Who said the bridge caused the derailment? No need to convey to "us", we know it.
It is a different question beside the cause of the accident. Was the high water level so unusual high that a reduced speed would have been appropriate. Depending on the accident's cause it might not have happened or the aftermath might have been less severe.
The question to answer was the high water unusual. I think yes others think otherwise. I had hoped Jeff Hergert might share his view of how UP handels such situation. He decided against it and is his right.
To put the flooding into perspective I look at the discharge at the Rock River gage near Rock Valley. Discharge at around 2:00 am on June 22, 2018 was about 35,000 cubic feet per second. https://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/uv?cb_00060=on&cb_00065=on&format=gif_default&site_no=06483500&period=&begin_date=2018-06-18&end_date=2018-06-25
In the time frame from 1947 to 2018 this discharge was only exceeded in 1969 (40,400) and 2014 (60,600). https://nwis.waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/peak?site_no=06483500&agency_cd=USGS&format=html
Everybody can draw his own conclusions.
And again, though there is rule 6.21, I think it was the job of MofW and Engineering to impose speed restrictions if necessary not the crew's.Regards, Volker
VOLKER LANDWEHR Was the high water level so unusual high that a reduced speed would have been appropriate.
Was the high water level so unusual high that a reduced speed would have been appropriate.
Again, how do you know that speeds were not reduced? We do not know if the train was running track speed or not. If you look at CSX's rule, a flash flood warning slaps a 40 MPH speed restriction regardless of water level. Is there something more in the BNSF rule book that does something similar? I don't know the BNSF rule book well enough to know, and I doubt those calling the BNSF's actions into question do either...
An "expensive model collector"
VOLKER LANDWEHRAnd again, though there is rule 6.21, I think it was the job of MofW and Engineering to impose speed restrictions if necessary not the crew's. Regards, Volker
This has been a central point of the discussion. It's the events leading up to, not the actual derailment that are important. It's been my position that it's possible that MOW and engineering did not see the water levels, though elevated, as an extraordinary problem.
Information revealed after the fact remains important in determining the actual cause of the incident, including that surge.
The high water had existed for several days prior to the incident.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
n012944 VOLKER LANDWEHR Was the high water level so unusual high that a reduced speed would have been appropriate. Again, how do you know that speeds were not reduced? We do not know if the train was running track speed or not. If you look at CSX's rule, a flash flood warning slaps a 40 MPH speed restriction regardless of water level. Is there something more in the BNSF rule book that does something similar? I don't know the BNSF rule book well enough to know, and I doubt those calling the BNSF's actions into question do either...
The rule says this:
“In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
I assume that this means go slow enough that you can see a potential track defect or other flood hazard, and still have time to stop before reaching it. I also assume that some hazards that will cause a derailment might be so small that they cannot be seen from hardly any distance at all. So if the point of slowing down is to stop short of even the most obscure hazard, how slow is a reasonable speed? I doubt that slowing from 50 mph down to 35 mph would be slow enough, for instance. In my opinion, the reasonable speed has to be less than 10 mph.
If you spotted a defect, dumped the air, and got down to 8 mph before derailing, what is the chance that you would jackknife 32 loaded tank cars?
In my opinion, the number of cars jackknifed into a heap is very strong evidence that they did not slow down enough to look for defects capable of causing derailments as the Rule requires.
The Rule“In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
Was the train running through heavy rain? Was it storming at the time? We've been discussing whether the water was high enough to cause concern ad nauseum.
I think the consensus is "maybe."
Hindsight tend to say yes, however nobody drives using hindsight.
tree68 however nobody drives using hindsight.
however nobody drives using hindsight.
Bucky does.
tree68Hindsight tend to say yes, however nobody drives using hindsight.
To a certain extent they do - Florida is well known for exceedingly heavy thunderstorms. For a variety of reasons I have driven I-95 on many occasions from Savannah to Miami.
If you are driving Northbound, you will tend to see a number of vehicles pulled off to the side of the Southbound lanes and none pulled over NB. When you are driving South you will observe that the cars pulled off all have 'out of the area' tags on their cars. Northerners have never had to contend with the routine Florida T'storm and don't know how deal with the high volume of water that is descending from the sky. Those accustomed to the area and conditions continue on motoring South at 30-40-50 MPH depending upon how much water is standing on the roadway.
Being pulled over to the side of the road in these condition is one of the most dangerous actions that can be taken. Cars on the side of the road can be obsucred by the wall of water and they often get hit by others that are trying to stop on the side of the road.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
tree68 The Rule “In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.” Was the train running through heavy rain? Was it storming at the time? We've been discussing whether the water was high enough to cause concern ad nauseum. I think the consensus is "maybe." Hindsight tend to say yes, however nobody drives using hindsight.
The Rule “In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
What does that have to do with anything I said? I was responding to the comment made by n012944, beginning with his question, “Again, how do you know that speeds were not reduced?” I gave an answer as to why I believe the speed had not been reduced. Is that okay with you?
The reason I posted the rule again is because my opinion that the speed was not reduced is based on the Rule with these words: “must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
The evidence of the derailment damage looks like they were not traveling at a speed at which they would have been prepared to stop. They may have slowed down, but obviously not enough to satisfy the rule.
My point is about whether the train slowed down per the Rule, and it has nothing to do with who made the decision to not slow down. It also has nothing to do with whether the rule was invoked or not. It is just about the question of whether or not the train slowed down.
BaltACD Being pulled over to the side of the road in these condition is one of the most dangerous actions that can be taken. Cars on the side of the road can be obsucred by the wall of water and they often get hit by others that are trying to stop on the side of the road.
EuclidWhat does that have to do with anything I said?
It has everything to do with what you've been preaching. It has not yet been established that any of the conditions calling for the actions you cite existed, beyond your opinion that the water was high.
So far as we know, the train was running under starry skies and the railroad had not yet determined that the water level was high enough to warrant any actions.
That the pile-up occurred is an indication that something wasn't right - but that's hindsight, something the crew didn't have at that moment.
And I agree - the crew may well have reduced their speed on their own if their own observation of the current conditions suggested they should. Given darkness and line-of-sight, they may have slowed down as much as possible after seeing the need and before the derailment occurred.
BaltACDBeing pulled over to the side of the road in these condition is one of the most dangerous actions that can be taken. Cars on the side of the road can be obsucred by the wall of water and they often get hit by others that are trying to stop on the side of the road.
Been there - St Louis MO. Drove into a blinding rainstorm, in the dark, in the left lane of I-44. Could hardly see past the end of the hood, although I could see the Jersey barriers out the driver's window. Didn't dare slow down much, or change lanes, even, so I toughed it out until the shower broke. Fortunately there wan't much traffic at the time.
https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/news/world/2018/07/09/turkey-train-derailment-kills-24-injures-more-than-300/36731733/
tree68 Euclid What does that have to do with anything I said? It has everything to do with what you've been preaching. It has not yet been established that any of the conditions calling for the actions you cite existed, beyond your opinion that the water was high. So far as we know, the train was running under starry skies and the railroad had not yet determined that the water level was high enough to warrant any actions. That the pile-up occurred is an indication that something wasn't right - but that's hindsight, something the crew didn't have at that moment. And I agree - the crew may well have reduced their speed on their own if their own observation of the current conditions suggested they should. Given darkness and line-of-sight, they may have slowed down as much as possible after seeing the need and before the derailment occurred.
Euclid What does that have to do with anything I said?
The point I made about not slowing down was a reply to someone questioning that one single point. Your immediate response brought up a bunch of unrelated points. That is why I asked what it had to do with anything I said. I was referring what I said in the post I had made previously.
And, I have said that this issue about speed and everything else about the wreck IS my opinion. Everything you have said is also an opinion, but you don't qualify all of it that way. In many cases you make assertions as though they were solid facts in your effort to discredit my opinions which I have labeled as opinions. When I say something is my opinion, that means that I accept the fact that it may prove to be incorrect. But you seem to believe that your opinions have some kind of special validity that proves mine to be incorrect.
Nah - My opinions (as well as facts cited) have the same validity (or lack of same) as anyone elses.
A point I would like you to acknowledge is that the conditions set forth in the oft-cited Rule 6.21 may not have been met just before the derailment. It may not have been raining heavily, or storming, and it's possible that neither the railroad nor the crew regarded the water as "high."
If those conditions were not met, there was no reason for the crew to reduce speed.
As has been pointed out - there was little or no standing water in the fields except those adjacent to the river. Even the Sheriff's drone video bears that out.
Am I trying to prove you wrong? No. Just trying to get you to realize that it's not black and white. It's a concept you've had trouble with in the past.
tree68 Nah - My opinions (as well as facts cited) have the same validity (or lack of same) as anyone elses. A point I would like you to acknowledge is that the conditions set forth in the oft-cited Rule 6.21 may not have been met just before the derailment. It may not have been raining heavily, or storming, and it's possible that neither the railroad nor the crew regarded the water as "high." If those conditions were not met, there was no reason for the crew to reduce speed. As has been pointed out - there was little or no standing water in the fields except those adjacent to the river. Even the Sheriff's drone video bears that out. Am I trying to prove you wrong? No. Just trying to get you to realize that it's not black and white. It's a concept you've had trouble with in the past.
In what way do you think I believe anything about this is black and white? Sometimes ideas seem black and white, and sometimes they don't. How is that for an example of black and white?
I am perfectly willing to accept the premise that the crew and/or their supervisors, felt there was no need to slow down. I would say that is most probably the fact of the matter. And they may have been completely within their rights to reach that conclusion.
I will indeed acknowledge that the conditions set forth in the oft-cited Rule 6.21 may not have been met. I would like you to acknowledge that action called for in Rule 6.21 does not require all three of the conditions to have been met, as you seem to believe. The word, “or” in that list of three conditions means that any one of them is sufficient to call for the action of slow approach. If the word was “and,” it would mean that all three conditions are required to trigger the requirement for action.
So on that basis, the only condition that I am certain existed as the train approached was high water, and I assume that one condition is sufficient to call for action. Probably my strongest opinion is that the train derailed at around 40-50 mph. I have no opinion about what caused the derailment. But if it was caused by the flood, I suspect it was due to a liquefaction loss of support within the fill. I am quite certain the company would have known if here was any track erosion.
“In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop."
The yes but but but but but but ..... motorboat!
I never said all three conditions had to exist. I did say that it's possible none of the three conditions existed.
You are certain that the high water existed. High water did exist, and had for several days. While we can't know for sure, it would appear that the railroad did not find that to be a problem, for reasons several people have outlined.
Had the railroad felt the existing high water was a problem, the oil train likely would not have come through at track speed, or close to it.
The 800 pound gorilla in the room is the four foot surge, which the railroad apparently did not recognize. It's possible that the crew did recognize it and began to take action. As can be seen in the Sheriff's video, however, their warning was limited (probably a quarter mile), and not nearly enough to bring that loaded train down to restricted (or other slow) speed by the time they hit what turned out to be the bad section.
Where we disagree is whether the high water before the surge was actionable. Some number of us here feel that it likely was not actionable, myself included. That area undoubted floods on a regular basis with no untoward results.
I'm good with the liquefaction idea - it make a lot of sense, given the surge, which may well have raised the water level to an intolerable level, and which may have been peaking at that location at that time.
tree68The 800 pound gorilla in the room is the four foot surge, which the railroad apparently did not recognize.
Why do you believe the railroad did not recognize the surge?
EuclidWhy do you believe the railroad did not recognize the surge?
That would be the $64,000 question... We've actually discussed some possibilities - internal communications failure, failure of their contract weather service (assuming they use one) to recognize and communicate the threat, ignoring the obvious because it's never happened before. All conjecture at this point, but there are plenty of possibilities. One would have to know exactly how the process works at BNSF to be any more specific.
One would presume that if they had recognized the threat, the oil train never would have even tried to cross the Little Rock River, and we wouldn't be having this discussion.
I'm betting they're asking themselves exactly the same question.
tree68One would presume that if they had recognized the threat, the oil train never would have even tried to cross the Little Rock River, and we wouldn't be having this discussion.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
The lamented yes, but sometimes arises when people argument around known facts.
Murphy Siding I dunno. I don't see where they would have thought the Little Rock River was a threat that might cause a derailment to happen further down the line- which it didn't. All the low lying farmland in that area tends to flood every spring to some extent; nothing new there.
I think we agree that there was a high water. From the facts I say it was an unusal high water. Was it high enough to be of concern for BNSF? Apperently not. Should it have been? My personal opinion is yes.
What did I find:- Rock River gage 10 mi upriver exceeded Major Flood Stage 16 hrs before accident
- Rock River gage at Rock Valley downriver 1.5 ft below record level 3.5 hrs before accident
- Rock River gage at Rock Valley downriver: Discharge of June 22, 2018 only exceeded twice in the last 70 years (see my post at top of page)
- Rock River gage 10 mi upriver had a discharge of 13,000 cubic feet per second.
- Of the 35,000 cfs at Rock Valley only 13,000 cfs came from the Rock River itself, according to the map the balance came most likely from Little Rock River.
It is for sure not a yearly high water.
If BNSF realized this or not we don't know. At least the information was publicly available.Regards, Volker
Murphy Siding All the low lying farmland in that area tends to flood every spring to some extent; nothing new there.
Are you saying that the flooding where the derailment occurred was not overflow connected to the Little Rock River, but rather just rain accumulating in those fields?
VOLKER LANDWEHR The lamented yes, but sometimes arises when people argument around known facts. Murphy Siding I dunno. I don't see where they would have thought the Little Rock River was a threat that might cause a derailment to happen further down the line- which it didn't. All the low lying farmland in that area tends to flood every spring to some extent; nothing new there. I think we agree that there was a high water. From the facts I say it was an unusal high water. Was it high enough to be of concern for BNSF? Apperently not. Should it have been? My personal opinion is yes. What did I find:- Rock River gage 10 mi upriver exceeded Major Flood Stage 16 hrs before accident - Rock River gage at Rock Valley downriver 1.5 ft below record level 3.5 hrs before accident - Rock River gage at Rock Valley downriver: Discharge of June 22, 2018 only exceeded twice in the last 70 years (see my post at top of page) - Rock River gage 10 mi upriver had a discharge of 13,000 cubic feet per second. - Of the 35,000 cfs at Rock Valley only 13,000 cfs came from the Rock River itself, according to the map the balance came most likely from Little Rock River. It is for sure not a yearly high water. If BNSF realized this or not we don't know. At least the information was publicly available.Regards, Volker
The Little Rock flows into the Rock just a few hundred yards beyond the railroad bridge (N 43 15' 51" W 96 14' 28"). Given the flat terrain, the "back flow" from the Rock will undoubtedly show up at the bridge. I would opine that using the levels of the Rock as a reference is not unreasonable.
I noted earlier that a rain gauge upstream on the Little Rock (at George, IIRC) recorded a four inch rainfall around that time - which would be reflected in the level of the Little Rock.
I feel the fact that both Rock River gauges showed a (more or less) four foot rise and fall within a 24 hour period, with the peak roughly coinciding with the derailment, is a factor. The peak was not sustained - the level fell as fast as it rose.
This rapid rise might also account for the railroad not realizing the threat. As I recall from the graph, the rise began around 4:30 PM
Murphy SidingVolker- You're on the wrong river. The bridge at Doon is over the Little Rock River, not the Rock River.
Yes and no. The Little Rock River flows into the Rock River between the two gages.
A flood on Rick River will lead to an afflux in Little Rock River as Tree68 already said. But there is another indicator: The upriver gage showed a discharge of 13,000 cfs, the down river gage a discharge of 35,000 cfs. The balance came from somewhere, most likely from the Little Rock River.
For me this indicates that the situation on Little Rock River didn't differ significantly from that on Rock River.Regards, Volker
Danke, Volker, for presenting the known facts so clearly.
Here is a map of the Rock Valley/ Doon area showing the River gages.
Source is the Iowa Flood Information System (IFIS): https://goo.gl/TaCvNy
The river flowing into the Rock River at Doon is the Little Rock River with a relatively large watershed area.Regards, Volker
Before everybody gets too excited about the flood gauge data, a significant detail is that the flood data is not updated on a real time basis, it is generally updated about hourly with a little lag. Since it takes several data points to determine a trend, it could take several hours to even detect that something was shifting in the water levels. If it was a short term event, like a sudden rise and drop, over a short period, lets say 3-4 hours, it could be over by the time the event was detected.
The downstream gauge is a lagging indicator, it tells you what happened, not what is going to happen, plus it lags the upstream gauge by probably an hour or more, being several miles away. By the time you could confirm that there was a difference in the trend and see a change in the downstream gauge, it would be somewhere over 3-4 hours.
There are also several tributaries from multiple directions feeding into the main river, in any case you would expect the downstream flow to be larger than then upstream flow, since there aren't gauges on all the tributaries it is pure speculation to assign the majority of it to one tributary.
This is all really cool for monitoring an event over a period of days or weeks (done that), but its not real handy for predicting something short term on a real time basis. After you get 6-12 hours of trend, you can make some pretty good guestimates of where it might go. They do provide forecasts, but like all weather forecasts they are estimates and they can be off by time and elevation (seen that too).
Volker would make a really good coroner. Its pretty easy to figure out what caused car crash after the event, but what the railroad's situation is trying to figure out if there will even be a crash, when and where it will happen, before it happens, all while riding in the car. Higher degree of difficulty.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
In 2004 I was traveling from Jacksonville to Mid-Ohio Race Course outside of Mansfield, OH. Route was I-95 to I-26 to Columbia, SC and then up I-77 to Strasburg, OH then US250 to Wooster and US 30 on to Mansfield.
Leaving Columbia I became entangled in the outer bands of a Hurricane Jeanne and continued to experience the bands while traversing I-77 up through the West Virginia Turnpike - after dealing with the bands which were causing standing water on the highway and limiting max speeds to 35-50 MPH to limit hydroplaning I finally called a quits to the day at Parkersburg, on the South side of the Ohio River.
The following morning, listening to loacal radio it was announced that the current flood stage of the Ohio River was approximately 10 feet higher than the Army Corps of Engineers had previously predicted for the storm. I had no trouble getting from the motel to I-77 and heading North and crossing the Ohio River. Entering Ohio at Marietta about all I could see was water - I-77 was 'high and dry' but all the surrounding fields and ground level roadways were under water - how far under water, I have no idea - it could have been a foot, five feet or even 10 feet.
As a user of I-77 I have to assume that the Ohio Transportation Department had done at least a cursory inspection of I-77 - it's bridges, culverts and other potential points of water damage since they did not restrict the speeds on the highway or declare any point of the highway out of service. Admittedly my Durango and race car on it's open trailer aren't a Oil Train - but the same principals apply
When was the last verified incidense of soil liquefaction causing a train derailment?
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