bridge but at the time of the accident it was on the bridge. The situation there, with almost record level and according fast currents, let me think that a restricted speed might have been appropriate. All answers we got were about the water in the fields but the Rule 6.21 mentions bridges explicitly. It is not one facette, it is the whole situation.Regards, Volker
Murphy Siding dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident. "Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is. If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about. In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over. Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest. If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation? Where the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks.
dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident. "Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is. If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about. In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over. Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest. If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation?
VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident.
"Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is.
If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about.
In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over.
Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest.
If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation?
Where the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks.
I find it interesting that both of you pic one facette. One the Major Flood Stage, the other the water in the fields.
I agree that even a Major Flood Stage doesn't represent a danger when the track is high enough above this level.
On the other hand this is not an insurance that nothing can happen. It is only the obvious. Even lower water levels can weaken a dam over time of application or multiple recurrence.
That aside there is still the bridge. The train didn't derail on the bridge but at the time of the accident it was on the bridge. The situation there, with almost record level and according fast currents, let me think that a restricted speed might have been appropriate.
All answers we got were about the water in the fields but the Rule 6.21 mentions bridges explicitly.
It is not one facette, it is the whole situation.Regards, Volker
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.