[quote user="narig01"
I would have to wonder how well the law would stand up in court. Someone challenging the law would have ample example in California of one person operation of rail. The many public transport rail operations, operated by one person in varying levels of control.
I was thinking about wanswheel's question whether there was some way to 'work around' the PTC mandate requirements with simple systems or kludges, and remembered this post of Randy's
Randy StahlI was just thinking about the Chlorine disaster in Graniteville SC. I think that was a 2 (or more) man crew that left a switch open killing the crew on another train and killing nearby people asleep in thier beds, I do not know if PTC would have detected the open switch in dark territory, I think not.
I have been spectacularly wrong a couple of times on details of the PTC mandate, so I am going to be careful here. I had thought that one of the principal reasons PTC was held up in implementation, and was turning out so costly, was because so many switches connecting to the general system needed to be 'instrumented' to work with the system. (That of course says nothing about whether they are power-operated or not -- PTC is not the same thing at all as CTC -- but it does say that, in dark territory or otherwise, the switch must be equipped with sensors that accurately determine its positions, and communications, buffering, etc. that convey its status to the 'centralized' PTC fabric.)
The 'cheap' version of this, for turnouts at least, ony 'cares' it the switch is in one of two positions: 'lined for the main and locked' and 'open'. (Bent points, shorts due to weather, etc. will all show up as 'open' hopefully with appropriate diagnostic codes as to what and why). The form of switch found in sidings and approaches requires more states, at least three of them: 'locked for the main', 'locked for diverging', and 'unlocked/in-between'. Again, this says nothing about power authority, just status of the points and any locking mechanism.
There might be a tacit assumption that a position sensor in the linkage somewhere is 'enough'. It is not. I do not know what technical 'assurance' might be desirable -- perhaps machine vision actually looking at the points and engagement, in addition to sensors that determine linkage position and locked status. I do not know how current switch design addresses this.
... I think about the runaway trains on Cajon Pass. I think of how at that time having PTC would have been useless because the brakes weren't working.
In the Duffy's Curve accidents I've read about, the causative factors were not exactly 'brakes not working', and at present I agree that PTC wouldn't have helped. In particular, the gross overloading of one of the trains concerned -- was it potash? -- wouldn't have been caught by PTC directly; defective DB status on locomotives wouldn't be; a combination of brake factors such as produced the wreck at Lac Megantic might not have been. However, it might be argued that once the PTC enablement has been installed, adding some of these capabilities is not technically demanding or particularly expensive by comparison with trying to provide them by other means.
I think of the poor engineer running a heavy train in deep snow and freezing temps failing to warm his brakes sufficiently to descend a heavy grade and passing red signal after red signal only to have his train accelerate while in full emergency.
I thought of Cranberry Grade when I read this. In my opinion a properly-set-up PTC would be able to monitor brake state vs. speed vs. dynamic, and inform the engine crew LONG before irreversible fade set in that the wrong combination of actions was occurring. Technically this is out of the realm of 'safety' in train movement and into the realm of 'safety' in train handling ... but why use the expensive mandated capabilities just for the mandated purposes, if you have already had to pay for them?
Shiny new shelters have gone up along the dark CSX territory near me - near switchs (virtually all hand throws) and sometimes crossings. Some also have associated towers.
I haven't wandered near them to see how they might be connected to the switch, so can't speak to whether they are simply connected to the throw rod or have more sophisticated technology involved.
I would opine that given proper maintenance and regular inspections, simply putting a sensor on the rod (an existing technology) would be sufficient to meet the need. I'm guessing that the system will require regular inspections, as do crossings today, and that inspection could easily include an inspection of the points in both possible positions.
This method of sensing switch position has been in use for years. In reality, it needs to transmit only two states - lined for the main, or not. Not can include lined for neither, as any position of the switch except lined and locked for the main (ie, normal position) represents a problem for an oncoming train.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
What ties the switch into a signal system is called a "circuit controller." It is a separate small box with it's own rod that connects to the points. In the photo link it's the box with the silver cover with conduit going to a square junction box. I've seen in pictures and in person the box being silver or black. The circuit controller can also be used to tie derails, usually a split rail type, into a signal system. Some of our derails have them, some don't.
http://www.garymgreen.com/Images/Switch%20hardware,%20La%20Verne,%20CA.jpg
My understanding, in this first generation of PTC being an overlay on signalled (ABS or CTC) trackage the switches aren't tied into PTC since they are already tied into the signal system. In dark territory, each switch would have to be tied into PTC. Probably using the same type circuit controller.
Jeff
I found the replys to be interesting, I did not read all of the them, but the main fact seems that those who replied do not seem to have worked as a freight brakeman or as freight conductor or engineman. I know when I worked as a brakemen or freight conductor and one year in the cab in engine service, the enginman seemed to complain the most and the BLET was always willing to take work from other craft.
The bottom line short and sweet, run with a single enginman, have a bad order car ten, twenty or more deep, that you have to set out alone, must be a real interesting project of locating the problem, getting slack to "pull the pin" run back to the engine and set the car out. I find it wild, how many ups and downs to complete, then for real giggles and grins throw in heavy reain and make it a night problem.
The nreal bottom line the FRA wants PTS for safety and then looks to review or ok single man crews then they have no regard for anyones safety, those studies about an accident or something going wrong, those problems are caused by fatique due to the hours and system of calling out crews only when there is work, no one gets the proper rest. Throw in six or seven mind numbing hours of being stuck on a siding and not moving and making milage, and then being relieved "on the road". Forty seven people died when a single crewman the engineman relied on the train brakes holding a loaded train on a hill, pure fatique and the fact that he was getting rest due to his hours so as to continue later in the day. Railroads created short lines they shed the low return work, they make their profits now the days of three / or four man crews are long gone, the system of centralized dispatchers saved them lots of money and every single job lost took a pair of eyes off the railroad. I noticed some wrote about European trains, they are short trains that run on passenger rail at speed, with lighter cars and mostly in unit trains, there is no comparison to American railroads.
Retired Trainman I found the replys to be interesting, I did not read all of the them, but the main fact seems that those who replied do not seem to have worked as a freight brakeman or as freight conductor or engineman. I know when I worked as a brakemen or freight conductor and one year in the cab in engine service, the enginman seemed to complain the most and the BLET was always willing to take work from other craft. The bottom line short and sweet, run with a single enginman, have a bad order car ten, twenty or more deep, that you have to set out alone, must be a real interesting project of locating the problem, getting slack to "pull the pin" run back to the engine and set the car out. I find it wild, how many ups and downs to complete, then for real giggles and grins throw in heavy reain and make it a night problem. The nreal bottom line the FRA wants PTS for safety and then looks to review or ok single man crews then they have no regard for anyones safety, those studies about an accident or something going wrong, those problems are caused by fatique due to the hours and system of calling out crews only when there is work, no one gets the proper rest. Throw in six or seven mind numbing hours of being stuck on a siding and not moving and making milage, and then being relieved "on the road". Forty seven people died when a single crewman the engineman relied on the train brakes holding a loaded train on a hill, pure fatique and the fact that he was getting rest due to his hours so as to continue later in the day. Railroads created short lines they shed the low return work, they make their profits now the days of three / or four man crews are long gone, the system of centralized dispatchers saved them lots of money and every single job lost took a pair of eyes off the railroad. I noticed some wrote about European trains, they are short trains that run on passenger rail at speed, with lighter cars and mostly in unit trains, there is no comparison to American railroads.
I believe the record shows the Lac Magnetic one man crew had been on duty 9 hours at the time he parked and failed to properly secure his train that ran away. We will never know if a qualified Conductor had been a part of the crew if he would have properly secured the train or just done as the single person crew did. The Canadian report aluded to a difference in training between engineers and conductors and that engineers MAY not have been adequately trained on how to secure a train.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I wonder: did the MM&A hire off the street for engine service, or did the company employee new hires as conductors and then train them for engine service?
Johnny
As I recall, the engineer in question had hired out on the CP or another predecessor company on the line as a engine service employee after prior railroad experience. Reading the Canadian accident report, I got the impression that if he had worked on the ground in train service, it was a relatively long time ago. Securement, at least on my carrier, has only become a 'hot button' issue in the last 10 to 15 years - of course, in the last 10-15 years almost all the T&E personnel have turned over because of retirements and their replacements.
I'll stand by my previous posistion on this topic.
One person crews can safely and efficiently operate some trains. And one person crews cannot safely and efficiently operate some other trains.
Can any one of you honestly say that one person could not bring a short intermodal train of 30 containers from Sioux City to Missouri Valley, IA safely and efficiently? (At MV the containers to be picked up by mainline intermodal trains with regular crews.)
The unions and management need to work together to sort this out. They understand where and when it's desireable and possible better than anyone, including (especially) the politicians and bureaucrats.
greyhoundsOne person crews can safely and efficiently operate some trains. And one person crews cannot safely and efficiently operate some other trains.
My feelings as well. It's not a black & white issue.
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