Euclid We also know the public reported problems with the crossing protection system earlier the day of the crash. That does not prove that a system malfunction caused the crash, but it is quite a coincidence.
Are you aware that witness reports after the fact are the least reliable source of information? Each is likely to see, and tell, the story differenly leaving the authorities to determine the true facts. People see things from their own perspective. Reality can be vastly different.
Norm
BroadwayLion Signs will not be read. A new crtossing protection is required. The kind used to protect Federal Buildings, it comes up out of the ground and can stop a tank. If a car is on top of it when it comes up, the car will just stay there until it goes back down again. Naturally it has to be much further away from the tracks so that if it does lift a car it will not be half on the tracks. It will need good warning lihgts to let people know to STOP AND WAIT RIGHT THERE! Oh well, ideas of LION might not be practicle, but what the heck do you expect from a LION. ROAR
Signs will not be read. A new crtossing protection is required. The kind used to protect Federal Buildings, it comes up out of the ground and can stop a tank.
If a car is on top of it when it comes up, the car will just stay there until it goes back down again. Naturally it has to be much further away from the tracks so that if it does lift a car it will not be half on the tracks. It will need good warning lihgts to let people know to STOP AND WAIT RIGHT THERE!
Oh well, ideas of LION might not be practicle, but what the heck do you expect from a LION.
ROAR
Observation from 25+ years of handling reports of 'malfunctioning' crossings where the OSP says the crossing didn't give them enough time to react. Their thought processes were somewhere other than operating their vehicle when the protections began to operate - after a period of time they noticed them and were 'surprised'.
On my carrier, whenever this is reported, a maintainer is dispatched. Findings upon arrival - protection is functioning as intended, review of crossing equipments log reveals no exceptions to operation in any period preceding the reported 'defect'.
My carrier takes the proper functioning of crossing protection seriously. I suspect all carriers do, including Metro North.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
^
Why the double posting? This was posted on page 3!
When I was working on the PRR in the 50's, Gates were released to lower by gravity and the descent was controlled by the motor acting as a generator into a resistance. Otherwise it would freefall and could do damage. No sensor was used to cause the gate to rise if it struck smething, it would just remain on whatever it landed on until the track circuits came clear (no train on track) and the motor circuits were energized to raise the gate to the upright and latched. I doubt that that design has changed. I know nothing is totally perfect but railroad signalling is designed to be fail-safe. I remember a crossing where a washout had caused the signal case to fall over but the crossing signal had one red light lit in both directions. Not flashing but lit. for the crossing signals to "clear" ie, gates rise and flashers go dark, the approach track section and the section between the approach sections had to be clear. Energized and no shunt. Today, they use audio tone overlay electonics but they provide the same functions. The poor lady failed to heed the sign "DO NOT STOP ON THE TRACKS" and paid a high price. Habit and highway design traps people into bad choices. Whether she thought she could get clear, why she did not back up or for whatever reason she failed to avoid being on the track when the train arrived. And then the train pushed the car into the energized third rail which being anchored to its supports was pushed up and into the lead car spearing it and setting it on fire due to the high fault currents arcing to the inside of the car. Such is how this tragedy occured. I suspect the five passengers who died were on the third rail side of the car. Hell of a way to go.
I am not very familiar with this third rail system, but this article describes what happened with it. As I understand it, the third rail runs along the track just a bit raised off of the ground. Then it is interrupted at a grade crossing, so the train loses contact with it as it passes through the crossing. So as the train passes through the crossing, it approaches the stub end of the third rail on the other side of the gap.
It sounds like the train hit the vehicle, and sort of "snowplowed" it under the blunt end of the facing third rail, and lifted the third rail off of its supports as train carried the impaled vehicle down the track. And the dislodging rail pierced the vehicle and followed a path through it that led into the first car of the train.
As it entered the train, the third rail broke up into 39 ft. lengths. So the passengers were faced with 39 ft. javelins of rail coming through the car at high speed. Of course, the rail was not traveling, but the train was swallowing it at 58 mph. Apparently this rail remained energized as this process played out. Here is an article that talks about it:
http://www.lohud.com/story/news/transit/2015/02/08/metro-north-train-suv-snagged-third-rail-valhalla/23070285/
The article’s expert says that the rail design was not to blame for the crash. I wonder about that. I would not say that the third rail caused the accident. However, if the third rail had stayed intact, it is perhaps likely that nobody on the train would have been killed.
There must be a lot of grade crossing collisions within this third rail system. I would think that, in the case of a collision, trains shoving an impaled vehicle into the butt end of the third rail would be highly likely. A lot of cars that get hit by trains stick to the front of the engine and are carried a long distance.
Worthwhile column on the problems with a grade crossing warning system forcing trains to stop, etc.:
http://ten90solutions.com/confessions_of_a_heartsick_man
Paul_D_North_Jr Worthwhile column on the problems with a grade crossing warning system forcing trains to stop, etc.: http://ten90solutions.com/confessions_of_a_heartsick_man
Interesting and informative!
Maybe this would help:
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/05/us/new-york-train-collision/index.html
Read -
http://ten90solutions.com/confessions_of_a_heartsick_man and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds). Emergency is not the desired braking method for trains as it can, for a variety of reasons, cause catastrophic accidents on it's own.
and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds).
Emergency is not the desired braking method for trains as it can, for a variety of reasons, cause catastrophic accidents on it's own.
BaltACD...and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds).
Euclid BaltACD ...and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds). Okay, say the vehicle became a fouling obstacle when the train was 20 seconds away. At 58 mph, that would mean that the train was 1701 ft. away. It required 950 ft. to stop, so if it was warned by a PTC-based obstacle detection system, the train would have stopped 751 ft. short of the crossing and six people would not have been killed.
BaltACD ...and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds).
Train was in emergency prior to striking the vehicle - how long before hasn't been discolosed. The train stopped 950 feet after striking the vehicle while the train brakes were in emergency, undoubtly getting additional retardation from pushing the vehicle along the right of way as well as having the 3rd rail entering the rail car and providing additional retardation. The 'unaided' stopping distance of the train from 58 MPH has not been disclosed in either normal service braking or emergency braking conditions.
The Sprauge type rail (under-running as on MNRC) is wrapped in ain insulated cocoon with only the bottome of the rail exposed. Brackets told it from the top.
The angled end of the rail permits the shoe (and aught else for that matter) to slide under the rail and perhaps lift it. The insulated cocoon and the brackets holds the rail together as it is pushed up.
The type of rail otherwise used (I am told that Culver was the first to put a protective board over it) slopes down at the end to lift the shoe up and onto the rail. Now the Brentwood accident on the LIRR demonstrates that things can still push under the rail or make contact with the rail, but the rail is not held by brackets as the Sprague rail. It is basically just sitting on the insulator seats with very little other than gravity to keep it there. In the event of an impact against the rail, it is usually just pushed off of its seats and is shoved to the ground.
Whatever. That is the LION's Story and him sticks to it
The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.
Here there be cats. LIONS with CAMERAS
BaltACDTrain was in emergency prior to striking the vehicle - how long before hasn't been discolosed. The train stopped 950 feet after striking the vehicle while the train brakes were in emergency, undoubtly getting additional retardation from pushing the vehicle along the right of way as well as having the 3rd rail entering the rail car and providing additional retardation. The 'unaided' stopping distance of the train from 58 MPH has not been disclosed in either normal service braking or emergency braking condition.
Euclid BaltACD ...and revise your calculations. While the lights began at 39 seconds prior to impact - the gates began their decent some, unspecified, seconds after the lights began operating and then would have contacted the rear of the vehicle at some seconds after the gates begand their decent. I am going to guess, that the gates began their decent 8 seconds after the lights started flashing and would have come into contact with the vehicle 2 to 3 seconds after the decent started, so the gate would have contacted the rear of the vehicle approximately 10 seconds after the lights started flashing or 29 seconds before impact (and it could very well have been less than 29 seconds as I believe the FRA minimum requirement is 20 seconds). Okay, say the vehicle became a fouling obstacle when the train was 20 seconds away. At 58 mph, that would mean that the train was 1701 ft. away. It required 950 ft. to stop, so if it was warned by a PTC-based obstacle detection system, the train would have stopped 751 ft. short of the crossing and six people would not have been killed. Add Quote to your Post
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Ed, I mentioned that in a following comment. I said:
"I agree that tearing up the third rail and the resistance of shoving the vehicle would have added some deceleration. But there is still a fair margin in the numbers. So I conclude that there was at least a good chance that the PTC-based obstacle detection system would have prevented the crash."
Darwin candidates 'outwit' any system designed to prevent their candidacy.
BaltACD Darwin candidates 'outwit' any system designed to prevent their candidacy.
That false belief is the entire problem that is holding up progress in making things safer.
MNRC third rail is shaped like a sideways H with a top and bottom shaped more or less like an ordinary rail head. The top is held by the insulation, in turn held by the brackets. The actual rail is smaller in section than an overrunning third rail. Brackets are screwed to extra-length ties about every 15-20 feet. The rails' breakaway characteristics compare favorably to overrunning third rail.
What almost everyone is overlooking is that this is more or less the first accident in which the design of the third rail was really involved, and then only with a scoop in the form of an SUV shoved into the end. For something that's been around over 100 years, the Sprage-Wilgus underrunning third rail has a fantastic safety record.
Euclid Ed, I mentioned that in a following comment. I said: "I agree that tearing up the third rail and the resistance of shoving the vehicle would have added some deceleration. But there is still a fair margin in the numbers. So I conclude that there was at least a good chance that the PTC-based obstacle detection system would have prevented the crash."
Note, however, that the engineer made an emergency application. I would presume that a PTC system would initially make a service application (or a penalty application), which would not slow the train anywhere near as quickly. That 950' would have been well over 1,000 feet.
Said application would merely serve as notice to the engineer that there was an issue - which he (or she) may already know. It would then be up to the engineer to decide to override the service/penalty application with an emergency application.
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tree68 Euclid Ed, I mentioned that in a following comment. I said: "I agree that tearing up the third rail and the resistance of shoving the vehicle would have added some deceleration. But there is still a fair margin in the numbers. So I conclude that there was at least a good chance that the PTC-based obstacle detection system would have prevented the crash." Note, however, that the engineer made an emergency application. I would presume that a PTC system would initially make a service application (or a penalty application), which would not slow the train anywhere near as quickly. That 950' would have been well over 1,000 feet. Said application would merely serve as notice to the engineer that there was an issue - which he (or she) may already know. It would then be up to the engineer to decide to override the service/penalty application with an emergency application.
Generally, I think the whole point would be to react to an emergency obstruction, and therefore apply the maximum stoppering effort as early as possible. This overrides the engineer because it can see farther.
However, if the obstruction were detected say 40 miles ahead, then I can see it starting with a service application.
If this system were in place at the Valhalla crossing, it would have put the train into emergency at the first detection of the obstruction.
Maybe the crossing protection should take control of automobiles in the area of the crossing and apply their brakes?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqrS-wMGKYM
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