Casselton Oil Train Wreck

[Euclid]

Well yes, it does raise the question of why the emergency transmission was not heard by the most pertinent party.  Surely this can’t be just an acceptable outcome of the official radio protocol intended to handle this critical warning message.

But generally, my concern with this topic is the application of the rules if the engineer of the oil train had heard the warning.  I have always been interested in Rule 6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action, and its earlier iteration, Rule 102 and its connection to Rule 99, both from the Consolidated Code of Operating Rules which stated:

When a train is disabled or stopped suddenly by an emergency application of the air brakes or other causes, a lighted red fusee must be immediately displayed on adjacent tracks at front and rear of train and adjacent tracks as well as tracks of other railroads that are liable to be obstructed must at once be protected in both directions as prescribed by Rule 99, until it is ascertained that they are safe and clear for the movement of trains.   

What has always intrigued me about those rules is that they call for immediate protective measures just on the assumption that they may be necessary.  They react to just the risk of trouble without actually knowing if there is trouble.  

[schlimm]

Murphy Siding

 

 

tree68

 

 

Note the earlier post indicating that the oil train was on a different channel when the grain train declared their emergency.  The oil train thus never heard the announcement by the grain train.  That tidbit very definitely was not conveyed by the video.  

 

 

 

 

Stop it man- you'll ruin the story.

 

 

Don't worry guys.  I feel confident Bucky can start a disquisition on the myriad of meanings of "heard."

[Murphy Siding]

tree68

 

 

Note the earlier post indicating that the oil train was on a different channel when the grain train declared their emergency.  The oil train thus never heard the announcement by the grain train.  That tidbit very definitely was not conveyed by the video.  

 

Stop it man- you'll ruin the story.

[Euclid]

I would like to see a detailed list that would put all the events in order.  Certainly the fact that the oil train never heard the “emergency” announcement that the grain train had derailed explains why the engineer never took any defensive action in response to the warning.  The Road Foreman of Engines on the grain train seemed to be surprised that the oil train was not slowing down.  But if the oil train engineer never heard the warning, he had no reason to slow down. 

The video, while not conveying the full “send and receive” of the radio transmissions, also appears to have a time sequence error regarding the emergency application by the oil train when they saw the obstruction. 

Apparently, they have taken down the links to the docket and interviews.  I expect the final release of the full report to be coming within a day or so. 

[tree68]

Euclid

I had assumed that this was the oil train engineer repeating the first broadcast as an acknowledgement to the announcement that the grain train had experienced an emergency application.  But somewhere in the interviews, it is said that this second announcement was not an acknowledgement of the grain train announcement.  Instead, it was the announcement by the oil train engineer that he had made an emergency application. 

Note the earlier post indicating that the oil train was on a different channel when the grain train declared their emergency.  The oil train thus never heard the announcement by the grain train.  That tidbit very definitely was not conveyed by the video.  

[Euclid]

RDG467

I know I'm taking the risk of getting the *** flying again on this thread, but here's two pertinent facts from page 3 of the NTSB report under the heading 'Accident Narrative':

1. "After the grain train's emergency brake application, the crew began to implement the safety protocols required after an emergency brake application: a crew member immediately broadcast an emergency announcement to other trains in the area, using radio channel 70" <my stop.>

2. In the next paragraph, it reads "However, the oil train did not hear the emergency announcement from the grain train, because they were releasing track warrant authority to the train dispatcher on radio channel 39 assigned to the Jamestown Subdivision. This was in accordance with BNSF operating rules, which state that a train must release a track warrant after it leaves the limits of the warrant. After the train crew made the emergency announcement, the road foreman of engines (on the grain train) attempted to contact the oil train crew by radio to alert them to the emergency brake application. "

So, the overlay we heard on the video didn't tell the entire story......

It would be helpful to have a fully detailed timeline of the events that unfolded ahead of this collision, including an account of who said what and who heard what in the radio transmissions, and the times of these details.  Much of it is provided, but there are points of ambiguity.

There is the video, its time clock, the audio of radio transmissions, and displayed captions, including details that are not actually revealed in the events depicted in the video, such as the point of derailment.  I assume that was found by inspecting the track damage.

Then there are also the interviews of the two engineers, two conductors and the Road Foreman of Engines.  Some, if not all, of these interviews make reference to the sequence of events such as the oil train engineer saying that he dumped the air the instant he first saw the fouling hopper car. 

Apparently, the Road Foreman of Engines told the conductor of the grain train to get on the radio and call out “emergency, emergency, emergency” in response to the UDE.  This resulted in the message being broadcast after the train had stopped.  Soon after, you hear “emergency, emergency, emergency” again in a different voice.  I had assumed that this was the oil train engineer repeating the first broadcast as an acknowledgement to the announcement that the grain train had experienced an emergency application.  But somewhere in the interviews, it is said that this second announcement was not an acknowledgement of the grain train announcement.  Instead, it was the announcement by the oil train engineer that he had made an emergency application. 

However, the video captions the point where the oil train went into emergency, and it is 10-15 seconds after the announcement that the oil train had gone into emergency.  So there is an unexplained discrepancy there.  The video view frame does change during that 10-15-second interval, but the clock counts the elapsed time from the first view to the second, so I assume 10-15 seconds is real time.   So, seeing that discrepancy makes me wonder about the whole sequence of events.   

[BaltACD]

Murphy Siding

Couldn't just chock the wheels with freshly cut tree trunks?

Under current Safety Rules T&E employees are not permitted to chock cars for securement.

[Euclid]

That reminds me of going out my driveway through the front yard after a snowstorm. 

 

[Murphy Siding]

Couldn't just chock the wheels with freshly cut tree trunks?

[BaltACD]

dehusman

I'm sure engineer Bucky would have plugged it at every tree.

And after the Conductor inspected the train - on foot - after about the 3rd tree Bucky and crew would have been HOS - middle of nowhere with no hopes of getting to a point wherer the crew could be relieved, and if they were on any degree of grade - hand brakes would have to be applied until trainline air pressure was restored to normal and a 'releasable' service brake application could hold the train until it was able to restart.

[dehusman]

I'm sure engineer Bucky would have plugged it at every tree.

[Murphy Siding]

BaltACD

 

How big of a tree do you have to gonk before you worry about the train

derailing?

[RDG467]

I know I'm taking the risk of getting the *** flying again on this thread, but here's two pertinent facts from page 3 of the NTSB report under the heading 'Accident Narrative':

1. "After the grain train's emergency brake application, the crew began to implement the safety protocols required after an emergency brake application: a crew member immediately broadcast an emergency announcement to other trains in the area, using radio channel 70" <my stop.>

2. In the next paragraph, it reads "However, the oil train did not hear the emergency announcement from the grain train, because they were releasing track warrant authority to the train dispatcher on radio channel 39 assigned to the Jamestown Subdivision. This was in accordance with BNSF operating rules, which state that a train must release a track warrant after it leaves the limits of the warrant. After the train crew made the emergency announcement, the road foreman of engines (on the grain train) attempted to contact the oil train crew by radio to alert them to the emergency brake application. "

So, the overlay we heard on the video didn't tell the entire story......

[BaltACD]

[Euclid]

dehusman

Please explain at what point the engineer of the oil train had a condition where the train would not slow down if he made a service application. 

This doesn't say "if you want to slow down real fast", it says that when there is doubt a service application won't control the train speed. 

If the oil train engineer made a service application and the train slows down then the service application can control the speed. 

What this is talking about is a situation where coming down a grade and a service application isn't slowing the train or situations where the train is exceeding the authorized speed by more than 5 mph. 

Neither of these conditions existed for the oil train in the Casselton incident. 

This rule is not applicable to the situation.

The point where the oil train engineer heard the radio announcement that that the grain train had experienced an emergency application is the point where he had a condition where his train would not slow down in time if he made a service application.   

However, the requirement was not just to slow down, as your question implies.  The requirement was to slow down to restricted speed before passing the disabled grain train.  A service application would not have accomplished that requirement.   

Slowing down before reaching the requirement for restricted speed is a matter of controlling the speed, as mentioned in Rule 103.8 Emergency Brake Applications.  So, if a service application will not slow down in time, an emergency application is called for.

As you say, the rule covers the situation where coming down a grade and a service application isn't slowing the train or situations where the train is exceeding the authorized speed by more than 5 mph.  But nothing in the rule limits its applications to only those two situations.  So, what is the basis of your conclusion that the rule does not apply to the situation of not being able to slow the oil train to restricted speed as required? 

 

[dehusman]

Euclid

....if any condition occurs in which there is doubt that service applications can control train speed....

Please explain at what point the engineer of the oil train had a condition where the train would not slow down if he made a service application.  This doesn't say "if you want to slow down real fast", it says that when there is doubt a service application won't control the train speed.  If the oil train engineer made a service application and the train slows down then the service application can control the speed.  What this is talking about is a situation where coming down a grade and a service application isn't slowing the train or situations where the train is exceeding the authorized speed by more than 5 mph.  Neither of these conditions existed for the oil train in the Casselton incident.  This rule is not applicable to the situation.

[Euclid]

n012944

 

Euclid

103.8 Emergency Brake Applications

When conditions warrant, use an emergency brake application without hesitation if any condition occurs in which there is doubt that service applications can control train speed and anytime maximum authorized speed is exceeded by 5 MPH or more. 

 

 

Your really don't understand that rule.

 

It would help make your point if you would explain why you don’t think the rule 103.8 means what I think it means.  I find that most rules mean what they say and say what they mean.  All they require is an understanding of the subject matter covered.  They are usually very well written. 

 

However, in the case of 103.8 that I quoted above, I would have placed a semi-colon after the first use of the word “speed” to clearly set apart the next part about exceeding the maximum authorized speed.  I would also want to clarify whether the introduction to the first part, “When conditions warrant,” applies to that second part about exceeding the speed limit. 

 

That second part does not apply to the Casselton oil train, but I do find it interesting because it is an example of how to interpret the first part with its introduction, “When conditions warrant.”  

 

If you look at the rule with just the second part (after the first use of the word “speed”), it reads as follows:

 

Use an emergency brake application without hesitation anytime maximum authorized speed is exceeded by 5 MPH or more.

 

So, if the speed somehow creeps up to 5 MPH over the speed limit, an engineer realizing that fact must make an emergency application without hesitation.  The rule does not say to make a service application to merely reduce speed by 5 MPH.  It calls for an emergency application that will fully stop the train, and also run the risk of derailing the train—all just because the speed limit is being exceeded by only 5 MPH. 

 

Yet, 5 MPH over the speed limit does not seem anything like the danger of grossly exceeding restricted speed when passing the disabled grain train.  So if the rule calls for an emergency application just for exceeding the speed limit by 5 MPH; it seems reasonable to conclude that an emergency application would be more than justified if a train cannot slow to the safety of restricted speed before reaching a location that Rule 6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action defines as a posing a risk of striking fouling equipment. 

 

There is also this rule that would apply:

 

1.1.1 Maintaining a Safe Course

 

In case of doubt or uncertainty, take the safe course.

 

The rules are clear and specific so they define the proper course of action before it becomes necessary.  That course of action is not something that can only be known in hindsight.

[n012944]

Euclid

103.8 Emergency Brake Applications

When conditions warrant, use an emergency brake application without hesitation if any condition occurs in which there is doubt that service applications can control train speed and anytime maximum authorized speed is exceeded by 5 MPH or more. 

 

Your really don't understand that rule.

[Euclid]

dehusman

 

Euclid

Yet, there was not time to slow down to meet either one of those two options, so an emergency application was the only option left that would have “immediately reduced” the speed of the oil train, as the RFE says was required.

 

Please quote the rule that says the oil train was required to "immediately reduce" speed.

Dave,

Here are the two rules (in blue text) that say that the oil train was required to immediately reduce speed:

Rule 6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action.

When a train or engine is stopped by an emergency application of the brakes or severe slack action occurs while stopping, take the following actions:

Obstruction of Main Track or Controlled Siding

•If an adjacent main track or controlled siding may be obstructed, immediately warn other trains by radio, stating the exact location and status of the train. Provide flag protection in both directions on these tracks. Provide flag protection for other affected railroads by going at least 2 miles in each direction if flagging distance is not known.

When only one flagman is available, provide protection immediately in the direction the first train is expected. After necessary protection is provided, provide protection in the opposite direction. Recall the flagman:

•When adjacent tracks are not obstructed. or •When the train dispatcher or control operator advises the crew that protection is provided on adjacent tracks.

Inspection of Cars and Units

•All cars, units, equipment, and track must be inspected as outlined in the:

◦Special instructions

◦ Air brake and train handling rules

Train on Adjacent Track

A train on an adjacent track that receives radio notification must approach the location at restricted speed. The train must stop short of any obstruction or flagman unless advised that the track is clear and it is safe to proceed.

 

Since there was not time to display fusees, the response of the oil train would have been only based on the radio warning by the grain train.   The requirement for the oil train to immediately slow down is covered in the last part of the rule called: Train on Adjacent Track.

That section of the rule says the oil train should have approached the location at restricted speed, thus able to stop short of any obstructions.  Restricted speed would have been very low, considering the report of near zero visibility in the cloud of snow alongside of the grain train.  The oil train did not have enough space available to slow down to restricted speed by using a service application of brakes, so they should have used an emergency application according to this rule:

103.8 Emergency Brake Applications

When conditions warrant, use an emergency brake application without hesitation if any condition occurs in which there is doubt that service applications can control train speed and anytime maximum authorized speed is exceeded by 5 MPH or more. 

[dehusman]

Sorry.  My bad.

[Norm48327]

[dehusman]

Euclid

Yet, there was not time to slow down to meet either one of those two options, so an emergency application was the only option left that would have “immediately reduced” the speed of the oil train, as the RFE says was required.

Please quote the rule that says the oil train was required to "immediately reduce" speed.

[n012944]

[BaltACD]

^

You overlook the one unwritten requirement of a RFE (being a company official) in this type of proceeding - THROW THE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE BUS.

The company's stance is ALWAYS, the rules we have in place would have prevented the occurence.  Irrespective of any facts, that the incident happened is prima facia evicence that the rules were not complied with.

[Euclid]

NP Eddie

Fourthly, is any of the information on your latest post correct, as nothing has been released that an RFE was on the grain train? Ed Burns Happily retired NP-BN-BNSF from Northtown.

Ed,

I am not quite sure what you are asking me.  This is my main point: In the NTSB interview with the Road Foreman of Engines, he stated that the oil train should have immediately reduced their speed, protected themselves, and maybe even stopped, as conditions require. 

He said the oil train crew should have been looking for hazards in front of them.  One of the “conditions” they faced was that they were too close to the blinding snow to slow down quickly enough by the use of a service application to “protect” themselves. 

Others here have insisted that an emergency application without actually seeing a hazard would have been reckless and inconsistent with good train handling.

I think it is obvious that, to address the situation as outlined by the RFE, the proper thing to do would have been to put the oil train into emergency as soon as they got the warning.  It would have been silly to worry about good train handling under those circumstances.

Others have said that I claimed that the using an emergency application was prohibited.  I never said that.  It was taken out of context where was I asked if an emergency application was prohibited.  It was then turned around and made to look like I asserted that an emergency application was prohibited.  Fortunately, a thread is a perfect transcript of who said what, so the record is clear to see. 

From the start, I have advocated the use of an emergency application.  In fact, that is the point that attracted such vehement criticism here.  I have never wavered from my original contention that an emergency application was the proper response to this developing catastrophe.  Others have insisted that I was giving incorrect information that might endanger others.   

Others have also insisted that the proper thing to do was one of the following:

1. Stop under the service application of brakes procedure specified by the Unplanned Stop Rule because it would have provided good train handling.

    

2. Pass the grain train at restricted speed; that is a speed slow enough to stop short of any obstruction or hazard once it has been seen.

 

Yet, there was not time to slow down to meet either one of those two options, so an emergency application was the only option left that would have “immediately reduced” the speed of the oil train, as the RFE says was required. 

[NP Eddie]

Euclid:

I have waited one day to reply to your last post.

Always include sources of information in any post. That clears up where are getting the information from.

And this will be last comment to you.

Ed Burns

[Euclid]

Ed,

The information I posted about the interview with the RFE on the grain train is public information in the NTSB report. 

There are also interviews with the student engineer and conductor of the grain train as well as the engineer and conductor of the oil train.  Open this link and it takes you to the page called Docket and Docket Items:  http://go.usa.gov/x9FUy

There are at least 7 pages to that list, and the interviews start about half way down page 2.  If you click on one of them, it opens a page where you can download the PDF file, and then open the PDF to see the interview.

I believe this link will take you directly to the page where you can download the PDF file of the interview with the RFE on the grain train: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=425455&docketID=55926&mkey=88606 

[NP Eddie]

Euclid:

First of all, the BNSF uses the term "Road Foreman of Engines" not "Traveling Engineer". The NP also used the term RFE, but the GN did use the term TE.

Secondly, how did you obtain the information about the Traveling Engineer's statement to a BNSF reconstruction of the accident?

Thirdly, you are violating GCOR Rule 1.27 regarding the divulging of information.

Fourthly, is any of the information on your latest post correct, as nothing has been released that an RFE was on the grain train?

Ed Burns

Happily retired NP-BN-BNSF from Northtown.

[dehusman]

Bucky:  Before you go any further done this rabbit hole and embarass yourself any more you ought to actually read the GCOR rule.  It doesn't say what you think it does.

[Euclid]

Here is an interview segment form the traveling engineer who was riding the grain train during the Casselton derailment:

TRAVELING ENGINEER:

But as that's happening, we've got a train [oil train] coming at us, and I believe we're still moving. I look up. I see their engine numbers. I call them up and warn them that our train is in emergency. I don't remember the verbiage I used. I told them they better protect themselves, slow down, stop, or whatever it was. I don't recall what I told them. And then I immediately -- or momentarily after that, I told the conductor get on the radio, announce your "emergency, emergency, emergency." And he did. And that train didn't appear to be slowing down at all.

QUESTIONER:

What are your emergency procedures? What governs your emergency procedures when a train crew declares an emergency?

TRAVELING ENGINEER:

You would expect that a train approaching you to immediately reduce their speed, protect themselves, maybe even stop, as conditions might require. I don't know that there's anything absolutely written in stone other than you'll get your train speed down, control, and you'll -- if I was on the train, we'd proceed looking out for hazards in front of us.

 

The traveling engineer is making the same point I have been making.  That is that the emergency application of the grain train instantly created an emergency condition for the oil train.  He calls for immediately reducing speed in anticipation of colliding with fouling objects.  That also happens to be the same point that is addressed by Rule 6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action.  That rule calls for IMMEDIATE action.  The word “immediately” means without any intervening time or space.  Certainly this action would rule out the use of a service application.

 

And notice too, that the traveling engineer did not say that there was no time to do anything, as some have said in this thread.  He also did not say that the oil train crew should have waited until they saw hazards in front of them before taking defensive action, as some have said here.    

 

Also when the TE says “You would expect that a train approaching you to immediately reduce their speed, protect themselves, maybe even stop, as conditions require,” just like me, he is making that assessment in hindsight.  Yet it does not invalidate his point like some are saying here about me making the same point.

 

The TE refers to the retroactive assessment as what would be expected by anyone with the knowledge of how to deal with the situation facing the oil train.  In other words, the TE does not agree with some in this thread who contend that the crew of the oil train could not be expected to react to the fouling before they knew that one existed.  They were expected to anticipate a fouling, and react accordingly.