EuclidOr does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ?
There is no specific definition of high water. Just like the term "dangerous defects" is used with no specific definition and "conditions that restrict visibility" are not defined.
Trying to define every possibility specifically is pretty well impossible.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Okay, in CSX rules, flash flood warning is issued and that invokes Rule 301.7 which automatically imposes a speed limit of 40 mph within the limits of the flood warning. Then IF the train encounters unusually heavy rain or high water within the limits, that added condition imposes an additional requirement for restricted speed when approaching bridges, culverts, and other points like to be affected.
Therefore, it is possible to have a flash flood warning and not have any requirement for restricted speed. Restricted speed is a separate condition within the broader framework of the flash flood warning. Restricted speed is not automatically imposed by the flash flood warning.
Now I have been told that under BNSF rules, that the requirement to slow down for high water can only be invoked if the specific definition of high water is met. And since the train did not slow down, that proves that the water alongside of the derailment site did not qualify as “high water” under the BNSF definition of high water. Is there a similar definition of “high water” for the purpose of imposing restricted speed under CSX Rule 301.7?
dehusman Euclid Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ? There is no specific definition of high water. Just like the term "dangerous defects" is used with no specific definition and "conditions that restrict visibility" are not defined. Trying to define every possibility specifically is pretty well impossible.
Euclid Or does it only apply when invoked according to a specific definition or technical specification that defines “high water” ?
dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident. "Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is. If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about. In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over. Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest. If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation?
VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident.
"Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is.
If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about.
In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over.
Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest.
If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Murphy SidingWhere the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks.
That arguement won't fly because we've been saying that throughout the entire thread and it hasn't seemed to have any effect. Its so obvious that its hard to believe people can't understand it.
tree68 Euclid Maybe you can post a reference that says that Rule 6.21 is default moot and must be invoked when the threshold definition of the rule term, “High water” is met. Maybe you can also post that threshold definition of “High water.” Actually, I've already asked you to provide that information, since you're so certain that the water levels at the Little Rock River crossing met that threshold. OTOH, if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule.
Euclid Maybe you can post a reference that says that Rule 6.21 is default moot and must be invoked when the threshold definition of the rule term, “High water” is met. Maybe you can also post that threshold definition of “High water.”
Actually, I've already asked you to provide that information, since you're so certain that the water levels at the Little Rock River crossing met that threshold.
OTOH, if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule.
I never said I was certain that the water level met the threshold. I said that I don't agree that there is a threshold. The specific definition, specification, or threshold that precisely defines what is "high water" is your idea, not mine. Frankly, I don't think it exists. What I have said all along is that "high water" is subjective and defined by common sense.
Now, above, you say that if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule. Really? What if the rule does not apply? what happened to the requirement to meet the definition of high water? You sound like you have switched over to what I have been saying.
n012944 VOLKER LANDWEHR I'm not a railroader and I don't believe that decisions by railroaders are automatically right. You really should......
VOLKER LANDWEHR I'm not a railroader and I don't believe that decisions by railroaders are automatically right.
I'm not a railroader and I don't believe that decisions by railroaders are automatically right.
You really should......
First thanks for correcting.
If decisions of railroader could automatically be trusted there should be far less accidents.
On the other hand this rule and the high water situation in general leaves so much room for interpretation. And especially in the high water situation at Doon with an heavy accident and following oil spill I find trust a bit difficult.
When others rely on your decisions the last you should do is automatically trust your own decision. I needed to question myself constantly as mistakes could have had deadly consequences in my job as structural design engineer. Think of e.g. the FIU bridge collapse in Miami. Living in Germany I'm not part of that accident.
That translates to other fields especially if something has gone wrong.Regards, Volker
Murphy Siding dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident. "Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is. If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about. In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over. Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest. If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation? Where the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks.
Where the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks.
I find it interesting that both of you pic one facette. One the Major Flood Stage, the other the water in the fields.
I agree that even a Major Flood Stage doesn't represent a danger when the track is high enough above this level.
On the other hand this is not an insurance that nothing can happen. It is only the obvious. Even lower water levels can weaken a dam over time of application or multiple recurrence.
That aside there is still the bridge. The train didn't derail on the bridge but at the time of the accident it was on the bridge. The situation there, with almost record level and according fast currents, let me think that a restricted speed might have been appropriate.
All answers we got were about the water in the fields but the Rule 6.21 mentions bridges explicitly.
It is not one facette, it is the whole situation.Regards, Volker
EuclidNow, above, you say that if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule. Really? What if the rule does not apply? what happened to the requirement to meet the definition of high water? You sound like you have switched over to what I have been saying.
No, its just that you have no idea what you are talking about and can't understand what people tell you (which shouldn't be a surprise to anybody).
The intended audience of rule 6.21 is the train crew. It explicitly gives them authority to slow down or stop if they feel there is a danger. If they think there is a danger then the rule applies. If they don't see a danger and there has not been a warning of a problem, then they won't take action.
VOLKER LANDWEHRThat aside there is still the bridge. The train didn't derail on the bridge but at the time of the accident it was on the bridge. The situation there, with almost record level and according fast currents, let me think that a restricted speed might have been appropriate.
Obviously the people responsible for the bridge didn't think there was a problem. Its their bridge, what they think trumps what you think.
Was the bridge damaged by the flood? Did it collapse under the train?
The responses of the defenders of the BNSF about Doon are reminiscent of Sgt. Schultz on the old "Hogan's Heroes" TV show:https://youtu.be/rwcBaG-S7UA
This drawn out discussion is a prime example of why you cannot write rules for every possible occurance. Rules that get down to these details, will never cover every detail. That is why the rule book's first rule is "take the safe path". Tell the train crew to be aware of the surrounding situation and slow down or whatever. Once the rule book portends to cover all conditions, one more exemption will occur. In the case of this derailment, the rules say all sorts of things, but none covered this particular case. Rules are a two edged sword: one to cover operation of the train and two to protect the crew if they followed the rule yet something happened.
This was clearly an unanticipated event. It is really no one's fault and should go down as an accident. But, I bet there will be a new rule that if you see water within 3.5 feet of the rail you should go 7.5 mph -- or something like that.
dehusmanObviously the people responsible for the bridge didn't think there was a problem. Its their bridge, what they think trumps what you think.
Obviously, but were they right? Did they have all information? Was there an accident?
dehusmanWas the bridge damaged by the flood? Did it collapse under the train?
That is the same hindsight you accuse us of. And it is not even correct. Did something happen beneath the surface at the pier foundations? Was there the danger of flotsam? We don't know.
Your argument sounds like lets wait and see if something gets damaged if yes we can react.
I think we can agree that we disagree. You think everything was handled OK, I still have my doubts.Regards, Volker
Regarding the excuse that there was only water standing in a farmer’s field:
The rule says this:
“In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
The rule is only generally stating where slow approach is required. It does not limit these locations to ONLY bridges and culverts. Notice that it also includes, “and other potentially hazardous points.”
Now we are told by Tree68 that there is some definition for “High water” that is independent of the Rule 6.21, and because the train did not slow down, that proves that the water alongside the derailment site did not meet the independent definition of “High water.”
If the term “High water” in Rule 6.21 must meet an independent definition outside of the Rule in order for the rule to apply, let’s see that independent definition. It certainly must be readily accessible because it is said to be the point that governs whether the Rule applies or not.
VOLKER LANDWEHRYou think everything was handled OK,
Never said that. I have no idea whether they handled everything ok because, as many of us have said many times before, we have no actual knowledge about what the BNSF did or didn't do. They could have done everything right or they could have done nothing right. I don't know, you don't know, nobody on this list knows and chances are, nobody on this list will ever know. This entire discussion has been about hypotheticals, what ifs and what processes are (except Euclid, where the discussion always goes to semantics).
VOLKER LANDWEHR Murphy Siding dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR We know the Rock River gage 10 miles upriver from Doon showed a first peak above Major Flood Stage 16 hours before the accident as well as the Rock Valley gage less than 10 miles downriver showing 1.5 ft less than record level about 3.5 hours before the accident. "Major Flood Stage" really doesn't have much meaning for the railroad in the grand scheme of things because flooding is relative to the evelation of what you are worried about flooding is. If "Major Flood Stage" is the water at the station of 15 ft and your facilites are at 55 ft, "Major Flood Stage" isn't anything to worry about. In the floods I have been involved with, what the railroad generally does is they go out to the tracks and somebody measures the water level below top of rail (actually several times). Lets say when the flood waters are at 10 ft at the measurement station and the water at the railroad (which could be miles from the measuring station) is 14 ft below top of rail. "Major Flood Stage" is at 20 ft and the water is forecast to crest at 22 ft. That's a rise of 12 ft from where it is now. Even though the water is 2 ft above "major flood stage", the railroad still is 2 ft above water. Something to watch, not something to panic over. Having been one of the guys who track the flood gauges and the freeboard of the railroad, I can tell you that is how it works. And once you get an understanding of what the water level changes at the measuring station mean at the railroad (the relationship may not be linear) its pretty reasonable as far as predicting water levels and when things will crest. If you've been watching this thing for the last 3 or 4 days, the water level crested below the top of rail by several feet and it is going down, are you going to go to be placing a lot of restrictions on the operation? Where the derailment occurred was in a flooded corn field. It was not on a bridge or a culvert over a flooding river. If the railroad had chec the tracks earlier, which many have suggested they had, they would not have seen anything outrageous about a flooded cornfield next to the tracks. I find it interesting that both of you pic one facette. One the Major Flood Stage, the other the water in the fields. I agree that even a Major Flood Stage doesn't represent a danger when the track is high enough above this level. On the other hand this is not an insurance that nothing can happen. It is only the obvious. Even lower water levels can weaken a dam over time of application or multiple recurrence. That aside there is still the bridge. The train didn't derail on the bridge but at the time of the accident it was on the bridge. The situation there, with almost record level and according fast currents, let me think that a restricted speed might have been appropriate. All answers we got were about the water in the fields but the Rule 6.21 mentions bridges explicitly. It is not one facette, it is the whole situation.Regards, Volker
petitnjThis drawn out discussion is a prime example of why you cannot write rules for every possible occurance. Rules that get down to these details, will never cover every detail. That is why the rule book's first rule is "take the safe path".
I have my doubts how Rule 6.21 can be applied by a train crew.
I don't see them in the "line of fire" here. Any speed restrictions should have come from MofW or Engineering as described in the CSX rule.
At night the crew wasn't able to see if there were any dangers. But is it better in daylight? As BaltACD said a number of pages back railroading is not a line of sight operation. As I understand it Rule 6.21 needs the line of sight. So how does it work?
petitnjOnce the rule book portends to cover all conditions, one more exemption will occur. In the case of this derailment, the rules say all sorts of things, but none covered this particular case.
You need rules but you can overdo it. The risk begins when people believe that everything is in the rules. How do they react on unusual situations and will they recognize them?
In my occupation I had a number of occasions were rules have undermined common sense and discrete thinking leading to avoidable damages.
To be clear that wasn't minted on this accident. And I understand that many rules are needed as long as management and operation department aren't acting in concert on the same side.Regards; Volker
Murphy SidingI think you have to take into consideration the lay of the land, local weathper patterns and the familiarity of those who operate in that area.
Taking all that into consideration and adding the known rainfall, the flood levels as well as the situation at the bridge I came to my doubts that the decision to run an oil train at normal speed was correct.
We all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation.
Murphy Siding This line has been in use for 125+ years and has no history of derailments.
That is a statement that raises my hackles. In civil engineering we had a lot of advances in knowledge and technology over the years. So 125 years age is not necessarily a quality marker.
To make this better understandable an example from Germany. In the 1990s we gained a lot of knowledge about the behavior of concrete and reinforcement steel under the influence of de-icing salt brought into parking garages from the streets. The standards needs changing. So we know that garages built before 1990 will have salt damage sometime. It is not a question of "if" but only of "when".Regards, Volker
VOLKER LANDWEHR Murphy Siding I think you have to take into consideration the lay of the land, local weathper patterns and the familiarity of those who operate in that area. Taking all that into consideration and adding the known rainfall, the flood levels as well as the situation at the bridge I came to my doubts that the decision to run an oil train at normal speed was correct. Murphy Siding This line has been in use for 125+ years and has no history of derailments. That is a statement that raises my hackles. In civil engineering we had a lot of advances in knowledge and technology over the years. So 125 years age is not necessarily a quality marker. To make this better understandable an example from Germany. In the 1990s we gained a lot of knowledge about the behavior of concrete and reinforcement steel under the influence of de-icing salt brought into parking garages from the streets. The standards needs changing. So we know that garages built before 1990 will have salt damage sometime. It is not a question of "if" but only of "when".Regards, Volker
Murphy Siding I think you have to take into consideration the lay of the land, local weathper patterns and the familiarity of those who operate in that area.
Murphy SidingIs the bigger issue here that a lot of people think oil trains in general should be slowed down?
Wasn't that already done?
I can't answer for others, I don't think so. I think special care should applied regarding oil trains in possibly dangerous conditions and the speed adjusted accordingly. Remember BNSF Rule 1.1.1 In doubt take the safe way.
But people have distinct differences in risk-awareness.Regards, Volker
All of my points about slowing the train have nothing to do with it needing special care because of being an oil train. To me, slowing the train is only related to the special risks of the flood as prescribed by the Rule.
But I hear that taking the safe way is not practical because you can't slow the trains to a crawl just because there is one molecule of water rumored to be in the area.
EuclidI never said I was certain that the water level met the threshold. I said that I don't agree that there is a threshold. The specific definition, specification, or threshold that precisely defines what is "high water" is your idea, not mine. Frankly, I don't think it exists. What I have said all along is that "high water" is subjective and defined by common sense. Now, above, you say that if a crew feels the water levels are extraordinary, they have every right to observe the rule. Really? What if the rule does not apply? what happened to the requirement to meet the definition of high water? You sound like you have switched over to what I have been saying.
What a bunch of gobbledygook.
About 90% of this discussion has occurred because you have asserted that the conditions for following Rule 6.21 had been met and that someone was at fault for this incident because the rule had not been properly observed.
But... There was WATER! Your definition of "high water" may well be different than anyone elses. You seem to have a problem with that. It's a common theme in threads that you adopt.
Throughout the discussion several of us have suggested that the conditions at that location did not necessarily meet the requirements in the eyes of the railroad.
No one is going to fault a crew whose observation of conditions make them feel that preventative action is necessary - in fact, that is the intention of the rule. If a crew reports to the DS that they feel conditions are such that they need to be extra careful, odds are the DS is going to notify the road foreman. If the road foreman finds that there was no reason for concern, so be it. The crew still abided by Rule #1 - take the safe course. They will not be penalized for observing Rule 6.21 although it turned out to be unnecessary.
Regarding this incident, it appears there were forces at work that the railroad did not consider - but we know that in hindsight, only.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68About 90% of this discussion has occurred because you have asserted that the conditions for following Rule 6.21 had been met and that someone was at fault for this incident because the rule had not been properly observed. But... There was WATER! Your definition of "high water" may well be different than anyone elses. You seem to have a problem with that. It's a common theme in threads that you adopt.
Euclid tree68 About 90% of this discussion has occurred because you have asserted that the conditions for following Rule 6.21 had been met and that someone was at fault for this incident because the rule had not been properly observed. But... There was WATER! Your definition of "high water" may well be different than anyone elses. You seem to have a problem with that. It's a common theme in threads that you adopt. If you read what I said, you will find that I believe the condition of "high water" as stated by rule 6.21 was met. I did assert that, as you say. And then I said that I believe that rule was complied with by MOW conducting inspection and monitoring. Apparently they found no problems with the track. I do not assume that the derailment was caused by the flood. If there is any question as to whether rule 6.21 was properly followed, I do not believe the crew bore that responsibility in this case.
tree68 About 90% of this discussion has occurred because you have asserted that the conditions for following Rule 6.21 had been met and that someone was at fault for this incident because the rule had not been properly observed. But... There was WATER! Your definition of "high water" may well be different than anyone elses. You seem to have a problem with that. It's a common theme in threads that you adopt.
If you read what I said, you will find that I believe the condition of "high water" as stated by rule 6.21 was met. I did assert that, as you say. And then I said that I believe that rule was complied with by MOW conducting inspection and monitoring. Apparently they found no problems with the track. I do not assume that the derailment was caused by the flood. If there is any question as to whether rule 6.21 was properly followed, I do not believe the crew bore that responsibility in this case.
The yes but game.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD The yes but game.
VOLKER LANDWEHRWe all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation.
Unfortunately, those her discussing on a gut level know very little about this location, apart from the fact that the fields were flooded by heavy rain, and that there was a bridge in the area. We don't know if the rainfall and localized flooding was anything particularly unusual, past history, or the design of the bridge. If the piers had pile foundations rather than spread footings they would have almost certainly stayed secure.
The railroad with a route in that area, that did know these details, was BNSF and as far as we know they handled the situation by operating as usual. The experts at the NTSB, by not undertaking further investigation despite a somewhat high profile derailment, seem to have implicitly agreed with that decision. None of the armchair critics on this forum have provided any evidence that the heavy rain had anything to do with the derailment. (I suppose it did make the spilled oil more mobile.)
tree68 BaltACD The yes but game.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
cx500 VOLKER LANDWEHR We all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation. Unfortunately, those her discussing on a gut level know very little about this location, apart from the fact that the fields were flooded by heavy rain, and that there was a bridge in the area. We don't know if the rainfall and localized flooding was anything particularly unusual, past history, or the design of the bridge. If the piers had pile foundations rather than spread footings they would have almost certainly stayed secure. The railroad with a route in that area, that did know these details, was BNSF and as far as we know they handled the situation by operating as usual. The experts at the NTSB, by not undertaking further investigation despite a somewhat high profile derailment, seem to have implicitly agreed with that decision. None of the armchair critics on this forum have provided any evidence that the heavy rain had anything to do with the derailment. (I suppose it did make the spilled oil more mobile.)
VOLKER LANDWEHR We all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation.
Murphy Siding cx500 VOLKER LANDWEHR We all, me included, discuss on a gut level regarding this special location and situation. So it would be very interesting to hear how a railroad with routes in that area would handle such a situation. Unfortunately, those her discussing on a gut level know very little about this location, apart from the fact that the fields were flooded by heavy rain, and that there was a bridge in the area. We don't know if the rainfall and localized flooding was anything particularly unusual, past history, or the design of the bridge. If the piers had pile foundations rather than spread footings they would have almost certainly stayed secure. The railroad with a route in that area, that did know these details, was BNSF and as far as we know they handled the situation by operating as usual. The experts at the NTSB, by not undertaking further investigation despite a somewhat high profile derailment, seem to have implicitly agreed with that decision. None of the armchair critics on this forum have provided any evidence that the heavy rain had anything to do with the derailment. (I suppose it did make the spilled oil more mobile.) And yet we still can't seem to convey the fact that the bridge had absolutely nothing to do with the train derailing. The train derailed in a farmer's cornfield that was flooded.
And yet we still can't seem to convey the fact that the bridge had absolutely nothing to do with the train derailing. The train derailed in a farmer's cornfield that was flooded.
It seems to me that you must be imagining that some of you are having trouble conveying the fact that the bridge had absoultely nothing to do with the train derailing. Nobody has made that claim. So why invent it? I think the reason has become obvious.
At the same time, you dismiss the danger of the flood by saying that the train derailed in a farmer's field that was flooded. No, the train derailed on its own railroad corridor roadbed which was on a fill that was flooded up to the bottom of the ballast.
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