The Milwaukee Road

[Anonymous]

Rob and Michael,

Thanks for some excellent insider information.

Rob, I will slightly disagree with you on the point regarding the "ideal" time for Milwaukee to have terminated it's electrification. True, most of the electric locomotives were paid for and still running in excellent condition in the 1950's, but there is something to be said for standardization, and when it became apparent that diesels were the way to go, it seems the wiser railroads jumped at this opportunity. One of the problems with Milwaukee's electrification was the location of its intermediate terminals. Going west to east, you had one electrified section running from Seattle/Tacoma (a logical terminal) to Othello (not a logical terminal) where Milwaukee had to turn over to diesels. Then you had another illogical terminal at Avery, where again Milwaukee electrification ran all the way to Harlowtown. At Avery, Milwaukee could either change over completely to electrics or add electrics as helpers to the incoming diesels, or they could just run the diesels through without the electrics. Same situation westbound at Harlowtown. If diesels ran through, it begs the question as to why have a redundant physical plant that needs to be maintained. If electrics were added at these points, then Milwaukee missed the opportunity to move its crew change/refueling points to more logical sites, such as Missoula or Deer Lodge. (I'll admit, I'm at a loss to determine where the first logical terminal location eastbound out of Puget Sound should be. Othello was too soon, Spokane would make sense except through freights did not go through Spokane, Plummer Id was the eastern junction of the mainline and Spokane branch and is roughly halfway between Puget Sound and Deer Lodge but there's nothing there!) The point I'm trying to make is that the location of the changeover points from the electrified portions to the non-electrified portions restricted Milwaukee's ability to extend terminal points to a day's haul, as well as forced crew change points at far out of the way locations. Whether this added unnecessary costs to the point of making the electrification less profitable than complete dieselization back in the 1950's I do not know, but I suspect it did. Since some diesels did start running through as early as 1947 with the new FM-powered Olympian Hiawatha, it had to have occured to management that such could also be done for through freights.

BTW, does anyone know the relative dates when other electrified railroads scrapped their respective electrifications, e.g. Virginian, South Shore, et al?

[MichaelSol]

“Lumber from Idaho could not penetrate markets east of North Dakota until the 1970s.”

Surely the old heads from Potlatch and Bennett Lumber would roll over in their graves if they heard this. My granddad and his cohorts ran a string of wholesale/retail lumber yards across IA and MN from the 20s to the present. At least back to the 50s, they got all of their stock from mills in OR, WA and ID.
---------------------------------------
Records of one of the largest finished lumber producers, the Big Blackfoot Milling Company at Bonner, Montana, shows that its largest markets outside of Montana, and shipped over the NP and MILW, were in Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois and Missouri. That was in 1910!

I had an uncle who was a lumber wholesaler in the Maryland and, being from Montana, he noted the significant amount of finish lumber and plywood from Montana in the early-mid 1960's, arriving by rail from the Bonner facility.

Best -- Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

You bring up some good points about rail capacity Rob.

There was plenty of "excess rail capacity" in 1978, and yet even with the existence of the enfeebled Milwaukee Pacific Extension, 10 million tons of coal could not be shipped from Montana mines because of lack of rail resources, and in 1979 the railroads were 8,000 grain cars short of being able to meet the Montana shipping needs.

Railroad physical plant capacity is not the relevant measure of railroad success.

I tend to agree with Tom Lamphier, the last "real" railroader at the BN, in his assessment: "If the government -- state and federal -- is going to assist other transportation modes while insisting that railroads provide standby service at non-compensating rates, there will be more bankruptcies, less rail service, more unemployment and more drain on the federal treasury," Burlington Northern President Thomas Lamphier told a January 1978 conference organized by DOT's Brock Adams [who argued that "excess" capacity should be eliminated]. The Milwaukee Road's problems, Lamphier stated, were directly related to its inability to react flexibly to changing conditions and unique aspects of its own situation because of government regulation and government transportation policy. The problem of duplicative rail service in certain transportation corridors represented a small percentage of overall railway mileage in the United States, and that such "excess capacity" was inevitable and even desirable in a competitive environment. [Associated Press, "Rail Users Ask Government to Help Milwaukee Road," January 19, 1978].

I absolutely disagree with the notion that railroads should be at 100% of capacity. That's an "MBA" approach that doesn't understand the industry. As you point out, Rob, that eliminates the ability of railroads to offer premium services and, inevitably, their ability to compete with alternative transportation modes. The premium services are where the premium margins are. The lack of excess rail capacity might explain, for instance, why the operating ratios for these "busy" railroads under Staggers Act deregulation are worse, in many cases, than they were under regulated conditions when there was significant excess capacity.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

Rob L.

Good information. You know much more than I and I cannot add much to what you said but I have one minor correction for the grades. Having worked on the Aberdeen Division from 1970 to 1975, if my memory is correct, the eastbound grade on the Andover hill was 1.0 per cent on the old line, which was abandoned before 1970, and was 0.5 per cent on the new line. Before the old line was abandoned, which was before my time, I believe the old line was used as the west bound line and the new line, which was much longer in order to get the lower grade, was used as the east bound line.

Larry

[rob_l]

This is a long and provocative thread which I am only now catching up with late in the game. Messrs. Burns and Sol already have done a fine job of blowing the whistle on some of the mis-information in the thread. If I may, I’d like to chime in to refute or question some of the points made, as follows.

1. “The anticipated traffic growth after the BN merger never materialized.” (This is a statement in Kooistra’s web site.)

This is really far off the mark. As Mr. Burns pointed out, Milw transcon traffic grew to four daily trains in each direction (plus extras). This should be compared to only two daily trains in each direction (plus extras) before the merger. As Mr. Sol pointed out, the revenue gain from improved post-merger competitiveness over the period 1971 – 1977 is estimated at $354 million.

An assertion much closer to the mark is that Milw PCE traffic doubled during the period 1970-1973, reaching an all-time high.

The idea that Milw was having trouble competing with BN and UP in the Chicago – PNW Corridor during the early 70s is preposterous.

2. “The ex-GN main line to this day is still not at capacity, so abandoning the Milw PCE was the right thing to do.”

I have a lot of trouble with this assertion. First off, a lot of BNSF money has gone in to expanding the capacity of the ex-GN main line since 1980 (the year of the Milw PCE’s demise), not to mention the fortune spent by BNSF to revive the Auburn – Pasco ex-NP route (much more than for just Stampede Pass). The capacity of the ex-GN main line is higher than it was back then. BNSF’s terminal-to-terminal times would be a lot worse if this money had not been spent. I would venture to say that the capacity of the 1980 ex-GN main line already has been reached and passed. Second, continuing traffic growth will require a lot more expenditures on this line. While I agree that these expenditures may be less than those required to resurrect the Milw PCE at this point in time, I submit that they will be dramatically more expensive than the costs to upgrade the Milw PCE circa 1978 plus the costs to keep it in good shape up to the present.

I agree with the general point that incremental investments for additional capacity are best made by adding trackage to the most efficient line, provided one line is clearly more efficient than others. But I do not agree that a massive disinvestment in a comparable or slightly inferior line, to be replaced by all-new investment providing equivalent capacity on a slightly superior line, makes economic sense.

One point that has not been raised in this regard is the issue of risk mitigation. Alternative, geographically-disparate lines that are comparable in terms of efficiency are attractive from the point of view of making capacity more robust to disruptions (derailments, weather disasters, terrorism), etc. Imagine the predicament if Two Medicine Trestle was destroyed.
Another point not raised concerns the disparity in speeds for different kinds of rail traffic (e.g., coal and grain vs. intermodal). Separate lines to segregate these traffic flows can be very efficient. (More on this point later.)

I submit that the abandonment of the Milw PCE was a colossal American public policy failure. If that capacity would be surplus forever, it wouldn’t bother me much. But we will need that much more capacity, and soon. Replacing that capacity costs us a lot more money. And I am afraid us taxpayers and consumers are going to be footing the bill, one way or another.

3. “Chicago – PNW traffic was of little account until the 1970s.”

Maybe this statement might be salvageable if the dates were changed to 1960s or 1950s. Or maybe not.

Milw spent the money to lower their tunnels in the early 60s and added transcon expedited trains 261/262 in 1963. 261 handled nothing except traffic originating Twin Cities and points east, destined to Spokane or points west. Eastbound, 262 was a big train of Long East loads originating Spokane and points west. (Albeit the train sometimes picked up EB grain loads in Harlowton.) Nothing destined short of Pig’s Eye was handled. Similar statements could be made about GN trains 97 and 82 or NP trains 600 and 601. Obviously, Chicago – PNW traffic was of no little account to these roads in the 60s.

“Lumber from Idaho could not penetrate markets east of North Dakota until the 1970s.”

Surely the old heads from Potlatch and Bennett Lumber would roll over in their graves if they heard this. My granddad and his cohorts ran a string of wholesale/retail lumber yards across IA and MN from the 20s to the present. At least back to the 50s, they got all of their stock from mills in OR, WA and ID.

4. “Transportation is a commodity. A railroad is only as good as its operating cost, its terminal-to-terminal time, and its traffic base.”

True to a point, but there’s more here. What’s missing from the equation: (1) management innovation, and (2) providing more logistics services than mere rail transportation.

Milw had an outsized share of PNW traffic by dint of (1) and (2). Example: Milw management was early to recognize the importance of auto and other high-cube traffic. It raised clearances, it put on fast schedules, and, most importantly, it provided very good terminals for shippers. Milw got auto terminals built adjacent to their yard in Spokane and on their line in Kent (which UP also got access to). As a result, Milw totally dominated auto traffic to the PNW. What they offered was not a transportation commodity and so BN could not compete. Milw was also first to put together a logistics package to capture the Japanese import auto traffic (but subsequently lost it due to endless derailments, more on that later.) Another example: Milw was the only road offering direct road-train service from PNW pick-up points to both Chicago and Kansas City without a stop at an intervening classification yard. BN was humping this traffic in Pasco and Minot, UP was humping it in North Platte, but Milw 262 kept this traffic moving (and the KC block was passed to a KC train at Pig’s Eye without switching it). In spite of slower top speeds (and a mileage handicap to KC), they got there sooner. Another example: Milw was the dominant carrier for Weyerhaeuser’s huge EB paper and lumber traffic flow. Milw offered A-frame flats for more rapid loading/unloading of lumber (these cars were the granddaddy’s of today’s center beams) when the other RRs would not. Again, making their service not a commodity. And they helped out Weyerhaeuser a lot with their flexibly-routed dedicated “WAM” log trains (understanding the whole start-to-finish logistics requirements of the customer).

5. Milwaukee had the highest operating costs, the least on-line traffic, and the least traffic unique to its route. That’s why the transcon failed.”

This is at best an oversimplification. If this argument works at all, it works in a de-regulated environment, not a regulated one like Milw in the 70s.

Milw PCE traffic was growing strongly 1970-1973, much more strongly than either BN PNW corridor traffic or UP PNW corridor traffic.

I just don’t believe the operating cost differences were very big on 2,000-mile transcon hauls. While Milw had more hills to climb than GN, they had an electrified RR and electric locos that basically cost nothing at that point in time. Milwaukee clearly had lower operating costs than NP. (Because of its profile, NP had to run shorter trains than either GN or Milw, and it had to add units or helpers on a lot more stretches.) Given UP’s circuitry, I would expect Milw’s cost was probably lower or at least comparable to UP’s. Probably somewhat higher then GN, but not by a huge amount.

For what it’s worth, here’s a quick (and very rough) comparison of grades (this is entirely from memory, so any corrections would be appreciated):

EB

Milw: Snoqualmie 1.7%, Saddles 1.66%, Bitterroots 1.7%, Pipestone 1.66%, Belts 1.0%, Marmath – Rhame 1.0%, Andover – Bristol 0.8% (the latter higher before the 40s)

GN: Startup – Sky 1.0%, Stevens 2.2%, Trinidad Hill 1.0%, Marias 18 miles of 1.8%

NP: Stampede 2.2%, Providence Hill 1.0%, Granite Lake 1.4% (reduced in 1965), Mullan Pass 2.2%, Winston Hill 1.0%, Bozeman Pass 1.8%, Fryburg Hill 1.5%

WB

Milw: Milbank – Summit 1.0%, Belts 1.4% (2% before 1956), Pipestone 1.9%, Bitterroots 1.7%, Ramsdell - Plummer 1.0%, Saddles 2.2%, Snoqualmie 0.7%

GN: Teton – Cut Bank – Peigan about 32 miles of 1.0%, Blackfoot – Summit about 34 miles of 1.0/1.3%, Fort Wright – Lyons 1.0%, Stevens 2.2%

NP: Too many to list

Given common rates, Milw’s operating cost for its transcon business was clearly low enough to generate a strong cash flow. As Mr. Sol pointed out, post-1968 the PCE accounted for 100% of Milwaukee’s net. The PCE was virtually all transcon traffic, there was little on-line traffic. Little switching, minimal intermediate terminals, the transcon trains just ran, car utilization was very good.

As Mr. Sol pointed out, Milw seriously deferred maintenance to the PCE beginning in the 60s (in order to keep paying dividends). In 1970, there was ZERO crushed rock ballast on the entire Rocky Mountain Division main line, it was all pit-run gravel (well, where it wasn’t just dirt). There still was a lot of 100lb rail in place in the level portions of the Division. Many ties dated back to WWII. This was perhaps tolerable while traffic was light, but became intolerable when traffic took off and rail cars got a lot heavier (especially when long strings of 100-ton hoppers loaded with grain started moving to the Coast).

When traffic took off in the early 70s, the deferred maintenance caught up with them (despite initiating a rail relay program using 132lb rail and the application of crushed rock ballast). As was cited, there were 31 derailments in the Bitterrroots in 28 days in October, 1973. When in this state the operating costs likely became hopelessly high, motive power and rolling stock required substantial supplements (per unit traffic), and the disastrous drop in service quality drove off all the traffic gains made since the merger.

Milw did not need any help to kill off its traffic base (which it had grown dramatically). It accomplished this just fine on its own. It was simple matter of inadequate re-investment in infrastructure that wore out.

Overall, Milw was clearly a loser enterprise, but the evidence is pretty strong that the PCE was a moneymaker propping up a hopeless short-haul Midwestern network.


6. “Scrapping the electrification earlier would have saved money.”

This is really far off the mark. The many cost studies over the years always showed that, as long as the current motors could run and the current distribution system worked, diesel costs were much higher. It’s only when the hardware finally wears out that you have an issue. (Note: The GN situation was different, the short electrification could be replaced by the unutilized diesel power laying over at either end.)


7. “All railroads should be at 100% capacity.”

Capacity is not a fixed number. As you load up a line with more trains, the dispatching delays increase. What one calls “capacity” depends on one’s tolerance of delays and the requirements for transit times needed to get the customers.

This is especially significant when there is a mix of traffic requiring different speeds of service. The resulting overtaking problems change the capacity equation drastically. BNSF is fortunate (or perhaps prescient) that their coal train networks and intermodal networks are largely disjoint. UP suffers a lot because theirs are not. If you are to provide good Z train service when those drags are out there, you require much more capacity than otherwise.

On the flip side, to get the maximum capacity out of a given plant, the speed mix has to collapse. This is already starting to happen. Take the BNSF Chi – LA transcon. Amtrak cannot run on time anymore, the fastest Z schedules are not possible anymore. Slower-moving manifest trains will become intolerable, the carload rates already have or soon will be raised to permit these trains to run shorter and faster or else the traffic will be foregone. Everything will evolve towards the common-denominator speed of the Q stack trains.

As a side note, my latest simulations for the Southern Cal agencies showed that, for the year 2000 mix of traffic scaled up to 2025 volume levels, FIVE tracks would be needed over Cajon Pass, just to preserve the level of dispatching delays the RRs experienced in year 2000. (In year 2000, there were still unit coal and pota***rains to get down the hill, in addition to carload trains, intermodals and Amtrak.) I think a more likely outcome is that the mix of speeds will tighten up, and less tracks will be built.

To/from the PNW on the BNSF and UP east-west transcons, we now have Z trains, stack trains, heavy lumber trains and very heavy grain trains. This is a difficult mix. Capacity is tight because of it. And adding capacity is expensive because of it.

I believe there is a total volume level at which it would be cheaper to handle the Z train and stack train traffic on one line and the grain and lumber traffic on a separate line rather than to put them on the same line.

If the Milw line had not been trashed, this now would be possible and practical. (And we already have the coal segregated on a third line, the ex-NP.)

Best regards,

Rob L.

[Randy Stahl]

I good example to show the hate and bitter ness some shop employees had for the management . A co worker, after having more than a few beers , broke into the then abandoned locomotive shop just to urinate in the supervisors office.
Randy

[MichaelSol]

Well that is an interesting perspective Randy, thanks for posting that.

That resonates with some other anecdotes I have heard. One of my friends, Arnold Lilley, transferred East at the shutdown of Lines West, as a supervisor in the Mechanical Department. He relates that it was quite a shock to him, as a whole different world from Lines West.

Out West, everyone was reliable and, to the extent that every well-established organization has its share of cranks, courteous. Employees and managers alike were reliable, loyal to each other and loyal to the Company. Most were related to someone else on the railroad, or the fellow they reported to had, early in his career, reported to the young man's grandfather at a different phase in the life cycle of careers and corporations. I still see that to this day at Retired Milwaukee Employee Picnics when I am able to attend.

Back at Milwaukee, Arnold says his experience was considerably different. "You had people that would show up one day, and not the next." Turnover was high. There was not an overall air of friendliness or cooperation as there was on Lines West. The overall quality of work was, he felt, considerably below that of the Deer Lodge Shops where Arnold had gotten his start on the Milwaukee. Very poor morale, very poor work product, many unhappy supervisors.

He quit and went over to the BN.

There, he said, in spite of it being a successful company, the employee morale was even worse. "You were just a number, there was no sense that you were engaged in an enterprise of mutual benefit to the employer as well as the employees."

He was surprised at how many people, at all levels at BN, who were rooting for the survival of the Milwaukee even as Lou Menk was demanding its liquidation. He noted that there was a terrific respect for the professionalism, expertise, and dedication of Milwaukee Road employees, and admiration for the Milwaukee Road as an enterprise. Even at BN, employees held a conviction that Milwaukee had been "managed" into its sorry state of affairs, and that its condition did not represent the authentic potential of the company.

Arnold left railroading altogether, became an extremely successful electrical contractor serving five states, and never looked back.

I have always wondered at the fate of these famed Milwaukee Shops in the final years, to what extent this condition was the inevitable result of a failing enterprise in its death throes, or to what extent senior management may have played a role by their attitude and conduct.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Randy Stahl]

The Milwaukeee shops were ovewhelming for an 18 year old kid. I made some good friends there , but I also made a number of enemys. Seems there were many guys that no one got along with. I was treated badly in my opinion. As a young electricians helper I was lower than dirt. I have many fond memories of the shops but I still resent the way way the older journeymen treated us. In the year and a half I worked there I never got to see most of the shop buildings, the place was so big. I did get into the glass house where the Hiawatha cars were built and the powerhouse where the old reciprocating steam engines were still maintained. I spent most of my time at the Milwaukee depot taking care of Amtrak trains and the sprint trains that weren't supposed to stop. I worked with Sol Luna who was a very nice guy, we had a great time. I avoided the Diesel house because I didn't get along with Henry Urbanski, every time I went there I got the Urbanski treatment. Today many of the people I worked with are dead and gone, Bill Biddlymeyer, Don Daly, the list goes on and on.
Randy

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Randy Stahl

I'm reminded of the old Milwaukee every day. I am working for my original boss from the Milwaukee shops, Tim Pacaggnela. We still talk of the old days. It's a strange feeling being out here in the woods of Maine with old buddys from the Milwaukee.
Randy

Randy, how long were you there, and what did you think of things going on during the time you were there? The Milwaukee Shops were, to my information, the largest railroad shops in the country -- although I've always wondered about that claim -- and was quite a wellspring of innovation for over a century. Good place to work? Bad place? Strange place? Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

Michael Sol

Were you an employee of the Milwaukee and if so where were you. I worked for the Milwaukee from 1967 to 1985, first in the division offices in Savanna and Aberdeen and then in Chicago.

Larry A. Whitney

[Randy Stahl]

QUOTE: Originally posted by gabe

Did you use to work for the Milwaukee Road Randy?

No Gabe.... I was an employee, we hired contractors to do the work ... LOL !!!!!!

[gabe]

Did you use to work for the Milwaukee Road Randy?

[Randy Stahl]

I'm reminded of the old Milwaukee every day. I am working for my original boss from the Milwaukee shops, Tim Pacaggnela. We still talk of the old days. It's a strange feeling being out here in the woods of Maine with old buddys from the Milwaukee.
Randy

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by dgwicks

Here are some quotes that I found in one of my personal collections. I am not a scholar so I neglected to also save the citation info. As I remember these were all from people who had actually been "on the ground."

I guess I am one of the "people who had actually been on the ground" as I am the original author of two of the three observations you cited. Yes, I have a familiarity with the Milwaukee Road. As with any quotations, such citations are often best viewed in the context of their original setting. Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

Here are some quotes that I found in one of my personal collections. I am not a scholar so I neglected to also save the citation info. As I remember these were all from people who had actually been "on the ground."

"1977 would be the year in which everything caught up with the
Milwaukee. Deferred maintenance had 4,000 miles of the railroad
under slow orders. The mainline through Montana was averaging
a derailment a day."

"When the decision to terminate the electrification was made,
the only component of that system that was in actual engineering
failure was the track. There were 31 derailments in one 28 day
period on the Bitterroots, partly due to the pressure of
business during 1973 and 1974."

"I again went across the whole Chicago-Tacoma railroad on a
business car trip in 1976, and I couldn't believe how much
the railroad could "die" in so short of a time span. The car
was bottoming out where nests of 10-12 ties in a row where
no longer doing anything to the track structure other than
taking up space. They were dead ties."

[Anonymous]

Thanks, Michael, for taking the time to provide additional detail. Now I understand the context of your earlier posts, and what you've stated now makes sense to me. I'm never one to say I know everything. Were we speaking in person, doubtless the confusion on my part would not have occurred. Forums aren't the best medium for some discussions.

QUOTE: $400 million is, in fact, the equivalent of what was required on the eastern end of the transcontinental mainline, Chicago-St. Paul, on a per-mile basis. One of the interesting mythologies from that era is the fact that the Lines East transcon mainline was in much worse shape structurally than the Lines West mainline, but that uninformed observers thought the reverse. The derailment differences between the sections could be seen more accurately as the difference in deployment of human maintenance resources, rather than as any kind of accurate measure of structural deficiencies.

That's an eye-opener for me. I'd always thought the reverse was true.

I've seen the "extension" referred variously as the Pacific Extension (http://wx4.org/to/foam/big_rr/milw/milw.html), Pacific Coast Extension, and Puget Sound Extension (for the latter ref. see http://www.northeast.railfan.net/classic/MILWdata5.html and http://www.mrha.com/links.cfm). The Milwaukee Road Historical Association refers to it as the latter.

Maybe it's a parochial designation.

The derailments and slow orders to which I referr were, as you likely know, an all-too-frequent occurrence during the latter years of the PCE/PSE due to lack of maintenance. I'm primarily referencing the condition of the track in Washington. I lived near the MILW during its latter years here in the Pacific Northwest and saw it frequently; lightly used branchlines (now shortline railroads) here in Central and Eastern Washington are in better shape, in many cases, than the condition of the MILW mainline in the late 1970s from my observation and recollection. Some of those shortlines today operate on former MILW property.

Anyway, the idea probably persists that the PCE/PSE was being neglected moreso than Lines East because management wanted to dump it ASAP.

[MichaelSol]

"As to the condition of the PSE extension (Puget Sound Extension is the correct terminology), the number of derailments and slow orders caused by deferred maintenance in the latter years of the PSE's existence speak for themselves. The right of way was in horrible condition, and was rarely if ever up to the same standards as BN in the 1970s."
----------------------------
Well, I guess I'm not sure who defines "correct terminology." Senior Milwaukee Road executives, and I've known quite a few of them, routinely refer to the PCE as the Pacific Coast Extension of the Milwaukee Road. The Puget Sound terminology dates back to the construction era, and slowly faded out of usage. By 1927, when the new company was named, it did not pick up the old Chicago, Milwaukee & Puget Sound name, and become the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Puget Sound, but rather, became the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific. By the 1926 ICC hearings, old timers would testify about the "Puget Sound Line," but newcomers would refer to the Pacific Coast Extension. Generally, even then such references were more often to the Puget Sound company -- the corporation that operated the western lines for a brief period -- rather than the line itself, that is, "the Puget Sound line," being the railroad operated by the Puget Sound company. Much like you might have referred to the "Burlington Line" as the railroad operated by the CB&Q, not the specific section of track leading to Burlington, Iowa.

By the 1970s, you really had to be an old timer to use the term, or simply putting on airs. By the time of the 1977 Receivership, we routinely referred to it as the "PCE" or the "Western lines" informally, or "Lines West" more formally. I would have to go back and review the testimony and exhibits to see if anybody actually referred to it as the Puget Sound Extension anymore. I don't recall that anyone did. At least, now that I've stated this, I hope it wasn't me.

As for derailments "speaking for themselves" I have no idea what that means in terms of the condition of the track.

I do understand what $51 million means in terms of restoring a 1400 mile mainline to Class IV conditions because I can understand the context of $51 million compared to a higher figure to restore one single tunnel and a mountain grade, or compared to annual normalized maintenance costs for a Class IV mainline. At that time, to completely rebuild a standard mainline to Class IV, without regard for bridges, tunnels, and mountain conditions, replacing 3400-3600 ties per mile of line, new plates, 132 lb rail, 600-1000 tons of new ballast per mile, grading and alignment, the cost was in the range of $250,000 to $300,000 per mile of track.

For the PCE, a complete rebuild, which is what "horrible" means to me, would have required on the order of $350,000,000 to $420,000,000. The $51 million actual engineering estimate suggests a different thought to me as to the condition of the line.

$400 million is, in fact, the equivalent of what was required on the eastern end of the transcontinental mainline, Chicago-St. Paul, on a per-mile basis. One of the interesting mythologies from that era is the fact that the Lines East transcon mainline was in much worse shape structurally than the Lines West mainline, but that uninformed observers thought the reverse. The derailment differences between the sections could be seen more accurately as the difference in deployment of human maintenance resources, rather than as any kind of accurate measure of structural deficiencies.

From an engineering perspective, the fact that a single tunnel project at Stampede Pass, measured in 1979 dollars, cost more than the rehabilitation of 1400 miles of transcontinental mainline, including tunnels and bridges, offers a clear economic measure of the condition of the line in terms which can be compared to other railroads and other railroad projects. This provides an objective measure, rather than the entirely subjective measure offered by terms like "horrible".

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Overmod]

up829, no matter how big and round the bore of a long tunnel like Cascade is, you're not going to get the necessary ventilation to eliminate diesel-exhaust-clearing delays. To do that, you would need something like a parallel exhaust tunnel (compare what's used on the Holland tunnel between NYC and NJ) or multiple 'stacks' with fans to pull exhaust from multiple points of the tunnel's roof. Perhaps using a pioneer tunnel to accompli***he former would be possible... but I rather think that if it were, someone from the railroad would have implemented it by now.

Be interesting to see whether the proposed CINGL or similar locomotives might reduce the exhaust problem in long tunnels.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Well, I am not sure of the point of using 2004 dollars for a 1979 estimate, but 1996 dollars for a 1996 cost, but, adjusting for inflation, the PCE rebuild would have cost $51 million in 1979, Stampede Pass rebuild $64 million, in 1979 dollars.

Recall this was an estimate to rebuild 1400 miles of mainline track with many tunnels and bridges, over five mountain ranges, to Class IV standards, compared to a single tunnel project, or, compare to the 440 mile Milwaukee Road mainline between Chicago and St. Paul at that time, estimated rebuild cost to Class IV standards of $115 million in 1979.

The alleged deteriorated condition of the PCE of the Milwaukee Road was vastly overstated by the railfan community. The perception was not supported by the FRA or independent professional consulting engineers brought in to inspect the line and actually walked it, mile by mile, one of them twice ....

Best regards, Michael Sol

I don't think we're talking about the same thing re: inflation or location, re: Stampede Pass versus PSE. Or maybe we are. Anyway, my point was that rehabbing the PSE would have been considerably less expensive compared with what BNSF paid to rehab Stampede Pass about 20 years later.

As to the condition of the PSE extension (Puget Sound Extension is the correct terminology), the number of derailments and slow orders caused by deferred maintenance in the latter years of the PSE's existence speak for themselves. The right of way was in horrible condition, and was rarely if ever up to the same standards as BN in the 1970s.

[Anonymous]

Wasn't the GN Cascade tunnel dug with a pioneer bore? If so and capacity really got to be an issue, wouldn't it make sense to turn a TBM loose on it and solve the problem that way. TBM's make nice round holes, so there would be plenty of room for ventilation. Have any of the western roads bored a tunnel of significant length in recent years?

[MichaelSol]

Well, I am not sure of the point of using 2004 dollars for a 1979 estimate, but 1996 dollars for a 1996 cost, but, adjusting for inflation, the PCE rebuild would have cost $51 million in 1979, Stampede Pass rebuild $64 million, in 1979 dollars.

Recall this was an estimate to rebuild 1400 miles of mainline track with many tunnels and bridges, over five mountain ranges, to Class IV standards, compared to a single tunnel project, or, compare to the 440 mile Milwaukee Road mainline between Chicago and St. Paul at that time, estimated rebuild cost to Class IV standards of $115 million in 1979.

The alleged deteriorated condition of the PCE of the Milwaukee Road was vastly overstated by the railfan community. The perception was not supported by the FRA or independent professional consulting engineers brought in to inspect the line and actually walked it, mile by mile, one of them twice ....

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

That same cost today to rehab the PSE would be about $148 million due to inflation, comparable to what BNSF shelled out to rehab the Stampede Pass route.

[MichaelSol]

Well, this perception is highly exagerated. The Federal Railroad Administration surveyed the Milwaukee's Western lines in 1978 and again in 1979, and estimated that a rebuild of the entire Pacific Extension mainline to Class IV Freight standards would cost about $51 million; about one-third the cost of rehabbing the Stampede Tunnel. A drop in the bucket by railroad standards. Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by dgwicks

QUOTE: Originally posted by wrwatkins

If the picture of the Milwaukee track at Hilldale south of Tacoma (link on the first posting of this topic) is indicative of their MOW travel must have been like Mr. Toad's Ride at Disneyland. Was this how the entire line was at the end?

Pretty much. If you look at some of the other photos in this series you can also see it. This was all mainline track that had practically no maintenance for maybe 15 years. Most of the ties had been under the rail for twice as long as was usual. When the change to diesel-electric was made the biggest problem was keeping the heavier diesels on the track. I often wonder if this was one reason they weren't able to find a merger partner. All they had to offer was the roadbed. The track would have to be entirely rebuilt. No small feat at any time!

Milwaukee Road: Fastest dirt roadbed in the West!

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by flint creek mp23

And, not all west side trestles are totally intact as Hull Creek trestle washed out in 1986 because of a flood of debris caused by illegal logging. Today there is a replacement span in place between the remaining trestle towers, but it's not heavy enough for a train.

Assuming the environmentalists were dealt with, replacing the span with one suitable to support a train would be technology simple viz the early 1900s and not that costly.

QUOTE:
The Milwaukee didn't intend to double track Snoqualmie Tunnel. This was told to me by Cecil Geelhart, former Cedar Falls Roadmaster, who also mentioned the west end dual portal was built to carry Portal Creek over the top of the tunnel and far enough away from the track to keep it from ever causing erosion problems.

That's the first I've heard as a reason why the west portal has two entrances. Sounds plausible to me.

[Anonymous]

The Milwaukee didn't intend to double track Snoqualmie Tunnel. This was told to me by Cecil Geelhart, former Cedar Falls Roadmaster, who also mentioned the west end dual portal was built to carry Portal Creek over the top of the tunnel and far enough away from the track to keep it from ever causing erosion problems. Also, the dual portal entrance acted as a snowshed. And, not all west side trestles are totally intact as Hull Creek trestle washed out in 1986 because of a flood of debris caused by illegal logging. Today there is a replacement span in place between the remaining trestle towers, but it's not heavy enough for a train.

And the idea of switching the bike trail to Stampede Pass would be complicated by, among other things, the Tacoma city watershed that keeps people out of the upper reaches of the Green River. Maybe something similar could be worked out similar to today's arrangement between the Cedar Falls watershed and the bike trail.

Yes, the BN really missed the boat in the 1987-88 when they started pulling up the track over Snoqualmie. The tunnels along the route may have needed some immaterial clearance work for double stacks, but maybe not since trilevel autoracks traveled the line. Anyways, I thought it would have made a good replacement for the Stevens and/or Stampede lines. I think it's too late now, though; they'd have to fight Washington state politics and recreationalists (who have a very loud voice), and BNSF has too much capital invested in Stevens and Stampede to scrap either line in favor of reconstructing another.

Brent

[Anonymous]

The one kicker to resurrecting the MILW line are the Saddle Mountains. Albeit a relatively short climb, the adverse grades are 2.2 percent. Distributed power would be needed on eastbound and westbound trains all the way from Spokane to Tacoma/Seattle. Is that a cost that makes sense?

Also, the Beverly Bridge across the Columbia River is situated in a place where high winds are frequent. At the east switch of Taunton siding was a signal that held trains from descending the Saddles in case winds across the bridge were too high. At least one MILW intermodal trailer train lost its trailers when high winds tore them off the flatcars. Double-stacks might be even more susceptible to this risk.

[Anonymous]

I wonder what the scrap value of the Stevens Pass line would be right now? At least they could tear up the rails from Everett to Wenatchee, and sell the rest of the line to a shortline operator to handle the online business. As far as I know, there is no online traffic between Everett and Wenatchee. I do have somewhat of a business relationship with the guy the runs a third party intermodal doublestack operation out of Wenatchee to Puget Sound, but as he and I have talked he can easily move that operation to Ellensburg, and has talked about doing just that if BNSF ever raises the clearances in Stampede tunnel for double stacks, so what we've discussed wouldn't be all that bad from his point of view.

One other thing that works out well with this radical re-alignment of cross-Washington rails, a re-opening of the Milwaukee line between Ellensburg and Seattle could allow some grain trains bound for Puget Sound to be removed from the Columbia Gorge route to the Yakima River line. It is the 2.2% westbound grades that keep the grain trains off both the Stevens Pass and Stampede Pass lines, and with the Milwaukee's 0.7% ruling westbound grade between Ellensburg and Puget Sound, some of the congestion on the Columbia Gorge line can be aleviated. Don't know if the 1.7% downhill from Snoqualmie Pass to the Sound might be a problem for such trains, but if they can handle the 1.8% coming down Maries Pass in Montana, it shouldn't be too much of a problem.

[Anonymous]

Dave,

I could whole-heartedly embrace all of what you've proposed. To me, the Stevens Pass line is the problem, not the solution. What you've proposed is what BN should have done in the 1980s. Routing traffic north to Everett, Wash., then over Cascade Tunnel, where a bottleneck exists, makes little sense when the MILW had the better route (and provisions for doubletracking Snoqualmie Tunnel).

As for the state's involvement, they'd be much more amenable to it now compared with 15 years ago, especially as there is talk of resuming Amtrak service over the Cascades through the growing Yakima Valley (which makes more sense than sending the Empire Builder through sparsely populated North Central Washington).

The major viaducts on the west side of Snoqualmie Pass -- Hansen, Mine, Hull, Change, and Boeztke -- are still intact. Replacing the bridge at Lake Easton that the MILW used to cross the former NP main wouldn't be an extravagant expenditure, and realigning track at Bagley and Easton junctions would be fairly straightforward.

The one hitch to all this is BNSF -- they seem entrenched in their thinking. Having spent $150-plus million to rehab Stampede Pass -- an amount I doubt they've recouped half of through revenue over it since December 1996, much less profit -- they've shown no signs of increasing traffic over Stampede.

[Anonymous]

SPandS-fan,

Here's the 64 million dollar question: What would it take today to ressurect the ex-Milwaukee line over Snoqualmie? The ex-MIlwaukee line is now a recreational trail, parts of some trestles were washed out a while back, and the city of Seattle watershed folks have restricted any access along the upper reaches of the Cedar River along the old right of way.

That being said, with the State of Washington now actively engaged in supporting rail reinvestment, why not? Rebuild the Milwaukee line between Easton and Bagley Junction adding re-alignments where appropriate, build a new connecting line between Bagley Junction and Ravensdale on the BNSF line, abandon the Stampede Pass line (and in doing so transfer the recreational trail to that corridor).

In fact, with a rebuild of the Milwaukee "short cut" accross the Saddle Mountains between Ellensburg and Lind WA (again with the appropriate re-alignments where necessary AKA the CWU campus), it might be possible for BNSF to either abandon or sell the ex-GN line between Spokane and Everett over Stevens Pass, and instead route all traffic over the newly rehabed MIlwaukee and the Columbia River Gorge routes. For the long term, this would allow BNSF to have access to the shortest routing between Spokane and Seattle with better grades, and take the operation and maintenance expenses lower with the explusion of the Stevens Pass route.

I personally don't think there is a need for BNSF to have THREE lines between Spokane and Puget Sound. From what I've witnessed, they just don't have that much traffic through the Northern Tier states and probably won't since they route most of their stuff down to LA.